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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to delineate and analyse 
the development and nature of Chinese communism from the 
beginning to the death of Sun Yat-sen.
It is divided into two sections. The first section 
attempts firstly to describe the social milieu in which the 
founders of Chiiese communism found themselves in at, and 
just prior to, the time when they embraced communism as their 
revolutionary praxis. Secondly, this section deals with the 
reasons for the acceptance of communism as the revolutionary 
praxis and the resultant actions of this acceptance - the 
participation in the National Revolution.
In the second section, a number of the central issues 
of Chinese communism pertinent to this period are examined: 
the communists 1 concept of the collaboration with the 
Kuomintang, the nature of the national revolution and the role 
of leadership, and the peasant policies. Finally, as the 
Chinese leadership embraced communism partly because of their 
consciousness of the need of a new culture for China, this 
study concludes with a discussion of the development of the 
concept of culture by these Chinese communists.
While this is not, primarily, ä study of Chinese 
communist activities nor a comparison between Chinese and 
Russian communism, a study of the development and nature of 
Chinese communism cannot exclude discussions in these two 
aspects. Therefore, to the extent that such discussions will
Vclarify ones perception of Chinese communism, these two 
aspects are brought into purview.
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INTRODUCTION
To the group of people who had accepted Marxism and founded 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Marxism was more than an 
epistemology. To them, it was a revolutionary praxis and the 
theoretical consciousness of that praxis. These people were 
students, new graduates, their teachers, and generally, may be 
referred to as members of the Chinese intelligentsia. Before 
they accepted Marxism, they had at least one thing in common. 
They were all dissatisfied with the social, economic, and 
political conditions in China. They all felt that China was 
being unjustly treated by the foreign Powers. At the same time, 
they abhorred the social injustices they witnessed in China. It 
was in their search for ways and means to effect changes that 
they accepted Marxism.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who became the leader of the CCP during its 
first years (and throughout the period covered by this study), 
was the senior man in that group both in age and prestige. He 
had long involved himself in seeking ways and means of bringing 
about changes in Chinese society. From as early as September 
1915» Ch'en had concluded that the major fault in modern 
civilization was the 'oppression by the capitalists'. To remove 
this injustice and oppression, he saw the need for a 'political 
revolution then to be followed by a social revolution in order
I.o bring about j socialism.' To be sure, he had yet. to define 
what he meant; by socialism, nevertheless, he did not rule out 
the eventual need to 'abolish the system of private ownership 
of property.' At the same time, he took the view that 'the 
political and economic conditions of one nation have effects 
on the rest of the world ... the growth or destruction of a 
nation depends as much on its internal politics as on decisions 
made external to it.'^
It is significant to note that when Ch'en denounced the
capitalists, the term he used was tzu-pen chia, the modern term
for capitalists. To be sure, later he did use the more
3traditional term t s'ai-chu, the owners of wealth, in a fairly 
similar context when he expressed the view that one's concern 
for one's own country should not extend to the defence of the 
rights of the aristocracy and the ts'ai-chu, nor to the attack 
of a smaller and weaker nation. Since he had this tendency to 
use interchangeably modern and traditional terms, in this study, 
for the sake of more fluent expression, I have translated the 
term t s' ai-chu as capitalists rather than as owners-of-wea.lt h .
Ch'en, 'Fa-lan hsi-jen yü chin-tai wen-ming' (The French 
People and Modern Civiliaztion) Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih (The Youth 
Magazine) I, 1 (15“IX-1915)• Ch'en was the editor of the 
magazine which became the Hsin ch'ing-nien in 1916, (The New 
Youth) and will hereafter be cited as HCN. It soon became the 
most influential magazine of the period.
2 Ch'en 'Ching kao ch'ing-nien' (Respectfully informing the 
Youths), Section 4, HCN I, 1 (15-IX-1915)•
3 Ch'en, 'Ou-hsiang p'o-huai lun' (On the Destruction of Idols) 
HCN V, 2 ( 15-VIII-I918), pp.89-91. Quote cited from p.90.
3Of more significance in the context of this investigation of the 
development and nature of Chinese communism is the fact that 
Ch'en was aware of such ideas as the abolition of the system 
of private ownership in the Marxian sense and the inter­
relatedness and inter-dependence of the political and economic 
conditions of nations.
In short, by 1915» Ch’en was aware of the development of 
the socialist ideas of Babeuf, Saint-Simon, and others and the 
extensions by Lassalle and Marx; and saw that the ’distribution 
and ownership’ and the 'intensification of the struggle between 
capital and labour would amplify the call for social
4revolutions’, as Marx had expounded. He also accepted the
idea that socialism was to be the vehicle to bring about social
justice, though he had not accepted Marxism as his own
revolutionary praxis. And, although he still had not openly
espoused Marxism or the revolution as a means of effecting
political, social, and economic changes, he did admit to a need
to go to war to fight for liberty, equality, and civilization
5even at the risk of a defeat.
This study traces the development of Chinese communism 
from the time when a group of people in China came to regal’d 
themselves as communists and began to take action to form a 
political party to the death of Sun Yat—sen in 1925« In this
Ch’en, ’The French People and Modern Civilization’ HCN I, 1 
p.3 (15-IX-1915)•
r> Ch'en, Ibid., p-3*
4period, the CCP was still very small numerically but it was 
an important period from the point of view of the development 
in the nature of Chinese communism.
Though numerically small, the CCP was very prolific in its 
publication activities, especially in their efforts to explain 
and justify their policies and actions. They had the twin task 
of explaining the necessity for a communist movement and party 
in China, and their decision to join forces with the Kuomintang 
(KMT) led by Sun Yat-sen in a national revolution. To do so, 
they had to explain and justify their conception of the 
objective realities, especially the socio-political aspects, 
of China and their means of social reconstruction. This study, 
therefore, is an investigation and analysis of these Chinese 
communist explanations and justifications.
Special attention is made to examine the perception of 
the objective realities of China by the Chinese communists as 
a means of understanding their decision to become communists 
and their reasons for adopting Marxism as a revolutionary 
praxis. Their perception, of course, also influenced their 
decisions on policies. The major decisions and policies 
examined here are: their reasons for being communists, their
reasons for their participation in the national revolution and 
their role in it, and the position they have allotted the 
peasantry in their perception of the revolution in China.
The Chinese communists saw themselves as the political 
party of the proletariat class in China, and working for the 
realization and fulfilment of the interests of this class would
be their ultimate goal. To achieve this goal, class conflict
5would be inevitable. In their efforts at determining the nature 
and boundaries of the social classes in China, as in most of 
their decisions and policies, the Chinese communists had 
received help, advice, and directives from their comrades from 
the Communist International. However, the Chinese communists 
were more independent than they had been given credit for by 
modern historians.
This is not to say that the Chinese communists were not 
influenced by the developments in Russia, nor to deny that there 
were many similarities in the policies of the CCP and the 
Comintern directives. However, on many important issues, such 
as the nature of the national revolution and the role of the 
CCP in it and the peasant policies, there seems to be some 
distinctive differences between the CCP's ideas and the 
Comintern's ideas, as this study will hope to show. On some 
occasions, while both the Chinese and the Comintern had held 
similar ideas, the Chinese communists seemed to have arrived 
at their conclusions prior to their receipt of the Comintern 
directives. This did not necessarily imply that the Chinese 
communists were uninfluenced by the Russian example, but only 
that the Chinese came to their conclusions through their own 
efforts in reading about and studying the situations in Russia 
and elsewhere.
This was also true on certain more fundamental theoretical 
issues. The Chinese were very strongly influenced by Ihe 
Communist Manifesto, especially the voluntarist aspects within
the revolutionary methodology. By 1921, The Holy Family
bwas translated into Chinese. Thus, one may be permitted to 
assume that the Chinese communists had noted that Marx had 
said that 'it is not "history" which uses men as a means of 
achieving - as iT it were an individual person - its own ends. 
History is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of their 
ends.' Having read these early writings of Marx, one may be 
permitted to further assume that the Chinese communists would 
deduce from their reading of Marx the conclusion that the 
'victory of a rising class depends upon its awareness of its
situation and aims, and upon the effectiveness of its political
borganization, as well as upon its actual economic position.'
Subsequently, as will be shown in this study, when the 
Chinese communist came upon Leninism, it was Lenin's What is 
to be done? and the Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the 
Democratic Revolution that attracted the Chinese attention. 
However, there was a significant difference between what Lenin 
was proposing and the exposition given by the leading Chinese 
theoretician of the day, Ch'ti Ch'iu-pai, The difference was 
in revolutionary methodology.
Lenin proposed that 'if the revolution gains a decisive 
victory - then we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the 
Jacobin, or if you like, in the plebian way.' He advocated 
this way to settle the accounts with 'the enemies of liberty' 
as distinct from the reformists of the Russian Social-Democrats
T.B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society, p.20 (London 19b5)* 
The author was commenting on the implication of the cited 
passage by Marx in The Holy Family.
7'
whom Lenin accused of being afraid 'to offend the aristocracy,
the nobles, the Court .. . [and] . . . kindly and polite, as bef i t s
gentlemen in white gloves.' Nevertheless, Lenin was quick to
point out that while advocating the Jacobin way to settle the
accounts with tsarism 'if the revolution gains a decisive
victory' his advocacy, 'of course does not mean that we
necessarily propose to imitate the Jacobins of 1793» to adopt
7their views, programme, slogans and methods of action.'
However, Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, after citing both tracts by 
Lenin, urged the 'labouring masses to join the national 
revolution ... [and to] use the "Jacobin" method to accelerate 
the process of revolution.' This was necessary, according to 
Ch'ii, if the labouring class wanted to achieve its final goal 
of socialism. Through the 'Jacobin' method, Ch'ii advised,
'the national revolution, when it reaches its high point, will 
join with the world revolution and enter directly into 
socialism.' This was more than merely the settling of old 
scores that Lenin was discussing in the Two Tactics. Ch'ii 
advocated such a revolutionary methodology - as distinct from 
merely a means of settling accounts - because of the special 
nature of their new collaborator, the KMT. In his view, 'the 
KMT, because it came from a patriarchal society and because 
of its historical connections, it has a practice of worshipping 
militarism and other evil heritage of the secret societies of
7 Lenin, Two Tactics, p p . 5 ( P e k i n g ,  1965)»
8China's old fashioned lower classes.' in the process of 
investigating the nature of Chinese communism, such distinction 
between it and the Russian positions are noted as indicative 
of the development of Chinese communism.
As this is a study of the development and nature of the 
message that the Chinese communists were trying to propagate, 
much of the attention will be on the ideas of those who led the 
Propaganda Department of the Party. Hence, special attention 
is given to the writings of Ch1en Tu-hsiu, P'eng Shu-chih, Ch'ü 
Ch'iu-pai, and Ts'ai Ho-sen, as well as some of the leaders of 
the labour and peasant movements and the leaders of the 
Socialist Youth Corps who published frequently. During the 
period under discussion there were differences of opinions 
amongst the CCP leaders but they were differences of degree or 
emphasis and not the more basic differences of lines, to use a 
communist term. To be sure, after the destruction of the 
collaboration with the KMT, there was much mutual recrimination 
and accusation within the ranks of the CCP, leading to the 
expulsion of Ch'en, P'eng, and many others.
If any pattern of thought was to be detected, it would be 
that all the Chinese communist writers were, at most times, 
showing much eagerness and revolutionary zeal and keenness in 
insisting on a prime and special role for the proletariat in
g
Ch'ü Wei-to, 'Tzu min-chu chu-i chih she-hui chu-i' (From 
Democracy to Socialism) HCN-Quarterly No.2, pp. 100-101 (20-XII- 
1923)« Ch'ü Wei-to was a well-known pen-name of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai.
the national revolution. At the same time, whilst in 
collaboration with the KMT, the Chinese communists were at great 
pains to remonstrate publicly that their present stance was 
merely a tactical necessity demanded by economic and political 
considerations and that they were very anxious to carry the 
revolutionary movement into the next stage - the socialist 
revolution.
One issue that the Chinese communists insisted upon was 
the necessity to conduct class struggles at all times. Even 
during the national revolution, when their targets were 
imperialism and the warlords and their agents, the struggle was 
seen largely in class terms. It was seen as a struggle between 
the imperialist-capitalist class of the foreign Powers together 
with their Chinese agents on the one hand, and the exploited 
people of China on the other. To be sure, the communists 
admitted that until the proletarian class was awakened and
organized, the special politico-economic conditions in ChinaI
required the efforts of a nation-wide multi-class front against 
the foreign scourge - imperialism. But, even during this 
struggle, that is during the national revolution, class struggle 
was necessary. This was so because as socialists the nation 
they proposed to build would not defend the interests of the 
capitalists. Thus, in the Chinese communist perspective, class 
struggle is an integral part of the national revolution.
In the process of trying to fulfil their goal, the Chinese 
communists had always urged the adoption of practical methods 
rather than idealistic ones. But their ultimate aims were
10
always quite conspicuous for those who cared enough to read 
the literature they published. For a time, the Communists 
conceded the leadership of the national revolution to the 
Nationalists - the Kuomintang. But while they were making 
this political concession, their leaders were publishing their 
doubts as to whether the KMT had reformed and awakened enough 
to deserve the honour. And, by the end of 1924, within a year 
of the official foundation of the reconstructed KMT, the 
Chinese communists were stressing that only the proletariat 
class was worthy of the leadership of the national revolution. 
During this period of collaboration, the Chinese communists 
had never ceased to regard the development of class consciousness 
and the class struggle as their contributions to the efforts 
of the national revolution, though such efforts were strongly 
objected to by their collaborators, the KMT.
This study attempts to delineate and analyse the body of 
ideas and precepts for action that may be called Chinese 
Communism, the message that the Chinese communists wished the 
public and their collaborators to know via their various 
propaganda media. To a large extent, the development of Chinese 
communism may be seen as the amplification and enrichment of 
the germinal ideas of 1920. This process of development involved 
practical experiences in collaboration with fellow 
revolutionaries of different ideological persuasion as well as 
in the labour and peasant movements. The demand for the unity 
of theory and practice, as to be expected, impinged upon the 
development of communism in China. At the same time, the
Chinese were also influenced by the comrades from the Communist 
International. To the extent that the directives of the 
Comintern affects the development of Chinese communism, Russian 
communism is brought into purview.
However, the main aim of this study is not primarily a 
comparative study of Russian and Chinese Communism nor a study 
of the Russian and other foreign influences on the development 
of Chinese communism. It is to delineate the development and 
the nature of Chinese communism, from its founding to the death 
of Sun Yat-sen, as perceived by the politically concerned in 
China, the collaborators of the CCP in the national revolution 
in China, their enemies, and the way the Chinese communists 
themselves wanted the people to perceive it through the medium 
of their own propaganda. However, a distinction should be made 
that such a study is not a study of the activities of the 
Chinese communists in the period. A study of their activities 
will involve a different approach and will also demand different 
source materials. In this study of Chinese communism special 
attention is directed to the communists’ perception of the 
national revolution and the peasant movement.
The focus of this study ends with the death of Sun Yat-sen. 
Tn this period though the CCP still had not achieved any major 
success in its membership recruitment, it had considerable 
achievement in its attempt at developing and systemizing its 
ideas. During the life-time of Sun, the Chinese communists had 
never denounced or repudiated him though they had issued 
warnings to and attacks at his allegedly bad advisors and even 
criticized some of his decisions and plans, often in terms
12
showing scant respect. However, even when the Chinese communists 
were criticizing and attacking the KMT in their propaganda, 
they had always regarded Sun as the one person deserving 
support during the national revolutionary struggles.
With the death of Sun this central rallying point in the 
national revolution coalition was no more. The factions within 
the KMT, which the CCP warned of during the life-time of Sun, 
surfaced. The Chinese communists as well as their Comintern 
advisors were, often openly, playing off one faction or leader 
against another or being manipulated by them in turn. Further­
more, amongst the communists themselves - both the Chinese and 
the Comintern - there were differences of opinion on policies 
and positions to adopt in the changing situation. Thus the 
development of the communist movement and the communist ideology 
had taken on quite different expressions in the years between 
the death of Sun and the ultimate destruction of collaboration, 
as compared with the years when Sun was alive.
With the changing political situation, the demand for a 
unity of theory and practice - so much a central demand of the 
Marxist revolutionary ideology - there must, perforce, be changes 
in theories, or more accurately, revolutionary methodology, for 
the Chinese communists had never regarded communism as purely 
theory. After the death of Sun the political situation had 
indeed greatly changed. Not only did the National Government 
in Canton manage to consolidate their control over Kwangtung 
but the CCP had achieved much success as the result of the May 
30th Incident and, together with their successes in the rural 
sector, much increased their confidence and greatly intensified
13
the tension between the collaborators. To have included the
last two or three years of the collaboration in this study would
inevitably have changed the nature and direction of this study.
Therefore, I have decided to leave the terminal events of the
study in 1925 because it provides a convenient break-off point
for an investigation of the first phase' in the development of
Chinese communism. To be sure, while the death of Sun resulted
in many changes, there were also unchanging elements in the
revolutionary praxis of the Chinese communists. To the very
end, they had regarded the United Front as 'united in action
to struggle against the enemy [but] in the propagation of ideas
Qeach retains its freedom.'
Unlike Lenin and the Bolsheviks who started to define 
their cultural programme only after their seizure of political 
power, the Chinese intellectual-revolutionaries had always 
regarded a cultural programme an integral part of their 
revolutionary programme, even before they had accepted Marxism. 
When Ch'en Tu-hsiu founded his Ch* 1ing-nien tsa chih in 1915 
(renamed Hsin Ch'ing-nien in 1916), his expressed aims were to 
discuss with the youth of the day 'the new means of cultivating 
oneself and governing the nation ... [therefore] ... the
magazine will freely discuss international affairs, scholarship, 
and ideas.'^
Liu Jen-ch'ing, 'Ho wei lien-ho chan-hsien!' (What is the 
United Front I) Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (The Chinese Youth) No. 130, 
(7-VIII-1926).
^  She kao (Publisher's Declarations), Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih I,
1, p.1 (15-IX-1915)•
Since it was this combination of cultural and political
concern that helped to lead Ch'en and his colleagues to accept
communism, it may be appropriate to conclude this study of the
development and nature of Chinese communism with a brief
examination of the development of their cultural expressions
after their acceptance of Marxism as their revolutionary praxis.
Certainly there were similarities between the cultural
expressions of the Chinese and Russian communists, as in other
facets of expressions. However, there were important spatial
and chronological qualifications to these Sino-Russian
similarities. In the political sphere the Chinese communists
were propagating in their homeland and during the revolution
those ideas of Lenin that were expounded in exile. In the
cultural sphere, there was even greater chronological 
1 1disparity. While Lenin concerned himself with a cultural
1 2programme only after the October Revolution , with the Chinese 
revolutionaries, one may almost say that the sequence of concern 
was the reverse.
This study attempts to assess the development and nature 
of Chinese communism as perceived by the Chinese in the period 
under discussion - from the acceptance of Marxism as a 
revolutionary praxis by certain Chinese revolutionaries, to the 
death of Sun Yat-sen.
C h ’ii Ch'iu-pai's advocacy of Lenin's What is to be done? and 
Two Tactics will be discussed in the chapter on the National 
Revolution.
1 2 See Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment 
(Cambridge UP 1970).
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE MILIEU
It has often been suggested that Leninism turned the
attention of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party to the
proletariat rather than the proletariat turning their attention 
1to Leninism. In this study, an attempt will be made to argue 
the case that it was the socio-political conditions of China that 
turned the Chinese to communism.
This is not to argue that the acceptance of communism was 
inevitable, but merely to make a case that their acceptance of 
communism was not just an academic or intellectual decision. On 
the contrary, given their perception of their contemporary socio­
political situation and their ideological development in the years 
prior to their acceptance of communism, it was reasonable for the 
founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party - especially 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta—chao - to embrace communism in the last 
years of the second decade of the Twentieth Century. In this 
chapter, a case will be made that it was reasonable for the 
future leaders of the Party to say as they did in 1920 on the eve 
of the formation of the Party, that China was ready for a 
communist party to be founded to perform its historic duties. To 
them, the seeding of communism in China was not out of season.
To the group of people who later formed the nucleus of the 
CCP The Communist Manifesto was probably the most important and
The most widely read books which support such suggestions are 
B.I. Schwartz, Mao and the Rise of Chinese Communism (Harvard 
U . P . 1951; ch. I~J and M. Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of
Chinese Marxism (Harvard U.P. 19671 esp. the Introduction).
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most often read complete work by Marx and Engels. In the Marxist 
Study Group in Peking University, the Manifesto was read in its 
English version, indeed as a text book of the English language
for those members who wanted to improve their ability in the
2English language. In the Manifesto, the Chinese discovered that
3Marx and Engels had proclaimed that
the communists everywhere support every 
revolutionary movement against the 
existing social and political order of 
things ... they bring to the front, as 
the leading question ... the property 
question, no matter what its degree of 
development at the time.
Finally, they labour everywhere for 
the union and agreement of the democratic 
parties of all countries.
Amongst the group of worker-students who went to France 
immediately after the Great War, the Manifesto was translated by 
one of their members, Tsai Ho-sen, and was a prominent and
4constant feature in their clubroom in Paris. From this latter 
group came many of the future leaders of the CCP, such as Chou 
En-lai, Tsai Ho-sen who became the first editor of the new party 
journal, Hsiang T a o , immediately upon his return to China, Teng
2 See Chin-tai shih tzu-liao (Sources of Modern History) No.2 
pp.161- 1 7 3 (P e k i n g 1 9 5 5 ) where a number of announcements by this 
Group were cited, including one announcing the 'English class'.
3 The Communist Manifesto, Ch.4. Any edition will suffice. The 
edition used here is by the Foreign Languages Press (Peking I67()) 
P.76.
4 Ho Chang-kung, C h 1 in-kung chien-hsueh sheng-huo hui-.i 
(Recollections o f t h e L i f e o f t h e  Worker-student),p.b 1 (Peking 
1958).
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]| s iao-pin^, Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Yen—nleri who was the son of party 
leader Ch' en Tu-hsiu, and many others. Indeed, by 1920 there 
were a number of partial and complete Chinese translations of 
this work. Therefore, irrespective of the importance of the 
Manifesto in the development of Marx's own political philosophy, 
this work had a profound influence on the thinking of those who 
formed and joined the Chinese Communist Party in its early 
years.
In this chapter, an examination will be made into the 
socio-political milieu in which the future leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party found themselves as they read the message from 
Marx and Engels. Special attention will be given to those who 
had contributed much to the theoretical development of communism 
in China. That is, those people whose main concern, during the 
period from the founding of the Party to the end of the first 
collaboration with the Kuomintang were with the Party's 
Propaganda Department. Available to these people, especially 
those in Peking were a variety of Marxist literature.
Amongst the Marxist literature available in the library of 
the Peking University Marxist Study Group were such titles as: 
Socialism, Utopian and Scientific (in Chinese) and The Origin of 
the Family by Engels, The Poverty of Philosophy, Revolution and 
Counter Revolution, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, The 
Civil War in France, and Wage, Labour and Capital by Marx. Lenin 
was represented by "Left Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder, 
and The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky; while Kautsky's 
Class Struggle, translated into Chinese by the future leader of
the Communist Youth Corps Yiin Tai-yin, was also present . these
18
were'* available in their English version. Altogether, they had
over 70 titles in English, almost 80 titles in German as well as
5a goodly number in French and Japanese. We may therefore say 
that the intellectual leaders of the Chinese Communist Party 
were not unfamiliar with Marxist literature before the formal 
founding of the Party.
However, a communist, whether he be in Western Europe, 
Russia, or China, does not formulate his ideas against a purely 
philosophic background but rather in direct relation to his 
experience. Indeed, we may safely say that while the general 
principles and the Marxist goal remain basically the same for all 
Marxists who feel constrained to change the world, the practical 
application - or, the means of achieving the goal - depends on 
the socio-political situation contemporaneous to the communist 
concerned. To the communist, Marxism is more than a body of 
philosophic thoughts because the rationale for being a communist 
is not merely to analyse the world but to change it. Indeed, 
twenty-five years after the first publication of The Communist 
Manifesto, Marx and Engels informed their readers that;
the general principles laid down in this 
Manifesto are, on the whole, as correct 
today as ever. Here and there, some detail 
might be improved. The practical application 
of the principles will depend, as the 
Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at 
all times, on the historical conditions for 
the time being existing, and, for that 
reason, no specific stress is laid on the
5 Chin-tai shih tzu liao, 2, 1955» PP•161-173*
the revolutionary measures proposed at 
the end of Section II.
But, what were 'the historical conditions for the time 
being existing’ in China, at least as they were perceived by the 
future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party?
In order to set in the proper context our appreciation of 
the reasons given by the Chinese, especially the intelligentsia, 
to accept communism, it would be appropriate to examine the 
nature of some of the relevant prevailing socio-political 
conditions and attitudes in China at the period of time preceding 
the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It may be 
reasonable to suggest that the year 1895 be regarded as a 
commencement of our discussion. It was the defeat by Japan that 
finally shook even the conservatives at the Ch'ing Court into 
realizing the inadequacy of the piecemeal attempts at national 
improvement. 1895 was also the year when K 'ang Yu-wei organised 
the kung^chii__shang-shu (Petition Presented by Examination 
Candidates). This remonstration by the examination candidates 
of the Imperial Examination, socio-intellectual elites by any 
reckoning, may be taken as evidence of a new and active 
politicization of the intelligentsia, a politicization based on 
a general dissatisfaction with the status quo and the various 
attempts at improvement. That year also marked the first of many 
abortive coups attempted against Manchu rule by groups professing
Marx and Engels, Preface to the 1872 Edition of the German 
Edition of The Communist Manifesto. Emphasis mine. Cf. Mao 
'On a New Stage' - concrete Marxism - utilizing Marxism in the 
concrete struggle taking place in the concrete Chinese 
environment. ( 1938)
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allegiance lo Sun Yat-sen.
Even more importantly, in the last five years of the 19 th
Century, we may begin to speak more significantly of 'national’
events, or events of 'national' significance, or 'national'
reactions to and perception of events. Technological
developments, such as telegraphy, had created a greater sense of
awareness, that is, beyond ones own region. One report mentioned
that in 1894, China had twelve Chinese newspapers, mostly in the
Treaty Ports while by 1 8 9 8, Shanghai alone had fifteen 
7newspapers. Another study reported that the number of Chinese 
magazines published had increased from eight to thirty-five 
between the years 1895 and 1 8 9 8; while the same report also 
mentioned an over 3 0 0 increase in the number of newspapers and 
magazines published between 1898 and 1900. Most of these,
gaccording to this study, were of radical thoughts. We may well 
regard increases in these facilities as important factors in 
overcoming regionalism. Improvements in the communication of 
people and ideas would certainly have helped in creating a 
greater sense of national unity and consciousness, as well as in 
intensifying discontent. Furthermore, through the development 
of modern communication technology, readers of the daily press 
and periodicals in inland areas might become more aware of the 
developments in the outside world. By 1911 even the Changsha
7
' Decennial Report, 1892-1901, I, 506 . Inspectorate General of
Customs. ( Shanghai)
g
Ko Kung-chen, Chung-kuo pao~hsiieh shih (A History of Chinese 
Journalism), pp.113f f » (Shanghai19357 reprinting in Hong Kong 
in 1964).
J ih Pao (The Changsha Daily) began to carry daily telegrams from 
Reuters.^
Now that the politically conscious in China, in the First 
two decades of the 20th century, had the technical facilities 
for the communication of news and ideas, we may take the next 
step in our investigation of the nature of the objective reality 
of China as perceived by the future leaders of the CCP. Or, 
what were the relevant messages being communicated?
This is not an occasion, nor is there any need, to make 
any detailed socio-economic survey of China. This is so because 
our subjects, the future communists, also did not have modern 
techniques of socio-economic survey nor was there any 
comprehensive survey being done by anyone at that time. Thus, 
we may be permitted to estimate, or make an approximation of, 
our subjects' perception of the socio-economic reality of China 
by collating and analysing contemporary reports on the regions 
and provinces where our subjects spent their formative years.
Furthermore, our subjects' background seems to share a 
certain similarity that tends to lend itself to this type of 
regional or provincial approximation. All of them spent the 
early years of their youth, that is at least until the middle of 
the second decade of their lives, in a rural setting but yet 
wilhin reasonable distance from a treaty port. The exception 
was Li fa-chao whose home was in Lo-t'ing in Hopei and thus 
making his nearest major urban centre the Imperial Capital, 
Peking, rather than a treaty port. In all cases, with the
Q Decennial Report, 1902-1911- I, 324. Inspectorate General 
of Customs. (Shanghai, 1913)•
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exception of Ch'en Tu-hsiu who was considerably older than Mu' 
rest of this group, their first educational experience was quite 
similar. It was received from the local schools or private 
tutors. This, as we shall show, really prepared them for changes 
Furthermore as we shall see, those who came to play influential 
roles in the development of Chinese communism in the period down 
to the end of the first collaboration with the KMT shared - 
through accidents of birth - certain environmental similarities. 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu from Huai-ning in Anhwei and Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai from 
Wu-chin (also known as Ch'ang-chou) in Kiangsu were from families 
with a scholarly tradition and, of course, were located within 
the cultural and intellectual influence of Shanghai. P 'eng 
Shu-shih, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Mao Tse-tung, and Teng Chung-hsia were 
from Hunan and all not too distant from Changsha. Yun Tai-ying 
was born in Liu—hsia in Hupei, near Wuhan and completed his 
formal education there. His family was originally from Kiangsu 
province. Lo Chi-yuan, a convert of Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1920 and 
T'an P'ing-shan were both Cantonese. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, now known 
as Shih Fu-liang was from Chu-chi in Chekiang not far from 
Hangchow. He and Tsai also went to France in early 1920 as 
wo rk e r- s t ud en t s .
Before focussing our attention onto the relevant regions 
and provinces in our effort to obtain a better appreciation of 
our subjects' perception of the objective reality, it may be 
advisable to take a brief survey of China's economy, if only to 
put our discussions in a proper perspective. According to recent
studies, in Lhe last years of the Empire, 'after 18()5 the
triple demands of indemnity payments, servicing large foreign
loans, and military expenditure wrecked the rough balance between
income and outlay which Peking had precariously maintained until 
1 1that time.' From 1895 to the end of the Empire, repayments of
principal and interest on indemnity and loans amounted to one
and one-half times as much as the total sum borrowed from foreign
lenders for railway construction before 1 9 1 2 ; and, expressed in
another way, this drain in capital represented more than twice
the size of the total initial capitalization of all foreign,
Sino-foreign, and Chinese-owned manufacturing enterprises
established between 1 8 9 5 and 1 9 1 3 *
Following the 1911 Revolution, the fiscal situation can
hardly be conceived to be a change for the better. While
nomenclature and bureaucratic structure were soon to experience
changes, 'the Republican government was even less able to control
1 2the revenue resources of China than its predecessor had been.'
The Central Government, under Yuan Shih-k'ai was too weak to 
restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the provincial and 
regional administrations. And, after 1 9 1 4 we may safely say that 
the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle were the only major 
revenues administered by the Central Government. Of course, not 
all revenues from these taxes went into the Central Government's
Albert Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, ca. 1870-1911- 
(1969) and The Chinese Economy, 1912-1949« ( 1 9 6 8 ) Michigan
Papers in Chinese Studies Nos.5 and 1 . This survey is based 
largely on these studies.
'  ^ Feuerwerker, Economy, 1870-1911• p.6 8 ff.
^  Feuerwerker, Economy, 1912-1949. p.48ff.
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coffer. Indeed, from 1912 through to the conclusion of the 
period under our consideration, 1925, a mere 1 8$ of the total 
revenue net of first charges of the Haikuan (Maritime Customs) 
was available to the Peking government for its administrative 
and other expenditures, the rest was committed to the service of 
foreign loans and indemnities. The tariff, normally an 
instrument for the protection and nurturing of the developing 
indigenous industries, was unavailable to Chinese industries.
From 1902 to 1918, the rate of duty collected on imports varied 
between 2y$ to 3^^ ad valorum. This was revised in 1923 to 5$ 
and no further major increase was possible until China regained 
tariff autonomy in 1930*
Income from the Salt Gabelle in fact achieved a greater 
gross revenue than that of the Maritime Customs, especially from 
1913 to 1922. In 1913, in order to secure the Reorganization 
Loan, 'without which the government of Yuan Shih-k'ai might not 
have survived, a foreign Chief Inspector was appointed to
1 3supervise and in effect control the Salt Administration.'
But, even at its most productive year, 1922, only 55$ of the net 
collection was actually remitted to Peking and the rest was 
retained by the provincial or regional authorities, with or 
without the consent of Peking. By 1926, a mere 18$ was actually 
remitted to Peking - Chinese $9 million out of a total of Ch. $49 
millionl
^  Ibid., p.49. See also S.A.M. Adshead, The Modernization of 
the Chinese Salt Administration, 19Q0~1920~ (Ha r v . U . P . 1 c>70) •
That a province or region could so defy the central 
government suggests an uneven economic development amongst the 
provinces and also implies that our proposed attempt al regional/ 
provincial survey (that is, those regions from which the future 
CCP leaders hailed) has some validity as a gauge of our subjects' 
perception of 'the historical conditions for the time being 
existing.' Keeping the state of the national fiscal condition 
in the background as a frame of reference, we may now inquire 
into the socio-economic conditions of the various regions and 
provinces which are relevant to this study.
In the context of this study, the region under the cultural 
and economic influence of Shanghai seems to be the most 
important. This is so not only because Shanghai was then the 
most important economic centre of China but also that within this 
region came three of the most important and influential men in 
our study of the development of Chinese communism, viz, Ch'en
Tu-hsiu of Anhwei, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai of Kiangsu, and Shih Ts'un-tmng
*
of Chfikiang. Here, it seems that the 'sprout of capitalism' was
quite apparent. In 1905 a British Consul, a Mr. Sundius,
reported that 'in the province of Anhwei, the great bulk of the
rice land is not the property of peasant proprietors or village
communes, but belongs to some half-dozen powerful families' and
that these families 'have ramifications throughout the Empire'.
These landlord families were well connected, but the returns
which they received from the harvests were not for use locally
'but also would be paid, by means of bank draft, payable at the
commercial and industrial centres, where they have manufacturing
* This is a cliche in the literature on Chinese economic 
history. It came about in connexion with the wide-ranging 
discussion, in the 1950's, on the first signs of capitalistic 
enterprises in Chinese history.
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and financial interests , 14 In short, then, one might expect
the politically concerned to have taken notice of the close
economic links between the landlords and the manufacturers
and financiers, that is, the capitalist class. Sundius's 
observation of 1905 was supported by a survey done by the Chin- 
ling University in 1922 which found that Merchants owned 7 5 °f
commercialization of agriculture, according to some reports, was 
not only restricted to the large landlords but also to farmers 
right through the rural industry. One report states that since 
1850 farmers were encouraged to specialize in cash crops because 
of better financial returns and improved transportation to 
markets. This movement was particularly noticeable near large 
urban centres where the population increased two to three times 
faster than the surrounding rural areas. Indeed, this 
phenomenon, according to the same report, which had its data drawn 
from 'all sorts of villages' was not restricted to villages near 
towns. It reported that a higher percentage was noted in areas 
along railways, that is, where transportation facilities were 
available. In social terms, this report adds that 'as farm size 
increased, the consequence of this process of commercialization J 
farm receipts rose and large farms earn between twice to five 
times as much as small farms', and, taking an overview of the
Decennial Report, 1902-11. pp.282-3»
1 5 Chin-ling University, Department of Agriculture and Forestry's 
1922 Report on the Occupations of the Landlords. Cited from 
Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu -liao (Source Materials on 
the History of Modern Chinese Agriculture). II (1912-27), p.324. 
See also Marie-Claire Bergere 'The Role of the Bourgeoisie' in 
China in Revolution the First Phase 1900~1913 ed. Mar y C. Wright, 
p p . 229-296 (Yale U.P. USA, 1968).
the land in Wu-hu hsien 15 Indeed, this process of the
27
entire period survey by this report, 1 8 9 0- 1 9 3 7 » the author 
concludes that commercialization increased the number of peasants 
losing their lands and becoming tenant farmers in a given year.
Such phenomena were also noted by contemporary non­
communist observers in various parts of the nation. Indeed, 
concomitant to this process of commercialization of the rural 
economy was the increasing interest shown by the capitalists - 
the banks. There was a flourishing growth of rural banks - 
nung-yeh yin-hang - not so much to provide cheap loans to the 
needy but as indications that the rural sector was a rewarding
place for investment, thus adding to the growth of social
1 7disparity. Of equal importance as an influence on the
contemporary, as an indicator of China's economic trend, was
China's industrial development. In the period between 1912 to
1 9 2 0 the rate and pattern of development was phenomenal, it had
18achieved the annual rate of 13 • per annum. Undoubtedly, this
Ramon H. Myers, 'Commercialization of Agriculture in Modern 
China', in Economic Organisation in Chinese Society, ed. W.E. 
Willmot t, 1 7 3- 1 9 2 . (Stanford U.P. 1972).
1 7 For the observations of rural social injustices and 
exploitations, see the reports on rural surveys in the Tung-fang 
t sa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany) XXIV N 0 . 1 6  (25 VIII 1927) and 
Chang Tzu-ch'iang ed. Kwangtung nung-min yun-tung (Kwangtung 
Peasant Movement), esp. pp.28-9 where he gave the results for a 
survey in 1921-2. This was published by the China Christian 
Alliance in Canton 1926. For the development of the rural banking 
interests, see Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao (Sources 
of the History of Modern Chineseruralindustries)ed. Chang Yu-i 
PIT, 176-228. (Peking 1937)♦ In Chang's Volume II, pp.43~130 are 
reports and source materials on the concentration of ownership.
I 8 John K. Chang, Indexes of Industrial Production of Mainland 
China, 1912- 19^ -9 » ( Ph. D . dissertat i on, Uni versi ty of Michigan, 
1965).
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rate has a built-in upward bias because it is using 1912 as the
base, a year of relatively low comparison. However, while in
absolute terms the industrial output of China in this period had
not been great, to the contemporaries, what mattered was the
rapidity of these changes in socio-economic terms. Such changes
can only be described as unprecedented. If Engels could see, in
1893, in the Italy of Dante 'the opening of the modern capitalist 
1 9era', then it would not be unreasonable for our subjects, after 
reading Engels, to feel that they too were living in an era ripe 
for action.
If there were economic factors present which might 
influence the contemporary observer to think that the 'sprout of 
capitalism' had taken root, there were also direct intellectual 
influences abroad throughout China, in the last years of the 
Empire and the early years of the Republic that helped our 
subjects to accept communism. They were the 'anti-imperialistic' 
and nationalistic sentiments that were being propagated in the 
new schools in the first decade of the 20th Century. The 
decision in 1901 to begin dismantling the examination system 
which culminated with the total abolition in 1905, was really 
revolutionary. It may well be regarded as a truly cultural 
revolution. Concomitant to this abolition of the century old 
mode of achieving upward social mobility came the establishment 
of the modern schools and the teaching of such modern subjects 
as world geography, mathematics, natural sciences, and most.
^  Engels, Preface to the Italian ed. 1893 of The Communist 
Manifesto.
important in our context, the teaching of nationalism and 
anti-imperialism.
The new schools and new curricula required new texts
because the elegant commentaries on the Classics, scholarly
though they were, were deemed insufficient - not only
intellectually so but economically as well, for the traditional
route of success via the examinations was now gone forever. It
seemed that these new schools were supplied with new textbooks
which clearly showed the damaging effects of the 'battle of
concessions' to China, especially the years 1895 to 1900. These
books put much stress on the injustices of the unequal treaties
and the various humiliations suffered at the hands of the
20invaders from afar. However, perhaps even more revolutionary
is the implied intention in such exhortations. In emphasizing 
nationalism, even if it is only negatively as anti—foreignism, 
as a means of national defence, this exercise really amounted to 
a general call to all the students in these schools to accept 
participatory politics. In seeking support and patriotism from 
the students of these new texts in these last years of the 
Empire, the originators of these books were certainly not asking 
all the readers of these textbooks to participate in national 
politics - though the introduction of provincial assemblies was 
an important step in greater involvement in the body politic. 
Nevertheless, such an implication cannot be avoided, especially 
to the politically concerned. As mentioned, all the people who
Cyrus Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China, 
pp. 180-191. (Columbia U.P. 1932).
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had major influences on the development of Chinese common:i sin i n 
our period were products of such schools, excepting Ch'en lii-lisiu 
Ch'en, as his autobiography informs us, had the more tradit io.na.I 
Classical education and had successfully passed the first degree 
examination. However, he was also involved in these new schools. 
In 1899, at the age of 20, he was on record as 1 propagating 
revolution' as a staff member of a normal school in his native 
Anhwei, and thereafter continued to live the life of a 
revolutionary, or at least, a changer-of-China. By 1903, after 
a brief exile to Japan, Ch'en founded, again in Anhwei, his own 
Patriotic Society (Ai-kuo hui) . ^
However, it is one thing to establish that there was a 
climate for socio-political change but another thing to explain 
the reasons for certain people taking certain directions while 
some of their colleagues chose other means. To do so, we will 
have to trace the intellectual development of our subjects 
especially the way they reacted to contemporary events and ideas. 
The concept that the scholar had a duty to the state, or empire - 
a facet of participatory politics - was, of course, very much a 
part of the Chinese tradition. But, with those who opted for 
communism that 'duty to the state' involved the replacing of the 
traditional idea of moral self-perfection with a programme of 
social transformation.
2 1 See Chung-hua min-kuo kai-kuo wen-hsien hereafter known as 
KKWH, (Documents on the Founding of the Republic of China) 1st 
Series, XII, 184 and X, 423-7* A brief biography of Ch'en can 
be found in Revolutionary Leaders in modern China, pp.335_3hb, 
ed. Hsiieh Chun-tu (NY , 197 1 ) • Ch'en's autobiography has been
translated by R. Kagan in The China Quarterly No.50 (April-June 
1972) pp.295-314.
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The intellectual development of Ch'en Tu-hsiu may be 
regarded as an example of a dissatisfied classical scholar turned 
communist. To be sure, it was not a sudden decision and in the 
process of becoming a communist Ch’en went through many phases.
In his brief autobiography, Ch’en informed us that the ridiculous 
scenes he witnessed in the Examination Hall in Nanking in 1897 
made him appreciate the words of Liang Ch’i-ch'ao as stated in the 
latter’s Shih-wu pao. Unfortunately for us, Ch’en did not have 
any footnote in his autobiography informing us which particular 
sentiment of Liang in the Shih-wu pao had such an effect. However 
Ch’en recalled that he began to regard himself as a follower of 
' Kräng Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i ch’ao. ’ If we check with the Shih-wu 
pao, we would find that at that time, Liang was expressing his 
political views in a series of articles entitled ’A General 
Discussion of Political Reform' (Pien-fa t'ung-i)~^ In these 
articles, Liang asserted that change was the principle of life; 
and with the universe (tien hsia, that is, China), under the 
pressure of the foreign imperialists, the only way available to 
preserve the Chinese culture and nation was to make political 
reform. To strengthen China, in Liang's view, the first need 
would be to enlighten the people via a new education system.
Of course, the subsequent development of Ch’en was not 
entirely due to the influence of Liang. But, in reviewing the 
intellectual development of Ch'en, as we shall see, two 
injunctions from Liang seemed evident: that change was the
principle of life, and that the strengthening of China needs to 
be preceded by the enlightenment of the people. As if to take up
22 Shih-wu pao Nos.2 and 3» Aug., Sept. 1896
32
the challenge to change, Ch'en joined with the radical Chinese
expatriates in Japan in the winter of 1902 to found the Ch'ing-
nien-hui, dedicated to revolutionary overthrow of the Empire.
His erstwhile comrades later came to remember him as a natural
leader. The next year, he returned to his native Anhwei and
founded his own Ai-kuo hui. However, there are a number of
things worthy of note and which we may regard as germinal in the
intellectual-political growth of our future communists. Firstly,
Ch'en as with all the other future communists, was prepared and
eager for action. The young Ch'en, together with Tsou Lu, and
Chang Chi cut off the queue of the Supervisor of Hupei Students 
24in Japan. Ch'en was then twenty-three years old, and we may
interpret that action as either a student prank or that Ch'en 
was prepared to act out his convictions.
Secondly, his associations in Japan among the expatriate 
Chinese were among the earliest records linking Ch'en with the 
French revolutionary movements. This group of Chinese 
revolutionaries had translated a book known as the Great French 
Revolution, unfortunately there is no record of its original 
author. The Ch*ing-nien hui, of course, were emulating the Young 
Italy Movement. And, finally, even at this early stage, his 
Patriotic Society (Ai-kuo hui) already showed a strong social 
concern. In his keynote speech at the inauguration of the Society, 
Ch'en expressed the sentiment that while the strengthening of the
See KKWH, 1st ser. IX, 3^ +2; X, 81-2; XI, 312: and Cheng Hsiieh-
chia, Chung-kung hsing wang shih (A History of the Rise and 
Destruction of the Chinese communists) II, 772.
24 Cheng Hsüeh-chia, Op.cit., II, 722-3-
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nation in its effort to resist foreign exploitation was
necessary, the welfare of the people must not be neglected. And,
in the constitution of the society, there was no loyalty oath to
the leader, decisions would be made by the majority in a ballot.
Even then, he was against the libertarianism of the anarchists
for, to him, that would amount to refusing to serve Public (or 
2 5National) Good. While we must record that such sentiments
were not exclusively those of Ch'en , and on the contrary, 
fairly common amongst the group he was associated with, it was 
Ch'en and the future communists who came to place more importance 
on the social aspects of their revolutionary programme and 
accepted more foreign revolutionary ideology. Perhaps, as 
supporting evidence to this suggestion, we may point to the fact 
that Ch'en never formally joined the overtly nationalistic 
Warning Bell group in 1904 though its founders were his old 
friends. He did, however, publish in that journal a Lamentation 
to a dead friend. And, shortly after the publication of his poem, 
the Warning Bell carried an editorial on the use of p ai-hua and 
the future of China, sentiments very similar to those Ch'en later 
expressed in the Hsin Ch'ing-nien. Of course, there is no way we
may demonstrate conclusively that Ch'en was the guest leader-
. 2 6writer.
The next year, 1905, witnessed the first fruit of that 
official educational propaganda as well as the first major foreign
See Su pao 7 VI, 25 V, and 7 VI 1903; and KKWH 1st ser. X
423-7- 
2 6 Ching-chung pao (The Warning Bell) 15 IV 1904 for the poem and 
25 IV 1904 for the editorial, entitled ’ Lun pai-hua yii Chung-kuo 
ch'ien-t'u chih kuan-hsi' (On the Relations between pai-hua and 
the Future of China).
revolutionary influence. That year marked the first successful 
nation, or more accurately, empire-wide boycott of foreign goods. 
Admittedly the target was American goods and the immediate cause 
was the racially discriminatory laws and practices in the Ü.S.A. 
against the Chinese residents. But the intensity of the whole 
movement, and the lengthy duration of the boycott and the 
resultant anti-foreign movement and slogan;» used constrained us 
to the conclusion that it was an expression of a deeper and more 
widespread sentiment. Slogans were written in the pai-hua, and 
demanding not only the revocation of the unequal treaties but 
also some bearing sentiments thus; The People are useful but the 
Government is useless. The movement also inspired anti-
27imperialistic novels bearing such titles as The World of Gold. 
Credit for some of these must go to those nationalistic and 
anti-imperialistic textbooks that were then the vogue.
That year also witnessed a revolutionary movement in Russia. 
This was debated, sometimes rather fiercely, between the 
expatriates in Japan, that is, between the Liang C h ’i-ch’ao group 
and the Min-pao group of Sun Yat-sen. The former abhorred the 
violence while the latter saw violence as inescapable and had 
some sympathy with the revolutionaries’ social programme. However, 
Ch'en, though in Japan at that time, had parted company, 
intellectually, with Liang but could not accept Sun’s Tung-meng 
hui. He did not seem to have commented on the event but returned
27 See Chang Chuan-wu, Kuang-hsu sa-i-nien Chung-Mei kung-yueli 
feng chiao (The Sino-American labour agreement disturbances in the 
31st year of Kuang-hsü), (1966 Taipei). Also see, Wai-chao pao
(Foreign Affairs News) of Shanghai Nos.31/32 19^4 which 
editorialized at length the various ’imperialists’’ partitioning 
of China, especially mining and railways.
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2 8to China before the end of 1906 . In 1907» Ch'en was reported
to be teaching in an Army School in Chekiang, teaching kuo-wen
29and writing revolutionary articles. Li Ta-chao who was to play
a significant role in the Chinese community movement, entered the 
Yung-p'ing prefecture middle school in 1903 at the age of 13* 
Though his future comrades were then too young, Ch'en was 
observing and probably influenced by some of the radical 
sentiments he found expressed in China on his return from Japan. 
On his return, he must have read in the Shanghai Times the 
editorial ’On the Foreigners and our National Manufacturing'.
The paper pointed out that as big capital will swallow up the
small capital, so will the national capital (min-tsu tzu-pen )
30be swallowed up by foreign capital. He may also have taken
note of the coal miners' rebellion during which its leader, one
Rung Chuen-tai issued a manifesto calling for the establishment
31of a republic and a thorough levelling of social inequality.
However, from 1907 to 1911, we have no reliable evidence on 
the whereabouts of Ch'en apart from the one mentioned by his 
friend and biographer, Ho Chih-yü that Ch'en went to Mukden to 
look after the funeral arrangements of his elder brother,
Ho Chih-yii 'Tu-hsiu chu-tso nien-piao' (a chronological list 
of Tu-hsiu's writings) in H o 's Tu-hsiu tsung-shu ch'i chung 
(Seven works by Tu-hsiu), 19^ +8. The debate was published in 
Min-pao Nos.3-7«
29 KKWH 2nd ser. IV, 116.
30 'Lun wai-jen yu wo-kuo chih-tsao t'u-huo', Shanghai shih pao 
(Shanghai Times) 7 XI 1906.
See Li Shu, '1905-nien Wo-kuo ke-ming ti Chung-kuo' (The China 
of the 1903 Russian Revolution), Li-shih yen-chiu (Historical 
Research) 1953 No.1, pp.1-18.
Meng-chi. There are, however, many unsubstantiated conjectures
33by scholars. We can therefore only assume, from the context of
H o ’s biography, that Ch'en spent these years teaching in the
school in Hangchow and studying.
During the 1911 uprising, he devoted his energies to helping
34his old friend Po Wen-wei and was active in Nanking. Po became
the Military Governor of Anhwei in 1922 and C h ’en accepted the 
position of Secretary-General while concurrently holding the 
deanship of the Anhwei High A c a d e m y . ^  C h ’en unlike his friend 
Po did not join the T ’ung-meng h u i . In 1912, when Po was defeated 
by Yuan Shih-ltai in the so-called Second Revolution, Ch'en again 
went into exile in Japan, this time with his patron. There, he 
was in contact with the other Chinese exiles who had opposed Yuan 
and also had to flee. Though Ch'en did not join the Sun Yatsen- 
led group, he was reported to have been on friendly terms, and 
indeed fairly closely associated, with men like Huang Hsing, Sun, 
Tai Chi-tao, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-^ai and C h ’en Ying-shih 
(Ch'en C h ’i-mei) and planned and hoped for the return to their
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Ho Chih-yü, op.cit. , p«3*
3 3 Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement, p.42 claimed that 
Ch'en had been to France but presented no evidence. In his 
footnotes (p*399) Chow claims 'but we find such record in 1919; 
likewise J.L.Y. How's M.A. thesis, 'The Development of Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu's Thought, 1915-38' (Columbia 1949)» Two Japanese studies 
also made the same claim, and also unsubstantiated: Hashikawa
Tokio, Chugoku bunka-kai jinbutsu sokan (A Biographical 
Compendium of Eminent Persons in Chinese Cultural Circles)
(Peking, 1940), II, 466; and, Hatano Kan'ichi, Chugoku Kyösan-tö 
shi (A History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo, 19 6 1 ) , l"7
32. Hu Shih, however, claimed that Ch'en had never been to 
France though he knew the French language. (Ch'en Tu-hsiu p 'ing- 
lun) .
^  Fu Sen-nien, 'Ch'en Tu-hsiu an' (The Ch'en Tu-hsiu case) C h 'on 
Tu-hsiu p'ing-lun (Commentaries on Ch'en Tu-hsiu), ed. Ch'en 
Tung-hsiao, (Peiping, Tung-ya, 1933). p.2.
^ ) Ho Chih-yii, op . cit. , p-3*
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homeland. His refusal to accept membership in the T'ung-meng
hui must therefore be intellectual or ideological. He was also 
busily engaged in his private intellectual pursuit. He wrote 
his study on Chinese synonyms - Tzu-lui-i - as well as his 
English Reader, a study of the English language intended for use
37in the Chinese schools and colleges.
Politically he seemed to have been carefully observing the 
international scene. For, on the 25 V1XI, 1914, when Japan
declared war on Germany, he joined an informed group called the 
European Affairs Studies Group. Shortly afterwards, he published 
what may be regarded as his political credo in the journal 
founded by Chang Shih-chao - an old friend of Ch'en - in Japan, 
the Chia-yin tsa-chih (The Tiger M a g a z i n e ) I n  this study,
Ch'en delineated his concept of the relations between the state 
and the people, indeed, we may consider this effort as the 
crystallization of the germinal ideas expressed in the early days 
of 1902-3 when he founded the Ai-kuo hui in Anhwei. Here also he 
signalled his rejection of the libertarianism of the anarchists 
with whom he clashed very strongly after he became a communist.
He felt that the people needed a state because men need a 
co-operative body to guarantee their basic rights and freedom, as 
well as to look after their welfare. On the other hand, the
^  See Cheng Hsueh-chia, op. cit. , pp. 764-784; Ho Chih-yii, op. 
cit., p .3 5 and KKWH 2nd ser. IV, 299.
37 Ho Chih-yu, op. cit., p.3«
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J See Cheng Hsüeh-chia op. cit., p.784. His article was entitled 
'Ai-kuo-hsin yii t zu-chiieh-hs in' (Patriotism and Self-Awareness) 
Chia-yin tsa-chih, I, 4 (10 IX 1914), pp.1-16.
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state also has the duty to provide and guarantee these needs of 
the people. Unless the state can do so, or accept these ideaJs 
as its goal, then it cannot accept the intellectual and emotional 
loyalty - patriotism - of its people. An awakened people is one 
which is aware of this contractual obligation between the two 
parties - the state and the people. That is, it is the duty of 
the people to love their state if that state is lovable, otherwise 
true patriotism constrains one to work towards the establishment 
of such a lovable state. While on appearance, there were some 
similarities between this concept of Ch'en and Mencius' idea of 
the right to rebel, on closer examination we find that the rights 
of the people, suggested by Ch'en were far greater, and were to 
be egalitarian and participatory in politics. His lament was 
that the China of his day was not such a lovable state. it could 
not provide any right or protection to its people. He had 
advanced from that of a K'ang-Liang reformer to the position of a 
radical democrat, even by the contemporary Western standards.
In reviewing Ch'en's activities down to 1915» we may detect 
some pattern which may be regarded as pointers to his future 
career as the party leader. The pattern may be that once he came 
to be intellectually convinced of a course of action, he would 
act on his conviction without reservation. To put this in Marxist 
terms, we may regard his initial intellectual conviction as the 
theory and the action, practice. When practice proved the theory 
inadequate, he would withdraw from action and study. Then, with 
an improved understanding, theory modified through practice, he 
would throw himself wholly into another attempt to bring his new
conviction to fruition. He would do so with equal determination
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but not with stubbornness. All the while, the ultimate goal 
remained the same though it was perhaps perceived more clearly. 
Thus, when he decided that the classical education and 
examination were inappropriate, he joined the staff of a 
progressive and revolutionary school. When he had decided 
against monarchism, he forceably cut off the queue of an imperial 
official. When such bravado failed to achieve the desired end, 
he withdrew to teach and reflect. His Ai-kuo hui was not a 
compromise but merely a vehicle to propagate his ideals and to 
seek a means to define and achieve his goal.
After the 1911 revolution, though the political situation 
was far from ideal, he felt called to action again. Here, we 
witness the first of many occasions on which Ch’en was prepared 
to cooperate with - or, at least, to be in the service of - a 
warlord, as his friend Po Wen-wei was, albeit a progressive one, 
provided he be allowed to retain his ideals and, more important, 
the freedom to propagate his ideals. We may include in this 
category his service with Ch’en Chiung-ming in Canton in 1920 and 
later with the Kuomintang (KMT) National Government. Indeed, his 
comrade, Li Ta-chao was also not above serving a warlord, even a 
non-progressive one like Wu Pei-fu, if by doing so, long term as 
well as immediate, benefits might be brought to the cause.
With this second failure in Anhwei, Ch’en embarked on yet 
another and more thorough period of preparation, education and 
contemplation. When he returned to action - practice - again, he 
had come to a new intellectual conviction, communism. And again, 
he gave his total commitment. He resigned the security of a 
chair in the prestigious Peita to organise unions for rickshaw
pullers and wharf-labourers in Shanghai, risking imprisonment in 
the process. This time, external circumstances brought to his 
side a nucleus of like-minded younger comrades. They all shared 
a similar perception of the objective reality of China. 
Furthermore, Ch'en may claim the credit for being an intellectual 
pathfinder for many of these comrades through his Hsin ch'ing 
nien and Mei-chou p 1ing-lun.
By 1915» Ch'en had come to the conclusion that socialism was
the ultimate solution for the social injustices concomitant with 
39capitalism, though his intellectual commitment was not dogmatic 
He was of the opinion that social teaching must be compatible 
with the age, perhaps the lesson of human changeability he learnt 
from Liang still lingered! He now took the view that 'doctrines 
rise and fall in accordance with the changes in social structure 
and living conditions. While a theory may give rise to a certain
4osociety, societies also produce certain theories.' To Ch'en,
the more complex the nature of social change and the quicker its 
tempo of change, the faster any particular doctrine would become 
obsolete, for it was not possible that a teaching could ever be 
of universal application nor for all times. Though he was 
fundamentally eclectic, at that particular time, especially in 
the realm of political theory, his intellectual persuasion tended 
towards French socialist ideas and by the end of 1918* he seemed 
to be on the verge of committing himself to the Syndicalist
^  Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 'Fa-lan-hsi jen yii chin-tai wen-ming' (The 
French People and Modern Civilization) HCN I, 1 (15 IX, 1915)*
pp.27-30.
^  Ch'en, 'K'ung-tzu chih tao yii hsien-tai sheng-huo' (Confucian 
Principles and Modern Life), HCN II, 4 (Dec. 1915)* p.2.
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approach. In this period he felt that only through education
and industrialization could China and her people achieve 
emancipation and strength. But education and industrialization 
could only be brought about if there was first a suitable
42political climate which, in his opinion, China did not have.
This gradual rejection of capitalism and the revulsion against 
the exploitation of people in the lower or weaker classes was 
felt in China even by those who did not become communists. For 
instance, Wang Ching-wei, anticipating Lu Hsun, called such 
exploitation cannibalism and the 'civilized people's human
43sacrifice.'
Contemporaneous to this intellectual development China was 
experiencing an unprecedented period of industrial development, 
spurred on by the Great War. The withdrawal of foreign 
competition in the form of low tariff imports of manufactured 
goods permitted the indigenous industries to develop at the rate 
of over 1 3$> p e r  annum, or in terms of net value, the industrial 
production increased from Chinese $74.9 million to Chinese $169*4
44millions between 19^3 to 1920. As mentioned earlier, this
Mei-chou p'ing-lun, 19^9 New Year edition's Editorial called 
for a general strike to change the socio-economic structure of 
society.
HCN I, 2 (15 Oct. 1915) 'Chih-jih chih chiao-yii fang-chen' 
(Today's Guiding principles for Education). Also see Ch'en's 
replies to readers as recorded in Tu-hsiu wen ts'un (The collected 
works of Tu-hsiu) III, 12 and III, 126. Meisner totally misread 
these letters and came to the conclusion that Ch'en was then NOT 
interested in politics, see his L i , etc. 36.
Wang Ching-wei 'Hsi sheng chih Yin' (The Meaning of Sacrifice), 
Tung-fang tsa-chih. It is of interest that Wang noted this prior 
to the 1917 Revolutions in Russia. Lu Hsun, A Madman's Diary,
HCN April 1918.
John K. Chang, 'Industrial Development in China', J ournal of 
Economic History XXVII, 1 (March 19^7) p p •36-81. Values expressed 
in 1933 equivalents.
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created a higher degree of imbalance in regional economic
condition and growth. Furthermore, as we have also noted, this
continued and accelerated the process of commercialization of
agriculture, especially in areas more accessible to urban centres
- this included areas from which came our future leaders of the
CCP. Some of the consequences of this process, as noted in the
reports cited earlier, were the gradual impoverishment of the
peasantry and the rise of a merchant-landlord class with financial
and familial linkages with urban industries. Mao's father, at
the time when the young Mao was about to leave home, was in
transition from an Upper Middle Peasant to that of the landlord-
money lender, through the successful application of his business
acumen. With the increasing number of peasants losing their land
45and becoming tenant farmers there must be an attendant 
debasement of the quality of life in the country. To the 
intellectuals, especially those exposed to foreign ideals and 
particularly those who had suffered such pains as Ch'u Ch'iu-pai 
did, and even those who had not suffered personally, as were Li 
Ta-chao and Yun Tai-ying, the primitive and idealistic 
communism of Tolstoy or the idealistic anarchism of Kropotkin 
must have been attractive. But such moral self-perfection is 
basically an inward and self-centred exercise. The Russian 
communists had to reject it. The Chinese, whether Confucian or 
communist, also rejected it eventually.
As we have noted, Ch'en was urging an egalitarian and 
participatory political system in his Us in Ch'ing-nien and later
45 See f.n . 16 .
the Mci-chou p ’ inf;-lun. The influence of the former journal on
the young intellectuals and students is well known; even the 
latter had inspired the founding of the Hsing-chi p*ing-lun in 
Shanghai and the Hsiang-kiang p 1ing-lun from Mao Tsetung, T s ’ai 
Ho-sen and others in Hunan. Therefore, if we keep in proper 
perspective the contemporary socio-economic conditions - the 
gradual but increasing impoverishment of the peasantry who were 
dispossessed of their land and reduced to tenants and in so doing 
meant that they were becoming the class-without-property, (Wu- 
ch'an chieh-chi, or the proletariat); the unprecedented rapid 
rate of industrialization; the increasingly evident linkage 
between the urban merchants and landlords, especially near the 
rapidly growing major urban centres; the years of nationalistic 
and anti-foreign education - then, we may be in a better position 
to appreciate the effects on their contemporary readers the 
clarion calls issued from Ch'en's influential journals. On 
January 3rd, 1919» the editorial of the new year issue of the 
Mei-chou p 1ing-lun announced that to overthrow the capitalists, 
the weapon of the workers 1 is the general strike of the grand 
union of the workers.' The May 4th issue of the same journal 
editorialized that now is the time for China to have a socio­
economic revolution. The editorial observed:
The revolution in China has to raise the (political) 
matters of Europe’s First Revolutions except that 
the revolutionaries in China have to be lao-nung 
(workers-peasants) class, and not the capitalist 
class. The target of revolution (in China) will 
not be the nobility but one resembling the mobility 
as well as the capitalists: the shih-ta-fu class
(the scholar-gentry), the only one in the world.
It is in this context that we come upon Ch’en’s end o 1' the
46year appeal on the realization of democracy. As Ch’en saw the
situation in China, the only big capitalist enterprises in China 
by the Chinese were those by the ’bureaucrat-capitalists’. His 
democracy had no place for them, but practically everyone else 
was included. His was a concept of regional self-government with 
trade and professional unions taking leading roles in the urban 
units. He wanted all employers and employees to unite and each 
person will have one vote of equal value in decision making.
These regional groupings or governments would have jurisdiction 
over education, public health, irrigation if in the country areas, 
roads, food supply, social welfare, cooperative societies, labour 
conditions, and election, that is, the election of representatives 
to the higher political units: the provincial and national
assemblies. He would, however, exclude all the current political 
parties, the cliques and factions, and the warlord groups. While 
Ch’en modestly denied that his concept meant a social revolution, 
he did say that the suggestions of Dewey and Bertrand Russell 
were not comprehensive enough in that neither of them gave 
sufficient attention to both the political and socio-economic 
aspects of the body politic. He put forward his basic units of 
democracy as a concept that would adequately cater for both 
aspects. In reality, his units resemble, functionally, very much 
like the soviets - the type of soviets that caused the sailors of 
Kronstadt, and others, to accept the slogan ’All Power to the 
Soviets’, but eventually led to their own suppression.
Ch’en, ’Shih-hsing min-chih ti chi-ch’u ’ (Foundation for the 
realization of democracy) HCN VII, 1, 13-21 (1 XII, 1919)-
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He published this article shortly after he had spent a
period in jail in Peking for distributing anti-government
hand-bills in the streets. Thus, this statement is a clear
demonstration that he had not repented but still persisted in his
anti-government activities and, in fact, inciting what must be
regarded as revolutionary social changes. Having come to such
an intellectual position, and taking into consideration his
previous pattern of activities, we may be permitted to suggest
that Ch'en was intellectually constrained to return to total
action. This he did. He resigned his chair and deanship at
Peita, leaving his colleague, Li Ta-chao, to do the intellectual
proselytizing in Peking through the Marxist Studies Group
at the University and other means. He went down to Shanghai
trying to organize and unionize the rickshaw drivers, the machine
workers, and the wharf-labourers. Whilst in Shanghai, C h ’en also
47renewed his association with Sun Yat-sen.
47 For Ch'en’s imprisonment, see Hu Shih’s account in Ch * en Tu- 
hsiu p ’ing-lun (critiques on C h ’en Tu-hsiu) ed. C h ’en T ’ung-hsiao 
(P e i p i n g 1933)• For the founding of the party cell in Shanghai 
in 1920, see C h ’i-wu lao-jen, ’Chung-kuo kung-ch’an-tang ch'enjli 
ch'ien-hou ti ch'ien-wen' (Recollections of the Events Surrounding 
the Founding of the C C P ), Hsin Kuan-ch'a (New Observer) 1 VII 
1957* For the founding of the unions in those early dates, see 
Wu Min and Hsiao Feng ed. Ts'ung Wu-ssu tao Chung-hua jen-min 
kung-ho-kuo ti tan-sheng (From May 4th to the Birth of the 
People’s Republic of China). (Peking 1951)* This is a chronicle 
of events. For the association with Sim, see Ho Chiang-kung, 
Ch'in-kung chien-hsueh sheng-huo hui-i (Reminiscences about the 
Life of the Worker-student) p .24 (Peking 1938). Ho recalled that 
in October 1920 Sun was invited by Ch'en to give the keynote 
speech at the opening ceremony of the Machine Workers' Union, 
organized by Ch'en. Ho and other students were organized to form 
a bodyguard for Sun.
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That Ch'en could achieve so much was more than the result 
of his organizational genius and quality of leadership, though 
these qualities were present in obvious abundance. We may 
suggest that, for the intellectuals of his day, and the workers 
who were unprotected by any labour laws, C h ’en's concepts were 
ideas whose time had come. Contemporaneous with Ch'en's article, 
Feng Tzu-yu published an article in Hong Kong entitled 'Chinese
48Socialism, its Past and Future’. In it, Feng argued that a
Leninist type of socialist revolution was applicable to China n o w . 
He argued against the necessity to wait for the industrialization 
of China because, firstly, Russia did so without industrialization, 
and secondly, that Marx and Engels issued The Communist Manifesto 
to the Germans in 1848 when their country did not have full 
industrialization. He wanted a revolution by the workers, 
peasants, and soldiers and a government of the proletariat.
Though he preferred the change to come via parliamentary 
procedures, he would not hesitate to use force if such was not 
forthcoming rapidly enough. Then, in distant Wuhan, Yun Tai- 
ying, who had been much influenced by Kropotkin, came under the 
influence of Ch'en's writings and his emissary, Ch'i-wu lao-jen. 
And, after a study of Engels and Kautsky, Yun became a Marxist-
49communist and embarked on his active revolutionary career.
Feng Tzu-yu, 'Chung-kuo she-hui chu-i chih k u o-ch’u chi chiang- 
lai' (The Past and Future of Chinese Socialism), Hsiang-chiang 
ch'en-pao 1 I 1920. The New Year Supplement.
49 For Yun's early political activities, see Ch'i-wu lao-jen, 
Erh-ch' i hui-i lu (Reminiscences of Feb. 7th), pp.8-10 (Peking;
1957)* Yun published a translated summary of Engels' The Prig; in 
of the Family in Tung-fang tsa-chifa(Eas tern Miscellany) XVI I , 19
and 20 ( 10 and 25 X 1920)7 pp«50-5, t>7-71* He also translated 
Kautsky's Class Struggle in this period. The translation was 
first advertised in the HCN IX, 3 (1 VII 1921).
In this d e s c r i p t i o n  of the m i l i e u  in w h ich the CCP was
■’i 7
founded, the explicit effects of the O c t ober Revolution and the'
May 4th Incident were p u r p o s e l y  omitted. This is not to deny the
influence of these two events. Indeed, their effect on the
contemporary intellectual and pol i t i c a l  d e v e l opments have been
50well docu m e n t e d  by scholars. The omission of the October
R e v o lution should not be taken as an attempt to downgrade the 
influences of the R u s sian activities in the d e v e l o p m e n t  of the 
CCP and Chinese communism. T h ese will be dealt wit h  in 
subsequent chapters. The intention here is to d e m o n s t r a t e  that 
in China, there was a group of p o l i t i c a l l y  concerned people who 
through a process of obse r v a t i o n  and study of the internal 
conditions and external influences, and through the interaction 
of the fruits of such intellectual activities and p r a c t i c a l 
p o l itical experiences, were moving towards a communist denouement, 
independent of the pe r s o n a l  guidance of their comrades from 
Russia. In this process, they may come to similar conclusions 
as their Ru s s i a n  comrades and often, as shall be d e m o n s t r a t e d  in 
subsequent chapters, d e velop their own Chinese varieties. For 
the purpose of this study, however, it is important to keep in 
mind that by 'the time the M a y  Four t h  Movement began, capitalist
p r o d u c t i o n  and capitalist relations of p r o d u c t i o n  a l r e a d y  held an
5 1important place in the Chinese e c o n o m y . ’
50 See, for example, The May Fourth M o v ement by Chow T s e - t s u n g  
(harvard U.P. i960).
5 1 J. Chesneaux, Th e  Chinese L a b o u r  Movement, 1919-1927* P»9*
(Stanford, 1968). His c h . 1, 'The Social and P o l i tical Situation', 
gives a detailed account of conditions on the peri o d  discussed 
here but from a somewhat different perspective.
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CHAPTER TWO
SEEDTIME OF CHINESE COMMUNISM
Part I The Making of the Revolutionary: pre-May 4th period.
The period between the resignation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu from his 
chair at the Peking University in 1919 to the publication of the 
Manifesto and Resolutions of the 2nd CCP Congress in 1922 may be 
regarded as a watershed in the development of Chinese Communism.
An examination of the activities of, and decisions made by, the 
newly converted Chinese communists may deepen our understanding 
of some of their activities and decisions committed in their 
period of collaboration with the KMT in our period of study.
An examination of this germinal period is necessary because 
there seems to be some contention by scholars on the nature of the 
understanding of our subjects, especially Ch'en, vis-a-vis Marxism 
and Marxism-Leninism. It is alleged that these Chinese had an 
imperfect perception of the theoretical aspects of the nature of 
a communist social revolution, and consequently, many of their 
actions were really little more than following the instructions 
and directives of their comrades from the Comintern.^ These are
For instance, B.I. Schwartz, in his Chinese Communism and the 
Rise of Mao (Harper Torchbook, 1958) found that 'Marxism has in 
its movement eastward ... undergone a slow but steady process of 
decomposition,' (p.4) and that in China 'it would be more correct 
to say that Leninism turned their (the Chinese communists) 
attention to the proletariat rather than the proletariat turned 
their attention to Leninism' (p.25)* And, more recently, a 
scholar gave credit to Sneevliet for the theoretical and political 
positions taken by the CCP during this period of our study. (Dov 
Bing, 'Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP', The China 
Quarterly No.48, p.68l). While Bing's view will be examined in
the text, Schwartz's still has to be dealt with. Whether the 
'eastward migration' of Marx's idea is a decomposition or not is a 
subjective value-judgement which is difficult to prove or refute, 
but what Schwartz said of the Chinese and Leninism is a non 
3eauitur and the student of the history of Marxism will recognise 
that the same was said of what Lenin did to Marxism by Plekhanov, 
and Kautsky.
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results of serious scholarly efforts and not merely polemics or 
propaganda, they therefore deserve our serious consideration.
We have mentioned that amongst our group of communists, the 
most widely read work by Marx was the Communist Manifesto. That 
being the case, the Chinese must have read in the First Chapter 
of the Manifesto that:-
The bourgeoisie itself ... supplies the proletariat 
with its own elements of political and general 
education, in other words, it furnishes the 
proletariat with weapons for fighting the 
bourgeoisie.... and, in particular, a portion of 
the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised 
themselves to the level of comprehending 
theoretically the historical movement as a whole ...
[would now] go over to the proletariat... (pp.43-4 
Peking 1970 ed.)
As we have seen, these early members of the CCP, especially Ch'en 
and Li, had long concerned themselves with socio-political 
injustices and the way to eliminate them. They had long been 
interested in socialist thought and had the opportunity and 
facilities to undertake such studies. Therefore, we may 
reasonably impute that these early Chinese communists qualified 
for inclusion into that ’portion of the bourgeois ideologists who 
have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically 
the historical movement as a whole' and went over to the 
proletariat. To this extent, the question as to whether, in China 
'it would be more correct to say that Leninism turned their (the 
Chinese communists) attention to the proletariat rather than the 
proletariat turned their attention to Leninism' becomes irrelevant.
For, to the Chinese themselves such ideological development was
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Marxist, that is, as the result of studying Marx, they were 
constrained to certain categories of action.
It seems that as soon as he came down from Peita to Shanghai, 
Ch'en was engaging his efforts at organisational activities, 
and by May 1920, formed the first unit of the CCP.*~ Immediately 
afterwards, efforts were made in other centres to form like-minded 
people into units of the Party. At the same time, we know that 
Ch’en was also very much involved with the labour movement, 
organizing unions and trying to awaken the workers into 
understanding their objective situation. And, as we have noted 
in the previous chapter, the first communist union in Shanghai 
was organized in October 1920 - the Shanghai Machine workers’
Union.
However, while C h ’en and his comrades were moved by their 
intellectual commitment into a programme of full-time 
revolutionary activities, we would be unjust to them if we regard 
their eagerness as an expression of their imperfect understanding 
of Marxism and the actual socio-political situation of China.
Nor, indeed, were they exclusively concerned with the newly 
developed urban workers and being politically exclusive. If we 
examine their political messages carefully, we shall find that 
their decisions and actions taken during the period of 
collaboration with the KMT had their origins in this germinal 
period - and not necessarily lessons brought to them by comrades 
sent by the Comintern. In short, we may trace the foundation of 
a collaboration or united-front tactics in these early days,
2 See Chung-kuo hsien-tai Ke-ming yun-tung shih (A History of 
the Contemporary Revolutionary Movement in China) I, 127« (The 
New Democracy Press, Hongkong 19^7)*
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before the arrival of Sneevliet or Maring, and that they - the 
Chinese Communists - were also active in the rural sector, such 
as organising peasants’ associations. The core message in their 
utterances in this period, as well as in the period of 
collaboration was the same - the necessity of Class Struggle.
Before examining in detail the development of the thoughts 
of these Chinese communists, and the consequent actions from 
their thoughts, it may be appropriate to preface the examination 
by recalling to our attention their thinking immediately prior to 
their decision to become full-time revolutionaries. As early as 
1 9 16, Ch’en had already felt the need to educate and awaken the 
youth in particular and the intellectual in general to the 
importance of politics. While the Hsin Ch’ing-nien magazine had 
been intended for the education of the youth, this education,
Ch’en explained, was aimed at achieving a ’radical realization 
from everyone in the nation’ the need for great improvements in
politics and the political parties, so that these will involve
3the people.' Shortly afterwards, he was further pressed by 
another reader for having too much politics in the articles of 
the HCN and that such action, according to this reader, was 
dissipating the energy needed for the promotion of a new culture, 
new education, and new ideas. Ch’en, in reply, reiterated his 
concept of education, culture and politics. To Ch’en, politics 
meant more than the current activities of the war-lords and their 
careerist hangers-on. On the contrary, it demanded the 
involvement of the people. While he admitted that the development 
/evolution - chin—hua - of the masses ’must be rooted in educati on
3 HCN II, 1 (1 IX 1916) reply to Wang Shu-ch’ien.
and industry and not politics, nevertheless, political development 
must first achieve a certain standard before education and 
industry can have the proper basis for development’. Indeed, as 
he saw it, the problem in China was that the masses still reg£ird 
politics as the work of the politicians. Therefore, he urged 
that ’from now on, unless a political element is added to the 
life of the people, unless [the people] will exert all their 
strength to solve the political problems, then there is no need 
to talk about education and industry ... as [politics] involves 
the very life and death of the nation, how [can oneJ bear to
4remain silent.’ In short, then, when Ch'en launched his 
movements for a new education and new culture, he had in mind to 
create a new political culture through a programme of political 
education. While politics might not have taken command, the 
achievement of a new polity was certainly a priority programme.
As far as Ch'en was concerned, a revolution - ke-ming - has
two facets; the elimination of the old and the making of the new.
He felt that in China, even just in the realm of ’political
revolution', the situation has not gone beyond the mere
elimination of the old for nothing new has been provided for in
its place. Therefore, 'strictly speaking, [china] cannot be said
to have a [political] revolution. As to the other types of
5revolution, nothing has been done.'
However such an unpromising situation did not deter him. To 
him, politics was the art of the possible. Virtue was not the 
private preserve of any single political party, nor was the
4 Ch'en HCN III, 5 0 VII 1917); Reply to Ku K'e-kang.
5 Ch'en HCN III, 5 (1 vii 1917): Reply to Ku K'e-Kang.
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possession of political idealism a substitute for the lack of 
political achievement. While one should not lose sight of ones 
political ideals and objectives, in China Ch’en thought that the 
old is still being rooted out to prepare the ground for the new. 
The revolution, explained Ch’en, entailed both processes.^ While 
accepting that republicanism in politics and the scientific method 
in learning as the two precious gifts of modern civilization, 
merely believing in them without actively working towards their 
fulfilment would not benefit the nation. For to take such a 
position, in his view, would be almost like practising 
superstition. Without the active cultivating of those gifts in 
the people, the national polity will not be strengthened and the 
constitution will remain mere empty words. He chided the KMT for 
being over sensitive in believing that every member of the 
Progressive Party (PP) were schemers and traitors. He thought 
that even in the PP there were no shortages of respectable people 
and advised that, for the sake of the nation, the KMT should show 
some respect for the PP. The latter, Ch’en felt, should awaken 
to the dangers confronting the nation rather than paying so much 
attention to the pursuit of power and influence. He then urged 
the two parties to put their own houses in order and unite to rid 
the nation of the evils that were besetting its body politic - 
before someone else would come to destroy the nation altogether.
In short, Ch'en was telling the PP to accept higher political 
principles, and the KMT to be more practical, for the sake of the 
nation which he believed to be in imminent danger of total 
collapse or being colonized. The sentiments were certainly those
6 Ch’en HCN III, 5 (1 VIII-1917), reply to Cho Lu-tun.
oT a patriot, but his patriotism demanded not only a strong
nation but a nation well organized to promote the constitutional
well being of the common and awakened people. And, to achieve
this high ideal, he rejected the exclusiveness that comes from
the immodesty of the idealist, and demanded goal-achieving
practicality from the true politician. After all, the aim of
education, for Ch'en, was to develop such activism and to
7eliminate passivity.
Contemporaneous to the expression of the above ideas occurred 
many important events in other parts of the world which greatly 
influenced the subsequent political development of China as well 
as the intellectual and ideological development of our subjects. 
The first of these events relevant to our discussion was the 
February Revolution of Russia. As can be expected, both Li and 
Ch’en commented on that event.
Li was very concerned with the implications of the February 
Revolution on China's internal situation and development. As the 
February Revolution was intricately linked with the Great War, 
both Li and Ch'en made their comments on the Russian Revolution 
in that context as well as on its likely effects on the Chinese 
political scene. In Li's view, both Imperial Russia and Germany 
were notorious for their bureaucratism - kuan-liao cheng-chih* -
7
' Ch'en, 'Chin-tai hsi-yang chiao-yu' (Modern Western Education). 
A speech delivered at the Tientsin Nankai College, HCN III, 5
(I-VII-I9 I7)•
■¥r Kuan-liao cheng-chih seems to connote a somewhat different 
condition from that of 'bureaucratism'. In the context used by 
Li, the kuan-liao, unlike the 'bureaucrat' in the normally 
accepted sense of today, were concerned with political matters as 
well as the day to day functioning of the government machinery.
and he saw the February Revolution as the rejection, by the
Russian people, ol this bureaucratism. The implication oT this
for China, as Li saw it, was that this Revolution should serve as
a warning to the bureaucrats in China, and that these people
should now realize what would be in store for them should they
8continue to hinder the development of republicanism in China.
Ch'en commented once on the Great War and in a separate
article, on the Russian Revolution. However, on both occasions,
he was no less concerned with the implications of these events on
the Chinese situation than Li, and was just as explicit. C h ’en
advocated China’s participation in the Great War for a number of 
Qreasons. Firstly, it would be an opportunity to show the white 
people that the Chinese refused to be regarded as a conquered 
people. If in so doing the whole country would be united, even 
if China lost the war, the Chinese people ’would at least be able 
to claim that for the second time - the first time being the 
efforts against the Monarchist Movement of Yuan Shih-kai - we 
have demonstrated to the world that our spirit would only bow to 
justice and not brute force ... and to change the hundreds of 
years of submissiveness in foreign relations.'
Li ’O-kuo ta ke-ming chih ying-hsiang' (The Influence of the 
great Russian Revolution) Chia-yin jih-kan (The Chia-yin Daily) 
29-111-1917* Cited in Li Ta-chao hsuan-chi (The Selected 
Writings of Li Ta-chao)" 81-2 (Peking 19 6 2 ). (Hereafter to be 
cited as HC). Meisner seemed to have taken a very different 
reading of this article of Li. Meisner found in this article 
that Li had 'suggested that an Allies victory would not be a 
victory for democracy but would only benefit "those who champion 
bureaucratic government"'. O p .cit. 59*
^ Ctien 'Tui Te wai-chiao’ (Foreign relations with Germany), HCN 
III, 1 (1-III-1917)*
1 0Secondly, as if anticipating the young Mao Tsetung, Ch'en 
saw ’war to a society in the same way as suitable exercises to 
the human body' and that a society which had not experienced war 
for a long period would show signs of degeneration. On the other 
hand, war would bring in its train great progress in knowledge. 
Therefore, he argued, the participation in the Great War would 
not only demonstrate that the 'yellow slaves’ can shed blood on 
the European battle fields, but also gain for China much new 
knowledge. In his mind, this knowledge would be gained by those 
soldiers participating in the conflict as well as those staying 
at home.
The third reason Ch'en put forward was that China was now 
divided by 'barbaric troops' of the various nations and thus 
suffering so much economically that education and industry were 
unable to develop. He felt that the present situation simply 
could not be allowed to persist any longer. Therefore, if China 
would help the Allies, she might gain some financial benefit, in 
the form of indemnity, and the reform of the tariff arrangements. 
Another reason for China's participation in the Great War was 
that China, being a new and developing state, was suffering a 
common malaise of such nations, that is,internal bickering and 
disunity. Ch'en felt that an external war might unite the 
various bickering factions.
Finally, he saw no absolute victory for either side in that 
the contending nations would need much time to recuperate from 
their war efforts before further ventures would be made into the
^  Erh-shih-pa hua sheng, 'l^i-yu chih yen-chiu' (A Study of 
Physical Education) HCN III, 2 (1-IV-1917).
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Kar Eastern regions. He felt that the common aims of all 
European nations in Asia was colonialism - chih-min chu-i. Indeed, 
in his view, the post-war period would create a new and complex 
international problem of balance of power and that China should 
take advantage of it to raise the level of her national strength.
Here, we witness a very nationalistic Ch'en Tu-hsiu whom one 
can hardly regard as being pro-France or pro-Britain. He did not
seem to be suffering from ’an extremely roseate view of the
1 1contemporary West’ : on the contrary, he had every appearance
of being a hard headed realist, more of a practical man of 
politics than an idealist.
When the February Revolution occurred, C h ’en accurately 
predicted that the new Russian Provisional Government would not 
make a separate peace with Germany. However, he thought that the 
politically awakened in China should see the February Revolution 
not merely as a revolution against the Russian Imperial Family
but against ’monarchism’ - chun-chu chu-i - and ’militarism’ -
12 .. c h ’in-lüeh chu-i. The terms chun-chu chu-i and ch ’in-lueh
chu-i seem to denote more than merely a monarchical form of
government which had an aggressive inclination towards its
neighbours. The combined connotation of these two ideas - chu-i
- perhaps points towards the idea of imperialism.
In this statement, Ch'en urged China to participate in the
Great War against Germany because this- would give China a right
B.I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of M a o , p.10.
1 2x Ch'en ’O-lo-ssu ke-ming yü wo kuo-min chih chueh-wu' (The 
Russian Revolution and Our People's Awakening) HCN III, 2
(1-IV-1917)•
5 »
to have a seat in the post-war peace conference. As with the
statement he published a month earlier concerning China’s foreign
relations vis-a-vis Germany, Ch'en repeated his view that the
international situation after the war will be greatly altered.
At the same time, however, he strongly exhorted the people of
China to awaken to their present precarious conditions. As Ch’en
saw the situation at the time, for China to really survive in the
new post-war situation as a viable and independent nation, the
Chinese people must make use of the means of modern civilization
to develop and consolidate national strength. ’For, as long as
militarism - ch’in-liieh chu-i - continues to be unabated among
the great powers, we will never have the opportunity to develop
1 3the strength of our nation.' Basically, his statement was an
exhortation to his countrymen, and used the February Revolution
to bring out the various implications which the international
situation had on China’s development and future. He was also
trying to impress on the readers the urgency of the occasion for
14China’s survival. It should also be noted that while German
militarism and expansionism were explicitly condemned, Ch’en, in 
both articles, did not single out any of the Allies for praise.
Just before the October Revolution, Li expressed some deep 
anguish over the shattered hopes of political improvement in
 ^* Ch’en, Ibid. The third of the five Awakenings (Chiieh-vu) that 
he exhorted his readers to make.
1 4 However, Meisner, Op.cit., p»59 claimed that this article of 
Ch'en’s 'had relatively little to say about either the February 
Revolution or the awakening of China. It was essentially 
concerned with arguing that China should join the Allied cause.'
i
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1 5republican China. It was occasioned by the anniversary of the
Wu-chang Uprising of 1911* Li felt that the sacrifices of these
martyrs in that and the other less successful uprisings were
negated by the bickerings among the political parties. He
entreated the various factions to atone for their past failures
and mistakes by working together diligently for their country.
The significance of this statement will become clearer if we
read this entreaty in conjunction with another article by Li
1 6published in the same issue of the journal. Here. Li was very
critical of the political philosophy and activities of Liang 
Ch'i-chao and the Progressive Party . In this
article, Li was rejecting the political line of Liang and with 
the repudiation, a turning away from his recent association with 
the Liang group. Since this was a lengthy article of some twelve 
pages, we may assume that it was written before the former 
statement which was merely a letter to the journal offering some 
of his thoughts provoked by the occasion of the National Day.
Reading the two statements together, we may assume that the 
anguish and lamentation in the letter may thus be regarded as a 
confession of his own failure, and perhaps, even as an olive 
branch extending to his former colleagues - now that the needs 
ol the nation moved him to feel that national need was of great 
and imminent importance. /VJ'tor all, at about the same time,
Ch’en Tu-hsiu was having very similar thoughts. As we have noted
 ^ Li ’ Chih Jih' (This day!) Tai-ping yang (Pacific Ocean) I, 7 
(15-X-1917).
^  Li *Pao-li yii cheng-chih* (Violence and Politics) Op. ci t.
C h ’en also commented on the Chinputang, see pp.6-7, supra.
earlier, C h ’en was telling the ilL to adopt higher
political principles, and the KMT to be less exclusive and more
practical, and that both parties should awaken to the imminent
1 7and serious dangers confronting China.
In retrospect, it seems that on the eve of the October 
Revolution, Ch'en and Li were still urging and pleading with 
their former colleagues, such as Liang and the Chinputang as 
well as the KMT to work together to build the new China they all 
seemed to be aiming for, at least theoretically. Some, in the 
view of Ch’en and Li, were too exclusive and impractical while 
others were too lax in their principles. At the same time, these 
two were also addressing an audience of young intellectuals who, 
like the two professors, were also eager and even impatient for 
changes. On the other hand, though C h ’en and Li also felt that 
China was facing imminent danger of total collapse, as practical 
men of affairs, they were anxious to ascertain that whatever 
alternative they should now propose, it should be practicable 
and plausible. Hence, they renewed their determination in the 
political education of their young readers and their own self- 
education - to find out more about the objective reality of the 
Chinese society before promoting a programme and theory of 
socio-political revolution.
In pursuance of such expressed desires to promote 
practicality rather than exclusive idealism, the HCN decided to 
publish some practical guides to social reform. If the new-style
1 7' C h ’en, Shih-chU tsa-kan (Random thoughts on the contemporary 
situation) HCN III, 4 (1-VI-1917) see p.6 of this chapter. Once 
again, Meisner gave a different reading to Li’s thoughts on this 
occasion. Meisner Op.cit., pp.34-35*
politics is to involve all the people, it is imperative that the
reformers should be familiar with the conditions of the masses.
With such expressed aims in mind, the HCN began to publish
1 8articles on social surveys. The editor of this report had
done social surveys of some aspects of life in the Peking urban 
areas but now decided to report on rural life and to study rural 
economic conditions because 'in China only very few people live 
in cities while most live in the villages. It would not be the 
'Politics of the Virtuous' (Hsien-.jen cheng-chih ) jf we do not 
study conditions in the villages and to examine their good and 
bad points in order that the educated people living in the cities 
would know how to develop and improve the conditions of these 
people'.
The report itself on a district in southeast Kiangsu 
province, was not unlike that made by Mao Tsetung on Hunan in 
1926. That is a record of exploitation of the poor peasants by 
landlords and corrupt officials. However, what is pertinent to 
our discussion is the editor's comment at the end of the report. 
He saw that the situation in China being analogous of that in 
France just before 1789» This editor, who had researched at 
Cambridge University, likened the sufferings of the Chinese 
peasants and their conditions as described in the report to that 
of the French peasantry at the hands of the aristocracy just 
prior to the French Revolution. That is, there existed, in his 
view, a condition in which the peasantry was cruelly exploited 
and which would lead to a revolutionary condition. As if to
1 ft HCN IV, 3 (15-III-1918 ) 'She-hui tiao-ch'a', ed. by Tao 
Lii-kung.
emphasize his points, he advised the readers to consult the
volume on The French Revolution in the Cambridge History of 
Modern Europe. The reporter found that the landlords were also 
the money lenders and always made loans at usurious rates. As 
if confirming our generalized socio-economic picture in Chapter 
One, his report also suggested the gradual impoverishment of the 
peasantry while the landlords-money lenders were able to increase 
their holdings.
Although the HCN was in the thick of the New Culture
Movement, it published another report of rural survey two months
1 Qlater and this time the subject was in Fukien province. In
the same issue, Li Ta-chao urged the young people to strengthen
their resolve to break new grounds in their political, social,
20and literary thinking so as to create a new life. In so
saying, Li was in fact giving support to his colleague, Ch'en, 
to the idea that the New Culture Movement was a very political 
movement to these two future communists and many of their 
contemporaries, and not merely a literary movement.
To C h ’en and his colleagues, their politics was neither a 
career nor something ’students need not be bothered with but 
rather, involves all citizens who had the right to participate 
in political matters’. That, of course, meant everyone who was
0 1' age, not a criminal or insane. In C h ’e n ’s view, the people 
should discuss all political matters ... but that fundamental
1 ^  HCN IV, 5 (15-V-1918) Yeh Yiian, ’She-hui tiao-ch’a ’ (Social 
Survey) ,
°0 Li Ta-chao ’Hsin-tii Chiu-til’ (The New! The Old!) HCN,
IV, 5 .
politics concerned with the very life and death of the nation
21and the people.’ However, this concern for one’s own country
call it nationalism if one must - is not to be ’idolized’. This
concern for one’s own country does not extend to the defence of
the rights of the aristocracy and the capitalists, nor to the
attack of a smaller and weaker nation. Indeed, the very
existence of nations, they admitted, would naturally lead to
international competitions, wars, and killings; and, they
confessed that the only way such evils can be eliminated would
require the awakening of all the peoples of the world to the
22truth of ta-t * ung.
Such sentiments, nevertheless, should not be taken to mean
a call for the spiritual transformation of human nature, but
merely a political awakening through a proper and gradual
political transformation because they had, by then, accepted a
23materialistic conception of world development, though it may 
not necessarily be a Marxist conception of materialism. As 
further evidence of their practicality, they also accepted the 
continuation of national, indeed sub-national and regional 
differences - even such differences as national and regional
24psychology and dialects - in the foreseeable future.
o 1 C h ’en 'Chin-jih Chung-kuo chib cheng-chihwen-1i’ (China's 
Political Questions of Today) HCN V, 1 (15-VII-1918 ).
o o Ch'en, ’Ou-hsiang p'o-huai lun’ (On the Destruction of Idols) 
HCN V, 2 (13-VIII-1918 ).
Ch'en, 'Jen-sheng chen-i' (The True Meaning of Life) HCN IV,
2 ( 1 5 - H - 1 91 8) ; ’ Yu-kuai lun chih i' (Questioning the Belief in
the Devils) HCN IV, 5 (15-V-1918) and his letter in V, 2 
(15-VTII-1918). His commitment and hopes in a materialistic 
science is another case in point.
24 Ch'en in reply to letter from Tao Lu-kung who suggested the 
adoption of Esperanto. HCN III, 6 ( I-VIII-1917).
Nevertheless it was their hope, and conviction, that the process 
of' evolution would eventually eliminate such nationalistic 
dif ferences.
In the exclusion of the aristocracy and the capitalists - 
2 5ts1ai-chu - from the membership of the nation which they had 
in mind to build, we may be permitted to surmise that if they 
pursued their premises to their logical conclusions, Ch'en and 
the nationalists of his persuasion would be confronted with a 
class struggle. We may argue that China in the second decade of 
the 20th Century had no aristocracy, but to do so would make 
ourselves appear, in the eyes of Ch'en and his colleagues, 
pedantic purists. As we have noted from the reports of their 
social surveys of the rural scene, they likened their own con­
temporary social conditions to that of France just prior to the 
1789 revolution. Furthermore, in their analogy, they regarded 
the Chinese landlord-money-lender class as the 'aristocracy' in 
the Chinese rural setting.
An explanation, however, may be required for the concept of 
ta-t'ung. This need not be a utopian call to return to the 
simplicity of the rural life of some imagined golden past, nor 
the anti-machinery Luddite mentality. Indeed, in the very same 
issue of the HCN which published the article by Ch'en on ta-t1ung 
was another article explaining how machines would promote this
o r~ While ts'ai-chu really means 'the owner of wealth' , the term 
'capitalists' was already used by Ch'en since 1915* Thus I feel 
that to translate ts'ai-chu as 'capitalists’ in here is not 
inappropriate.
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t a -1' ung. The writer specifically dissociated the system he
was advocating from 'that of the ancient Chou Dynasty ... or, 
that of Tolstoy in modern day Russia.' Their new ta-t'ung fully 
advocated the use of machines on the farms and the factories as 
labour-saving devices, thus giving the workers more time for 
recreational and educational activities. What the writer was 
lamenting was that the machines now belong to the rich while the 
majority, the poor, were merely working for the benefits of this 
small rich minority. Under such conditions, it would be proper, 
so the author argued, for the majority to wage a revolution 
against this minority and to overthrow the organisational set-up 
which controls the machines.
Indeed, the author went on, 'This [method of resolving the 
problemj is already so often discussed in books and newspapers 
that there is no need to elaborate here.' Then he went on to 
predict that a violent revolutionary process would occur before 
the workers can finally gain control of the machines from the 
rich. Meanwhile, he advised the workers to obtain more knowledge 
on the workings of the machines and even learn to improve the 
efficiency of the machines, as well as getting themselves united 
and organised. To the author, the revolutionary activities were 
due to commence.
The echoes of The Communist Manj festo arc rove rbe ra I, i tig- 
very clearly in this message to the workers - and the readers of
26 /Wu Cheng-heng 'Chi-ch'i ts'u-chin ta-t'ung hsueh' (The treat
Unity Discourse on the Promotion of Machines), HCN V, 2 (15 Vol.
1918)» reprinted from Lao-tung Chih 1, 5*
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the HCN. The ideological significance of this message, in the 
context of this study, is at least twofold. Firstly, the editors 
of the HCN must have felt that it was a significant message, 
significant enough for them to reprint it from another magazine. 
Secondly, this author used the terms kung-jen and lao-tung jen 
interchangeably to denote the workers of those machines. He was 
certainly not making the distinction between the toilers - those 
working in the fields - and industrial workers - those working 
in the factories - as the Russian communists were wont to do.
If C h ’en and Li, on the eve of the October Revolution, were
making their last anguished calls to the various bickering-
political factions to come together for the sake of the nation,
their sentiments in the months after the October Revolution were
noticeably more radical. As we have noted, their social surveys
emphasized the issue of class differentiation in society and
pointed to a coming class struggle, that is, the emphasis was on
the sharpened struggle between the forces that would bring forth
social betterment and reconstruction on the one hand, and the
forces of continued social corruption on the other. Indeed, by
August 1918, C h ’en felt that the forces controlling the Chinese
27society were practically all evil.
More significant, however, was the statement by Li, ’On
28Comparing the French and Russian Revolution**,’ Here he was
discoursing as an historian in trying to compare an event of the
Ch'en ’ Sui-kan lu’ (Random Thoughts), 21. HCN , V, 2 
( I 5-VIII-I9 1 8 ).
28 Li ’Fa 0 ke-ming chib pi-chiao-kuan’ (A Comparative approach to 
the French and Russian Revolutions), Yen-chili chi-kan No. 2 
(I-VII-I9 1 8 ).
past with a contemporary issue, and attempting, as historians 
are wont to do, to evaluate the historical significance of the 
contemporary controversial issue in an historical context. It 
is important to bear in mind this last mentioned point when 
reading this statement by Li, otherwise there is the danger 
of reading into the statement sentiments which Li might not have 
intended to convey.
In this statement, Li expressed the view that some had tried 
to denigrate the Russian Revolution simply because the slogan of 
the French Revolution was Liberty whilst that of the Russian 
Revolution was Bread. To evaluate history thus, Li felt, was to 
be
ignorant of the fact that the French Revolution 
was the revolution of the 18th Century, that it 
was a revolution to establish nationalism - 
kuo-chia chu-i - that it was a political 
revolution though with the overtones and 
flavours of a social revolution.
The Russian revolution is a revolution of 
the early 20th Century and a revolution based 
on socialism. It is a social revolution as 
well as one bearing the banner of a world 
revolution. Since the spirit of the times 
was different, the nature of the revolutions 
was different, and we cannot evaluate both in 
the same terms.
Li, the professor of history, further explained that:
History is the record of the general expression 
of the thinking people. An authoritative 
history is that which moves the minds of the 
masses. But only that history which reflects 
the thoughts of the masses [of the past] would 
be authoritative in influencing the minds of
(>8
the masses | of todayJ .... The French 
devolution was not only an expression ol' the 
French people changing their minds and 
attitudes but it also changed in the thinking 
of the 1 9 th Century. The Russian Revolution 
is not just a sign of the changes in Russian 
thinking but that of the whole world in the 
20th Century.
He likened such ’reflection’ to the falling leaves being signs 
for the coming of the cool autumn.
He then went on to admonish historians to lift up their
heads to catch the light of this new civilization of the world
and incline their ears to welcome the news of New Russia being
built on liberty and jen-tao - the human1y way; and not to be
saddened by the seeming confusion of the Russian situation of
today. He then urged his fellow historians to seek the new tides 
29of the world.
This statement indicates to us the acceptance, by Li, of the 
October Revolution as a desirable event and that it should be
On this statement by Li, Meisner, 0p .cit. 60-68, has a
different reading. He argued that while Li was emotionally 
committed to the ideals of the October Revolution, he was still 
an idealist, not a materialist. Our main difference seems to 
stem from the interpretation of the term History in Li’s 
statement ’History is the record of the general expression of the 
thinking of the people.’ Meisner took it to mean ’what happened 
in the past’ whereas my reading is that it was referring to the 
’writings of the historians’ and that this article of Li’s was 
aimed at the historians. My reason for this reading stems from 
the very next words Li wrote: ’An authoritative history ...’
My contention is that this article by Li does not permit the 
modern historian to conclude whether Li was then an idealist or 
materialist but that the article was merely an admonition to 
historians on how to evaluate a contemporary issue in an 
historical perspective.
welcomed. Furthermore, it should be welcomed not merely because?
it was the decision of the Russian people but that it was the
harbinger of things to come for the world. As we have noted,
on the eve of the October Revolution, both Ch'en and Li were
lamenting the failure of the republican experiment in China and
they were especially saddened by the unprincipled and impractical
politicians. Their last calls to these people, as we have noted,
were forlorn and they knew that was to be so. Instead of seeing
the political situation in China improving, they saw it
degenerating into warlord anarchy. The Peiyang groups split
amongst themselves, Sun Yatsen gathered his groups of dissenting
parliamentarians and military commanders and headed south to
Canton, and, between these two geographical extreme centres, the
various military men carved out their own domains and spheres of
30influence and interest. "
Thus by the summer of 1918, the political vision of our 
future leaders of the CCP began to clarify. As we have seen, Li 
saw, in July, the October Revolution as the harbinger of the 
liberation of mankind and warned against equating the Allies with 
the representatives of liberty. Furthermore he also saw ’the 
fighters of freedom’ in the Socialist Party of Germany, the 
revolutionaries and strikers in Austria, the young Turk Movement 
of Atuturk, and even the colonials seeking freedom and
} See 0. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China, chapter 2 ’The 
Revolution that failed’, pp.51-80 for a clear and succinct 
description of the political situation of that time. (Columbia 
U.P. 1964).
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independence From the British Empire.~ In August, we Found 
Ch’en excluding the aristocracy/landlords and the capitalists 
From his New Nation. And, by November, when celebrating the 
conclusion oF the Great War, Li proclaimed that the social 
effects of the ’Victory of the Common People’ was democracy - but 
to him, it meant the defeat of capitalism and the victory of 
lao-kung chu-i, the ideology of the workers, just as the
32revolutionaries in Russia and Germany were trying to do.
It was against such an intellectual and socio-political
background that Ch’en and Li began co-editing a new weekly
journal, the Mei-chou p *ing-lun (Weekly Review). It was to be a
forum of political discussion and comment. Its motto was ’For
Justice, Against Hegemony’. In its opening issue, it stated its
declared aim as the promotion of a world society without national
33boundary and one of eternal peace. However, the founders of
this journal were certainly not impractical idealists. On the 
home front, the Review had a message for Tuan Chi-jui and Sun 
Wen. It said that since both Tuan and Sun were fellow-countrymen 
- t * ung-pao - and wanting the same rice to eat, they should share 
the rice so that both may have some.
That message may well be taken as a lighthearted gesture of 
political humour, but Ch'en’s satirical darts, aimed at the 
Diplomatic Corps in Peking and the Peking Government, were
31 Li ’Pan...ism chih shih-paiyii Democracy chih sheng-li’ (The 
Defeat of Pan...ism and the Victory of Democracy') T'ai-ping yang, 
I, io (15- V H - 1918).
32 Li, 'Shu-min ti sheng-li’, HCN V 5 ( 1 5 Nov. 1918) .
 ^* Mei-chou p' ing-lun No. 1 22-XII-1$H8» ’The Manifesto' , written 
by Ch’en Tu-hsiu.
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devastatingly accurate - as well as showing us the editor’s
political attitude. In these statements, again in the opening
34issue, C h 'en demonstrated clearly that he was harbouring no 
illusions concerning the nature of politics, both in China and 
in foreign countries. To him, politics was corrupt for that is 
human nature, especially those aspiring to be politicians. At 
the same time, he saw the Foreign powers as the real power behind 
the Peking Government, hence asked that if the Kaiser was to be 
tried for war crimes, should not someone in China be tried for 
the crimes against China - he clearly had in mind not the Germans 
and Austrians but the existing and still powerful and effective 
Foreign Powers and their puppets, the warlords.
If those were their views at the end of 1918, we should not 
be surprised by their - Li, C h ’en and their colleagues - New
35Year Message for 1919* In it, there are at least two concepts 
worthy of note for us. Firstly, it is the reconciliation between 
Marxism and Darwinism, or evolution and revolution. Secondly, 
having reconciled those two ideas, the authors made a very
C h ’en ’Sui-kan lu’ Mei-chou p ’ing-lun (The Weekly Review)
No.I, (22-XII-1918) .
^  ’Hsin chi yuan’ (New Era), Mei-chou p ’ing-lun No.3 (5-1-1919)* 
This article was written on New Years Day, but unsigned. The 
editors of Li Ta-chao hsüan chi (The Selected Writings of Li 
Ta-cliao) included this article in their collection, pp. 1 1 9 - 1 2 1  
but there is no evidence to support this claim. However, if we 
judge the internal evidences, such as the call for a general 
strike of all workers, we may detect in this Message influences 
of French Syndicalist or German Left Socialist thoughts and Li 
certainly could not claim credit for these influences. On the 
other hand, C h ’en had the reputation of being the Francophile in 
that group of intellectuals and had long professed admiration 
for French Socialism, see his article on The French and Modern 
Culture, I1CN I , I ( 1 5-1.X-19 1 5) • For our purpose, it may suffice 
LI* we re Per to the unnamed author in the collective, ’they’ .
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significant analysis of the international situation and made 
some equally significant proposals.
On the first point, they rejected the hitherto current 
conceptions of evolution, viz, that it is a struggle for the 
survival of the fittest and from which comes the idea that it 
was natural for the strong to annihilate the weak. That is, the 
argument that allows Darwinism to underpin, ideologically, the 
practice of class inequality, and for it to be used as an excuse 
for class exploitation, was denied. On the contrary, they 
argued that in actual fact, the process of natural evolution 
calls for a great degree of mutual help from members of the 
species rather than mutual competition, and therefore, mutual 
help for mutual protection should be the lesson to gain from the 
study of evolution. However, it was greed that drove some of 
the more ambitious to become exploiters and to wage wars amongst 
peoples and nations; and, it was greed that created the situation 
in which a minority class effecting economic exploitation over 
the masses. But such a condition is not natural and such 
injustices must be eliminated. The means to make the change, 
they argued, was revolution, and through this process of 
revolution, ’construct the system of production’ so that the 
'robbers of labour surplus [value] would be eliminated'.
Having come to this position, they then informed their 
readers that while:
Previously, in a production system under 
capitalism anyone intending to expand the power of 
the capitalist class of his nation will resort to 
war to break the confines of national boundary so 
as to gather the whole world under one economic
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organisation and putting it under his own 
capitalist government to control. From now on, 
the system of production has started an extremely 
great change. The labouring class wants to form 
a union of the proper producers. [They want toj 
break down national boundaries, and to overthrow 
the capitalist class of the world. Their weapon 
is the general strike of the grand union of the 
workers. This new era of the world revolution, 
it is the new era of mankind.
And, after having come to this position, they then felt that in 
this 'new era of awakening .... even in the darkened China and 
moribund Peking ... we should make use of this ray of light, and 
strive to help mankind to go forward and work for the benefit of 
mankind.'
Now, some of the exhortations may well be discounted as the 
traditional grandiloquences of new year messages. However, in 
reconciling Marxism and Darwinism and in placing so much faith in 
the revolutionary spirit of the working class - lao-kung chieh- 
chi - we may detect the sentiments of the German Left Socialists, 
such as Anton Pannekoek and Rosa Luxemburg, as well as, perhaps, 
being further evidence that the message was, if not entirely 
written by C h ’en, strongly influenced by him. That Ch'en had 
tried to reconcile Marxism and Darwinism was obvious and he was 
to be even more explicit in this shortly afterwards in his now 
famous reply to young T s 'ai Ho-sen.
The sentiments of this Message, on the reconciliation of 
Marxism and Darwinism, can almost be read as a synopsis of a
*(> Ch'en 'Correspondence Section', HCN IX, 4 ( 1 -VXLl-I 9'~ I ) .
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tract by the same title, Marxism and Darwinism by Anton
Pannekoek, the Dutch Socialist who sided with Luxemburg and was
a publicist, since 1 906 , for the German Social Democratic
37Party. This pamphlet was available in a Chinese translation 
in early 1921. It was translated by Shih Ts'un-tung, a colleague 
of Ch'en and later to be a leading figure of the Communist Youth
Corps which was also noted for its Leftist expressions and
. • 38actions.
However, even if we decide to regard C h ’en as the author 
of the New Year Message, we should not conclude from that Message 
that C h ’en was not aware of the realities of the Chinese 
situation. After all, new year messages do have the tendency to 
be rather sweeping, though we may detect the general ideological 
perspective of the writer(s) from such messages. In the very
37 Pannekoek's sociological analysis had been very influential 
among the left-wing socialists and he had often debated with 
Kautsky and Lenin. The latter also reviewed Pannekoek’s very 
important pamphlet Tactical Differences in the Labour Movement 
in Zvezda No.1 D e c . 1 9 1 0 ( s e e L e n i n ’s Collected Works V 0I.I6 , 
p p .347-332). I should like to acknowledge a great intellectual 
debt to Mrs. Marian Sawer of the History of Ideas Unit of this 
University for supplying me with evidence to support my 
suspicions that the sentiments of this Message and further 
writings by Ch'en may be found in the writings of Pannekoek.
Ch'en and the Communist/Socialist Youth Corps in China had 
revered the memories of Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. In 1920 
the Youth Corps in Canton, newly founded by ch'en staged a 
procession in memory of their heroes’ martyrdom. Unfortunately, 
some of the populace seemed to have confused the two martyrs 
with a missionary couple in China. (See C h ’en Kung-po The 
Communist Party and 1 , p.17* This is from a Hong Kong edition
of 1971, published by Ch'un Ch'iu). For Luxemburg's ideas, a 
succinct account may be found in J.P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg
o u p  1966).
o  O
 ^ Pannekoek’s pamphlet was available in an English translation 
in 1912 (Chicago ^c)^2) and the Chinese translation was published 
by the Commercial Press as a title of their Kung-hsueh-she 
collections.
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next issue of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun, Ch'en again directed his
attacks onto the now special duo of targets - the Foreign Powers
and their local agents, the Warlords. He was attacking them for
their destructive and reactionary policies, that is, Ch'en was
again arguing in his old 'nationalist’ line - the building of a
lovable state which would deserve the love and respect of the
citizens; or, for the citizens to build such a state if the
present one falls short of that standard. From such an
ideological position, it is not difficult to understand the easy
acceptance of the idea of a National Revolution agaHnst
Imperialism and Warlordism. The guns were already trained to
that direction while Ch'en and his colleagues were already seeing
the coming struggle in terms of class struggle. The objective
realities were present, all that was required was new labels.
They were, through their writings, intellectually at war with
the Foreign Powers and warlords and it was but a small step to
39consolidate such intellectual endeavours into ideologies.
At this point, it is necessary to examine the contemporary 
meaning of some of the terms used by the Chinese writers. In 
1919» our future leaders of the CCP were concurrently voicing
39 Ch'en was most active in making political comments in this 
journal. He made an attack on the Foreign Powers and the 
Warlords in No.4 (12-1-1919) and in No.8 (7-11-1919) Woodrow 
Wilson and his Fourteen Points were attacked, for impractical 
idealism. Ch'en was certainly not trying to promote the politics 
of the Anglo-American system in China, as Schwartz & Meisner, 
have been alleging. In the last mentioned issue, he regarded the 
victors of the Great War as 'worse than the Bolsheviks'. In 
No. hi ( 2-111-1919)» Ch'en attacked the idea of international 
control or influence over Chinese enterprises or territory.
7<>
their approval for democracy or a democratic form of government 
as well as proposing an anti-bourgeois class struggle involving 
a social revolution with the worker-peasant class - lao-tung 
chieh-chi - rising up against the capitalist class. Such 
apparent contradictions have to be explained. Furthermore, in 
1919* a great and influential exponent of Western-styled 
democracy, John Dewey, was visiting China and was closely 
associated with our Peita-based intellectual-political leaders. 
Indeed, by the end of 19^9» Ch'en published an article entitled
4o’The Basis for the Realization of Democracy’ in which he 
discussed the ideas of Dewey and Bertrand Russell who was also 
visiting China at that time. Therefore, we are confronted with
41at least three alternatives, viz, that C h ’en was a Deweyite, 
that C h ’en had a special, non-Deweyite connotation for democracy, 
or, that C h ’en simply did not understand the issues involved.
The last alternative cannot be seriously entertained. The 
contention that is being put forward here is that if we trace 
the intellectual development of C h ’en during 19^9» the second 
option is the logical explanation. As Li and Ch'en were to 
become more and more involved with a social revolutionary 
movement that was to be based on class antagonism, there is a 
need for us to examine the nature of class and democracy in 
their understanding.
C h ’en, published in HCN VII, 1 (1-XII-1919)•
41 Schwartz, O p .cit. , p.22 & Meisner, O p .cit. pp.112-113 take 
the view that in this article Ch'en was a Deweyite.
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As has been noted in the early issues of the Weekly Review, 
judging from the New Year Message, C h ’en must be regarded as 
anti-capitalist. As the leading member of the Weekly Review 
group and its managing editor, that Message would not have 
contradicted his own views. Then, in subsequent issues in 
February and March 1919 of that journal, he demonstrated, 
repeatedly, his aversion to the Great Powers’ political and 
economic exploitation of China. He was certainly not thinking 
of any Anglo-American model for China.
Li was just as explicit if not more so. By February 1919 
he felt that democracy had lost out in the U.S.A. and that the 
capitalist class was in control and hence the exploitation, not
42only of others but of their own masses. However, though he
felt that the exploited were inclined towards Bolshevism and 
that such a trend was a world trend, Li would still make the 
following statement, without sensing any apparent contradiction:
Today everybody wants to develop according 
to democracy. The present era is the era of 
democracy.^
It seems, therefore, that both Ch'en and Li had their own 
definition of democracy which was rather different from the 
understanding of that term by their contemporaries in the Anglo- 
Yinerican world, or even by some of our own contemporaries. Lt 
was unlikely that Ch’en and Li did not understand the meaning of
4 *2 Li ’ChanHhou chih shih-chieh iCh&o-liu* (The Post-war 
tendencies of the world), Shen Pao (The Morning Post), , 8-1 I -
1919.
4 3 Li ' Lao-tung chiao-yii wen-ti’ (Problems of Labour Fd lira I. i on ) , 
Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.9 (16-11-1919)*
/
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the term. To say so would be patronizing as well as ignorant. 
Their knowledge of the English language was never challenged. 
Ch’en had published a four-volume reader of the English language
44a little earlier.
In his discussion of the Problems of Labour Education, Li 
expressed the view that the labour problems of the post-war 
world were linked with the problem of democracy, or the lack of 
democracy. In his view, much of the just rewards of the workers 
- lao-kung - were taken from them by the capitalists. And, in 
his view, a true democracy is one in which all share equally the 
benefits and opportunities resulting from their collective 
production - sheng ch * an.
Another concept from our subjects that was originated
in these early months of 1919 and was to claim great attention
later in their political career was national liberation. This
is not unnatural especially when they were then openly denouncing
those politicians and capitalists who insisted upon ’the
principles of imperialism’ - ti-kuo chu-i. It was not that our
subjects were against law and peace for Ch’en, in the eleventh
issue of the Weekly Review, had said that they would respect law
and peace, conditionally. They would not blindly idolize law
and peace if these concepts were to become instruments of 
45exploitation. Two weeks later, in the Social Comments column
of the Review, the editors took advantage of a comment on a
44 / xCh'en, Mo-fan Ying-wen chiao-pen (Model English Text). This 
is a four-volume text on the English language. An advertisement 
of this study can be found in the HCN V 6 (15-XII-1918).
^J Ch’en ’Wo-ti kuo-nai ho-p*ing i-chien’ (My Views on National 
Peace) Mei-chou p ’ing-lun No.11 (2-111-1919)*
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discourse by Hu Shih on ’Pragmatism and William James" to 
elucidate further their position on imperialism and the national 
liberation movement. Having rejected H u ’s arguments, the writer 
asked, rhetorically:
How can there be international peace when 
governments are organized by politicians and 
capitalists on the principles of imperialism 
and ch’an-yeh chu-il
Therefore, Peace and Pragmatism are but
46dud cheques to cheat the people.
Having taken such an ideological position on international
economics and politics, it is only natural that our subjects
would extend their support to the various independence and
liberationist movements - tu-li tzu-yu yun-tung. The various
liberation movements they encouraged included the Irish, Korean,
Egyptian, and most important in the Chinese context, the
47Mongolian. Probably alone amongst the various contemporary
politically vocal groups, these future communists defended the 
Mongolians’ aspiration for national independence and they also 
were alone in not regarding Mongolia. as being part of China. 
Indeed they argued that the first duty for China was to help the
5 ’Social Comments' Mei-chou p'ing-lun N o .13 (16-111-1919)*
The term ch’an-yeh chu-i really has no exact English equivalent. 
Taken in context, the nearest explanation in modern usage would 
be the belief or ideology behind the multi-national industrial 
enterprises. Or, putting it more tritely, a rough proximation 
would be ’what is good for the industries is good for all.’
47 Ch’en again took the lead with an article entitled, ’Hsueh- 
sheng yii tu-li yun-tung’ (Students and the Independence 
Movement), Mei-chou p'ing-lun N o .14 (23-111-1919)* Then, in 
No. 13 3O - I H - I 9 1 9) there was an editorial article entitled 
’Min-chu tzu-chiieh chu-i' (The Ideology of National/People’s 
Independence).
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Mongolians to self-rule, 'after all, the Mongolians had not 
really received any Chinese beneficience'. To do anything less 
would be to behave like the Great Powers, they argued. Therefore, 
we may say that it is only to be expected that when the Review 
introduced the Communist Manifesto in its Book Review column, 
the reviewer would agree with Marx and Engels that democracy 
meant the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that every nation 
would achieve this happy state under its own conditions and
.. . 48methods.
It should be with such an intellectual and ideological 
preamble that we should discuss Ch'en's oft-quoted essay on 
'The Basis for the Realization of Democracy'. Here, far from 
being a Deweyite, we find Ch'en rejecting the ideas of Russell 
and Dewey as 'not thorough enough'. He was affecting much 
modesty in his reply to the visiting wise men from the West.
But our wise man in the East proposed his own, and by implication 
more thorough solution to achieve democracy - a solution more 
suited to the objective realities in China. And, as we have 
noted, the scheme that Ch'en proposed was more akin to what the 
sailors of Kronstadt fought and died for, or what Anton Panriekoek 
had envisaged than anything to be found in Russell's England or 
Dewey's U.S.A. In any case, at the time of writing, Ch'en had 
completed his first experience of incarceration at the hands of
49the Peking government and had probably fled to Shanghai.
48 , . >Book Review Section Mei-chou-p'ing-lun N o .15 (6-IV-1919)*
49 /See Chiang Meng-lin, 'T 'an Chung-kuo hsin-wen-i yun-tung' (A
Discourse on the Chinese Literary Movement) Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh
(Biographical Literature), XX, No.3 (Sept.1 9^7) pp•107-10 8 .
Chiang was a fellow professor at the Peking University and a
personal friend of Ch'en. It was Chiang who notified Ch'en that
What is at issue is more than the rectification of names or
to debate with modern scholars, but to find out the intellectual
and ideological development of those who later became the
leaders of the CCP. A study of the timing of the intellectual
development of these people will cast some light on the external
factors, if any, which might have influenced them. Much has been
said by scholars on the importance of the May 4th Incident, the
May 4th Movement, and the publication of the Manifesto on China
on the 25th July 1919* commonly known as the Karakhan Manifesto
on the intellectual and ideological development of these future
50members of the CCP. That these events did have their
influence is not denied here. What is attempted to argue here 
is that our subjects had already decided that there was a 
necessity for a socio-political revolution based on class 
struggle and class antagonism before 4th May 1919* and that they 
had taken this decision independently through their observation 
of the objective reality of China and their knowledge of socio­
political developments in the historical and international 
scenes. Subsequent events such as the May 4th Incident and the 
Karakhan Manifesto and so forth had the effect of reaffirming 
their decisions and making them more determined to bring their 
convictions to reality and fruition.
the police were again trying to arrest him (Ch’en) and advised 
the latter to flee to Shanghai. Also see Chang Kuo-tao, ’Wo ti 
hui-i’ (My Recollections) Ming-pao No.5, p.64. While neither 
gave the exact date of C h ’en*s departure for Shanghai, we know 
that Chang was sent to Shanghai by Li to discuss political 
matters with C h ’en towards the end of December 1919- 
50 For a succinct account, see Chow Tse-tung’s The May Fourth 
Movement ch.VIII and IX (Harvard U.P. i960).
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Scholars have not questioned the conversion of Li to 
Marxism prior to the 4th May 1919* Therefore, the main burden 
of this proposition is to demonstrate that not only Li but the 
significant portion of his colleagues, especially those 
associated with the Mei-chou p'ing-lun were like-minded. As 
that journal was founded specially as a forum for expressing 
their political views, then an examination of the issues, leading- 
up to the 4th May 19^9* would be of vital importance to this 
proposition.
A fortnight after the book reviewer of the journal equated 
democracy with the dictatorship of the proletariat, Ch'en offered 
the opinion that the Bolshevik Revolution, like the French 
Revolution in the 18th Century, would be the turning point in
the 20th Century for the evolution and changes in human
51society. A week later, he felt that the moderates of the world
52were gradually becoming radicalized. Then, on the very next
issue, the journal published - on the 4th May - an editorial 
urging a socio-political revolution in China based on class 
antagonism. This editorial bears the title:
Chung-kuo shih-ta-fu chieh-chi ti tsui-o 
An approximate translation may be: The Crimes of the Scholar- 
gentry class of China. There is no exact English equivalent for 
the shih-ta-fu and the leader writer acknowledged that it was a 
uniquely Chinese phenomenon. More important for our discussion, 
the fact that nowhere in this issue of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun
C h ’en, ’Random Thoughts' Mei-chou p ’ing-lun No. I 8 (20-JV-19 I 9)• 
'Random Thoughts', Ibid, No. I 9 (28-1V-1) 19)•
51
52 Ch’en,
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was the Shantung Question being discussed. This question, which 
was the immediate cause of the May 4th Incident, claimed the 
attention of the entire next two issues of the journal.
Therefore, we may deduce from these facts that the sentiments of 
the editorial of the 4th May issue were not primarily aroused by 
the events leading up to the May 4th Incident. On the contrary, 
a case may be put that they were conclusions and results of the 
observations of the realities in China by the responsible 
members of the editorial board of the journal.
In surveying the history of revolutions in Europe, this
editorial claimed that this history showed two distinctive
periods and types. Firstly, in the 18th and 19th Centuries were
the Capitalist Revolutions in which the bourgeoisie was pitted
against the nobility. These were the political revolutions. The
second or contemporary type was the proletarian revolution, and
was a socio-economic revolution with world-wide significance,
including China. The Chinese, the editorial went on, wished to
have a social revolution now. The editorial observed that:
The revolution in China has to raise the 
[political] matters of Europe's First 
Revolutions except that the revolutionaries 
in China have to be the lao-nung class,
(that is, the workers and peasants classes) 
and not the capitalist class. The target of 
the revolution [in China] will not be the 
nobility but one resembling the nobility as 
well as the capitalists: the shih-ta-fu
class (the Scholar-gentry class), the only 
one in the world.
It went on to give two reasons for this anaylsis. Firstly, the 
nobility in China had disappeared since tin; end of the Chou
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Dynasty. And, 'what the society now lias is this shih-ta- Tu 
class who has held the power of distribution in China for two 
thousand years, as well as all the political and social 
positions. The sole aim of their corrupt existence is the 
acquisition of power and influence. Their character cannot even 
be compared to the animals.' Their second reason was that apart 
from the true lao-ning classes, everyone else aspired to become 
a shih-ta-fu.
Therefore, the revolution must be started by 
the lao-nung classes. Unless this shih-ta-fu 
class is overthrown we can never have healthy 
and clean politics and society in China?nor 
will our bitter existence be alleviated. We 
would have no hope for improvement.
The reason that the 1911 Revolution brought forth no good result,
reasoned the editorial, was that apart from removing the emperor,
it left intact this distributing class. Then, as if to re-assure
its readers that such was not an impossible dream, it claimed
that :
When the time comes to establish our revolution, 
it will be easier than the social revolution in 
Russia, Germany, Austria, and Hungary because in 
those countries the capitalist class has great 
power and thus difficult to overthrow.
In our China, because the economy is not 
developed, we have few large capitalists. This 
point is one fortunate aspect in China's 
unfortunate conditions.
This perspective of the world and the Chinese revolution 
could not have been a sinicized version of the Leninist Thesis
presented at the Second Congress of the Communist International
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because Lenin presented his Thesis fourteen months after the 
publication of this editorial. Unwittingly, this editorial might 
well have been the Chinese response to Engels' conjectures as the 
latter expressed to Kautsky in a letter:
In my opinion ... countries inhabited by a 
native population, which are simply subjugated - 
India, Algeria, etc. - must be taken over for 
the time being by the proletariat and led as 
rapidly as possible towards independence. How 
this process will develop is difficult to say.
India will perhaps, indeed very probably, make 
a revolution ... the same might also take place 
elsewhere ... and would certainly be the best 
thing for us ...
But as to what social and political phases
these countries will then have to pass through
before they likewise arrive at socialist
organisation, I think we today can advance only
53rather idle hypothesis.
The editorial of the Mei-chou p'ing-lun, dated the 4th May, may
well be regarded as the Chinese answer to the surmises of Engels.
Perhaps, in their own way, they were trying to grasp that
54opportunity which Marx said the Russians were losing.'
^  Engels to Kautsky, 12-IX-1882. Cited from Shlomo Avineri, 
(ed.) Karl Marx on Colonialism & Modernization, p.473 (Anchor 
Book, NY 1989)*
54 Marx to the Editors of 0techestvenniye Zapiski, Nov.1877, in 
which Marx said: ’I have arrived at this conclusion: if Russia
continues to pursue the path she has followed since 1 861 , she 
will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a people 
and undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime.' 
Cited from Avineri, Ibid, p.468.
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Not long alter the publication of that editorial, Ch'en was 
arrested in Peking for distributing handbills which protested
5 5against the arrest of the students. ' It was upon his release
that he published his study on democracy. His flight to Shanghai
meant that he was able to devote his time and energy completely
to his political and revolutionary activities. He even went so
far as to say, in the same issue of the HCN that published his
study on democracy, that it was the anti-Bolshevik Powers and not
the Soviet Russia or the German Marxists that had disrupted world
peace. The revolutionaries merely wanted to build their lao-nung
(workers-peasants) government. Of ideological interest is
Ch’en's use of lao-nung to describe the government the German
5 6Marxists were trying to bring about.
5 5' ' To get an idea of Ch’en's genuine enthusiasm from a 
contemporary anti-communist observer, see Hu Shih, 'Ch’en Tu-hsiu 
yii wen-hsueh ke-ming' (Ch'en tu-hsiu and the Literary Revolution) 
in Ch'en Tu-hsiu p’ing-lun (Critiques on Ch'en Tu-hsiu) ed.
Ch'en Tung-hsiao (Peiping 1933)»
K g
Ch'en ' Kuo-chi-pfe i yii shih-chieh ho-f>*ing • (The Bolsheviki and 
World Peace', HCN VII 1 (1-XII-19 19), pp.113- 116. 'The Basis
for the Realization of Democracy' was in pp.13-21 of the same 
issue.
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Part 2 After May 4th : Practical Revolutionary Politics
While Ch'en was constrained by circumstances to leave 
academia and soon to take up the like of a practicing 
revolutionary, it is well for us to investigate what his future 
collaborators, the KMT, were thinking. At the time when Ch'en 
was imprisoned, the KMT founded a new theoretical monthly 
journal, the Chien-she (Reconstruction). In its early issues, 
we find their leading theoretician, Hu Han-min discussing at
57some length certain aspects of Marxism. In these studies, Hu
had shown himself to be quite well read in the writings of Marx 
and Engels, including Das Kapital Vol.III and some of Engel's 
letters in the 1890's, as well as the writings of the European 
Marxists and their critics.
These studies showed that Hu had accepted a mechanistic 
version of the materialistic conception of history. That is, he 
accepted the general Marxist theory on the relation of economics 
and historico-political development and even the various stages 
of political development. While Marx and Engels, as we have 
noted, had, at times, shown suitable vagueness on the political 
future of the Eastern world - Marx, after all, had never insisted 
that he was making a revolutionary prescription for all the world 
- Hu, on the other hand, seemed to have accepted the more 
mechanistic thoughts of the European Marxists. Consequently, he 
was at odds with some of the political implications of Marxism.
er ' Iiu Han-min ' Chung-kuo che-hsueh shih chih wei-wu ti yen-chiu' 
(A Materialistic study of the history of Chinese philosophy) 
Chien-she (Reconstruction) I 3 & 4 (Oct & Nov 1919)* And, 'Wei- 
wu shih-kuan p'i-p'ing chih p'i-p'ing' (A Critique of the 
Criticism of the Materialistic Conception of History) J 5 (Dec.
1919)•
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II is acceptance of a mechanistic materialistic conception of' 
history ideologically constrained him to the conclusion that as 
China was not a capitalist society, a socialist revolution could 
not be brought about until the capitalist stage was realized, 
and then, had to wait until capitalism collapsed of its own 
internal contradiction. Furthermore, he was not convinced of 
the necessity for class struggle in China.
But the KMT of that time was a mansion of many rooms.
Though Hu was a party member of long standing as well as being 
a theoretician of repute, his ideas were immediately challenged, 
and indeed rejected, by a comrade of equal standing and repute.
The dissenter was Feng Tzu-yu. Feng’s reply was written almost 
immediately after the publication of H u ’s studies and was
58published as his New Year message for 1920 in Hong Kong.
While Feng never achieved great political power and is now 
better known as a member of a KMT Right during the first 
collaboration period of the Canton National Government, his ideas 
expressed in this Message were of great significance in the 
history of Chinese communism. Though he was soon to reject many 
of his own ideas, the seeds sown seemed to have germinated and 
flourished. Understandably, due credit was not given. For 
these reasons, we shall have a careful examination of Feng’s 
ideas in order to determine the extent to which the CCP had made 
use of them and attempted to realize them.
^  Feng Tzu-yu, ’She-hui chu—i ytt Chung—kuo (Socialism and China).
Written on the 15 Dec.1919 ana published as the New Year 
Supplement of the Hsiang-chiang Ch ’en-pao (Hsiang-chiang morning 
post) in Hong Kong, 1-1-1920. It was re-issued as a pamplil e t on 
the 20th IV 1920, also in Hong Kong.
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Feng argued that though China’s capitalists were weaker 
than the European and American counterpart, the lao-tung ehe 
(workers), should not wait until the consolidation of capitalism 
before launching their own socialist revolution. On the 
contrary, the workers should try to establish socialist policies 
during the period of political revolution. In his scheme of
59things, China was undergoing a political revolution.
As to the charges that for China to try to establish 
socialism now would violate the Marxist stages of historical 
development, Feng replied that the Russian success at the 
October Revolution had demonstrated that a socialist revolution 
could be successful during the early periods of capitalism.
Indeed, he countered his detractors by saying that when Marx and 
Engels issued the Communist Manifesto, capitalism in Germany was 
still in its infancy. As if to demonstrate China's readiness 
and suitability for a socialist revolution, Feng described his
conception of Chinese capitalists. They were: the militarists,
■
the high-ranking bureaucrats, and the Overseas Chinese merchant - 
investors operating in China. Incidentally, his capitalists in 
Russia were: the nobility, the large landlords, the high-ranking
churchmen, the senior militarists and bureaucrats/^ In his view, 
the Chinese workers - lao-tung ehe - had suffered enough and 
action was needed immediately. As we have seen, this argument 
rc^sembled very closely the 4th May 1919 editorial of the Mei-chou 
p 'ing-lun.
59
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Ibid. p .4 (The 1920 pamphlet edition).
Ibid. pp.14-15»
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As to tlio method of revolution, lie placed great emphasis on 
propaganda. The audience of his message would be the workers, 
peasants, and soldiers because these 1'ormed the overwhelming 
majority of' the people - jen-min. The similarities with later 
Chinese communist thoughts are all too obvious for elucidation.
A successful revolution, argued Feng, must have the understanding 
and active participation of this majority. He was prepared to 
work through parliamentary procedures to achieve 
collectivization which was to be the first step towards the 
building of communism. But if the parliamentary procedures were 
to be thwarted by the enemies of the people, there would be no 
hesitation to use force to conduct this class struggle and to 
obtain victory. He saw these steps to be unavoidable for China 
and the world.^
In his perception, the era of imperialism was drawing to
an end and now the era of 'nationalism1 was at hand, but this
was to be a new type of nationalism whose aim was to break down
national boundaries and work towards cosmopolitanism, and the
elimination of the state. There would be a new national
constitution which would nationalize land and abolish private
control of the means of production, and establish a proletarian
government. For, in his view, the majority of the people already
62belonged to the proletariat! class.
6 1
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Ibid. p p .23-24.
Ibid. pp.27-30*
Feng reminded his readers that his ideas were extensions oF 
those of his Min-pao days back in Tokyo. J It seems, therefore, 
that while China cannot be said to have a Marxist-Social- 
Democratic tradition, it is not altogether correct to say that 
'those who came into the Communist fold in China were committed 
to a 'Marxist' revolution long before they had accepted even the
64basic assumptions of the Marxist world view.' As we have seen,
the debates amongst the European Social-Democrats between 1905" 
1917 were re-enacted in China before the formation of the first 
CCP group in May 1920. For our purposes, another aspect of 
Feng's discourse may be of note. Feng pointed out that the 
workers-peasants-soldiers alliance was not only the alliance of 
the overwhelming majority of the oppressed people of China but 
an alliance of the proletarian classes of China. In short, Feng 
saw the Chinese population containing an overwhelming majority 
of proletarians. In spite of this, Feng still felt the need to 
explain to his readers that to have a socialist revolution in 
China need not wait for full industrialization. To Feng at 
least, and presumably to many of his readers, the 'proletariat' 
need not refer to those who work in the Satanic Mills. Thus, 
from an entirely different source, the concept that China was 
overwhelmingly a 'proletarian nation' was being introduced to 
the politically conscious public. Indeed, the message from Feng
6 3 I bid. p.3 in which Feng reminded his readers to compare his 
1919/1920 ideas with his 1906 ideas in Min-pao No.4, 'Min-sheng 
chu-i yii Chung-kuo cheng-chih ke-ming chih ch'ien-t'u (The 
Principle of the People's Livelihood and the Future of China's 
Political Revolution).
94 Meisner O p .cit. p.56.
was published on the very same day as the more famous one -
ö ithat is, to modern scholars - given by Li Ta-chao.
To conduct a social revolution, however, needs detailed 
knowledge of the social conditions and organisation. As we have 
noted, the HCN had begun publishing reports of social surveys 
before the imprisonment of Ch'en. In the four months after his 
release, the HCN published four reports, a chart to advise 
would-be surveyors the type of questions to ask, a discussion on 
the establishment of a rural bank to protect the peasants from 
the exploitation of the usurers, and providing assistance in the 
promotion of a programme for the education of the workers. Then, 
on the issue celebrating May Day, fifteen survey reports were 
published.
Ch'en was not only publishing reports by others, but
apparently, was also busying himself propagating the message to
6 6the workers of Shanghai. At the same time, he and Li were very
concerned with organizational problems, or more exactly, the; lack 
of organizational experience and experienced personnel. During 
these months, Ch'en not only pleaded for a greater sense of 
organization from the supporters of the New Cultural Movement '
I
6 5 Li 'Yu ching-chi shang chieh-shih Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu- 
hsiang pien-tung ti yuan-yin' (An economic explanation of the 
Causes of the Changes in Modern Chinese Thought) HCN VII (1-1— 
1920). Meisner, Op.cit. p.144 discussed Li's article at some
1ength.
Ch'en 'Lao-tung che ti chüeh-wu' (The Awakening of the Workers) 
HCN VII 6 (1 V 1920). This is a resume of a speech he gave to 
the maritime workers and in which he exhorted them to be aware 
or their ultimate objectives: not only just for improved working
conditions, but 'the control of politics, military, industries, 
and to occupy the position of the rulers.'
/i ry
Ch'en 'Hsin wen-hua yün-tung shih shih-mo?'
Cultural Movement?) HCN VII 5 (1-IV-1920).
(Wha t is t he N ew
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but when the Educational Programme for the Workers failed, both
he and Li placed the blame on organizational defects, though
others blamed the capitalist system.^
It was not that Ch'en underrated the oppressive nature of
the capitalist system, he had shown every evidence of this
6 9awareness at the time. However, his sentiments should be taken
as evidence for his concern for the practical problems entailed 
in the launching of a social revolution. This former professor 
was then 40 years old and quite experienced in the requirements 
in the organizing of revolutionary activities, or in making 
radical social changes. And, as we have noted, he was in close 
liaison with other revolutionaries, including Sun Yatsen who also 
contributed to the May Day issue of the HCN. Ch'en and his 
followers were also active in organizing party cells and labour 
unions in many parts of the country. For the future development 
of the party, a language school was formed, with the help of 
their Russian comrade Voitinsky, in Shanghai to prepare promising 
young comrades for study and training in Russia. As if to 
provide the ultimate evidence for his belief in being practical
See HCN VII 5 (1-IV-1920) which has a collection of opinions 
by people concerned with the founding of this Programme. Tai 
Chi-t'ao, who joined the first CCP group which Ch'en founded in 
May 1920 but soon left and was later to become a leading 
theoretician of the KMT Right, put the blame on the capitalist 
system. The reasons for failure given by Li and Ch'en are also 
included in this collection. Chiang Kai-shek contributed $10 to 
the Programme while Shih Ts'un-t'ung, the translator of Anton 
Pannekoek, took an active part in the Programme. For more detail, 
see HCN VII 3 (1-II-1920).
69 See HCN VII 5 for his reasons for the Programme's failure, and 
his article on the Shanghai textile industry in the next issue,
VII 6. In both cases, he accused the capitalists of robbing the 
labourers' surplus value.
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and working within the bounds of possibility, rather than being
exclusive, he left the editorship of his HCN at the hands of the
translator of the Communist Manifesto and sailed to Canton to
70serve as Education Commissioner for Ch'en Chiung-ming. There, 
Ch'en quickly formed a cell and initiated a magazine, the 
Lao-tung Sheng (Voice of Labour) as the party organ to propagate
7 1his message to the workers.
In 1920, the Chinese communists had not only given us an
indication of what we may expect of their future political
activities, they had also given us some clear indications of
their future ideological orientation. The newly formed first
unit of the CCP published its own journal, appropriately titled
The Communist (Kung-ch'an tang) while Ch'en, Li and their
colleagues kept up a prolific rate of writing.
In the first issue of the HCN after the formation of the
72CCP, Ch’en gave us a discussion of his political views. Here,
Ch'en not only repudiated all those Chinese intellectuals who 
advised against discussing politics, such as Chang Tung-sun and 
Hu Shih, but repudiated all other forms of political ideas except 
Marxism. Not only did he regard the dictatorship of the
 ^ Ch’en sailed on the 16-XII-1920. On the day of departure, he 
wrote to Hu Shih informing the latter of the arrangement 
concerning the HCN. The Translator was Ch'en Wang-tao. This 
letter was reprinted in Chang Ching-lu (ed.) Chung-kuo hsien-tai 
ch'u-pan shih-liao (Historical Materials of Modern Chinese 
Publications) 1^ p.7•
^^ See Ch'en Kung-po Han feng chi (The Tales of Cold Winds)
pp.205-212.
^  Ch'en 'T'an chi&ig-chih' (Talking about politics) HCN VIII 1 
(1 IX 1920). There was a gap of four months between this issue 
and the previous one (l-V-1920).
proletariat, alter a class struggle between the capitalist class 
and the workers ( lao-tung ehe) as the true Torrn of democracy, 
but also repudiated Revisionist Socialism - that which seeks to 
bring about socialism through the ballot box and parliamentary 
means. To him, the state, politics and the law were but tools 
now in the hands of the capitalists. He felt that revolutionary 
methods were required to get these tools from the hands of the 
capitalists in order to build the proletarian state. The same 
issue also has three articles introducing different aspects of 
life in Soviet Russia, and three reports of social surveys on 
various provinces as well as a report on Hong Kong Strikes. 
Finally, in reply to an inquiry from a reader, Ch'en advised that 
the liberation of the worker, youth (from old ideas), and women 
(in order that they may achieve their equality and rights) could 
only be brought about by class struggle, for he saw these
7 3injustices as expressions of the contemporary economic system.
As an indicator of contemporary public opinion, a full-page 
cigarette advertisement inserted in this issue, byr the Nanyang 
Brothers Tobacco Co., is quite revealing. It is entitled 'The 
Truth about Liberation!' The picture depicts a girl with hands 
bound behind her back and hung by her legs over a cliff. The 
caption reads: ’Sir! Do you want to realize Liberation? Please
take note of the picture and the words.’
The 'words’ explain that China is just like that girl, bound 
hands and feet by foreign loans and capital. To retrieve the 
lost rights to the foreign Powers, all patriots were urged to buy
 ^^ Ch'en 'Lan-to ti hsin-li' (The Psychology of Laziness) UCN 
VIII 2 (Random Thoughts) 1-X-1920.
Chinese products. In short, the advertisers openly appealed to 
the patriotism and economic nationalism of the public to buy 
their cigarettes - arguing that such purchases would be a 
contribution towards retrieving the political and economic rights 
lost to foreign Powers. If the business men would make use of 
patriotism and economic nationalism to advertise their wares, 
then similar appeals by the political propagandists must be 
regarded as judicious adoption of ideas whose time have come.
However, Ch'en was under no illusion that what he had just
embarked upon would bring forth quick success. Looking back at
the recent failures of idealistic projects, such as the Peking
Workers Education Programme, the various cooperative societies,
the students’ New Culture propagation projects, the learned
professor-turned-revolutionary warned against any expectations
of quick results. He counselled that success would come only
74after great endeavours.
Between the formation of the first unit of the CCP in May 
1920 and the departure of Ch’en to Canton on the 16th December 
of the same year, units were formed in Peking and Wuhan. At the 
same time, in Shanghai, the Socialist Youth Corps was founded in 
August as well as a language school while two trade unions, each 
with its own house journal, were also established before the end 
of 1920.75
Ch’en ’Lan-to ti hsin-li’ (The Psychology of Laziness) HCN 
VIII 2 (Random Thoughts) 1-X-1920.
75 Both formed in September 1920 while the Kwangtung unit was 
formed in December, presumably after the arrival of Ch’en in 
Canton, and in Changsha, a unit was formed in 'spring of 1921'. 
See Chung-kuo kung-ch1an-tang li-shih chien-pien (A Short History 
of the Chinese Communist Party), p.21.
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Contemporaneous to all these, the Shanghai unit, apart from 
publishing the already mentioned official organ The Communis t . 
also established a workers’ broadsheet, the Lao-tung chieli (The 
Workers ) . The Peking group responded with one entitled Lao-tung1 
ehe (The Workers) while C h ’en ’s group in Canton published the 
Lao-tung Sheng (The Workers’ Voice) and Lao-tung yii Tu-nii (The
76Workers and Women). Amongst these publications, the most
77important and the only one available is The Communist. As
C h ’en was in Shanghai when it was founded, and as he was 
undoubtedly the most important figure in the party at the time, 
we may assume that the ideas expressed there would not be 
contrary to the main trend of his own views. Therefore, we must 
examine the ideas in this journal if we are to understand the 
early Chinese communists’ ideas.
In its manifesto the editors announced that theirs was an 
international movement for the sun never sets on the back of the 
Chinese workers - lao-tung ehe - because Chinese workers may be 
found all over the world. Since the Communist International had 
already made contact with the CCP in the person of Vo it insky, we
7 6' C h ’i-wu lao-jen, Hsin kuan-cha (New Observer), O p .cit.; Li 
Jui, Op . cit. p . 1 43 ; Wu Min and Siu Feng ed. Op . cit. Shih Tsuri- 
tsung, the translator of Pannekoek was a founding member of the 
Shanghai SY.
77 The Librarian at the Shanghai Public Library informed me in 
August 1972 that their copies of the Lao-tung chieh had been 
sent to the National Library in Peking during the Cultural 
Revolution. A professor of Party History at the History Faculty 
of Peking University assured me that the National Library would 
have the Lao-tung ehe, Lao-tung chieh, Lao-tung Sheng, and Lao- 
tung yü fu-nü but that they were really small four-page broad­
sheets while The Communist is the important one to consult for 
my type of study.
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are constrained to the view that there was iittle editorial or 
ideological direction from the Russian comrade.
However, the articles in all the six issues of this journal 
may be divided into two groups. Firstly, the original articles 
written by the Chinese comrades. They are generally more 
readable and always leavened with appropriate Chinese proverbs 
or quotations. The second group are the translations. They may 
be ideological discussions or introducing different aspects of 
communist activities and achievements in Russia, or elsewhere. 
Generally, these articles do not read well. They are too 
obviously translations, written in a stilted style, and often 
betrayed a patronizing attitude.
The first of the original Chinese articles carried the title
'Remember the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Russian
78Communist Government' but, in content, it was almost entirely 
discussing the situation in China. Citing the Communis t 
Manifesto and The Critique of the Gotha Programme the writer 
attempted to demonstrate that Marx had consistently advocated the 
necessity of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat in order to 
achieve the goals of socialism. Then, arguing that the 
conditions in China were even more backward than those found in 
Russia before the October Revolution, the author reasoned that 
such conditions made the need Tor a revolution and a dictatorship 
of the proletariat more urgent. There was no evidence in this 
article to show that the author found in China a shortage of the 
proletarian class. His complaint was that the Chinese
' Wu Hsieh 'O-kuo kung-ch'an cheng-ku ch'eng-li san-cliou-nien 
chi-nien', The Communist No.2, pp.2-12 (l-IX-1920).
99
proletarians were lacking in knowledge, and he cited as an
example for his allegation the soldiers o I' the 191 I Revolution.
He lamented that the Chinese proletariat lacked any real
understanding of the nature of the revolution at hand and had
mistaken socialism for 'getting the wealth of the rich and thus
not to have to work any more.' However, he argued that to train
the Chinese proletariat before the revolution would mean
postponing the revolution to the 22nd Century:
But we can't wait! Therefore, after the 
Revolution, we must use the communist (Bolshevik) 
method to train them ... but [we must] not adopt 
the Bolshevik methods blindly.
In practical terms, this type of revolutionary activity 
that was being recommended here - one led by a core of 
politically awakened vanguard - can be considered as both 
Leninist and Sun Yatsenist. Both were making the claim that 
they were acting on behalf of an overwhelming majority of the 
populace, if the latter would only realize it; and both operated 
with a decidedly minority core of believers. In short, these 
early Chinese communists would not find any operational 
incompatability if they were to be called upon to work with the 
KMT, as they were soon called upon to do.
Indeed, the methods advocated by The Communist whilst Ch'en 
was still in Shanghai constrain one to recall some of Sun's 
efforts in the pre-19^1 days,, and since. The Chinese communists 
were certainly action-orientated, or more concerned with the 
practicality of their ideas rather than the purity or orthodoxy 
of their theories. However, this should not be taken to mean
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that they were ignorant of what w'* may call the classical 
Marxist theories, rather, thr r expressions should be taken as 
their attempts at the unity of theory and practice, a truly 
Marxist operational methodology. The main article in the next 
issue, the last one to be published with Ch'en still in
79Shanghai, was typical of the original Chinese articles of that 
journal.
The author opened with a rebuttal to those critics who 
argued that the Chinese should first learn more about the nature 
of socialism before launching into a socialist revolution. He 
regarded such advocacy as 'the thinking of our enemy'. He asked, 
rhetorically, how many Parisians had read Rousseau or how many 
workers and soldiers in St. Petersburg or Moscow had read Marx. 
To this writer, a socialist revolution becomes necessary when 
the people themselves felt
they had suffered the exploitation of the 
politics and economics of their time ....
[consequently they] want to destroy their 
contemporary social suppression and to escape 
the shackles of their government. Therefore, 
the basic ideas of Rousseau and Marx may be 
considered to be within everyone's mind. What 
these two had done was articulating these 
idea s.
A Lenin or Kaut sky might not have used those words, but the 
sentiments were certainly within the Marxist tradition. And, as 
he went on, he showed his awareness of classical Marxist
79 /Chiang Chun, ' She-hui ke-ming ti shang-chiian' . (On the 
methods to bring about a Social Revolution) The Communist No.2, 
pp.2-9 (7-XII-1920).
ma l. or i a li sm. 'The author further explained that
the foundation of social stricture is built on 
human activities - the production of goods and 
their distribution. ... The causes of 
revolutions are from these and not invented by 
human intellect nor abstract theorizing. In 
short, revolution is not the revolt of 
philosophic research but from the realities of 
socio-economic conditions and changes.
Then, to show he had done his homework, he integrated, 
appropriately, the Marxian slogan immediately after the above 
sta t ement:
All past social history is history of class 
struggle.
He then went on to explain the realities of Chinese society 
in terms of class struggle. As with the other original Chinese 
articles, this one also quoted a Chinese proverb:
Fu-che tien_lien chien mo, pun-che tu mo li 
£hi .
Which, roughly translated means: The fields of the rich stretch
from the towns to the distant lanes, while the poor do not have
Ö 0enough land to stand the point of an awl’. This, the author 
argued is 'indicative of China having two classes, the extremely 
rich and the extremely poor.'
In the cities, the workers of industrial enterprises in 
China suffered more than workers elsewhere because the capitalist
'Chien' literally means the streets in the towns or markets, 
while 'mo' means the paths between two fields. The idea to be 
conveyed here is the vastness of the landholdings of the rich 
contrasting with the poverty of the tenant farmers.
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class in China was international in nature, European, American, 
and Japanese. He then followed this observation with a masterly 
piece of theoretical adaptation, reminiscent of that equally 
original analysis in the Editorial of the 4th May edition of 
Mei-chou p'ing-lun. This analysis may be regarded as a 
forerunner of the Chinese communists' analysis of the objective 
realities of the situation in China in Marxist class struggle 
terms.
Like all Marxists our author took for granted the class 
antagonism of the factory workers and the owners, but he 
explained that the class antagonism in the rural area was no 
less real or intense. As he saw the situation,
the landlords and the tenants, influenced by 
ch'an-yeh ke-ming - (Property Revolution would 
be the nearest translation for this term) - 
have become the Capital and Labour classes, that 
is, the wu-ch1 an chieh-chi (the class without 
property, the proletariat) and the yu-ch1 an 
chieh-chi (class with property) the capitalists.
As our writer explained, because of the polarization of wealth,
their antagonism is even more obvious because 
the poverty of the proletariat and the riches 
of the capitalists were increasing daily. Thus, 
the opportunity for a social revolution is at 
hand.
Further, it seems that nature was on the side of the revolution 
for 'the recent years of war and natural calamity had resulted 
in tens of millions more proletariat dying from hunger and cold'.
As to the actual tactic, he strongly advised a mass 
movement, with the politically awakened minority inI egraI i i tg
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with the overwhelming masses, as was done in Paris in 1871. He 
then gave a final, and for us significant, advice to those who 
felt they were tne politically awakened:
Therefore, those of us who want to take 
part in a social revolution in China 
must not feel restricted by the theorists, 
but must endeavour to work on what is 
practicable.
Judging the above presentation intellectually and as a 
propaganda vehicle, these original Chinese articles were far 
superior and more effective than the translated Russian ones.
The first such translation that was specially devoted to the
8 1Chinese situation must have repelled its readers by its 
patronizing tone and shaky reasoning. This comrade urged the 
total reliance on the wisdom and experience of the Russians and 
furthermore, the Chinese should welcome their wise comrades 'with 
Oriental voices and smiles' for Russian Bolshevism 'is the 
protector of the people of China'. Then, Comrade Bek discovered 
that China had 120 million proletariat which he considered would 
make China ready for an anti-government movement. He gave no 
reason for selecting this figure but argued that as 'the Chinese 
have experience in opposing the warlords, so they are suited to 
the task of destroying capitalism'.
Though the authors of these original Chinese articles in 
The Communist used pseudonyms, the arguments presented in them
Q  1
B.K. Bek, 'Chung-kuo yü 0-kuo' (China and Russia) The 
Communists, No.3 (7 “IV— 1921).
coincided with the sentiments of Ch'en at that time. ~ 'they 
were that China was a poor and industrially backward country, 
and the overwhelming majority of the populace were politically 
and economically exploited. Hence there was an urgent need to 
rectify or improve the socio-economic-political conditions of 
the people and the nation. He was certainly not against 
industrialization but was of the opinion that industrial 
advancement need not be brought about by capitalism. 'I deeply 
believe that foreign capitalism is the sole cause of China's
83poverty. Therefore foreign capitalism must be overthrown'.
Of course, the overthrow of foreign capitalism involved the 
overthrowing of its ancilliary causes - those who in China were 
helping or benefited by foreign capitalism.
He believed that the process of social evolution would 
bring about the downfall of capitalism in a given nation, but 
in China, the entry of the foreign capitalists would also bring 
down the national capitalists and thus make the struggle of the 
Chinese workers so much more difficult, especially so because 
the Chinese workers were not experienced revolutionaries. Hence 
the Chinese had to use the quicker and more radical revolutionary 
method. The Chinese workers, in their fight against foreign 
capitalism and capitalists, were really fighting to defend 
national independence. Indeed, these themes were amplified and
8 2 Ch'en 'Kuan-yii she-hui chu-i ti t'ao-lun' (Discussions on 
Socialism) HCN VIII 4 (1-XII-1920), pp.1-24.
83 Ibid., p.18
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repeated in the numerous articles written by Ch'en and his
84colleagues in the next few months.
However, for our purpose, it is noteworthy to emphasise 
that while Ch'en and his colleagues had translated and published 
numerous articles describing and introducing the various aspects 
of social, political, economic, and intellectual life in the new 
Soviet Russia, they never told their readers that they were 
trying to build the Russian 'paradise' in China. Russia, when 
mentioned in these original articles, was used merely as an 
example of using the revolutionary method to 'help' and quicken 
the evolutionary process of social development. The theoretical 
justification the Chinese employed had been from the masters 
Marx and Engels. On the other hand, writings from their 
international comrades tended to set up Russia as the example 
for China to follow, and as we have noted, regarded Russia as 
the final protector of the social revolution.
That the Chinese communists were able to obtain counsel in 
theoretical issues from the masters, much credit must be given 
to Ch'en. Firstly, he had the editorial office of the HCN moved 
from Shanghai to Canton where he could get political
85protection. Then, he set about having the major writings of 
the masters translated and published. Within months, he was able 
to publish such works as The Capital (abbreviated); Wage, Labour 
and Capital; Critique of the Gotha Programme; Civil War in 
France; On the Jewish Question; The Holy Family; A Contribution
See, for instance, the articles in Vol.IX of HCN.
8 5 There is a Special Announcement in HCN IX 1 ( 1-V-1920) 
announcing the transfer of the editorial office.
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to the Critique of Political Economy; The Poverty of Philosophy,
and many others. The Russian classics were not neglected and
they included such notable ones as Lenin's The State and
Revolution; Imperialism: the last Stage of Capitalism; 'Left-
wing1 Communism: an Infantile Disorder; and Trotsky's Communism
8 6and Terrorism and Bolshevism and World Peace.
If the Chinese communists had access to the Chinese 
translation of the major writings by the Western communist 
writers, we must, at least, allow them the theoretical 
possibility of coming to their conclusions through their own 
reading. Seeing that the most frequently cited works were not 
those of Lenin or the Communist International but The Communist 
Manifesto, the ''Gotha Programme" and The Civil War in France of 
Marx and Engels and seeing that they were so fond of reminding 
their readers that Marx and Engels wrote the Manifesto for the 
German communists when Germany was not fully industrialized, 
their conclusion that the objective reality of China constrained 
them to revolutionary action is thus perfectly understandable, 
especially if we underline their conception with their knowledge 
of Pannekoek's theory on evolution and revolution.
Thus, there remains one facet in our examination of the 
seed of Chinese communism - that of the idea of collaboration in 
politics in the period of revolutionary activity. The current 
understanding is that in the beginning, the Chinese were not 
happy about the prospect and idea of collaboration with the KMT 
but were persuaded to do so by Maring. Scholars, however, may
86 For a complete list, see advertisement in HCN IX r> ( 1-IX-1921 )
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differ on the nature of Maring's persuasion. After his removal
from the party leadership, Ch'en was to claim that Maring made
the collaboration issue an order from the Communist 
87International.
This study offers the proposition that there is no 
conclusive evidence to indicate that Ch'en at that time, up to 
the 1922 Second Congress of the CCP, was against collaboration 
on the grounds of principle or theory. Indeed, there is strong- 
evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion and that even if Ch'en 
had any reservations about joining the KMT, they were minor and 
procedural ones. This, however, is not to deny that in 
subsequent years, during the period of collaboration with the 
KMT, Ch'en had cause to feel that many of his actions and ideas 
were thwarted by the comrades from the International. Of course, 
to argue thus is not to neglect the unpublished Manifesto of the 
First CCP Congress contained in the now famous M.A. thesis by 
Ch'en's erstwhile comrade Ch'en Kung-po, and the importance of 
this Manifesto will be critically examined.
We have spent considerable effort to demonstrate the fact 
that Ch'en was a practical man and that he had little time for 
impractical idealism. Just before his departure for Canton, he 
reiterated his ideas on practical revolutionary action by using 
a parable that, in recent years in China, has again acquired 
currency. He told his readers that the process of social
O
See R.C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communism; Meisner, 0p .eit. 
Schwartz O p .cit. The latest and strongest argument supporting 
this is by Dov Bing, C.Qf-$.where Bing claimed that Maring 
originated the idea and convinced the Chinese of its wisdom.
reconstruction is like sailing a ship, one needs direction and
endeavour. One needs to have a direction in social change and
this is the chu-i - theoretical framework - and an ultimate
system which one aims to build. But as he put it in a
picturesque way, social reconstruction could not be brought
about by a wave of the magician's hands, and a new system could
not be expected to fall from the heavens. The old 'cannot be
destroyed instantly', on the contrary, the reconstruction of a
88social system can only be achieved slowly and step by step.
For the present, therefore, !as feudalism still has not been 
overthrown in China, we [the communistsj do not absolutely oppose
On
[the democrats],' though true democracy and liberty meant, for
90Ch'en, an economic system with a proletariat dictatorship.
Ch'en was a man of his word. A little earlier, as we have 
noted, he invited Sun Yat-sen to give the keynote speech at the 
inauguration of a trade union he helped to found. Now, having- 
come to this conclusion and having counselled his readers so 
forcefully and definitely, he put his ideas into practice and 
set sail for Canton to take up an appointment as Education 
Commissioner for Ch'en Chiung-ming's government.
Once he got to Canton, as we have noted, he formed local 
units of the CCP and the SY. His collaborationist activities 
also paid handsome dividends. By February 1921, two months after
8 8 Ch'en, 'Chu-i yii nu-li' (ideology and Endeavour) HCN VIII 4 
(1-XII- 1920).
89 y WCh'en 'Min-chu-tang^kung-ch'an-tang' (The Democratic Party 
and the Communist Party) HCN VIII 4 (1-XII, 1920).
^  Ch'en, a reply to reader K'o Ch'ing-shih. HCN VIII 3 (I-XI- 
1920). 'Lao-tung chuan-cheng' (Workers or proletariat
dictatorships)
his arrival at Canton, a National Association of Trade Unions 
was founded. Though the CCP did not sponsor this, nevertheless, 
the Chinese communists were making good use of their unofficial 
collaboration with the KMT and the opportunities thus offered to
work from within. The expressed aim of this association was 'to
91destroy the capitalist class'.
Ch'en was also very forthcoming with his political views.
His prestige as the founder and editor of the HCN, the leading-
light in the New Culture Movement as well as being a high ranking
official in the Education Department of the Government provided
him the opportunities and protection to air his views and he
92certainly did not conceal his ideological position. ~ The 
sentiments expressed in his public utterances and his action 
were more than the exposition of his brand of socialism - 
communism. He took the battle to enemy territories and continued 
his attack on the Confucian conservatives, the anarchists and 
socialists of different persuasions. Consequently, he won for 
himself many enemies, the nickname of 'poisonous animal', a 
Cantonese pun on his name, and eventual]y, Ch'en Chiung-ming
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Wah tze Yat Pao (The Chinese Mail), a Chinese daily published 
in Hong Kong gave wide coverage to events in the Canton 
government of the day and the inauguration of this Association 
was given wide coverage in its issue of 25-11-1921. The HCN IX 
1 (l-V-1921) published a number of resolutions and manifestos of
this meeting.*
92 A series of lectures given at a women teachers' college was 
published by the HCN Press with the title Ch'en Tu-hsiu hsien- 
shfeng yen-chiang chi (Collected speeches of Mr. Ch'en Tu-hsiu) 
1921. A speech given to the Law School in Canton was published 
in the HCN IX 3 (I-VIX-I921) entitled 'She-hui chu-i p'ing-lun' 
(Critical discussions on Socialism). On each occasion, lie 
espoused the communist line.
*
!he paper*s own iömanisation will be used and not #Hua-tzu jih-pao*.
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r«'lu('tantly had to dismiss his old comrade and fellow exile in
93Japan of the Anti-Yuan She-kai days, Ch’en Tu-hsiu.
However, one thing of concern to us is very clear. We can
definitely say that Ch’en the practical revolutionary was
obviously willing to work with those with whom he had strong
ideological differences while at the same time, he would use
such opportunities to expound his own political philosophy.
Indeed, he saw his work in Canton as of such great importance
that he decided not to attend the inaugural First Congress of
the CCP in Shanghai. Instead, he sent as delegate, his former
student of Peita days, C h ’en Kung-po who was planning to go to
94Shanghai during that summer holiday for his honeymoon.
According to another of C h ’en’s students, Chang Kuo-tao:
we sent letters and telegrams urging him and 
the delegates from Canton to come to Shanghai 
at once. A few days later, Ch ’en Kung-po, the 
delegate from Canton arrived with a letter from 
Ch’en Tu-hsiu. It was addressed to all the 
delegates. In it Ch’en explained that his 
resignation from his Canton post had not been 
accepted and that he could not get away for the
95Congress.
It seems that the First Congress of the CCP was not regarded 
as an event of great importance by the leading figures of the 
Chinese communist movement. Its lack of importance is further
9 3 See C h ’en Kung-po, I and the communist party, pp.28-30.
94y See Ch’en Kung-po, Op.cit., pp.17-18; and Chang Kuo-tao, the 
Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-19^7 Vol.I, p . I4 1JKansas U* 
Press, 1971*
 ^} Chang Kuo-tao, Ibid., p . 141.
demonstrated by the decision of Li Ta-chao to stay in Peking and 
send as his delegate a former student, Chang Kuo-tao, to the 
meeting. The Congress was scheduled in July in order to coincide 
with the long summer holiday of the schools and universities.
Yet the two leaders, C h ’en and Li, both professional educators, 
had decided to stay away. We may say that the activists at the 
Congress were the student-demonstrators of the May 4th generation, 
full of enthusiasm but not so experienced in the practical matter 
of revolutionary politics. Therefore in any evaluation of the 
significance of the Congress, its resolutions, manifestos and 
decisions it is well for the student of CCP history to bear this 
in mind.
The Congress produced an unpublished Programme and a set of 
q bObjectives. The fact that it was not published tells us much
about the degree of importance C h ’en attached to this Congress.
The Chinese communists, especially Ch'en, had no reason to hide 
their sentiments expressed in these documents. Any casual reader 
of the HCN in 1921 would have recognized that it was an organ of 
communist propaganda and any listener of the speeches given by 
C h ’en would not have difficulty in identifying his ideological 
affiliation. Further, as we have noted, C h ’en was most active 
in making available to the reading public the writings of the 
major communist writers in having these people’s work translated 
and published. That the Congress decisions were not published 
nor publicized was probably because of C h ’e n ’s disagreement with
^  See C h ’en Kung-po The Communist Movement in China (M.A. thesis 
at Columbia University 1924, subsequently published by Columbia 
U.P. i960 and ed. by Martin C« Wilbur) Appendix 1 and 2.
and opposition to them, or that their publication was of little 
significance, or both.
Between the First and the Second Congress of the CCP - July
1921 to July 1922 - the membership of the Party grew from 57 to 
97123* Thus, only the most optimistic and unrealistic communist
would think they, the CCP by themselves, would bring about the
desired socio-political revolution and changes. Irrespective of
personal preference, the reality of the situation demanded that
should the CCP members want to be effective, they would have to
move within existing political structure and hence the necessity
for them to develop friendly and working relationships. Besides,
they were too insignificant to think in terms of equal
partnership, or to use the later communist jargon, the bloc
without strategy. This was not lost on the leading and
responsible members of the CCP, including Li and Ch'en. As Chang
Kuo-tao observed, 'No one amongst us imagines that communism
98would be achieved in China at an early date.'
Hence, as has been noted, Ch'en kept up his active
association with the Canton Government, while Li maintained
friendly relationships with a whole variety of socially and
politically significant people, ranging from erstwhile
colleagues of the New Culture Movement days to the Research
99Clique and Chihli group of militarists. These communist
97 ,Ho Kan-chih Chung-kuo hsien-tai ke-ming shih (A History of
Modern Chinese Revolution) p p .37-^0 (Peking 1957)•
^  Chang, O p .cit., p.224.
^  Chang, Ibid., p.224
leaders entered into such activities with these diverse Croups 
for different reasons. In having a working relationship with Wu 
P ’ei-fu, Li was not hoping for any ideological alliance. On the 
contrary, the arrangement was entered into by both sides for 
special reasons of their own. Wu wanted to get more information 
on his rivals, the so-called Communication' Clique and was prepared 
to appoint Li’s recommended friends as inspectors on the Peking- 
Hankow Railway. Li, on the other hand, was thus able to have 
his appointees, all communists, to establish communist-led 
organisations along the railway line’s main centres.
The relationship between Sun and Ch’en Tu-hsiu was quite 
different. They, together with Ch’en Chiung-ming, were long­
time acquaintances of revolutionary activities, dating back to 
the pre-1911 days. They spent their exile together in Japan 
after the collapse of the anti-Yuan She-kai movement - the 
so-called Second Revolution, in which they all took some part.
In their own ways, they all had concepts of social reform and 
each regarded himself as a socialist and each regarded himself 
and his ideas the most suitable for China. Ch’en Chiung-ming, 
of course, had no political party of his own, though he had his 
own group of followers amongst whom was the father of Teng Yen-ta 
who later, as a KMT Leftist, worked closely with the CCP.
Indeed, in the context of traditional Chinese politics, both Sun 
and Ch’en Chiung-ming had their own mu-fu. However, Ch’en 
Chiung-ming and Ch’en Tu-hsiu were fellow-members of the European
 ^^  See Erh-ch*i tsan an shih (A History of the February 7Ü* 
Massacre")"* (Peking 1957) » and for a contemporary account, the
Ching-Han kung-jen liu hsieh shih (The Bloodied History of the 
Peking-HankowWorkers) (Peking T923)•
Affairs Studies Group in Tokyo in August 1914. in this group, 
Huang Hsing was the most prestigious member while Sun did not 
join.
On the other hand, C h ’en Tu-hsiu’s refusal to join the Sun 
group was not entirely ideological. It was mainly because Sun 
was insisting on all members swearing personal allegiance to him 
and that they be finger-printed. While Sun might have good 
reasons for such decisions, especially when he considered his 
exile was partly due to the betrayal of his former comrades, to 
C h ’en Tu-hsiu such requirements of membership were not only 
childish but an ideological and intellectual impossibility.
In spite of these differences, as we have noted, there were 
close working relations between Sun and C h ’en through the years. 
The former, even in the dark days before he was able to return 
to Canton in the summer of 1920, was asked by C h ’en to make a 
contribution to the special May Day issue of the HCN and was 
invited to address the inaugural meeting of the first communist 
founded trade union in Shanghai.
The two C h ’en ’s apparently thought quite well of each other, 
hence the Governor’s invitation to the communist to chair the 
Education Commission. Indeed, when the Governor appointed P ’eng 
P ’ai to become the Director of Education in their ’ancestral’ 
hsien llai-feng, Governor C h ’en should not have been unaware of 
the CCP’s rural policies. By that time, the CCP had announced
publicly in the HCN the formation of their first Peasant
101Association in Chekiang. Indeed, it has been claimed that
 ^^  HCN IX 4 ( 1 - VIII-1 921 ) ^Ya-chien nung-min hsieh-hui/. In the 
Manifesto, published in the HCN, the organizers were openly 
proposing a proletariat class struggle in the rural sector of 
society.
the Governor had always been interested in rural and agricultural 
reforms as well as social reforms even with some socialist
p , 102flavour.
When the governor invited the communist to join him, the
former also invited Sun to become the generalissimo. When the
generalissimo and the governor were about to come into conflict,
the communist, we are told, felt that militarily the CCP should
side with the governor, but ideologically they should side with
103the generalissimo. As the governor’s gunners shelled the
generalissimo’s mansion at 3p*m. on the 16th June 1922 - that is,
before the Second Congress of the CCP - this ideological affinity
expressed by our communist thus becomes significant.
While the actual idea of members of the CCP becoming members
of the KMT was not in the minds of the Chinese communists until
Maring suggested the move - and to C h ’en we have noted certain
procedural barriers - the Chinese communist leaders had
demonstrated their enthusiasm in practical and close cooperation.
To be sure, the CCP members were also active in their separate
ways, in organizing the workers, peasants, and students as well
1 04in general propaganda work in literature.
See C h ’en Ching-ts*un (Chiymg-ming) hsien-sheng nien-pu 
(Chronicle of Mr. C h ’en Ching-ts*u n ) , p p . 7 - 8 (n.p., n .d . ) a 
xerox copy is kept in the University Service Centre (Hong Kong) 
Library. I have been confidentially informed that it was 
published by Ch'en’s follower in Macau.
10 3' C h ’en Kung-po, 1 and the Communist Party, p.38.
1 o4 For a general recollection by one of the participants, see 
C h ’ i-wu lao-jen, ’ Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang ch’eng-li ch’ien-hou 
ti chien-wen’ (Recollections of the events surrounding the 
founding of the CCP ) , Hsin k.uan-ch’a ( 1-VII-1 957) . The CCP also 
founded a Labour Secretariat. There is some disagreement 
concerning the details on the founding of the Secretariat (see 
Bing, The China Quarterly Nos.48 & 5 6 ). While the exact date
1 1  ()
Once those procedural barriers were removed, C h ’en really
had no strong objection against joining the KMT. And, the
barriers were removed. The finger-printing and the swearing ol
personal allegiance to Sun were not required of the communists
1 0 5who wanted to join the KMT, and, the KMT was restructured.
To be sure, he would hardly be expected to be a loyal member in 
the sense that he would accept, in the same spirit as an 
ordinary KMT member, Sun’s Three Principles of the people.
Yet as a practical man, he was not unaware of the limitations of
may be difficult to ascertain, contemporary Chinese evidence 
provides us with a very close approximation. The party cell in 
Shanghai at the time published a journal called Kung-ch* an-tang 
(The Communist). In its 6th issue, dated 7-VII-1921, p.62, was 
the Manifesto of the Secretariat and the Opening Announcement of 
the Secretariat’s journal, Lao-tung chou-k'an (The Workers’
Weekly). That issue of The Communist announced that ’since the 
founding of the labour Secretariat by Chang T'e-li (Kuo-tao) ... 
the labour movement has flourished.’ It also said that The 
Workers * Weekly was then at its 4th issue. It may not be 
unreasonable to suggest that the Secretariat and journal were 
founded at about the same time. That being the case, the first 
issue must have been four weeks old on the 7th July 1921. This 
would bring the founding of the journal, and the Secretariat, to 
the 9th or 16th June 1921, depending on ones way of counting.
To be sure, Bing was not really at fault. One of his sources, 
Chang Kuo-tao, recalled that the Secretariat was founded in 
September 1921 (see Chang’s The Rise of the Chinese Communist 
Party I, 169-170). This may be one case where the seemingly 
photographic memory of Chang Kuo-tao failed him.
10 5 In 1924, a member of the KMT Rightwing told reporters that 
the main objection C h ’en had to joining the KMT was the 
requirement of finger-printing. When that was waived, C h ’en and 
the communists joined the KMT. See The Chinese Mail 5-TII-1924 
which published a long interview with an anti-communist member 
of the KMT on the history of the development of the collaboration. 
The swearing of personal allegiance to Sun, certainly, had 
ideological implications and to that extent there were 
ideological objections to joining the KMT but it was part of the 
admission procedure which Ch'en and others objected to.
^ ^  Chang Kuo-tao, O p .cit., p.266.
/his own party of 123 members. Thus, once he joined, C h ’en took
a conspicuous part in the affairs of the Canton Government of
107Sun. Judging by contemporary reports the activities of C h ’en
and his party were intending to create and intensify the class 
struggle within the KMT and the KMT-controlled areas. Their 
emphasis on class struggle gave them much initial success and 
much opposition from within the KMT and outside. The Chinese 
Communists were acting in a way in which all convinced Marxists 
should be doing, especially if the Marxists believed in the 
validity and currency of the ideas expressed in The Communist 
Manifesto.
1 07 See the Chinese Mail 20-IX-1922. This newspaper gave much 
prominence to C h ’en and the communist activities in the Canton 
government, taking an anti-communist view.
Section Two : Chinese Communism during the First Period of 
Collaboration.
INTRODUCTION
The CCP joined the KMT and the Canton National Government, 
for tactical reasons and out of necessity. Shanghai was no
longer a safe place and they were frequently harassed by the
1police. Since the Chinese communists wanted to continue the 
publication of their translations of Marxist classics and their 
own communist ideas, a move became a necessity. However, while 
we may suggest that in joining the KMT and the National 
Government, the CCP was seeking a safe refuge, they were 
certainly not hiding their identity in both the literature they 
published nor in their political actions. They seemed to have 
been quite conspicuous, to the outside observer. More than 
that, they were also sparing little effort in creating and 
intensifying internal contradictions within the ranks of the KMT 
A case will be put here that the policies and the activities of 
the CCP were not substantially or basically changed at the 2nd 
Congress nor even the 3rd Congress of the CCP; on the contrary, 
most of the new developments subsequent to the 2nd Congress had 
their roots in the pre-2nd Congress period and not contrary to
Page 3 of The Communist No.3 (7”IV-1921) was confiscated by 
the police of the French Concession and that was part of the 
reason for the delay in that issue, four months after the 
preceding one. Furthermore, not long after the First Congress 
of the CCP - the Congress itself was disrupted by a police raid 
C h ’en, his wife, and a number of CCP members were arrested by 
the French police. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, Op. cit. , p.1b4 and gji'i
wu lao-jen, Hsin Kuan-cha, Op.cit.
1 he general directions manifested in the early period.
To make such assertions does not imply Lhal the CCP had 
been totally unchanging. Indeed, they had been quite adaptable. 
The thesis that is being submitted here is that the CCP had 
always realized that given the objective realities of China, to 
usher in a socialist system would require a long process of 
revolutionary class struggle. Therefore, for practical and 
tactical reasons, the CCP considered it necessary to work in 
collaboration with those contemporary political forces that 
would provide it with better opportunities to achieve the 
ultimate goal. These tactics would include joining in a 
government of the ’democratic' elements or even working with 
'progressive warlords'.
In so doing, it certainly did not imply the CCP's approval 
of the goal, the ideology or even the practice of their political 
partners of the day, nor signify that the CCP were lessening the 
demand for class struggle. Such action of collaboration merely 
signified a temporary tactical operational procedure, demanded 
by the historical conditions of the time.
Furthermore, this submission does not deny that there were 
considerable influences and even pressure from the Comintern 
comrades in matters of theory and practice. Nor does this 
submission imply that there was total unanimity amongst all 
members of the CCP or even just among the leading members.
2 Kuo Hua-lun, Chung-kung shih-lun (An Analytical History of the 
Chinese Communist s) V o l .I , Ch.4 argued that a change came as the 
result of the Comintern intervention during the 2nd Congress. 
(Taiwan 1969)* Schwartz, Op. cit. Ch.4 saw this change at the 
3rd Congress.
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Indeed, there were not infrequently differences, even major 
differences, between the Chinese and the Comintern and amongst 
the Chinese communists themselves on matters of ideology and 
political action. Often, these differences were made public, or 
aired publicly.
The propositions being submitted here are that the major 
and significant decisions made by the CCP, such as the joining 
with the ’democratic elements’ in a national revolution with the 
Imperialists, compradors and warlords being the enemies of this 
national revolution; the need to give significant attention to 
the rural sector of the national revolution - a peasant- 
orientated revolution policy - were so made not simply because 
the comrades from the Comintern told them those were the correct 
policies of the day, but because the CCP themselves had already 
thought of them, through their own reading of Marxist literature 
and because of their perceptions of the realities of the Chinese 
situation. Furthermore, it is submitted here that in the eyes 
of the Chinese communists the concept of class struggle and the 
need to have class struggle in order that their goal - the 
proletariat dictatorship - may be brought about were not less 
real or urgent simply because for tactical reasons they had to 
join forces with the democratic elements. Indeed, this formation 
of a united front in a struggle in a national revolution demanded 
greater vigilance in the conduct of class struggle. A united 
front situation, to the Chinese communists, meant that they had, 
in due course, to inculcate and develop class antagonism amongst 
their bourgeois partners.
These propositions are made with full cognizance of the 
various manifestos and declarations made by the many of the
leading figures of' the CCP pointing to what seems to be the 
contrary. The most notable case in point is the famous 
declaration in Canton in January 1924 when Li pledged the support 
of the Chinese communists to the cause of national revolution led 
by the KMT. However, such declarations to the contrary, the CCP 
had never really tried to hide their real intentions and their 
goal, as well as their insistence that they, the party of the 
proletariat, were the real vanguard of the revolution. Indeed, 
during the period of the first collaboration with the KMT,
Chinese communism, in the context of the revolutionary 
developments in China, may be regarded as the creating, the 
fostering, and the intensifying of class antagonism and struggle 
in the rural and urban sectors and within the KMT. The comrades 
from the Comintern certainly exerted considerable influence in 
the development of Chinese communism. But the ultimate product 
was recognizably more Chinese. Indeed, a case may be made that, 
while the CCP issued many manifestos giving an appearance of 
compliance with the Comintern, the main thrust of their 
propaganda message, as perceived by a contemporary reader of 
their publications, did not always coincide with that from the 
Comintern. Sometimes, the Chinese communists actually came upon 
many of their common ideas ahead, or independent, of their 
foreign comrades, and often were at variance with them.
The development and nature of Chinese communism during the 
first period of CCP-KMT collaboration will now be examined in 
four major aspects, in order to demonstrate the above contentions
1. The Chinese communists’ concept of the 
collaboration.
2. The nature of the national revolution and 
the role of leadership as perceived by the 
Chinese communists.
3. The concept of nationalism in this period of 
the national revolution, as perceived by the 
Chinese communists.
4. The Chinese communist peasant policies during 
this collaborationist national revolution.
The resolutions of the Comintern, the instructions and directives 
of foreign comrades, as far as we can ascertain them, pertaining 
to these aspects will be brought into the purview of our 
examination to highlight the distinctiveness and similarities of 
the Chinese and Comintern positions.
CHAPTER THREE
The Meaning of Collaboration
Shortly after the formation of the first unit of the CCP, 
Ch'en Tu-hsiu went to Canton to join the administration of Ch'en 
Chiung-ming who, in the context of his day, may be regarded as a 
progressive warlord. Governor Ch'en certainly seemed to have 
given Communist Ch'en much freedom in the propagation of 
communism. Immediately before he commenced service with the 
Governor, Tu-hsiu announced his political philosophy thus:
As feudalism still has not been overthrown in 
China, we [the communists] do not absolutely 
oppose [the democrats]. But it would be a 
great mistake for anyone to imagine that 
'democratic politics' represent the wishes of 
the entire people or true equality and liberty.
.... Democracy can only represent the 
expression of the capitalist class, it cannot 
represent the wishes of the feudal parties 
nor those of the working (lao-tung) classes.^
He further explained that only with the total removal of social
classes can we talk in terms of 'the wishes of the entire
people'. He was, of course, working for the realization of the
ultimate goal, the communist state. In other words, as early as
1920, Ch'en was accepting the idea of a long haul towards
communism via the road of collaboration with the democrats. At
the same time, that is while in collaboration, he would also
(Mi' on Tu-hsiu, ' Min-chu-tang yii kung-ch' an-tang" (The 
democratic party and the communist party), HCN VIII 4 (I-XII- 
lb.To). Ch'en, as we have noted, left Shanghai for Canton on the 
evening of the 1b-XII-1920.
work towards the ultimate elimination of the economic class to 
which his collaborators belonged.
It may well be true that 'despite the presence in China as 
early as 1920 of an emissary of the Communist International, the 
decisions of the Second Congress (of the International) regarding
collaboration with the bourgeois revolutionaries appears to have
2had no influence whatever in China at the time’ ; nevertheless, 
the sentiments expressed by Ch'en were certainly very Leninist, 
or Marxist - the Marx of the Communist Manifesto. The influence 
of this early tract by Marx on the Chinese communists is well 
known, and Ch'en, writing his idea in November, may well have 
his Marxism reinforced by Lenin. This was not the Lenin of the 
2nd Congress of the Comintern brought over to China by the 
comrades, but the Lenin as the Chinese communists discovered for 
themselves.
The November 1920 issue of the HCN published a lengthy 
excerpt of a speech by Lenin given at the 8th Party Congress of 
the Russian CP, on national self-determination, in March 1920.
In this speech, Lenin was not discussing Asia but Finland. 
However, it is apparent that editor Ch'en must have found the 
message appropriate for the local situation. Lenin said:
The methods that the workers (lao-tung chia) 
employ in ridding themselves of their relationship 
with the capitalist class differ in different 
places. But the recognition of both national 
self-determination and workers' self-determination 
is not a contradiction, they are merely different
2 d'Bncausse & Schram, Marxism and Asia p .51 (London ^ C) 6 C) )
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ways to the same goal .... we only use the 
most appropriate tools in our battle with 
our class enemies.^
In short, the message from Lenin which Ch'en wanted to pass on 
to the comrades in China was: be adaptable. This is also a
typical case which shows how the Chinese communists independently 
accepted and adopted communist ideas and methods through their 
own study of the messages from foreign communists, from Marx to 
Lenin.
As far as Ch'en and his followers were concerned, 
collaboration was a mere tactical manoeuvre. Their aim was to 
conduct class struggle through the creation of class 
consciousness and thence class antagonism. An examination of 
some of the political actions and agitations in Canton in 1921 
will provide some interesting indications about the way the 
Chinese communists worked.
The agitation for equality for women had long been a plank 
on the platform of the New Culture Movement and had thus been 
regarded as an expression of modernization or modernity.
However, the communists were able to make use of this issue in 
Canton to extend their cause of class struggle. On the 28th 
March 1921, a group of the various women’s organizations staged 
a procession through the city demanding political equality with 
men, and petitioned the provincial assembly. Next day, 
Generalissimo Sun Wen and Governor Ch'en granted the women adult
3 The speech, in Chinese, was entitled 'Min-tsu tzu-chueh’ 
(National self-determination), and published in HCN VTII 3 
(I-XI-I92 0). It was translated into Chinese from the English 
magazine Liberator (VI 1920 issue) by Li Ch'in-ying, a frequent 
translator and contributor in The Communist.
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franchise. But this only resulted in another demonstration, and 
this time demanding the rights of political participation - the 
right to be elected. Apparently, fighting broke out at the 
assembly building where the demonstration took place and, 
unfortunately, one of the demonstrators was injured by an 
assemblyman. While the offending assemblyman was taken to court, 
some of his colleagues backed the demonstrators and tried to have 
a resolution adopted by the assembly giving the women their 
political rights as demanded. This was defeated by 50 votes to 
32. The experience moved the women to form a Women’s Alliance
4and make more demonstrations outside the assembly.
However, no further gains were made. But, fortunately for 
them, a new and emotional issue presented itself and the 
communists turned this half-chance into an overwhelming success. 
Towards the end of May, the politically conscious women of Canton 
found their cause celebre in the announcement of the marriage 
between the principal of a provincial women teachers’ college and 
a comprador from Annam, an Overseas Chinese. What incensed the 
ladies was not the idea of marriage, but the details of the 
marriage agreement. Comprador Liu already had seven wives back 
home and Miss Wu was to be his No.8, though to be styled a p *ing- 
ch’i - a wife of equal status. Apart from this offensive title, 
Miss Wu was to receive a gold watch with a solid gold chain and 
$30,000, of which ^0(fo was paid as deposit and the rest upon 
consummation. The actual ceremony was to be in the traditional 
style with sedan chair and procession.
^ For details see Wah Tze Yat Pao (The Chinese Mail) 28, 3 I 111;
and 4, 9, 11, IV 1921.
To the members of the Women’s Alliance, the most galling
part was that Miss Wu was one of their members. She was promptly 
expelled from the Alliance, in spite of her protestation that it 
was a love-match and asked the Alliance not to interfere on the 
ground of individual freedom. The Alliance replied by agitating 
for her dismissal from the principalship. in the end, Miss Wu 
resigned on the ground that the duties of the p ’ing-ch'i would 
leave her no time for the principalship. The marriage was 
consummated and Comprador Liu, apparently satisfied, paid over 
the agreed amount while the Women’s Alliance metamorphosed into 
the Chung-hua nu-chieh lien-ho hui (The Chinese Womens Alliance) 
and issued a ringing manifesto. It blamed Confucianism for the 
’poisonous’ social conditions which women had. to endure, but what 
concerns our discussion was the latter parts of their Programme. 
Included in their demands were:
No.7« On the principle of class consciousness of 
the male and female workers (lao-tung), we propose 
that the women should participate in all the 
organizations and movements of the peasants 
(nung-min) and workers (kung-jen).
No.8. With the men, we participate in the mass 
movement against the warlords and capitalists.
No.9* On the principle that a nation has the 
right of existence, we have to struggle against 
all foreign imperialist exploiters.
10. On the principle that we unite with people 
of similar interests, we propose an alliance 5with womens organizations of the other countries.
*5 The Chinese Mail first announced the marriage on the 20-V-1921, 
giving all the details of the agreement and plans for the 
ceremony. On the 24th V, the first reaction from the Womens 
Alliance was reported. The Manifesto of ten points was published
Judging from this manifesto, the evidence of communist 
influence was self-evident while the operational method o 1' the 
Chinese communist in a state of collaboration can only be 
regarded as effective.
In the domain of the Canton National Government, there was
much activity in the labour movement contemporaneous to the
struggle for the equality of the sexes. In February 1921, the
Chung-hua kung-hui - The China Workers’ Association - was
constituted. While this was not a communist-led organization,
the association had communist participation and adopted as its
aims, these slogans
To unite the workers I 
To destroy the capitalist classl 
To promote social equality!
This association was initiated by Governor C h ’en in January 1921.
He asked Tai Chi-t’ao to come to Canton to help draft a
constitution. Instead, Tai remained in Shanghai and sent the
draft to Canton. Hu Han-min was then given the task of organizing
7the association.
While the official government backers of the association 
were not communists, the former certainly had some progressive
on the 15-XI-I921 but internal evidence showed that the new 
Alliance was established some time ago though the Manifesto had 
taken some time to finalize. The reports seemed to indicate that 
Miss Wu was rather incensed by the actions of her erstwhile 
friends. There was no indication of the respective ages of the 
bride or groom.
^ For a description of the reconstruction of the Association, see 
The Chinese Mail, 25-11-1921. The HCN IX 1 (1—V— 1921) published
the constitution of the Association drafted by Tai Chi-t’ao.
7 See The Chinese Mail, I9-II-I921.
ideas. Governor Ch'en had envisaged seeing workers' leaders 
sitting on the boards of directors of industrial and business 
enterprises. At the very time of the planning of the 
association, his government intervened, on behalf of the workers, 
in a wage dispute between the machinists union and the factory
g
owners. Ideologically, the position of the government may be 
regarded as nationalistic and anti-imperialist. They wanted to 
improve the socio-economic conditions of the workers and the 
nation. But, unlike the communists, they did not accept a 
materialistic conception of history which sees the necessity for 
class conflict as the social contradiction that provides the 
motive force for social development. In the Marxist vocabulary, 
they were not dialectical materialists.
This ideological position was clearly demonstrated in a
9speech by Chang Chi to the Machinists' Union. This KMT veteran 
complimented the union for the leading role it took during the 
hong Kong General Strike. In his view, the 'greatest danger for 
the Chinese workers and Chinese industries was the capitalist 
class formed by the collaboration of foreign and Chinese 
capitalists.' While he urged the workers to resist exploitation 
from that quarter by joining the revolutionary party, Chang also 
appealed to the patriotism of the Chinese capitalists and asked 
them to join the revolutionary party also.
however, the tide of the workers' opinion was turning 
against such conciliatory attitudes between socio-economic
Q
The Chinese Mail, 4-111-1921.
Q A detailed report of the speech was published in The Chinese 
Mail, 4-111-1921.
classes. Between February and July 1921, over forty cases of
1 0labour unrest were reported. Judging from the slogans used by
the strikers, we may obtain some indication of the ideological
underpinning of the labour agitations. In March, the machinists
had another strike. They and the striking paper-flowers workers
of Fo-shan insisted on referring to their employers as 'the 
1 1capitalists’. When the women workers of the Kwang chou-San-
shui Railways struck for better working conditions, they argued
1 2that
A thirteen-hour working-day is against the
principles of socialism.
Indeed, even The Chinese Mail, never a friend of the communists, 
editorialized that China was suffering from three curses:
1. Foreign capitalists and the economic 
exploitation of the foreign governments 
with their plans to make China a perpetual 
slave of the foreign capitalists.
2. The all-evil warlords. The condition of 
today is three-times worse off than the 
early years of the republic and six-times 
worse off than the last years of the
C h ’ing Dynasty. There are now over two 
million soldiers under the various warlords.
3. The politicians who regard the people as 
their enemies.
See The Chinese Mail of this period. This daily had at least 
two full pages per issue devoted to news from Kwangtung province. 
On the 26 III, even the priests in the temples around Canton went 
on strike demanding higher pay for their prayerful services.
1 1 The Chinese Mail 3 III for the Fo-shan strike and 15 III for 
the renewed strike by the machinists.
 ^ The Chinese Mail 14-111-1921.
The editor, however, advised the Chinese workers and the 
merchants - shang - to be of mutual assistance to each other 
rather than in mutual conflict in face of such formidable 
enemies. ^  ^
If the non-communist or the anti-communist patriots of 
Canton and Hong Kong were urging a united front of the workers 
and the bourgeoisie against the warlords, compradors, and 
imperialists, then as a communist, C h ’en must have felt that 
Canton would be a fruitful area, and the united front a fruitful 
method, for his political activities - if he could tread his 
ideological path astutely. Hence we may better appreciate and 
understand his decision to stay in Canton rather than to attend 
the First Congress of the CCP. What was needed in such a 
situation in Canton in order to reap a good political harvest 
would be a core of reliable cadres to lead the social agitations 
into the correct channel of class consciousness. This was indeed 
an important issue exercising his inind and this was included in 
the messages he sent to the 1st Congress. He would hardly be 
concerned with the dogmatic bickerings that took place between 
some of his former students. As Chang Kuo-tao recalled, one of 
the four points C h ’en asked the Congress to take special note of 
was the:
Need of caution in approaching the masses with
1 4a view to bringing them into the Party fold.
This caution apparently had been fruitful. With labour 
unrest continuing unabated through the latter part of 1921, more
The Chinese Mail 25-11-1921.
1 4 Chang Kuo-tao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, p p .
141, 698; the latter lists the four points.
and more trades formed their own unions and eventually, an 
Alliance of Trade Unions was formed. It was still officially 
under the auspices of the KMT. However, in spite of the 
exhortations of Chang Chi and other KMT veterans, this Trade
Union Alliance resolved to include in their constitution the
1 5following clauses:
We do not recognize capitalism.
We do not recognize any system of Private 
Property.
Workers should control the means of production 
and have the enjoyment of the fruits of 
production.
We will never agree to being used by the 
non-working class.
Once again, as with the manifesto of the Womens Alliance,* we can 
witness the influence and the handiwork of the communists. In 
Canton, as we have noted, the Chinese communists found themselves 
in a social situation in which the concepts of anti-imperialism
and anti-warlordism were already the political ideologies of the
1 6es tablishment. Given the ideological stance of their leader,
Ch’en Tu-hsiu, the Chinese communists would hardly need any 
personal prompting from the comrades of the Comintern to embark 
on the revolutionary path that they had taken. And, judging
The Chinese Mail 8 & 2 1 - X I - 1 9 2 1 .  The constitution was 
published on the latter date.
1 The sentiments of economic nationalism and the sentiments 
against the economic imperialism of the foreign powers were so 
strong that the Shanghai Compradors’ Association felt constrained 
to cable similar associations in other treaty ports to call for 
the formation of a national association to demonstrate and 
protest their patriotism. They argued that the real aim of the 
patriotic comprador was ’to maintain the commercial development, 
and hence the independence of China’. See The Chinese Mail, 
2 8 - I X - 1 9 2 1 .
from the manifestos and constitutions they had managed to 
influence, these Chinese communists, though acting in a covert 
fashion, were overtly true to their ideological persuasion.
More than that, they did not compromise their demands, but 
insisted on promoting class consciousness and struggle.
In the context of the collaboration, what the CCP were doing 
amounted to a denial of the ideological validity of the political 
programme of their partners. Like the CCP, both Chang Chi and 
Tai Chi-t’ao were trying to promote industrialization and the 
improvement of the lot of the masses. But, unlike their 
communist colleagues, Chang and Tai tried to avoid class conflict 
by counselling mutual assistance between the workers and the 
capitalists through appealing to their patriotism. The 
communists were trying to promote class consciousness and 
intensify class conflict.
Judging from the declarations of some of these mass 
organizations which involved the CCP in collaboration with other 
political groups - such as the Womens Alliance and the Alliance 
of Trade Unions - the CCP were not without their successes. But, 
if their collaborators were as convinced of their own ideological 
positions as the Chinese communists were of their communism, 
disagreement and conflict would be inevitable, unless one party 
gives way. Neither was willing to retreat. According to the 
communist labour organizer and historian, Teng Chung-hsia, an
unpleasant public confrontation occurred at the First National
1 7Labour Congress in Canton:
^  Teng Chung-hsia, Chung-kuo tzu-kung yuii-tung chien-shih (A 
brief history of the Chinese Labour Movement) , p p . 7 1 - 2 . First 
published in 1930* The edition used here is published in Poking, 
1933* This Congress opened in Canton on May Day, 1922.
At the welcoming ceremony, the KMT man tried 
to make propaganda by saying: 'That the
Labour Congress can convene freely in Canton 
is proof that only the KMT will give freedom 
to the workers'.
At that, our reply was: 'Freedom is a natural
endowment and not something for anyone to give
us ’ .
While the CCP was not in charge of this 1922 Labour Congress, 
they had made effective use of the occasion to propagate their 
ideas. T'an P'ing-shan, a former Peita student of Ch'en and a 
convert of the master, was in charge of the organisations for the 
May Day celebrations held in conjunction with the Congress. His 
tremendous efforts were apparently so successful that they
1 8remembered with great disgust by his political adversaries.
However the effecting of a liaison and collaboration between 
the KMT and the communists must not be regarded as a one-way 
affair with the communists as the eager suitor using the comrades 
from the Comintern as the match-makers. The KMT, especially Sun 
himself, was quite anxious to obtain help from the Soviet Russia 
and Germany, indeed, Sun had initiated such a movement 
contemporaneous to the movement of the CCP towards collaboration 
with the KMT. It is true that when Sun initiated his efforts to 
form his projected three-way alliance for Russia, Germany and 
his government, the communists had evinced no foreknowledge. 
However, when Ch'en was appointed to the committee to draft plans
The Chinese Mail 5 - H I - 1 924 published a long interview with 
an anti-CCP member of the KMT on the history of the development 
of' the collaboration. While the interviewee's name was not 
given in this report, internal evidence suggests he was a KMT 
member of long standing and very familiar with the leading 
members of the CCP.
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for the KMT-CCP collaboration in September 1922, the hitherto 
secret negotiation of Sun became public knowledge and was 
publicized for him by his political enemies and the English press 
in Hong Kong. Therefore, in order to appreciate fully and in 
proper context the reasons the communists collaborated with the 
KMT, we need to examine carefully the political situation, 
especially the intrigues, in Canton in 1922.
According to the expose in the Hong Kong press in September 
1922, which was based on documents captured by Ch* en Chiung-ining 
when he expelled Sun in June that year, Sun had sent an emissary, 
one Chii Ho-chtlng, to Germany the previous year trying to effect a 
tripartite alliance with Germany and Soviet Russia. One such 
document, dated 26th July 1921, revealed that a substantial sum 
of money was sent by Sun Yat-sen to Chii Ho-ching as expenses 
required by the latter for a mission to Germany. The purpose of 
the mission was to effect a tripartite alliance comprising 
Russia, Germany, and China, that is, the Canton administration 
of Sun. One of the intermediaries Chii was sent to contact was a 
former German diplomatic representative to China who had also 
served as the army attache in the German embassy in Russia. This 
German gentleman, according to Chii, would come to Canton as a 
liaison officer but incognito, as far as the public was concerned.
in March 1922, Sun expressed satisfaction with the progress 
of Chii’s mission and ordered Liao Chung-kai to remit another sum 
of money to Berlin for further expenses incurred by Chii. Sun 
also ordered that this German emissary should be met in Hong 
Kong and that means should be found to bring the emissary to 
Canton secretly. This emissary would have the code name Ml’, as
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• • 1 9suggested by Chu. While nothing concrete came of this secret
attempt at forming an alliance, the very fact that there was an
attempt in 1922 had ideological significance especially in the
context of the politics of collaboration.
The first significance of this episode is the timing of the
release of these captured documents. They were obviously meant
to embarrass Sun, by trying to demonstrate that ’Sun harboured
Bolshevik ideas and had wanted to establish a Bolshevik
20government in Canton for some time.’ This episode was
published at that particular time because it was meant to be a 
supporting evidence used by the opponents of the collaboration 
between the KMT and the CCP. This news was leaked to the public 
just two days after the publication of the names of the committee 
of eight appointed by Sun to draft a new party constitution for 
the KMT in pursuance of the decision to make major structural 
changes to suit the political needs of the collaboration. The 
one member in this committee receiving special attention was
19 Photographs of the letter sent by Chu from Berlin on New 
Year's Day 1922 giving an outline of the history of his mission 
was published in The Chinese Mail 25-IX-1922. The same issue 
also published the photograph of a telegraph from Chii to Sun 
which was copied in the official stationery of Sun's office as 
well as a letter, handwritten by Sun to Liao Chung-k’ai, 
explaining the telegraph and ordering Liao to pay out more money 
to Chii. This letter from Sun to Liao was dated 8-111-1922. In 
this letter Sun expressed his satisfaction of the progress of 
the scheme to date and asked Liao to make the necessary 
arrangement to meet his German agent, code-named 'H'. These 
documents were captured by Governor Ch'en's troops in June 1922. 
They were in a briefcase belonging to Liao but apparently left 
behind in flight. Details of this capture were published in the 
23-IX-I922 issue of The Chinese Mail.
20 The Chinese Mail, 23-IX-1922.
137
2 ICh’en Tu-hsiu. This report hinted darkly that Ch’en, 'the
sell-styled Marxist communist’ was up to some conspiracy and 
that Ch’en was secretly discussing methods of recruiting KMT 
members into the CCP ,
The second significance of this episode is that the KMT was 
anxious to form alliances with ideologically diverse partners.
The very decision to send Chii off to Berlin to effect the 
tripartite alliance indicates that Sun was certainly not 
objecting to forming alliances with the Bolsheviks and the losers 
in the Great War.
These reports should not be taken as an indication of Sun’s
ideological re-orientation. indeed, it was reported that the
22German Social-Democratic Party had heard nothing of Chii."~
However, there were rumours that Sun was trying to effect
something like the Rapallo accord between Germany and Russia
which involved secret military arrangements. It was thought
that with the arrival of agent H, the Sun administration might
23reap some benefit from a similar type of arrangement. In
short, what these rumours indicated was that Sun was prepared to
The entire committee membership was published in The Chinese 
Mail on the 20-IX-1922. The first indication of the news of the 
tripartite alliance was on the 22 September issue which gave an 
outline of the affair of Chii being sent to Berlin and announcing 
the existence of documents to prove their allegation. These 
documents were published the very next day.
2 2 The Chinese Mail 26-IX-1922, sought the opinion of Chiang 
K ’ang-hu, the founder of the Chinese Socialist Party who had iust 
returned from Europe where he attended a Comintern Congress in 
Russia andmet SDP officials in Germany* Chiang reported that the 
SDP officials had heard nothing of the scheme.
23 See The Chinese Mail 27, 28, 29, 30 IX abd 1-X-1922.
enter into secret deals with anyone who might strengthen his 
position, and that meant some military assistance.
However, it is important to remember that at the very time 
Sun was despatching Chii to Berlin to sound out the secret scheme, 
that is, at the end of 1921 and beginning of 1922, Sun was 
planning his Northern Expedition in Kweilin and turning down 
Maring1s overture of collaboration between the CCP and the
24KMT. Maring, of course, would not have known of the secret
scheme on tripartite alliance which Sun had hoped to realize.
The comrade from the Comintern proposed the now famous concept of' 
coalition of many classes. Therefore, it is only to be expected 
that the ideas of Maring would be rejected. To Sun, the basis 
of his revolutionary movement w a s : ^
The unbroken heritage from the Great Yao, Shun,
Yii, T'ang, King Wen, King Wu, Duke of Chou, and 
Confucius to the present day is the basic 
principle of my political thought.
In short, Sun was not one who would be interested by systematic 
ideology and not one who would be particularly worried if his own 
political principles were somewhat inconsistent. As one scholar 
on revolutions said, 'With Sun Yat-sen ... democracy easily 
shaded off into a theory of benevolent and constructive 
dictatorship, and Marxism, communism, socialism, 'livelihood', 
the planned society, welfare economics, and anti-foreign and 
anti-imperialism sentiments were all mixed together.'~
24 For a succinct account of these events see Mao and the Chinese
Revolution, Ch.V by Jerome Ch'en (Oxford U.P. 1967)*
2 5
26
Ibid. cited from Ssu-min Pao of Kweilin, 28 Dec. 1921. 
R.R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World (N.Y. 1932).
What interested Sun was results, or in his own terms,
anything that would help fulfil his dream of unifying China by
'revolutionary* means. Indeed, this gaining control itself was
the revolution. Hence, the very fact of sending Chii to pursue
his tripartite scheme was a case in point. Chii was a member of
the anti-communist faction of the KMT, and later was to become
very antagonistic to fellow-KMT members who co-operated with the 
27CCP. The alliance, if materialised, would not be one cemented
by a common political principle or aim but for pragmatic 
immediate advantage. Indeed, this was how Sun regarded the 
collaboration with the CCP at the end of 1922. At that time, 
the most important thing, he told Chiang Kai-shek, was to acquire 
a base. He saw Kwangtung as this vital base and was prepared to 
regain it, whether the CCP and the KMT had similar ideologies 
was of secondary importance. Then, having acquired this base in 
Kwangtung, the ’revolution* could expand throughout the Southwest 
and thence the rest of the country, ’having the southwestern 
provinces as my base, there will then be many ways to bring the 
revolution to a success.
That Sun would not let the achievement of his political 
ambitions be encumbered by ideological consideration may be seen
' See letter from Chii to Sun dated 10-XI-1924 in which the 
former attacked the HCN and the editorial staff of the Shanghai 
Min-kuo jih-pao mentioning by name Shen Hsuan-lu and Shao Li-tzu. 
A photocopy of this letter is in the East Asian Collection of the 
Hoover Institution, uncatalogued when I read it.
2 8 Sun’s letter to Chiang, dated 21-XI-1922, was reprinted in Kuo 
Min chou-pao (National News Weekly) I V , N o . 1 4 (2 2—V— 1926). ft is 
also reprinted in Tsung-li ch’uan-shu (Complete Writings of the 
Director-General), p p .1009-1012, ed. Hu Han-min (Shanghai, 1930.)
in the way he persisted in his dream of an alliance with the
Germans. While he was having discussions with Maring in Kweilin,
he despatched to Rerlin Teng Chia-yen, an American-educated
member of his group, to expedite matters. In Teng’s absence,
Sun, having been expelled from Canton by Governor Ch’en, went to
Shanghai amidst rumours of a peace conference of warlords for a
peaceful solution of the political conflict. Whilst in Shanghai,
in August 1922, he met Li Ta-chao and admitted the Chinese
communists into membership of the KMT without finger printing
29and the swearing of personal allegiance. Then, after further
discussions with Joffe, Sun issued the now famous Sun-Joffe 
Manifesto. But, his consorting with communists did not indicate 
any ideological affinity with communism, or indeed any ideology. 
He demonstrated his non-ideological pragmatism by continuing his 
efforts to court German capitalism. Eight months after the 
Sun-Joffe Manifesto, Sun wrote to emissary Teng, who was still 
in Berlin, thus:^
With a view to designing a great plan for the 
reconstruction of China, you should consult 
with some of the most influential Capitalists 
such as Siemens, and with their governments: 
with Chinese man-power and resources and with 
mutual co-operation, we will develop the wealth 
of China, reform our administration, and improve
20 Lo Chia-lun, Liu-shih nien lai Chung-kuo Kuo-mm-tang yu 
Chung-kuo (The Kuomintang and China in Sixty Years), p.559 
(Taipei: Committee for Compiling Historical Materials of the
KMT, 1959)*
O  Q
J Cited from Kuo-fu ch'uan-shu (The Complete Writings of the 
Father of the Nation) ed. Chang Ch'i-yun, p .837 (Taipei, China 
News Press, i960). Emphasis mine.
our military strength. In short, by means of 
German experts and knowledge, in the shortest 
time, we shall make China strong and wealthy.
If such is achieved, China will do everything 
in her power to help Germany in shaking off the 
yoke of the Versailles Treaty.
Hence, any evaluation of the motives and actions of the CCP 
vis-a-vis the KMT has to be made against such a background of 
political self-interest and ideological pliability of Sun and 
the KMT — The Chinese communists’ new comrades-in-arms.
The CCP, led by C h ’en Tu-hsiu, had demonstrated in 1921-2 - 
before the Second Congress of the CCP - their willingness ’to 
make use of the KMT organisational structure as a means for
their [the communists’] own propaganda and contact amongst the
31masses' . Now, when the Hong Kong paper broke the news of the
secret negotiation for the tripartite alliance in September 1922, 
Sun was once again in exile in Shanghai. The intention of that 
newspaper, as we have observed, was to demonstrate that Sun had 
long harboured pro-Bolshevik sentiments and hoped that such a 
news scoop might further damage the credentials Sun had with the 
Western Powers.
On the other hand, Sim and the KMT were supported by their 
new comrades, the CCP in the tripartite controversy. The
H. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p .58 
(Stanford 1 9 5 1 ) but Isaacs was referring to post-2nd Congress 
activities under the direction of Maring from August 1922. See 
also Jerome Ch'en, O p .cit., p«91* R.C. North, Moscow and Chinese 
Communists, p.b4 (Stanford 1953) also supported Isaacs. But as 
wo have demonstrated, T'an P'ing-shan and his comrades were doing 
in April and May 1922 exactly what Isaacs said they were 
instructed to do in August 1922.
communists supported this attempt by Sun on the ground that had
the tripartite alliance come about, it would then be an alliance
32of the victims of imperialism. They did so because in their
estimation, the KMT 'is a revolutionary party representing (or, 
'working towards a') national revolution; and not a political 
party representing any class; in their party constitution, their 
demands are the common benefits of the citizenry, not any 
particular interests of any class; amongst the membership, those 
representing the capitalist class, the intellectuals and the
33proletarian workers seem to be of equal strength*.
Editor T s 'ai Ho-sen went further than his party leader.
T s 'ai advised that Hong Kong newspapers should not worry 
themselves over the fear that Sun's tripartite alliance was to 
be based on Bolshevism. Sun’s min-sheng chu-i (People's 
Livelihood), in the context of the industrialized nations' 
economies, would 'merely' be regarded as 'national capitalism, 
means which the imperialists are using to ameliorate class 
struggle and to extend their political grasp. They are the means 
employed by Briand of France and Lloyd George and Henderson of 
Britain...'. T s ’ai went on to add that what the Western Powers 
are afraid of was not Sun's political theories 'for they are but
32 T s 'ai Ho-sen, the editor of the new party organ Hsiang Tao 
(The Guide Weekly) supported Sun's attempt in the opening issue 
of 1 3 —fK— 1 9 2 2 and again devoted a leading story to its defence 
L11 No.4 (4-X-1922), on the grounds that such an alliance would 
enable these victims to escape the scourge of Britain, the USA, 
France and Japan.
• C!; *en y u“h siu, •Kuo-min-tang shih shih-mo?» 
m m - t a n g  ?) Hsiang Ta o No, 2 ( 20-IX-1922). (IVha t is the Kuo-
common ideas. What the Western Powers fear is that the Chinese
34politics and economy might escape their control1.
From the perspective of the development and nature of 
Chinese communism, the entire episode of the attempted tripartite 
alliance was related to the KMT-CCP collaboration, as the 
opponents of communism rightly saw. The significant aspects, 
however, were not the Bolshevizing of the KMT or Sun, but the 
jointly shared belief - by Sun and the CCP - that neither Sun nor 
the KMT were class-conscious but merely trying to acquire control 
of the entire China by 'revolutionary1 means without 
particularizing what was meant by ’revolutionary1 other than what 
was to be planned by Sun and the KMT. Furthermore, the tone 
which the CCP used in their official journal, The Cxuide Weekly, 
in reference to Sun's ideas and the KMT, were quite patronizing. 
Indeed, in the very first issue, Editor T s ’ai, made use of the 
rumour that Sun and Wu P'ei-fu might work out a compromise, 
warned Sun in no uncertain terms that the unhappy history of the 
KMT hitherto should be a lesson against any further dalliance
35with the imperialists and their agents, the warlords. Thus,
rather than seeing the KMT as an amalgum of three classes, as 
viewed from the Comintern, the CCP saw their new partners merely
n | i Ts'ai Ho-sen, 1 Chung-Te—0 san-kuo lien-meng yu kuo-chi ti-kuo 
chu-i ke Ch’en Chiung-ming chih fan-tung1 (The Tripartite 
alliance of China, Germany, and Russian, International 
Imperialism, and the Counter-revolutionary actions of Ch’en 
Chiung-ming), Hsiang Tao No.4, p.27 (4-X-1922).
35 Ts'ai, ’T ’ung-i, chieh-chai, yü Kuo-min-tang1 (Unification, 
Loans and the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.1 , pp.4-6 (13-IX-1 922).
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as an organizational structure, a means to develop their own 
propaganda and to contact the masses. And, after Sun’s return 
to Canton in January 1923» the collaboration provided the CCP 
with a refuge, for they needed a safe base to work.
however, by this time, for the CCP to work in collaboration 
within existing political structures in order to develop their 
own propaganda and to contact the masses was already an 
established practice. Such collaboration need not signify any 
ideological affinity. A case in point is the collaboration 
between the North China branch of the CCP under Li Ta-chao and 
Wu P ’ei-fu, who controlled the northern regions of China.
On May 1922 , when T 'an P'ing-shan and his comrades were 
making use of the organizational structure of the KMT for the 
propagation of communist ideas, the CCP also approved the 
establishment of a liaison between Li Ta-chao and Wu P ’ei-fu.
The arrangement called for the appointment of five inspectors on 
the various railway lines in territories controlled by Wu. Li 
was particularly friendly with Wu's Transportation Commissioner, 
one Kao En-hung, and the Chief Inspector, Huang Tung. The latter 
and Li were students together in Japan. These inspectors were 
placed there to report on any suspicious activities of the so- 
called Chiao-t'ung Pai (Communication Clique) who were rivals of 
Wu. At, the same time, these inspectors would ’promote ... class 
education and arouse the workers’ class consciousness'. ^
Indeed, after the February 7 incident during which troops of Wu 
put down a railwaymen’s strike organized by the communists with
^  See C h ’i-wu lao-jen, ’Erh-chi* hui-i-lu (Memoirs on 7U) fob. 
especially p p .70-79 (Peking, Kung-jen 1937) for details.
1 4 5
three 'inspectors’ playing significant parts, the Peking Branch
of' the CCP criticized their new collaborators, the KMT.
Shortly after the incident, a memorial service was held in
Peking for those who died during that action. It seemed that the
KMT was not officially represented. To this, the CCP commented
that seeing 'no one from the so-called revolutionaries of the
Three Principles of the People bothered to come, is a clear
demonstration that the CCP is your (that is, the workers') only 
37friend.' To be sure, the CCP did not expect much from those
'so-called revolutionaries of the Three Principles of the People'.
A little earlier, at the Fourth Congress of the Communist
International held in November, 1922, the CCP representative,
38Liu Jen-ch'ing, told the gathering that:
If we join the party (KMT), we shall be able 
to show the masses that we too are for a 
revolutionary democracy, but that for us 
revolutionary democracy is only a means to an 
end. Furthermore, we shall be able to gather 
the masses around us and split the Kuomintang 
Party.
While Liu Jen-ch'ing was reporting the CCP policies and 
activities with enthusiasm, the leadership of the Comintern did 
not seem to share such enthusiasm. Indeed the Russians showed
^  Ching-Han kung-jen liu-hsieh chi (The Bloody Tales of the 
workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway) was published in March 1923 
by the Peking Kung-jen Chou-kan (Workers’ Weekly), a CCP organ. 
The quotation was from p.183. This book had a postscript by Kao 
Chun-yu, a regular contributor of the Hsiang Tap and a Peita 
alumni. It also has a number of quotations from Karl Liebknecht, 
von Heine, and especially The Communist Manifesto.
o  O
 ^ Cited from Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the Fast, p.lVI 
(Stanford U.P. 1957)* The Chinese delegation was led by Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu. Emphasis mine.
scant respect. Karl Radek, the f'irst rector of the Communist
University for the Toilers of the East (KUTV) replied in a most
patronizing manner. The contrast between the attitudes of Liu
and Radek was so sharp that the latter’s speech bears repeating
in some detail. kith confidence bordering on pomposity,
39Comrade Radek said:
As always, I begin by saying: Comrades, do
not see things in too rosy a light, do not 
overestimate your forces. When the Chinese 
comrade comes and tells us: we have taken
root all over China, I must say to him, honoured 
comrade, it is not a bad thing to feel strong 
enough, when one undertakes a piece of work, to 
carry it through successfully, but one must 
also see things as they are ... The comrades 
who are working in Canton and Shanghai have not 
had much success in establishing links with the 
masses of the workers ... Many of them shut 
themselves up in their chambers to study Marx 
and Lenin just as formerly one studied Confucius. 
Comrades, you must understand that in China 
neither the question of triumph of socialism, 
nor that of a soviet republic is on the order 
of the day. Unfortunately, in China even the 
question of national unity and of a united 
national republic is not yet historically on the 
order of the day. ...
To the Chinese delegation, especially its leader Ch’en Tu-hsiu 
who had made a reputation as an anti-Confucianist, this speech 
must have been disappointing and insulting.
39 Cited from Carrere d ’Encausse & Schram, Op.cit., p.19^*
What Liu said in his speech was not really boastful for he 
was doing no more than reporting to the Congress what the Chinese 
communists had been doing. What Radek said, however, had 
demonstrated to his Chinese listeners that this leading member 
of the Comintern was not only ignorant of the Chinese situation 
but that his and the Chinese perceptions of the tasks ahead were 
quite dissimilar. As the Chinese communists entered into a 
collaboration with the KMT, their actions were geared to 'split 
the KMT'. By this, the Chinese communists meant that through 
their action within the KMT, members of the latter party would 
heighten their class consciousness. And, led by the party of 
the proletariat (CCP) the awakened members of the non-class based 
KMT would develop the national revolution into a socialist 
revolution, through class struggles within the ranks of the 
members of the national revolution coalition. As has been noted, 
the new nation that Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his comrades sought to 
build would not defend the interests of the 'aristocracy and 
capitalists ' .
However, the Comintern seemed to have their own plans for
their Chinese comrades. In its first formal instruction on the
relations between the CCP and the KMT, the Executive Committee
of the Communist International (ECCl) declared t h a t : ^
Article 2 ........ The ECCI considers it
necessary that action between the Kuomintang 
and the young CCP should be co-ordinated.
Article 3« Consequently, in the present 
condition, it is expedient for members of 
the CCP to remain in the Kuomintang.
Cited from Jane Degras, Communist International II, p .3 
(Oxford U.P. 1956), emphasis mine.
Then, as if to re-emphasize their position, the Comintern
despatched another instruction to coincide with the Third
Congress of the CCP, held under the wing of the KMT in Canton
in June 1923* Of interest to the development of the Chinese
communists' concept towards the nature of the collaboration, it
is worth noting that these May 1923 ECCI instructions laid
stress on the peasant movement and urged the CCP to exert the
leadership of the working class and to push the KMT toward an
agrarian revolution. However, it was silent on the issue of the
actual form of the KMT-CCP collaboration, in spite of the
patronizing lecture Radek gave to the Chinese comrades at the
41Fourth Congress of the Comintern.
The Manifesto of this Third Congress of the CCP bears the
outward manifestation of the influence of the ECCI instruction
of May 1923 and said that 'the KMT should be the central force
42of the national revolution and should assume its leadership'. 
However, this was prefaced by the statement that the policy of 
the CCP in the preceding year, using the slogans of 'Down with 
the Warlords' and 'Down with Imperialism' has been the correct 
policy. Besides, taken in context, this reference to the KMT 
should not be taken as a sign of a change of heart through the 
persuasions of the comrades of the Comintern. Indeed, a case 
may be made that the Manifesto of CCP had some significant 
departure from the Comintern resolutions and injunctions 
mentioned as well as the self-denial spirit of the Sun-Joffe
See Degras, Ibid, p.25 for the ECCI Instructions.
See Hsiang Tao N0.3O, p.228 (20—VI— 1923)• Emphasis mine.
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Manifesto. The Chinese communists certainly put an unusual 
interpretation to the injunction of ’co-ordinating' the CCP 
activities with those of the KMT. The expression 'the KMT 
should be the central force of the national revolution' was 
really a reproach, if the Manifesto of the Third Congress of the 
CCP is read in context as the intended readers wouTl,
Immediately after the passage cited, the Manifesto went on
thus:
Unfortunately, the KMT has frequently adopted 
two mistaken attitudes:- (a) they desire 
foreign powers to help them in the national 
revolution. In thus appealing to the enemy, 
not only do they forfeit the appearance of 
leadership in the National revolution, but 
also, in cultivating a tendency in the people 
to rely on foreign powers, destroy the spirit 
of independence and self-confidence of the 
people. (b) in concentrating on military 
matters and neglecting propaganda work amongst 
the people, they thus not only lost the position 
of political leadership but also lost the 
sympathy of the people.
Having thus chided their new partners, the CCP then 'hope that 
all the revolutionary elements in society will concentrate 
|their efforts] on the KMT, so that the movement for a national 
revolution may be expedited; and, at the same time, hope that 
the KMT will repudiate their too outdated outlook and their
43
43 An accurate Chinese version can be found in the Tung-fang 
t sa-chih (Eastern Miscellany) XX, No.2 (25"I” 1923), pp. 10- 11. 
The English version in North China Herald 3“It'"1923, p.289, is 
a c cura t e.
reliance on foreign powers and the military*. The CCP felt that 
'to propagandize and organize the workers and peasants are our 
special duties, and to guide the workers and peasants to join 
the national revolution is our central task' for they saw their 
task as helping the 'liberation of the oppressed peoples and 
classes of the world'. The criticism of the KMT, and Sun, on 
matters of seeking aid from the foreign powers was but a repeat 
of the criticism issued by editor T s 'ai in the very first issue
44of the Hsiang Tao.
In short, then, the CCP publicly announced at its Third 
Congress that its aim in the national revolution was to help make 
the KMT see the contemporary situation and the needs more 
realistically - as the communists themselves see the situation.
In other words, the CCP saw one of their major roles in the 
collaboration as a re-direction of the policies and revolutionary 
methodology of the KMT. Indeed, we may say that since C h 'en 
Tu-hsiu accepted the appointment to the committee on the 
reorganization of the KMT, in Sept. 1922, the CCP had used every 
available means to publicize their views well before the special 
EGCI directives for the Third Congress of the CCP. In their 
many journals, the CCP had repeatedly announced that in 
collaborating with the KMT, the CCP had no intention of becoming
Ts'ai Ho-sen 'T'ung-i, chieh-chai, yii Kuo-rnin-tang' 
(Unification, Loans, and the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.1, pp.4-0 
(13-IX-I922) esp. p .6 . The issue of peasant policy, especially 
the question as to whether the policy of the CCP during the 
period of collaboration was merely mirroring that of the 
Comintern or even watering down the latter, will be discussed 
fully in a separate chapter.
more like the KMT. On the contrary, the CCP aspired to change
their collaborators. The many journals of the CCP were certainly
read by the politically conscious, though not necessarily of
similar persuasion as the communists, and had considerable
45influence over a wide area.
From the initial committee to investigate the problems of 
the re-organization of the CCP through the Sun-Joffe declaration 
to the First Congress of the re-organized KMT in Jan. 1924, the 
CCP had been at pains to reassure the readers of their journals 
that they have not given up the idea of class struggle nor have 
they turned away from their goal of a proletariat socialist state 
in their adopting a new set of slogans and the goal of national 
revolution. When questioned on this very point of the 
theoretical foundation of a united front of the two - proletariat
4 6and the capitalist - classes, the official organ replied:
The proletariat is stronger than the capitalist 
class. This is not only true in the present 
situation but of all times because at any given
4 5 Perhaps an extreme case of the influence of CCP literature 
may be seen in an article by Fei Chiieh-tien in the journal by the 
so-called Research Clique of the Progressive Party in Peking, 
Chieh-fang yii kai-tsao (Emancipation and Reconstruction) 111 
N o .10 ( 1 VI-1921 ), pp.85-104. In the article entitled 'Kuan-yu 
she-hui chu-i yun-tung wen-ti' (On the question of the socialist 
movement), the author openly admitted to being influenced by an 
article in The Communist N o .1 (On the 3^d Anniversary of the
founding of the Soviet Union) to the extent that 'while China may 
not have a strong bourgeoisie, China has a majority belonging to 
the proletariat, hence what is needed is socialism and not 
capitalism'. He further agreed with the writer of The Communist 
that this socialist revolution that China needs should be made 
by a union of the workers and peasants.
46 Reply to a reader, written by Kao Chun-yu, a former Peita man. 
Hsiang Tao No.4 (4-X-1922), pp.35-6. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was away and
Kao had to take over the task of replying to the reader.
1 r>2
time of history, the proletariat is more (numerous 
than the capitalists). All they (proletariat) 
need is to unite. Therefore, in the national 
revolution, the proletariat will take the major 
(chu-yao)position while the capitalist class will 
occupy the position of one who is summoned.
In other words, this revolution will be directed 
by the revolutionary masses. The proletariat 
take part in this revolution because they 
understand their own class interests, and they 
are not fighting for the interests of any other 
class.
The writer further assured the readers that the proletariat were 
certainly not under any illusion that the national revolution 
would be their liberation. At best, the national revolution was 
regarded as a practical way of gaining revolutionary experience 
and the techniques of organisation so that their ultimate 
complete liberation may be expedited.
As if to emphasize his points, the same writer in the very 
next issue of the Hsiang T a p , took advantage of a press report 
of rumours that Sun Yat-sen, Sun Ch'uan-fang, and Wu P ’ei-fu 
were secretly negotiating a deal, warned the KMT sternly that 
unless the KMT make plain to the masses that it has irrevocably 
broken off relations with the warlords and was not retreating 
from the principles of the (national) revolution then the
hiposition of the KMT amongst the people would be endangered.
(The current conditions in Fuchien and the KMT) Hsiang T a o , No.5 
(ll-X-1922), pp.40-41 . The same author issued a similar warning 
in the very next issue, N o .6 (18-X-1922), p.52; and in No.8
(2-TX-1922) a number of writers, including; Kao and Editor T s ' ai 
commented on the need of the KMT to demonstrate their real i/at ion 
that the working masses ( lao-tung chiin-chung) were the iti.'t i o to rce 
of China's national revolution.
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Chang Kuo-t'ao, who came to be known to certain sections of the
48KMT as one of the more 'verbose theorists' amongst the CCP. 
warned the KMT that if the latter really wanted to be 
collaborators in a national revolution, then they should quickly 
demonstrate to the masses that they were not tools of the 
warlords and imperialists but were willing to organize the masses
49against these national enemies.
A fortnight later, our verbose theorist was slightly more
theoretical when he told the intellectuals if they really wanted
a national revolution for the true independence of China, and if
they were 'truly patriotic and see the reconstruction of China
as their own duty, then they must unite with China's revolutionary
socialists to overthrow the warlords, bureaucrats, and foreign
powers; and share (with the revolutionary socialists) the goals
of peace, independence, liberty, and unification; and would make
the target of their propaganda the villages, factories, shops and
schools' and not try to form compromising solutions with the 
50warlords. Not all communists were so verbose. One Tien Cheng,
An interview with 'an old KMT member’ by The Chinese Mail 
20-11-1 924 in an article entitled ' Kung-ciian-tang nei-inu' (inside 
the CCP). Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was another such a one, while Teng 
Chung-hsia, T'an P'ing-shan and Kao together with Li and Ch'en 
were the leaders and directors of operations, with the latter two 
as the chiefs. This writer extended grudging respect to Ch'en 
for openly practising his belief even risking jail while seeing 
Li as the 'slippery one’ and the 'verbose' ones were mentioned in 
terms bordering on contempt.
49 Chang Kuo-t'ao, 'Kuo-min-tang ying-fou fu chien ke-ming cheng- 
fu' (Should not the KMT rebuild a revolutionary government?) 
Hsiang Tao No.10 (15-XI-1922) pp.79-81. A similar warning was 
made by one Sun To in the very next issue, dated 22-XI-1922,
pp.88-9•
50 Chang Kuo-t'ao, ' Chih-shih ch ieh-chi tsai cheng-chih sluing ti 
ti-weichi cb*i tse-jen' (The Political positions and duties of 
the intellectuals) Hsiang Tao (6-X1I-1922) , pp.98-100.No• 12,
after mentioning that both the Chinese and the European chambers
of commerce in Shanghai were asking the warlords to cut down
military expenditure and claiming that approval for the Japanese
occupation of Shangtung as good for the maintenance of order,
simply posed the question: * Kuo-min-tang na li ch’ii liao? ' -
51where has the KMT gone?
While the verbose theorist insistently told the petty 
bourgeoisie that ’at present the only solution to the political 
problems is for the revolutionary democrats and the various
59socialist organizations to unite in a revolutionary movement’ 
it was left to the verbally economical Tien Cheng to give the 
Marxist justification for the tactics of collaboration. In reply 
to a criticism that in collaborating with the KMT the CCP was 
betraying its profession of Marxism, Tien Cheng advised his 
critics to read 'the last chapter of The Communist Manifesto*, as 
well as the Second Congress of the Comintern’s resolution on the 
colonial question. He countered his critics by accusing them of
53suffering from ’Left-wing Infantilism', while declaring that:
Today the only revolutionary Marxist party is 
the CCP and only the CCP can represent the 
development of Chinese Marxism. Any true 
Marxist should follow the CCP and support 
nationalist revolutionary movement in China.
^^  Tien Cheng, Hsiang Tap No.13 (23-XII-1922) p.101.
Chang, ' Wo-min tui yu hsiao tzu-ch'an chieh-chi. ho-pMng p/ai ti 
ch’ iian-kao ’ (Our Remonstration to the Petty Bourgeois Peace 
Faction) Hsiang Tao (No.13» 23-XII-1922), pp.105-6.
2-^  Tien Chen, ’ " Chin - Jih"-p*ai chih so-wei ma-k’o-ssu chu-i’ (The 
so-called Marxism of the |'Chin-Jih,, clique) Hsiang Tao No. 15 
(27-XII-I922), pp.122-3 .
We may say that from September to December 1922, that is.
from the ministration of Comintern wisdom via Comrade Radek to
Liu Jen-ch'ing's speech at the Fourth Congress of the Communist
International, the official organ of the CCP was expressing
opinions far closer to that of Liu than that of Radek. The
discussion on the nature of the KMT by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the
second issue of the Hsiang Tao was quite dissimilar to Radek's
or Maring's, his agent in China. Ch'en, as we have observed,
saw the KMT as a 'revolutionary party in the national revolution
movement, not representing the interests of any class', while
Maring, in August, 1922, went into much precise analysis and
discovered in the KMT a union of four classes, viz, 'leading
intellectuals mostly men who took part in the 191 1 revolution;
the overseas Chinese capitalist bourgeois elements; the soldiers
54of the southern army, and the workers'.
While the nature of these messages which the CCP conveyed 
to their readers fitted in well with the essence of the speech of 
Liu Jen-ch'ing at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, it also 
implied that Comrades Radek and Maring were not successful in 
re-directing their Chinese comrades into their conception of 
reality nor persuaded by their wisdom on the political demands of 
the contemporary situation. Furthermore it seems that the 
lecture by Radek had little success in modifying the message the 
Chinese communists wanted to spread.
54 For Ch'en, see Hsiang Tao No.2, p.16. For a detailed account
of Maring's view, see the article by D. Bing, 1Sneevliet and the 
Early Years of the CCP' in The China Quarterly No.48 (Oct.-Dec. 
1971f p p .677-697. Quotation is from pp.685-6 . It will be 
observed that my account differs significantly from Bing's.
A week after Tien Cheng explained to his readers that the
CCP was really following the injunctions of Marx when they
formed a collaboration with the KMT, editor Ts'ai gave the
readers further elucidation on the communist's concept of the
collaboration. The reason for the national revolution movement
in China, explained Ts'ai, was to oppose international
imperialism. In China, this involved the warlords who were being
used by the imperialists to keep China divided. The majority of
the people who suffered the consequences of such exploitation
were the workers-peasant class (kung-nung) - which indeed formed
the majority of the population - and the 'infantile capitalist
class who were oppressed by the foreign capitalists; this is the
middle class ... It is the KMT which leads this middle class to
the road of the national movement (kuo-min yun—tung) ... while
the CCP leads the workers-peasants class to a united front
5 5national movement'.
In so saying, Ts'ai explicitly denied the multi-class 
nature of the KMT which Maring and the Russian comrades were 
wont to discover. Furthermore, Ts'ai informed his readers, 'from 
now on, the true master of this movement will be the one who is 
most loyal in the opposition to international imperialism'.
And, he enjoined the KMT to work closely with the CCP in their 
march forward. To this, party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed and 
offered further explanation on the nature and differences of
5 5 Ts'ai Ho-sen 'Wai-li chung-liu chieh-chi yü Kuo-min-tang' 
(Foreign Powers, the Middle Class and the KMT) Hsiang Tao No. 1 (>,
( I8-I-1923) pp. 125“6. This article was written after the 
delegates to the 4th Comintern Congress had already returned to 
China, and was the leading article of that issue of the journal.
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56the method and aims of the revolution.
Revolution, the former professor advised his readers, aims 
to bring about a higher form of social organization and while to 
do so may involve certain military aspects, it would be a great 
mistake to confuse the two. The putsch may be a method to bring 
about a revolution but it may also be used by the counter­
revolutionaries. He further advised his readers not to be 
confused by party labels but to judge a party and its members by 
its actions. If these basic principles were fully grasped,
C h 'en added:
then we may unite with any party or even 
military person as a revolutionary move 
(tactic). This type of union (lien-ho) is 
purely a revolutionary union, it is a union 
to propel the revolution through certain 
stages and it is a union to overcome certain 
counter-revolutionaries. It should never be 
a union based on compromise Tof basic 
principles ] .
As to his newly acquired collaborators, Ch'en said that the KMT 
were still unable to understand the evolutionary stages of 
revolution and counter-revolution and thus unable to recognize 
who was the main enemy in the present situation. In the purview 
of the subsequent development of Chinese communism, what Ch'en 
said here may be regarded as putting into layman's language the 
concept of dialectical materialism and the theory of
5 6J Ch'enf 'Ke-ming yii fan-ke-ming' (Revolution and counter­
revolution ), Hsiang Tao, No. 16, pp.128-130. ( 18-1-1923) ,
contradiction.
However, though Ch'en had just returned from the Fourth 
Congress of the Comintern, sentiments expressed in this articie 
cannot be regarded as evincing much influence by the Congress.
On the other hand, they fitted in with the trend of development 
of communism in China as examined hitherto. Furthermore, these 
ideas expressed by Ch'en can hardly be regarded as in conformity 
with those expressed in the 12th January 1923 ECCI Instructions 
mentioned earlier because it would be difficult for any member 
of the KMT to regard -what Ch'en said here as an attempt to 
'co-ordinate the actions between the two parties', as the 
instructions insisted.
Such divergences of views are more noticeable and
significant if these Chinese communist ideas on the nature of
the collaboration and their collaborators are placed in the
context of the ideological and political development in the KMT
at the time. On New Year's Day of 1923, the planning committee
58of the KMT issued a manifesto. In this, the national
revolution was certainly not seen as a class struggle but quite
57
57 Today, in the context of Chinese communism, credits for such 
ideas are usually given to Mao Tsetung. But, as can be seen, 
such concepts were in practice early in the First United Front 
period. To be sure, Mao developed the theoretical aspects much 
more fully in his On Contradiction.
58 This committee was formed as a result of the earlier committee 
of which Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a member. The earlier committee was 
formed on the 4-IX-1922 and the latter on the 15-XI, with Hu 
Man-win and Wang Ching-wei assigned to draft the manifesto. For 
details of the formation and discussion of this committee, see 
Tsou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shih-kao (Draft History of the 
KMT) Vol.l"^ pp . 31 6-321 . (*2 Vols. Chungking: Commercial Press
1944). Lo Chia-lun, O p .cit. pp.57^-5 also has a summary.
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the opposite. Its proclaimed aim was to unite all the peoples 
into one great Chinese people. Instead of class struggle, the 
KMT manifesto resurrected the old Tung-meng Ilui slogans of 
'Equalization of Land' and 'Regulation of capital', and the Three 
P rinciples.
The reply from the Chinese communists was clear and 
uncompromising, for there was little choice. Sun had never given 
up his dream of a so-called Peaceful Unification (ho-ping t 'ung-i) 
which, in reality meant little more than a partition of China 
into spheres of domination by the various warlords working under 
a facade of unity. At the same time, for all his talk of 
national independence and the retrieval of the Lost Rights, Sun 
was then quite prepared to see China partitioned by the Powers. 
Soon after his return to Canton, Sun took advantage of a visit by 
the new U.S. Minister, J.G. Shurman and importuned the American 
Minister to 'persuade other powers to agree to undertake a joint
59military intervention in China for a period of five years.’
Therefore, faced with such a protean collaborator, it is 
only to be expected that the Chinese communists felt the need to 
re-affirm their ideological stance. The pages of the Hsiang Tao 
were replete with warnings and denunciation of the Peaceful 
Unification and the dangers of dallying with the imperialists.
Sun was often mentioned by name. Indeed, one writer went so far 
as to claim that 'unless [the demands ofj the various sections 
of the nation coincided with [the interests] of the working class 
(lao-tung chieh-chi) then min-chuan, the 'democracy' segment of
59^ See Clubb, O p .cit., pp.120-2. And, for the CCP's response to 
the Peaceful Unification, see T s 'ai Ho-sen in Hsiang Tao Xo.lS 
(31-1-1923)* pp.141 — 3 - This is a front page article for the 
issue.
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oT the Three Principles will never be established’.
Party Leader C h ’en Tu-hsiu made a significant contribution
and it was deemed important enough for the article to be
61reprinted. In this discussion, C h ’en saw the present national
revolution as a ’capitalist democratic revolution’ and ’urged 
the KMT to understand and awaken to its task.’ The KMT was 
urged not to resist the Left-wing Tendency within sections of 
the capitalist class. In any revolution, the former professor 
explained, it was only a portion of the revolutionary class that 
was awakened to struggle for the interests of the class. Indeed, 
within this historically assigned revolutionary class, there 
might well be many who were against the revolution and even 
sided with the class enemy.
Then, C h ’en defined for the benefit of his readers the 
aspirations of this revolutionary capitalist class that should 
be engaging in revolutionary actions; he also defined what should 
be those revolutionary actions. The revolutionary capitalists 
were those who would struggle against the feudal warlords and 
international imperialism. The counter-revolutionary capitalists 
were those who would rely on foreign capital, foreign military 
might and the warlords.
By C h ’en Yii, Hsiang Tao No.22 (25-IV-1923) ♦ p.l6l. Other 
warnings may be found in Nos.18, 19, 20, 21 (31 I, 7 II, 27 II,
18 IV, 1923)* Editor T s ’ai was the most frequent contributor.
^  Ch'en 'Tzu-ch’an chieh-chi ti ke-ming yü ke-ming ti tzu-ch’an 
chieh-chi’ (The Capitalist Revolution and the Revolutionary 
Capitalists) Hsiang Tao No.22 (25-IV-1923)* pp.l6l-4. This was 
included in the collection entitled Chung-kuo ke-ming wen-t’i 
lun-wen tsa (Collected Discourses on the Problem of the Chinese 
Revolution) published by the CCP in Nov.1926.
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But we know that the Chinese capitalist class is 
weak and cannot overcome the feudal warlords and 
international imperialism. Thus its revolutionary 
party (the KMT) has often adopted ri^ht-leaning 
policies of compromise.
However, all is not lost for there is ’an escape route right in 
front of us: join hands with the revolutionary proletariat class
and together we will overthrow our common enemies.’
On the other hand, for the proletariat to form a united 
front with the capitalists is only a temporary message for 
immediate needs. In emphasizing the split between the 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary capitalists, and the 
antagonism that should be fostered between the Right and Left 
wings, Ch'en was really echoing the sentiments of Liu Jen-ching 
at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, the speech which drew 
a patronizing lecture from Radek.
Shortly after the publication of that article, the ECCI sent 
the aforementioned special May Instructions in preparation for 
the Third Congress of the CCP. The Manifesto of this Congress 
has already been noted. But, of greater interest in the context 
of a discussion on the CCP concept of the collaboration was 
another manifesto published almost contemporaneous to the 
Congress manifesto. This second one is the manifesto of the
restructured Hsin Ch^ing-nien now coming under the editorship of
62Ch’u Ch'iu-pai.
J HCN No.1 (15-VI-1923). The HCN, now an official organ of the
CCP, had become a quarterly. C h ’u had been a lecturer at the 
Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV), had been 
a personal friend of Bukharin, and was to be a leading 
theoretician of the Party for the next ten years.
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In this manifesto Ch'ii reminded readers that the HCN was the 
leader in the Revolution of Ideas (ssu-hsiang ke-ming) and would 
certainly continue the role as: ’vanguard of the revolution of
ideas.' Ch’ii, who had six contributions in the same issue of the 
journal, went on to explain that the Chinese society was in the 
grasp of world capitalism and thus shared the same fate with the 
world’s proletariat. Under such conditions, 'the Chinese 
capitalist class will naturally rely on the world capitalists and 
form liaison with them.’ Here, Ch'ii was showing a more radical 
position than that of his leader, Ch'en,in the latter's article 
just discussed. Ch'ii was not appealing to the Left leaning 
capitalists. On the contrary, he condemned them without making 
the distinction of Left and Right amongst the capitalist class. 
Indeed, on the eve of the formal ceremony of collaboration - 
the inaugural meeting of the reconstructed KMT in January 1924 - 
theoretician Ch'ii announced in this prestigious journal:
Therefore, in the true revolution in China, 
only the proletariat class (lao-tung) can 
shoulder this great duty. Recent social 
history in China has clearly demonstrated 
this. Even in the capitalist revolution, if 
that is not directed by the working class it 
will not succeed. Besides, the capitalist 
class will inevitably sell out mid-way [through 
the revolution]. The true liberation of China 
must be the task of the working class.
Under his direction, the editor proclaimed that the HCN would 
help to point out the rightful direction for this revolution of 
ideas and thus would become a weapon of knowledge for the working- 
people of China. ’The HCN cannot but be the compass point of the
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proletariat revolution of China.1
It is of interest to note that Ch'ii used the terms lap- tung 
(working-class) and wu-clian (without property) inter-changeably. 
But of paramount interest to the suspicious readers within the 
KMT must be the insistence on the overthrow of the capitalist 
class by the proletariat. This was certainly not calculated to 
gain the confidence of the KMT.
Fifteen days after the Hsin Ch1ing-nien manifesto was 
published, the CCP published another theoretical journal, 
entitled Ch*ien-feng - The Vanguard. Contributors were the 
familiar ones to the readers of the Hsiang Tao and Hsin Ch *ing- 
nien. They included such well known ones as Ts*ai Ho-sen, Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu, and Ch'ii Ch’iu-pai. In its first issue J there were 
many calls for more revolutionary action on the rural front, 
just as the Comintern had directed in its May Instructions and 
just as the CCP had been doing sometime prior to their receipt 
of the Comintern Instruction. In the context of a discussion on 
the CCP's concept of the collaboration with the KMT, it is of 
interest to note that many of the sentiments heretofore mentioned 
in the pages of the Hsiang Tao were repeated in this opening 
issue. Considering the time of its publication, one is 
constrained to the conclusion that opinions expressed here must 
have been in accord with at least the majority of the CCP 
leadership, if they did not have their unanimous agreement.
Therefore, it is of significant concern when an aritcle 
entitled ’The Past and Future of the National Movement in
Ch'ien-feng, No.1 (1-VII-1923)• Relevant articles will be 
discussed in the pages to follow. The development of' a rural 
policy will be discussed in a separate chapter.
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China’ should say that ’the KMT cannot really be considered as 
a political party ... since (Sun Yat-sen) returned to China 
(after the anti-Yuan exile) and the reconstruction, the only 
concern of the KMT was with the military and diplomacy ... it is 
fearful of imperialism and will never be expected to be against 
the imperialists.’ He felt that the task left to the KMT was for 
it to take on an anti-imperialist policy seriously, and to remake 
their programme so as to attract the other revolutionary elements 
in the nation. Another point of note was the author’s concern 
for the peasants. He asked: 'What is the sense of having a
revolution if it has no effect on the peasants?'
.. 65Ch'u Ch'iu-pai also contributed and, as with the article 
by Sun To, C h ’ii's was also included in the volume entitled 
Collected Discussions on the Problems of the Revolution in China 
which was published in 1926. This should signify that ideas 
contained herein had a wider currency than just in 1923» Ch'ü 
prefaced his article with a quotation from Marx which stated 
'that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the 
overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the 
explosion of the long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading 
abroad, will be closely followed by political revolution on the
' Chung-kuo kuo-min yun-tung chih kuo-ct?u chi chiang-lai' (The 
Past and Future of the National Movement in China), by Sun To 
who was a regular contributor to the Hsiang Tao as well.
Ch'ien-feng No.1 (1-VII-1923).
^ Ch’ü, 'Chung-kuo chih tzu-pen chieh-chi ti fa-chan’ (The 
Development of the Capitalist Class in China) Ch’ien-feng No.1, 
The various contributors to this journal differed in their 
opinions on the peasant movement, but that will be discussed in 
a later chapter.
continent. 1
Though Marx was being cited out of context, Ch'u was using 
that as an illustration of the supra-national nature of 
capitalism. In the context of the Leninist concept of 
imperialism, this statement by Marx was most appropriate. In 
the context of this study, however, the significant things in 
Ch’ii's article are that he saw that, in the national 
revolutionary movement in China, the most organized and the most 
united class was the proletariat. Naturally, he saw the current 
social struggles in China in terms of class antagonism. But, as 
the capitalist class placed so much reliance on foreign 
capitalists and imperialists, 'the solution [to the social 
problems in China] cannot be obtained simply through the giving 
of political power to the bourgeoisie.' As to the working class 
in China, 'because of the peculiarity of the Chinese capitalist 
development, they still only had an awakening to nationalism and 
few in the working class had a class awakening.' Nevertheless, 
because the proletariat 'is the most united, it can unite with 
the petty bourgeoisie and foster the spirit of national 
revolution within the latter class. In this way, the Chinese 
proletariat may join hands with the proletariat of the world and 
realize the great and sustained world-wide social revolution and 
thoroughly overthrow imperialism.'
On the other hand, there were also other discussions on the 
united front in this theoretical journal. Ch'en Tu-hsiu
66
Marx, 'Revolution in China and in Europe', published in the 
New York Daily Tribune (14-VT-1953) as a leading article. This 
English version is cited from Avineri Op.cit., p.73*
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discussed the united front in the revolution of ideas in which 
he singled out Hu Shih for praise, but in a rather two-edged way. 
Ch’en found that all the leading members of ’the so-called New 
Thought Movement thinkers, including Ts'ai Yuan-pei and Liang 
Ch’i-ch’ao ... still have not escaped totally from feudal and 
patriarchal ideas... The only one who really understands the 
ideas and culture of the capitalist class is Hu Shih. While his 
belief in Pragmatism and our belief in the materialist conception 
of history have great differences, in the revolutionary struggle 
against feudal ideas, there is a real need to unite [with Hu and 
like-minded thinkers in the capitalist class].’ Of course, such 
ideas of a tactical united front in a struggle against a common 
enemy had been the theme of Ch’en at least since he became a 
communist. And as has been mentioned, such was also the message 
he gave to his readers shortly after he founded the CCP and just 
prior to his taking up his first appointment in a united-front 
situation in the service of Ch'en Chiung-ming in December 1920.
Organizationally, the CCP and the KMT were being drawn 
closer together, especially since the arrival of Borodin to 
Canton in September 1923« Borodin has been regarded as having 
played an important part in the framing of the new KMT 
constitution which showed the traditional KMT positions on such 
matters as property ownership and capital rather than the CCP 
positions.^ However, this did not stop the senior members of
6 7
' Ch'en, ’Ssu-hsiang ke-ming shang ti lien-ho chen-hsien' (The 
United Front in the Revolution of Ideas), Ch’ien-feng No.I.
6 8 R.C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, pp.75-8. (Stanford 
U.P. 2nd ed. 19 6 7 ) • North was of the opinion that Borodin had a 
strong influence on the content of the constitution and that Sun 
and Borodin formed a close working relationship.
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the CCP from attacking the KMT, and even Sun Yat-sen himself, by 
name. Tsai Ho-sen, in particular, was most relentless in such 
attcicks. He accused the KMT and Sun of bowing unashamedly to 
the capitalists and imperialists, as well as 'having a slavish 
mentality and have committed grave and serious mistakes against
6 9nationalism'. In short then the CCP was attacking the policies
and attitudes of the KMT right up to the eve of the opening of 
the inaugural ceremony of the reconstructed KMT in January 1924, 
and had done so repeatedly.
In other words, from the perspective of the target of 
communist propaganda, the collaboration between the CCP and the 
KMT did not signal any fundamental change in Chinese communism. 
The readers of these communist journals were in no doubt that 
the message the CCP leadership intended to transmit on the issue 
of the collaboration was that it was merely a tactical manoeuvre 
dictated by circumstances. Indeed, the message practically 
adjured the readers not to rely too much on the integrity of the 
KMT but to remember always that the 'real and true revolution' 
for the liberation of China was a proletariat revolution.
One is constrained to conclude that the purpose in giving 
such messages was not to cultivate trust and co-operation from 
the members of the KMT as the Comintern had directed. Nor can 
such messages be reasonably argued as being made in accordance 
with the spirit of the Sun-Joffe declaration or the speech Li 
Ta-chao made at the inaugural meeting of the KMT in 1924.
Ts'ai, 'Yu Ilua-sheng-tun hui-i tao Ho-tung ho-p'ing hui-i' 
(From the Washington Conference to Ho-tuiig' s Peace Conference) 
Ch' ien-feng No.2 ( 1 -XII-1 923 ) • Also see Hsiang’ Tao No.39 
(8-IX-1923)•
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While it was the intention of Borodin and the Comintern to 
create an environment of trust, harmony, and co-operation between 
the communists and the KMT, the Chinese communist leadership, 
through their propaganda media, did not renounce their policy of 
effecting a complete restructuring of the Chinese society by 
means of class struggle. The Chinese communists therefore 
informed the politically concerned members of the public that 
the collaboration which they were entering into was but a 
tactical decision and not a departure from their fundamental 
revolutionary methodology of class struggle. Indeed, as the 
Chinese communists saw it, the collaboration meant the extension 
of class struggle right into the KMT which the CCP saw, at best, 
as a revolutionary movement and 'to split the KMT', as Liu 
Jen-ching had insisted. Or, as Marx and Engels put it, and the 
Chinese communists were so fond of citing it, in the final 
chapter of The Communist Manifesto:
In short, the Communists everywhere support 
every revolutionary movement against the 
existing social political order of things.
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CHAPTER 4
The National Revolution 
PART 1 T t s Nature
An appropriate symbol of a significant aspect of' the CCP-KMT 
collaboration may be found in a much publicized photograph taken 
during the First Congress of the re-organized KMT in Canton in 
January 1924. This is a picture of the delegates leaving the 
meeting hall after a session. Leading the delegates were Sun 
Yat-sen and Li Ta-chao. Li was in the centre of the picture with 
Sun about half a step ahead and to the left of Li, but to the 
reader, Sun would be on the extreme right of the picture. This 
symbol of deference created by Li - walking on the right-hand 
side and slightly behind Sun - would not be lost on the 
contemporaries. And, judging by the main speech he made to the 
Congress, this image of deference to the KMT was exactly what Li
had tried to create for the CCP.
2In that speech, Li told the gathered dignitaries of' the 
KMT that the communists 'cannot but admire the Tsungli (.Sun) and 
the senior comrades [of the KMT] for their spirit of earnestness 
and devotion in shouldering the duties of the Kuo-min ke-ining 
(the national revolution).' Indeed, the praise Li had heaped on 
the KMT was embarrassingly fulsome, and given what had been 
published in the CCP organs, the suspicions the KMT leadership 
had on the sincerity of the CCP were not unjustified. Li claimed
 ^ See Ke-ming wen-hsien Vol.8, where this photograph is included. 
2 Ibid. Vol.9, p p .1243-1246.
170
that 'the KMT is the only revolutionary party with a history, 
ideology and leadership. Only the KMT can be the party to 
accomplish the national revolution, to liberate the people, to 
restore the rights of the people, and to affirm the livelihood 
of the people.' In joining the KMT, Li claimed, the COP was 
doing no more than ask for the privilege of sharing with the KMT 
the duties of the national revolution and to be loyal to the KMT.
As to Sun Yat-sen, a source close to him recalled that Sun
decided on the drastic reorganization of the KMT at the time when
the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming were pressing on Canton. On the
day he made the decision - 24th October 1923 - Sun explained his
3decision to his long-time comrade, Tsou Lu, thus:
In re-organizing our Party today, we should 
maintain the original affection among our 
members, which has been characteristic of our 
Party, and adopt the Soviet organization 
whereby we shall be benefited but free from 
its evils.
In other words, what attracted Sun to the Soviet model was party 
organization and efficiency, not ideology. If democratic- 
centralism was the Leninist spirit of party organization, then 
what particularly attracted Sun to the Leninist model was the 
'centralism' aspect.
This was made clear to the CCP and the KMT in the opening 
address of the First (re-organized) National Congress of the KMT 
by Sun. He expounded in no uncertain terms the spirit of the 
reorganization:
3 Tsou Lu, Op.cit., T, p.412.
Therefore, if we are going to succeed, we 
must be united and of one mind. In order 
to achieve this spiritual unity which is so 
vital to a political party, the comrades 
must be prepared to sacrifice their individual 
freedom, and to put all their ability at the 
disposal of the Party. Only in this way can 
the Party itself have both freedom and the 
ability to command, and shoulder the great 
work of the revolution and the reconstruction 
of the country. The failure of the Party in 
the past was due to the fact that while the 
individual member enjoyed freedom, the Party 
as a whole had none; that while the individual 
member possessed ability, the Party as a whole 
was deprived of it. Herein lay the failure of
4the Kuomintang.
As Sun saw the situation, the two tasks challenging the delegates 
were 'firstly, to reorganize the KMT so as to revitalize i~ into 
a powerful and organized political party; and secondly, to 
consider the ways and means to be adopted by the Party in order
5to solve the problems of national reconstruction.1'
Finally, the Congress adopted a Declaration. It was divided 
into three sections: firstly, on the present situation of China;
secondly, on the principles of the KMT; and finally, on the 
political platform of the KMT. For the first time in a KMT 
official pronouncement, this Declaration denounced imperialism as 
the fundamental cause of the present troubles in China. It 
declared that 1 imperialism and militarism are working hand in hand
Speech cited by Tsou Lu, Ibid, p.33^. 
Ibid. p .337•
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to the lasting ruin of the Chinese people ... the arbitrary rule 
of the militarists and the domination of the imperialist are 
getting worse every day, and China is sinking deeper and deeper 
into the hell of a semi-colonial condition.’
The second section of the Declaration was an exposition of 
the Sun Min Chu I - the Three Principles of the People - which 
constituted the ideological basis of the KMT. This section must 
have given the CCP leadership much food for thought. While it 
declared as natural rights the Four Freedoms, nevertheless, it 
declared that they were to be realized through the very unnatural 
means of ’guided democracy': that is, these natural rights would
only become the rights of the citizenry through three stages, 
namely the military, the educative, and the constitutional 
periods.
The Declaration, however, did make an appeal to the workers 
and peasants, saying:
the KMT pledges to assist the peasants and 
the labour movement, and to raise the economic 
status of the peasants and workers in order to 
increase the effective power of the national 
revolution. It invites the peasants and the 
workers to join the Party so as to secure a 
united front against the militarists and 
imperialists, for in fighting against these 
enemies the masses are effecting their own 
emancipation.'
The important issue, however, was not the involvement of the
J See Ti-i ti-erh tz’u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsuan-yen chi 
c h u e h - i - a n (Declarations and resolutions of the first and the 
Second National Congresses of the KMT), pub. by Dept, of 
Organization CEC of the KMT (n.p. August I927)»
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pecisants and workers. The guarantee Tor the fruition of the 
revolution was Party dictatorship for 'only a well-organized 
Party in supreme authority can be trusted to deal effectively 
with the counter-revolutionary intriguers and imperialist 
plotters, and to bring about the full realization of the San Min 
Chu 1 to the happiness of the masses and the glory of the 
country.’
The final section had two parts: the internal and external
policies of the KMT when it came into power. The internal 
policies dealt with such issues as the apportioning of power 
between the central and the local governments. But, as such 
civil rights were part of the natural rights, which by the 
definition of this Declaration would not be enjoyed by the 
citizens until the third stage of constitutional development, 
this portion of the party platform must be ascribed as futuristic 
and not of immediate concern. However, the external policies did 
have their relevance. It was the aim of the KMT to abolish the 
unequal treaties such as those which provided for the existence 
of the foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, maritime customs 
control by foreign powers, etc. The Declaration called for the 
renegotiation of the treaties on the basis of equality and mutual
respect. However, in spite of the warning given by Ts’ai Ho-
7sen, this reorganized KMT of Sun Yat-sen still looked longingly 
to the securing of foreign loans. The Declaration explicitly 
assured that all ’properly secured’ loans would be repaid but 
thus«' mad«' by the 1 irresponsible military cliques’ in their bid 
for power would be repudiated.
 ^ See Hsiang Tao No.1, pp.4-6 (13-IX-1922) in which Tsai warned 
Sun not to rely on loans of the imperialists.
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Notwithstanding the pledge of co-operat ion made by Li Ta- 
chao in his speech to the Congress, the leadership of the CCP 
could not but be concerned by the different emphasis and 
interpretations on the nature of the national revolution between 
themselves and their collaborators, the KMT. The interests 
expressed by the KMT on foreign loans must have made the Chinese 
communists regard their collaborators as uncomfortable bedfellows. 
Again, since the Chinese communists had repeatedly proclaimed 
that the workers and peasants, that is the class-without-property 
or the proletariat , were the main forces - chu-li chun - of the 
national revolution, the position which the KMT declaration 
ascribed to these classes must be unacceptable to the communists. 
To Sun and the KMT, the national revolution was the concern of 
the Party and the Party was to be the main force of the national 
revolution. The workers and peasants were ‘invited’ to join so 
that they might partake of the benefits of the revolution. This 
self-image of the party and the national revolution by Sun and 
the KMT fitted in well with what C h ’en Tu-hsiu had said of the 
KMT - that it was a non-class-differentiated
revolutionary group. That, by inference, was a denial of the
g
Comintern’s concept of the KMT - a union of l'our classes.
The CCP, however, was not slow in responding to these KMT 
declarations of ideological positions. Notwithstanding what Li 
Ta-chao had said in the KMT Congress, the CCP, through the medium 
of their official journals, made their views on the nature and 
leadership of the national revolution abundantly clear.
8 See C h ’en in Hsiang Tao No.2, p.16 (20-1X-1922).
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Furthermore, they made no effort to conceal what they - the party 
of' the proletariat - intended to achieve in their participation 
in the national revolution.
The KMT Manifesto on the reorganization and the preamble of
the new party constitution were published in full by the CCP
official organ, the Hsiang T a o , where they were accorded front- 
Qpage comments. While the KMT would 'invite’ the workers and 
peasants to participate in the national revolution, the CCP 
exhorted ’all those who love their country to rise up and unite’ 
to resist the imperialists and the traitors. It urged its 
readers to join the national revolution so that, together, ’we 
will first build a political party of the common people (pVlng- 
min )*. It saw the national revolution as a concurrent 
development of two movements: the political movement by the
common people and the military aspect of the revolutionary 
movement. It concluded on such an aggressive note so that the 
real intention of the message would not be mistaken. It saw the 
reorganization as heralding a new era for the min-cHuan (people’s 
right, or democracy) government. The writer said that ’unlike 
previous occasions when [the common people] left this to the few 
leaders of the min-cbPuan movement’ , this time ’we should actively 
join the KMT and together realize the national revolutionary 
movement’. Thus, the immediate CCP reaction to the three-stage 
process of realizing min-cHüan (people’s right or democracy) was 
an explicit rejection.
On the very next day, the theoretical journal of the CCP, 
the reorganized HCN Quarterly published an article by its editor,
^ They were published in Nos.48-9 (12-XII-1923) and the comment 
was published in No.49, PP»373-^»
! 11
Ch'ii Cli ' j 11 — I»«'» i , which in effect made a liar ol‘ Li Ta-chao. While
Li publicly proclaimed that the communists, in joining the KMT, 
were to help the latter to fulfil their goals and not to change 
it to become more like the CCP , C h ’ii, in a lengthy discourse, 
claimed that the philosophic commitment of the communists would 
constrain him to do exactly what Li claimed communists would not 
do. ^  C h ’ii effectively cited the Communist Manifesto, Lenin’s 
What is to be done? , as well as party leader Cli’en Tu-hsiu to 
support his argument.
C h ’ii argued that as Marx had approved, as a revolutionary
tactic, that under certain conditions there was a need for the
various classes to unite,
therefore, irrespective of whether the nation
is advanced or backward, under a feudal-
militaristic form of government, the proletariat
must join and partake in the promotion of a
democratic revolution. The more backward the
nation concerned, the more powerful will its
proletariat be in such a democratic revolution.
At the same time [in such a backward nationj
there will be better opportunity to change the
victory of the capitalists' revolution into a
J 1victory for the proletariat revolution.
In short, he was arguing that since the capitalist class in China 
was not well developed, the proletariat should participate in the 
democratic-national revolution so that at the overthrow of the 
common enemy - the feudal-militarist class - the proletariat 
might snatch the victory from the capitalists, and that this was
Ch'ii Wei-to 'Tzu min-chih chu-i chih she-hui chu-i’ (from 
Democracy to Socialism) IICN No.2, pp*7 9 - H )2 ( 20-XII- 1 c) 2  3) . C h ’ii
Wei-to was a well-known pen-name of C h ’ii Ch'iu-pai.
1 1 Ch'ii, [ bid, pp.82-8'3.
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possible especially in societies where the capitalist class was 
weak, as in China. Expressing such a view at that time by a 
communist of such prominence in such an important journal was 
bound to create suspicion.
Furthermore, Ch'ii warned that as the capitalists were the 
biggest beneficiary of the democratic revolution, the working
class should not be 'content with reformism but should adopt the
1 2revolutionary tactic* to change the social structure o 1' society. 
On the other hand, Ch'li was not unaware of the fear of having the 
'political party of the proletariat' being contaminated through 
participation in a democratic revolutionary movement. However, 
he assured the proletarian readers that such contamination would 
not be caused by certain members of the proletariat party's 
leadership surrendering to the capitalists, nor by a certain 
faction of the proletariat party trying to maintain a 'formal 
independence' in the democratic movement. indeed, O h ' ii saw such 
independence as merely in form as well as running the chance of 
being contaminated. He was, in fact, strongly against 
maintaining such independence. He argued that since the current 
need of the Chinese was 'merely a democratic revolution' any 
slogans proclaiming such independence would only confuse the 
masses and permit the leadership of the revolutionary movement 
to fall into the hands of the capitalist class. He advised that 
'(In' duties of the political party of the proletariat are to 
direel the labouring masses to use realistic slogans - in so 
ilo.ing; i the proletariat party] will never become homogenized by 
the capitalist class.* He emphasized the 'realism' of the slogan
1 2 Ibid. p .86.
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IxH'.'iuse, as he saw the situation,
though the proletariat and the capitalists have 
similar political slogans [asking forj "democracy", 
their economic contents will never be similar. If 
this "slogans of class realism" can be made use of 
properly, then [the proletariat party] will 
naturally be able to lead the democratic 
revolution to its natural conclusion and thus 
creating all conditions necessary for the social 
revolution.
Indeed, Ch’ü who had met Lenin and had become a personal friend 
of Bukharin counselled his fellow-proletarians that there was 
really no need to risk ones life by shouting:
We want revolution, we don’t want reformism!
1 3We want socialism, we don’t want democracy:
As Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai was a member of the Central Committee of the 
CCP, any survey of the development of Chinese communism must take 
cognizance of his ideological statements, especially if they were 
published in the leading theoretical journal of the Party - the 
IICN. Far from the conciliatory tone Li Ta-chao adopted in this 
speech at the KMT Congress, Ch’ii was making an unmistakeably 
aggressive statement on the eve of the Congress. Indeed, he saw 
the collaboration of the CCP with the KMT in the national 
revolution as an indication of the capitalists giving a concession 
to the proletariat. Citing himself - a sure sign of his self- 
confidence, for the only other authorities cited were Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and Ch’en Tu-hsiu - Ch’ü argued that because of the 
economic conditions existing in China, there existed a political
1 3 1 bid, pp.87-88.
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situation in which the capitalist class with their democracy and 
the proletariat class with their socialist labour movement were 
intermingled. This was so because the process of industrial and 
economic developments in China were different from those in 
Europe and the U.S.A. and hence, political movements would be 
different. Therefore, in China, the democratic and socialist 
revolutions would be more closely related. Indeed,
if the Chinese capitalist class wants to 
develop their potentials, they must remove the 
warlords-militarists, and they must eliminate 
[the influence of] imperialism. But, if the 
capitalists want to eliminate these two, they 
have no option but to rely on the labouring 
masses of China and the proletariat class of 
the world: the capitalist class of China cannot
1 4but give in to socialism.
This statement implied some divergences within the CCP on
the nature of the KMT. Party leader, C h ’en, had claimed that
the KMT was a non-class revolutionary party. The Comintern,
especially due to the influence of Maring, saw in the KMT a
1 5front of four classes. C h ’u, on the other hand, had
consistently referred to the KMT here as the political party of 
the capitalist class, sometimes simply as ’the capitalist class’. 
furthermore, he viewed the socio-political development in China 
as a series of distinct class struggles.
To C h ’ii, the current major class contradiction was one 
between the feudal-militaristic class on the one hand and the
* Ibid. p.92 citing his article in C h ’ien-feng (Vanguard) No.1 
(I-VTI-I923) entitled ’Hsien-tai Chung-kuo ti kuo-hui chi yu 
chun-fa' (The Warlords and the national Assembly system in China 
today).
 ^) See Dov Bing, O p .C it. pp.683-686.
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capitalist and proletariat classes on the other. To Ch'ii, this
was a peculiarly Chinese situation. But, because of the very
special nature of the Chinese situation,
only with the direct action of the proletariat 
class can the revolution be a thorough one in 
the removal of the twin obstacles of Chinese 
capitalism (feudalism and warlordism). That 
is, [the revolutionaries] must use the methods 
of the working class to bring about the national 
revolution. In the process of the national 
revolution, the labouring class will become more 
important every day until it[grasps] the power 
of leadership. As the final goal of the 
labouring class is socialism, therefore, at the 
very zenith of the national revolution, [china i 
can join with the world revolution and directly 
enter into socialism.^
In so saying, Ch'ii had introduced two new' ideas on the 
nature of the Chinese national revolution. Firstly, the 
participation of the proletariat was a necessity, not only for 
the ultimate success of the revolution but also because their 
participation was needed by the Chinese capitalist class. 
Furthermore, if the proletariat class could understand and 
appreciate properly their objective position in the national 
revolution, then their role would not only bo that of the ’main 
force' but eventually would acquire the power of leadership. 
Having acquired this position, the proletariat would then be 
able to lead the Chinese revolution directly into socialism by 
completing their struggle against the capitalist class. While 
other writers, such as Ts'ai Ho-sen, had implied such
1 6 Ch'ii, HCN , Op . c i t. pp.99-100
cl eve lopmen t s , Ch'ii now stated this explicitly and emphatically. 
This may weill be called the Chinese version of the concept of 
the continuous revolution.
The influence of the 1848-vintage Marx and of Lenin on this 
statement by C h ’ii is obvious, and these influences were duly 
acknowledged. Ch'ii had numerous quotations from both. The 
writings of Lenin which most influenced Ch'ii here were What is to 
be done? ( 1902) and Two Tactics of Social Democracy in tin* 
Democratic Revolution (190.5)- This is of great significance 
because it shows that Marxism in China in the 1920's was going- 
through the similar vicissitudes experienced by the Russian Social- 
Democratic Party between 1894 and 1905- Since Ch'ii had already 
demonstrated his concern for the need to realize socialism in a 
practical, and not dogmatic, fashion,^ and since he was 
personally familiar with the Russian leadership, a review of the 
development of communist ideology during these crucial decades 
will set this discussion on national revolutionary theories and 
tactics by Ch'ii in a more relevant perspective.
During the last twenty years or so of the life of Marx, he 
had engaged in a serious study of the Tsarist economic conditions. 
However, he was careful to avoid taking sides in the deepening 
controversy current at that time over the prospects of capitalist 
development and the potentials of a socialist revolution in
1 In II-IV-I921, while Ch'ii was in Moscow, he already said that 
should the socialist revolution occur in Germany then, it would 
take a different form to the Russian 1917 Revolution because of tile 
socio-economic differences of the two countries: see C h 'u C h ' in-
p'ai wen-chi (Collected Works of Ch'u Ch' iu-pa i ) T, pp.11'3-1 15 
(Peking 1955-4).
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Russia. While neither Marx nor Engels doubted, alter about 187b, 
that the Tsarist regime would soon collapse, in the' life} time ol'
Marx, they would venture no further than to issue a tanta Lizing
1 8statement to the effect that:
If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal 
for a proletarian revolution in the West, so 
that both complement each other, the present 
Russian common ownership of land may serve as 
the starting point for a communist development.
The Russian disputants were, on the one hand, the Social-
Democrats who saw the system of common ownership of land by the
peasants - the obshchina - as a hindrance to socio-economic
development. And, on the other hand, the Populists who hoped
that the obshchina system would enable Russia to ’pass directly
1 9to the higher form of communist common ownership,’ thus 
bypassing the need for a full-scale capitalist system.
Though this dispute seemed academic during the life time o 1' 
Marx - for after all, the disputants were mainly the radical 
intelligentsia with no mass following - it became relevant from 
the mid-1890’s . In 1894, when the third volume of Capital was 
published, the Russians sought in it the confirmation of their 
respective ideological positions. While the readers in Western 
Europe might seek in this concluding volume signposts for the* 
analysis of mature industrial capitalism, the Russian Populists 
and the Social-Democrats sought in it the impact of capitalism
The 1882 Preface to the Russian edition of the Communis t 
Manifes to. Any edition will suffice but this passage is cited 
from the English edition published by the Foreign Languages 
Press, (Peking, 1970), p.18.
19 Tbid., p.17.
on the peasant economy. The Populists claimed that the peasant
°()community was holding its own while the 'Marxists' denied it. '
The Marxists in Russia were by no means unanimous. After 
1894, there came the phenomenon of 'legal Marxism' : the legal 1\
published Marxist literature trying to demonstrate that Russian 
capitalism was indeed progressing, even though there was general 
backwardness in the country. Thus, one faction from amongst the 
Russian Marxists gave encouragement to capitalism along liberal 
lines on the ground that capitalism was a necessary, indeed 
beneficial, stage of historical development. Another faction, 
the so-called Economists, accepted the general position of the 
first group while adding emphasis to the need for trade unionism. 
The third and largest faction demanded that the political duty 
of the Social-Domocrat was to overthrow the autoci^atic monarchy.
Henceforth, the dispute transcended the realm of mere 
academic disagreement for in the next few. years the Russian 
Marxists were to undergo more changes. Those intellectuals whose 
ideological development constrained them to reject Marxism tended 
to opt for liberalism in politics, rather than to become 
'revisionists' as was the case in Germany and Western Europe. 
Peter Struve, the Social-Democrat who co-authored the 1898 Minsk 
Manifesto and a founding 'Legal Marxist' became a liberal in 
politics .Those accepting Marx9theMarxist Social-Democrats, over 
the period 1903-1905, split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik 
fac tions. ~ ^
See Lenin, 'Who are the "Friends of the People"?' or 'The 
Development of Capitalism in Russia'. Any edition.
2 1 Detailed discussions on these developments may be found in L. 
Schapiro The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London 1()(>l)) 
or E.H. Carr The Bolshevik Revolution, vol.1 (London 1950).
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The two pamphlets by Lenin which were cited by C h ’ii were 
landmarks in the Bolshevik-Menshevik split as well as being 
signposts indicating the direction of action of the Chinese 
communists. What is to be done? was written in 1902 mainly as a 
counter to the ’Economic’ faction of the Russian Marxists. in 
this pamphlet Lenin developed at great length the concept that 
the ’socialist consciousness’ of the working class was injected 
into it by the radical intellectuals who, as professional 
revolutionaries, were really the purveyers of the socialist 
world-view. This was promptly noted by Trotsky and others as a 
statement for a Jacobinical style of organization that would lead
to dictatorship, not the short-term dictatorship of the 1848
22Marx.
In 1905 Lenin published the tract Two Tactics in which he 
expanded into a revolutionary strategy what Marx had proclaimed 
in 1848 in the Communist Manifesto. Here, Lenin was planning a 
strategy for the Russian revolution which would be more than 
merely complementary to the revolution in the West - as Marx had 
said in the 1882 Preface - but would enable Russia to catch up 
with the West. It was never part of Lenin’s aim to conducts a 
revolution against the Monarchy so as to usher in the bourgeois 
rule. He had already rejected the concepts of the Legal Marxists 
and the Economists. The task before Lenin, then,was to transform 
a bourgeois revolution into a proletarian one. In other words, 
he was trying to work out the strategy to bring- about what Marx 
had earlier proclaimed: ’the proletarian dictatorship’.
2 2 See Trotsky’s tract Our Political Task (Geneva 1904).
Here, Lenin was t I’yin^' to design a revolutionary strategy
which would commence as a bourgeois revolution, in the Marxist
sense, but in the process would bring the proletariat and the
peasantry to the forefront. Thus, we find Lenin, on the one
hand, confessing that a bourgeois revolution ’is in the highest
degree advantageous to the proletariat ... \_ and j ... is
absolutely necessary in the interests of the proletariat ' because
a bourgeois revolution is one that ’most resolutely sweeps auav
the survivals of the past, the remnants of serfdom (which include
not only autocracy but monarchy as well) and most fully guarantee
23th€J broadest, freest and most rapid development of capitalism’.
Yet, on the other hand, Lenin argued that for a
decisive victory of the revolution over 
tsarism, bourgeois revolution was not enough 
because !the bourgeoisie] need tsarism with 
its bureaucratism, police, and military forces 
for use against the proletariat and the 
peasantry too much to be able to strive for 
its destruction ... the only force capable 
of gaining a decisive victory over tsarism is 
the people, that is the proletariat and the 
peasantry.24
In short, then, the Leninist strategy was a revolution which 
may be described or defined as a ’democracy' but certainly not 
’bourgeois'. It will be a democracy because only the ’people’ 
can achieve a ’decisive victory'. It will not be bourgeois 
because the bourgeoisie does not form part of the people, 
excepting the 'rural and urban petty bourgeoisie’. But then, the
Lenin, Two Tac tics, p.44 (Peking, 1963).23
24 Ibid., p.5 2.
I.i II.or would not he the 'main forces' in comparison to the 
proletariat and the peasantry. In any event, the 1 bourgeois
2  <3democrats' were, by nature 'inconsistent' and thus unreiiable.
As for the operational method whereby the people would
achieve this decisive victory over tsarism and bring about this
state of democracy, Lenin advised, citing Marx, the adoption of
'the Jacobin, or if you like the plebeian way ... [forj the
Jacobins of contemporary Social-democracy Lat’e J the Bolsheviks.'
By the Jacobin way, Lenin meant that the revolution would be
raised 'to the level of the consistent democratism of the
proletariat ... that is, the proletariat and the peasantry ...
jwillj ... settle accounts with the monarchy and the aristocracy
in the "plebian way", ruthlessly destroying the enemies of
liberty, crushing their resistance by force, making no
concessions whatever to the accursed heritage of serfdom, of
Asiatic barbarism and human degradation.' However, it is worth
noting that in spite of such an advocacy, Lenin, in the very next
sentence, denied that he was advocating the 'methods of action'
of the Jacobins of 1793* Indeed, he maintained that he was doing
2 6'nothing of the kind.'
Within fifteen years - in 19^9 - the socialists in China,
through their own study and observation, had already come to the
conclusion that to fulfil the Marxian call in the Cominunis t
Manifes to, a revolution with the proletariat and the peasantry at
27the forefront was necessary. Furthermore, the Chinese
Ibid., p.53-
Ibid,. , p . 5b .
2 7' See the 1920 New Year Messages of Li Ta-chao and Feng Tzu-yu 
cited in a previous chapter.
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communists had already arrived at the conclusion that through a 
revolutionary process social changes may be expedited and that 
their revolutionary goal was to do just that. Now, C h ’ii was to 
provide them with a strategy for this national-cum-socialist 
revolution, clothed in the latest fashion of Marxist-Leninist 
slogans.
However, while C h ’ii cited Marx and Lenin, his own strategy
had gone beyond the Leninist strategy of 1905 - a strategy which
caused the Bolshevik-Menshevik split over the Jacobinical
elements in Lenin. C h ’ii agreed with Lenin to the extent that
the national revolution in China, a ’democratic revolutionary
movement of the people, ... cannot be achieved by peaceful
means but must be by an understanding of the views and methods
2 8of revolutionary socialism.’
The objective realities in China, as C h ’ii saw them, were 
also different from the Russia of 1905 when Russian capitalism 
and industrialization were much more developed and advanced than 
the China of 1923* However, there were other differences as well. 
China was no longer a monarchy as Russia was in 1905 but, as with 
many other lands, had become a victim of international 
imperialism. Indeed, Ch'ii commented that if the true socialist 
party in China - thc^  CCP - were to rely solely on the ’ indus t r i a l  
proletariat ... it would not have survived... | thus J while in the 
advanced nations the proletariat leads a united front towards a 
workers’ (lao-kung) dictatorship, in China [the process] is from 
a national movement (kuo-min yun-tung) united front to a
28 C h ’ii, Op . c i t . , p.9 6 .
1 8 8
revolutionary dictatorship (ke-ming tu-tsat c h i h ) and then J'urthor
advancement [into socialism].' He agreed with Lenin in that both
denied that capitalist democracy can be equated with a true and
thorough democracy. And, as if to try to emulate the Leninist
strategy - in forcing the Bolshevik-Menshevik split - C h ’ii
denounced Sun Yat-sen's People's Livelihood and People's Power
(Min-sheng chu-i and Min-chu chu-i) as programmes for the
29development of capitalism.
In spite of such strong denunciation right on the eve of 
the first congress of the reconstructed KMT, Ch'ii still urged the 
people to support the national revolution, and. provided reasons 
to demonstrate the urgency of a proletariat participation of such 
a revolution. In 1905i Ch'ii explained, the Jacobinical elements 
in the Leninist strategy proved divisive. In 1923* Ch'ii, the 
disciple of Lenin, urged a Jacobinical operational method as 
reason for participation in a united front. Indeed, while Lenin 
denied that his operational method was Jacobinical, though in 
substance it was, Ch'ii had no such reservations.
Furthermore, his reasoning was hardly calculated to win the 
trust and confidence of his new comrades in the national 
revolution. Ch'ii reasoned that as the masses had had no 
political or revolutionary experience, and as such experiences 
could not be gained from books alone, they had no choice but to 
join in a national revolution - in order to gain the necessary 
political experience for a proletariafcvdietatorship. He further 
explained that in this national revolution, the proletariat
29 Ch'ii, O p . ci t . , pp. 98-99*
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should use the 'Jacobin’ method to expedite the process of the 
revolution.
In so doing, according to his strategy, the proletariat
would 'realistically experience the lack of thoroughness' of the
capitalist revolution, especially in its lack of complete
opposition to the foreign Powers and the warlords. Then, having
thus become experienced, 'the proletariat will have acquired the
political knowledge and experience to take [the revolution] to a
higher state ... in other words, use actual and contemporary
economic objectives to change the KMT, so that it will progress
from a hazy revolutionism - ke-ming chu-i - to a truly democratic
30revolution and a people's revolutionism.'
This article by Ch'ii is a significant landmark in any 
investigation into the concept of national revolution at this 
stage of the development of Chinese communism. It is so not 
only because of the very timing of its publication but also 
because of the importance of the vehicle of publication and its 
author. The HCN had long had a nation-wide reputation and, by 
1923» had become the leading theoretical journal of the CCP.
Ch'ii, by then a writer of some note, was its editor - he even 
designed its front cover. Furthermore, Ch'ii was a member of the 
Central Committee of the CCP recently returned from Russia, at 
the invitation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, after having served as a 
lecturer in the Communist University of the Toilers of the Fast 
in Moscow and as a personal friend of Bukharin. Therefore, his 
pronouncements - even if published under his best-known pennaine - 
must be regarded as authoritative.
30 Ibid., pp.100-101.
Thus, just as the collaboration between the KMT and the CCP 
was being officially formalized at the January 1924 KMT Congress, 
we find two of the leading members of the CCP issuing apparently 
contradictory proclamations. On the one hand, there was Li 
Ta-chao who, as an official CCP delegate to the Congress, telling 
the gathered dignitaries that the communists joined the KMT out 
of respect for Sun Yat-sen and his pioneering comrades. Indeed, 
Li insisted that the communists shared the same goals with the 
KMT and that in collaborating with the KMT, the communists were 
merely trying to expedite the fulfilment of those goals, and 
certainly not to change or Bolshevize the KMT.
On the other hand, we find Ch'ii openly proclaiming that in 
joining the KMT, the communists were merely adopting a tactical 
necessity as demanded by the objective reality of the economic- 
political situation in china. In so doing, the CCP was decidedly 
not compromising its principles. On the contrary, the party of 
the proletariat was merely using the opportunity to gain 
revolutionary and political experiences, and to try to change 
the socio-political outlook of the KMT, if possible. If the 
latter was not possible, and if the KMT refused to accept the 
demands of social development, then they would just have to go 
into the dustbins of history.
However, from the perspective of the Chinese communists, 
the differences in the two proclamations were more apparent than 
real. It may be argued that the positions stated by Li and Ch’ii 
were not mutually exclusive. The communists and the KMT were in 
agreement on one of the Three Principles of the People', the
M i ii-chu chu-i which is generally translated as Nationalism. I 'o
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both the CCP and the KMT, it meant the recovering of the lost 
economic and political rights taken away by the foreign Powers 
in the series of so-called unequal treaties and the assertion of 
economic and political independence. Both agreed that the 
foreign powers were backing the various warlords and thus 
prolonging the state of disunity in China. To the communists, 
the struggle to regain these lost rights was one requiring the 
capitalists working in collaboration with the proletariat and the 
peasantry, indeed all patriots. On the other hand, the 
communists had never been enthusiastic, and were often very 
critical, of the other two Principles - the Principles of 
Democracy and Livelihood - the socio-economic programme to be 
carried out after the regaining of political and economic 
independence. It was in these areas and issues that the two 
parties would and did come into conflict. Thus, given the 
communist view of social development, we may say that the speech 
by Li was not a lie, it was merely a partial truth. Li, 
together with the other communists in China, saw the necessity 
for a national revolution to be carried out by a wide 
collaboration of social classes, but to the communists, the 
national revolution was only a step towards the socialist 
revolution during which some capitalists would part company with 
the proletariat and the peasantry.
However, as the national revolution was the only and final 
revolution for the KMT, future conflict between the two 
collaborating parties thus became inevitable. While Li may be 
guilty of not revealing the total and ultimate designs of the 
CCP, the CCP as a whole could hardly be so accused for in their
various journals they had made their ultimate designs, and their 
strategy in obtaining them, abundantly clear.
On the other hand, the apparent differences in the two 
Chinese communist positions may be considered as indicative of 
the methodological, and even ideological, fluidity within the 
CCP at the time. There were considerable differences within the 
leadership of the CCP, amongst the Comintern agents sent to 
China, and consequently, between these agents and the Chinese 
leadership of the Party.
Such differences of opinions on the nature and tactics of 
the collaboration and the national revolution existed within the 
CCP ever since these very issues were raised. Back at the 3rd 
CCP Congress in June-July 1923* when the Party met to work out 
the strategy of the national revolution, it had resolved to form 
a CP faction in any organization other than the CCP to which the 
CCP members belonged, as for instance the KMT. Maring, according 
to Chang Kuo-tao, put forward a Rightist programme hoping to 
ingratiate himself with the KMT. In the end, the Congress 
adopted the concept of the CP faction as well as accepting
31Maring's proposals, but the latter 'were not implemented.'
Chang further recalled that Borodin even tried to convince 
the Chinese communists that 'there were many patriots amongst the 
warlords' but Maring's replacement, Voitinsky, told the Chinese 
communists that they should disregard Maring and that the
1 Chang Kuo-t'ao , Op . cit. , pp . 31 1-31^« 
32 Ibid., p.320.
Comintern really had hoped that the CCP would join the KMT to
33revolutionize the latter. " The Chinese communists, however, did
34not really need that reassurance from Voitinsky. At the same
time when Ch'ii published his theoretical statement on communist
strategy, members of the Peking Branch of the CCP were already
laying down their demanding, and indeed condescending, conditions
Tor the CCP to join the KMT - in a KMT journal.
This was the newly founded monthly, Hsin min-kuo, (New
Republic) which 'was the organ of the recently established KMT
organization in Peking and was edited by Fan Ti-jen, a non-
35Communist.' It also published contributions from Li, Chang
Kuo-tao, Kao I-han, Liu Jen-ch'ing and other communists and may 
thus be regarded as a window to view the attitudes of the Peking 
Branch of the CCP on the collaboration, and the national 
revolution.
33J Ibid., pp.317~320. Chang claimed that the Shanghai, Peking, 
and Hunan branches, i.e. a majority, of the CCP had questioned 
the resolutions of the 3rd Congress and demanded the recall of 
Maring. Voitinsky seemed to have been able to get on well with 
the Chinese who objected to Maring's overbearing attitude.
34 ,In spite of Chang Kuo-t'ao's effort in trying to create the 
impression that he was acting to provide a mellowing effect 
between the KMT and CCP, in March 1923 the Peking Branch of the 
CCP published a fiery pamphlet to commemorate the February 7th 
Incident. It was entitled Chi.ng-Han Kung-jen liu-hsieh chi 
(Bloody Tales of the Peking-Hankow Railways Workers) and was 
published by the Kung-jen chou-pao, (Workers' Weekly), an organ 
of the Peking Branch of the CCP in which Chang was a leading 
member. It attacked Sun's Three Principles, and citing Karl 
Liebneckt, von Heine, and the Communist Manifesto and proclaimed 
that the CCP was the only revolutionary party.
3 5J Chang, O p .cit., p.326. The New Republic was first published 
on the 15 November 1923 with articles by Li, Sun, and Liao Chung- 
kai on its first issue as well as advertisements for the HON, 
Hsiang T a o , and Ch*ien-feng, - all CCP journals.
The first issue had nothing really controversial. Even Liu
Jen-ch'ing said no more than that the Chinese revolution and
problems confronting China had world-wide implications in that
while the overthrow of the warlords was a prime necessity,
revolutionaries should not forget that standing behind the
warlords and supporting them were the foreign Powers. ^  However,
the issue did give a full coverage to the Fifth National
37Students’ Congress held in Canton in August 1923* Amongst the
resolutions carried in that Congress was one sponsored by the 
editor of the Hsin Chung-kuo, Fan Ti-jen, a non-communist as
38Chang Kuo-tao recalled.
The resolution was entitled ’On the Methods to Overthrow the 
Warlords’. Amongst the methods suggested there were two which 
were of significance to our discussion on hand. Firstly, the 
students were called upon to take part in propaganda work with 
the soldiers of the warlords ’to tell them that they are all 
members of the proletariat’. Secondly, the students were urged 
to join the labour movement because ’the labouring class - lao- 
tung - is the main force - chu-li chün - of the national 
revolution'. The labouring class was the main force in the 
national revolution because 'they are the strongest in class 
s truggle. if we are separated from them, then the real 
revolution would be impossible. The workers - kung-jen - had
^  Liu, 'Chung-kuo wen-ti chih shih-chieh hsing' (The World-wide 
nature of China's Problem) Hsin Min-kuo I No.1, pp.104-8 (1 5-XI-
1923)•
37 Ibid., pp.114-127.
^  Ibid. , p.122 ’Ta-tao ch un-fa fang-fa ti i-chlieh-a n*( Resolut, ion 
on the Methods to Overthrow the Warlords).
already started to shed their blood for the revolutionary cause, 
as they so bravely did along the Peking-Hankow Railway.1
However, the communist contributors were most explicit in 
the next issue in telling the readers the communist’s concept on 
the collaboration with the KMT and the way the CCP members would 
regard the national revolution. It might well be a coincidence 
that the second issue of the Hsin Min-kuo was published on the 
very same day that Ch'ii published his ideas on a Jacobinical 
methodology - the 20th December 1923* But, it seemed obvious 
that an the very eve of the KMT Congress, the Chinese communists 
spared no effort in announcing publicly their future political 
intentions.
In this issue was a contribution by Kao I-han, a former
Peita colleague of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and a CCP member, written in
reply to a letter from a reader who had lost all confidence in
39political parties. Kao, citing C h ’en , said that his approval 
of the KMT activities was certainly not an enthusiastic one. 
However, 'though the KMT in Kwangtung has not achieved much, at 
least it has not suppressed the freedom of association and 
publication: and, when the nation was being betrayed by Yuan
( Shih-Wai ) , Tuan (Ch’ i-.jui) , and Chang (Tso-lin) , the KMT tried 
to fight for the nation.’ But he also set forth his conditions 
Tor joining the KMT, and his intentions whilst in the KMT. He
29 Kao’s article, a reply to Teng Ch ’o-ming, was in Hsin Min-kuo 
volume I, No.2 (20-XII-1923) and citing Ch'en’s article ’Pei- 
ching-pien yii Kuo-min-tang ’ (The Peking Coup and the KMT) in 
Hsiang Tao No.31/32 (joint issue) published on the 11-V1T-1923. 
when Ch'en urged Sun not to rely on the generals in the Southwest 
but on the masses to fight a genuine national revolution.
Joined because he wanted to help expel the ’old gang’ , that is, 
those who were against his new programme. His programme, which 
he would try to fulfil by becoming a full-time cadre working in 
the Party, was to ’change the KMT into a socialist political 
party because merely being sympathetic to the working class - 
lao-tung - was not enough.’
The 'non-communist' editor, Fan Ti-jen, contributed an 
article which must have endeared him to the hearts of the
40communists. As if to confirm the views of communist Kao I-han,
the editor openly stated that ’ the democratic - min-chu - 
revolution is a revolution of the capitalist class because its 
success will benefit the capitalists. This is so in the French 
Revolution and the recent revolution in Turkey’. Then, the 
editor went on to attack the economic policies in terms which no 
communist had done:
While Sun Chung-shan's Democratic Revolution was 
not entirely a one-class affair, according to 
(KMT) Party Constitution we can see that it will 
only benefit the capitalists. In the overthrowing 
of the warlords and bandits, the KMT will improve 
transport and commerce. In unifying currency, 
the KMT will make business practice easier. In 
regaining customs and tariff, the KMT will offer 
protection to local industries, and in reducing 
interests the KMT will improve liquidities for 
business. All these are the opposite to the 
class interests of the working class (lao-tung)
... the capitalists in the KMT still have not
Fan Ti-jen, ' Kuo-min ke-ming yü tzu-clVan chieh-chi’ (The 
national revolution and the capitalist class) Hsin Min-kuo I, 
N o .2 (20-XII-1923)> pp.10-11. (emphasis added).
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awakened, and still prefer to be slaves to 
the warlords.
However, Fan still urged the working class to work within the 
KMT. In Fan’s estimation, not only did the working class form 
60-70^ of the KMT membership, but ’since industries in China 
still have not developed to the stage of total class conflict, 
both sides are still under foreign and warlord oppression and 
should therefore come together under the framework of the KMT 
which would bring the two classes together to fight their common 
enemies.’
If a member of the KMT, albeit a radical member of the 
party, would write in such a tone in an official organ of the 
party and in the capacity of the editor, we may be permitted to 
assume that there was a considerable portion of the politically 
concerned who would be receptive to such views. While there is 
no denying that the politically concerned sector formed only a 
minor proportion of the total population of the nation, 
nevertheless, the former did form a significant segment of the 
target of political propaganda by such organs as the Hsin Min-kuo, 
H C N , and Hsiang Tao. Apparently, the propaganda was getting to 
the target.
While it is always difficult for the historian to ascertain 
public opinions, in this very month of December 1923. there was 
an opinion poll conducted in Peking on the political awareness 
of the people. The Peking University celebrated its 27tl) 
Anniversary on the 17th December 1923 and the University decl.uod 
as Open Days the 16th and 17th. During these two days, live 
professors of the University conducted a test on the visitors to
1 9 8
the University with the aim 'to find out the political opinions 
of the people towards Chinese politics, and not to influence the
41visitors.' Over the two days, 1007 visitors answered the ten 
questions put to them. They gave their answers privately, in a 
'voting booth', on the question paper. Confidentiality was 
strictly maintained, indeed, apart from the five professors, very 
few people had foreknowledge of the test. The respondents had an 
average age of 26, ranging from 16 to 40 and three quarters of 
them listed themselves as belonging to the hsiieh-chieh, that is, 
either students or teachers of educational establishments, with 
the rest spread fairly evenly between the business sector, the 
military, politics, workers, and eleven journalists.
Whether these visitors to the University formed a cross- 
section of the population is not the point at issue - they were 
most certainly not a fair sampling because the proportion of 
students-teachers in the total population simply could not be 
75$» - but these respondents might be regarded as a fair 
representation of those politically concerned who formed the 
targets of the propaganda efforts. In response to the first 
question, on their attitude to the Tsao K'un presidency, there 
were 202 who avoided the question. But of those who made an 
answer, an overwhelming 97% were opposed to Tsao, including 7 r>% 
of those listed as politicians as well as 87^ of the military 
men. Their reasons were that Tsao was the leader of the bad 
warlords, corrupt, and 'a servant of British and American
11 'Min-yi ts'e-liang' (Tests of popular opinions). Us in min-kno
I N o . 4 (20-II-I9 2 4 ).
imperialism'. Even those who supported Tsao were not really 
enthusiastic for they merely regarded him as 'the only possible 
president under the circumstances' and that 'he might 
temporarily hold and halt [the deterioration] in China's 
international position.' We may conclude from here that these 
answers pointed to the fact that the politically concerned in 
China were worrying about the position of China in the 
international scene and that a substantial proportion of these 
were against imperialism.
Of greater interest to the propagandists were the responses 
to questions on political actions, reading habits, and methods 
to 'save China'. An overwhelming 81$ would not obey the new 
constitution of Tsao K'un and a felt that a 'national
revolution is the best means to save China from the warlords and 
foreign control.' Almost three out of five, 59$» thought that 
China should be friendly to the Soviet Union and 1 3$> preferred 
the U.S.A. , while 20$> thought that both were exploiters of China. 
However, Lenin was certainly the most admired non-Chinese person 
in the world, scoring 227 votes, with Woodrow Wilson a poor 
second with 51 votes. But Leon Trotsky had to share equal sixth 
place on 12 votes with the Kaiser and thus behind Tagori who 
scored 17 and Einstein 16. Bertrand Russell came third with 23 
votes. *‘iarXj on the other hand, had to be content with equal 
fifteenth with Lloyd George and Napoleon on 6 votes thus putting; 
them behind Gandhi, John Dewey, and Bismarck , all with 9 votes.
However, on political ideology, Socialism was a distinct 
favourite with 291 followed by Sun's Three Principles with I 53 
and Democracy a poor third with 66 votes. Thus, perhaps not
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unexpectedly, .Sun was also the most respected Chinese with 473 
votes with C h ’en Tu-hsiu second on 173» and the former chancellor 
of Peita, Tsai Yuan-pei third with 153« All the rest failed to 
score higher than 45 which went to Tuan C h ’i-jui sharing it with 
Hu Shih. Liang Chi-chao scored 29, Wu Pei-fu 27 and Li Ta-chao 
25 and the rest all under ten. Tsao K'un had a solitary vote, 
putting him on equal standing with Wellington Koo, Confucius,
Lao Tse, Tsiang Kuo-fan, and Han Wu-ti.
On reading materials, Peking’s Shen Pao and Shanghai’s 
Min-kuo jih-pao were equally popular, but in the weekly, a more 
significant result was shown. The Hsiang Tao was the most 
popular with 222 votes (almost three times more votes than the 
most popular dailies) with Hu Shih's Nu-li Chou-pao (the 
Endeavour Weekly) a second with 127 and the Communist Youth 
Corps’ Weekly, Chung-kuo ch/ing-nien a distant third with 37 but 
it shared equal second favourite position with, the female readers 
with whom the Nu-li only managed one vote.
While nothing conclusive can be drawn from these figures, 
one may be permitted to say that the communist journals were 
getting a significant readership from amongst the politically 
concerned. The organizers of the poll omitted to find the most 
popular quarterly journal, but admitted that the HCN had actually 
received many votes. The political propagandists for the 
national revolution must have been very heartened by these 
results, especially when the respondents favoured the involvement 
of the student movement in the national revolution by a ratio of
two to one.
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Therefore, if these propagandists of the CCP were to appear 
radical, they were really reflecting the general opinions of 
their readers, and were certainly not too far ahead, 
ideologically, of their readers. Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, however, must 
be regarded as an exception. Apart from an outright advocacy of 
Jacobinism in his own H C N , he was also openly advocating 
Socialist Culture and Civilization through class struggles, which
42he saw were already in progress. By that he meant that the
current social organization, value - both economic and cultural - 
were bourgeois and, consequently, should be struggled against 
and replaced by the new socialist-proletarian values. Indeed, he 
felt that this struggle, a class struggle, had already commenced 
in China and urged his readers in the non-partisan Tung-fang 
tsa-chir) to rise up and take part in the coming and present 
struggles.
However, it was more than mere coincidence that the Chinese 
communist writers were so explicit in announcing their attitudes 
on the national revolution on the eve of the KMT Congress. From 
another perspective, the first eight months of 1924 may be 
regarded as a period of ideological confrontation between the 
KMT and the CCP and that some of the apparent radical 
pronouncements were really defensive gestures.
From the 7th January to the 24th August 1 924, Sun Yat-Sf n
Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai 'Hsien-tai wen-fa ti wen-ti yii she-hui chu-i' 
(Socialism and the Problems of Modern Civilization) Tung-fang 
tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany) XXI, No.1 (10-1-1924). It was
written on the 8th XI 1923» The Taiwan reprint of this journal 
has changed Ch'ii's name, as well as omitting in;uiy articles by 
communist writers.
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delivered his lectures on the San Min Chu I - The Three 
Principles of the People - at weekly intervals in Canton, the 
seat of the National Government. Though we now have the word 
of Sun's widow that the lectures were made up 'on the spur of 
the moment. It all depended on the political situation and the
4laudience' , to the Chinese communists of the time, those 
lectures presented a tremendous challenge. If the Chinese 
communists were to retain their own political, and more 
particularly ideological, identity, they were constrained to 
delineate the ideological boundaries between themselves and the 
KMT.
That this latter point was important was not ed by members 
of the CCP as well as the KMT. Appearing on the same issue as 
Ch'ii's proclamation of a Socialist Civilization was one by a KMT
44member of long standing, Yu yu-jen. He denied the socialist's
claim that the KMT was a capitalist party, at the same time,
argued that China was not really suffering from the exploitation
of capitalism but rather from imperialism and the warlords.
Therefore, the Chinese people should heighten the 'spirit of the
people' - min-chu ch*ing-shen - to save the nation, and not
further divide this spirit. Then, as if to take up the challenge
from communists like Ch'ii, Yu wrote thus:
I prefer to disregard rumours about the dangers 
of a socialist party and KMT collaboration for
4 3 /See Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (N.Y. Random House, 
1938) p •32 where Snow recorded an interview with Soong Ch'ing- 
ling.
44 . . .Yu Yu-jen, 'Kuo-min-tang yu she-hui-tang' (The KMT and lhe 
Socialist Party), Tung-fang tsa-chih XXI No.I, pp.Dl4-19 (10-1-1924).
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the KMT is not a capitalist party as was 
Kerensky’s, besides, Lenin, in his New Economic 
Policy, has really admitted that pure socialism 
is not yet workable in current conditions.
He then adjoined the socialists to study the Min-sheng chu-i - 
Democracy - assuring them that if they would do so, they would 
realize the wisdom of Sun Yat-sen and would come to help Sim and 
the KMT in the national revolution. Indeed, Yu appeared to have 
been quite confident that through their collaboration with the 
KMT, the CCP would change - from their advocacy of socialism to 
what Yii regarded as the more practical advocacy of Min-sheng 
chu-i.
The more important issue was not whether the KMT was a 
multi-class party, a Chinese version of Kerensky’s government, or 
even C h ’en Tu-hsiu’s conception of a non-class revolutionary 
party bent on an anti-imperialist and anti-warlord course if 
prodded along by the CCP. What was at issue was the leadership 
of the national revolution. Certainly, Ch ’ ii C h ’iu-pai did not 
press this point even when he was advocating a Jacobinical 
method, nor did Kao I-han when he listed the conditions for 
joining the KMT and intentions after joining it. However, by 
claiming that the national revolution was but a preliminary step, 
however necessary, in the total revolutionary programme, C h ’U, 
or anyone else who held similar views, was in fact making an 
implied claim to the leadership of the revolution for the 
communists. After all, according to the communist perspective, 
the national revolution would not be a ’thorough' one and t rue 
democracy would not be achieved unless the party of the
proletariat would be there to ensure that the revolution was 
directed along the correct path - the elimination of the 
caoitalist system.
Similarly, in making the claim that if the CCP join the 
KMT and study the teachings of Sun, especially his Min-sheng 
chu-i, the Chinese communists would not only collaborate 
wholeheartedly with the KMT but would also change the communist 
programme and goals to those of the KMT, implied that the KMT 
should take the leadership of the national revolution. 
Furthermore, to the KMT members and leadership, the national 
revolution was to be the revolution and not a transit step 
towards a socialist revolution. And, the revolutionary programme 
therefore really involved the acquisition and expansion of a 
territorial base and thence, the implementation, through a 
period of KMT tutelage - by the KMT alone - into the nirvana of 
Min-sheng chu-i. At that time there would be no special role 
envisaged for the CCP in this KMT scheme except to be absorbed 
into the KMT.
Therefore, at stake in this ideological confrontation was 
the very existence of the CCP. Looking at the situation from 
this perspective, the pronouncements of the Chinese communists 
hitherto were more than those of the zealous evangelicals but 
were acts, often desperate ones, of defence of their right and 
need to exist. Indeed, they were acts of defiance.
The Chinese communist leadership was not unaware of the 
issues at stake and was eager, if not anxious as weJi, to 
consolidate their ranks. While Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the Cent ra t 
Committee of the CCP had always considered Shanghai as the.i r
homebase and headquarters, they were naturally anxious that the 
other centres, especially Peking and Canton, would coordinate 
their activities particularly in such a crucial period. However, 
the Central Committee (CC) and Ch'en were to find that the 
presence of a Soviet Embassy and Comrade Karakhan in Peking and 
Comrade Borodin in Canton made matters difficult.
As Chang Kuo-tfao recalled, ’within the ranks of the CCP, 
the Peking and Kwangtung District Committees were forever tending 
to behave as though they were sovereign, independent bodies. 
Sometimes, while ignoring CC directives as a matter of local 
expediency, or through their contacts with Karakhan in Peking or
4 5Borodin in Canton, they would obtain Comintern views direct.’
As to the Kwangtung District Committee, Chang recalled, they 
often gave as a reason for disobeying CC directive: ’Borodin’s
ideas’. However to venture into a discussion of the details of 
factional politics of the communist movement would be a diversion 
in a study of the nature of Chinese communism. Suffice to say, 
on the debate on the concept of the national revolution, while 
there were some differences in emphasis amongst the Chinese 
communists these differences were not of a regional nature. In 
short, whatever influences Karakhan and Borodin might have 
asserted on their Chinese comrades - and, in spite o 1' the 
creation of what Chang Kuo-t^ao called ’sovereign, independent 
bodies' in the Peking and Kwangtung District committees - there 
was a general uniformity in the communist message projected by 
the Chinese comrades.
45 Chang, Op.cit., p.407»
200
PART 2 The Proletariat as Leader
The concept of leadership in the national revolution, of' 
course, was a corollary to the issue on the nature of the 
national revolution. Thus, as was to be expected, the Chinese 
communists were very much aware of the expected contention as 
soon as it became the decision of the Party to collaborate with 
the KMT. Thus, we find that while the Manifesto of the 3rd CCP 
Congress offering the leadership of the national revolution to 
the KMT, as the ’KMT should do’ in spite of its mistaken outlook, 
the CCP at the same time claimed for themselves the role of the 
'vanguard' and the ’main force' of the national revolution in
46another manifesto published on the 1st July 1923*
Thus, taking into consideration all the major CCP 
pronouncements in their Various journals as a whole since the 
3rd CCP Congress, the KMT could not but feel that the CCP, in 
trying to join the KMT, really wanted to change the KMT into the 
communist image. It was true that the Chinese communists were 
talking earnestly about the need to have a thorough-going 
national revolution to rid the country of its imperialist and 
warlordist exploitations. They even agreed that a national 
revolution would need to be led by a kuo-inin tang' - a political 
party of the people of the nation - but, they also made no secret
,(> Manifesto of the journal C h ’ ien feng (Vanguard) 1-VII-1923*
This was an official CCP organ and its Manifesto claimed to be 
the vanguard and main force of the national revolution and the 
KMT leader.
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4 7of' their opinion that the KMT had lost its revolutionary elan 
and that many of its members had become stooges of the 
imperialists. Consequently, and because of the peculiar 
politico-economic conditions in China - being a semi-feudal and 
semi-capitalist society and at the same time exploited by 
international imperialism-capitalism - the party of the 
proletariat had to join forces with all nationalistic 
revolutionary elements to salvage the nation from further 
exploitation and to set it on the proper course of nation­
building. In short, while the CCP would concede the ’leadership’ 
to the KMT merely as a tactical manoeurve , the communists had 
consistently maintained that they were the vanguards and they, 
being the party of the masses, knew the direction to the ultimate 
goal of the revolution.
The KMT, of course, disputed the communist interpretation 
of the ultimate goal of the revolution, hence the subsequent 
dispute over the role of leadership would be inevitable.
During the intervening six months, from the 3rd CCP Congress in 
June-July 1923 to the KMT Congress in January 1924, there had not 
been any evidence of any change from the CCP on these issues. On 
the contrary, there was an intensification of the propaganda 
message. Itis only to be expected that some senior members of 
the KMT decided not to accept the declaration of Li Ta-chao given
47 Contributors of No.1 of the Vanguard, including C h ’u, Ch ’en 
and Tsai all made such implications. Sun T o ’s ’Chung-kuo kuo-min 
yüri-tung chih kuo-criu ch i chiang-lai’ (The Past & Future of China’s 
National Movement) openly lamented the ’degeneration’ of the KMT, 
Vanguard, 1 pp.2-9*
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at the KMT Congress. In spite of the assurance given by Li, 
editor Ch'ii and his Jacobinical message must have aroused much 
concern. The response of the 'senior comrades’ of the KMT to 
the collaboration with the CCP was one of unremitting opposition. 
Their main target was Ch*en Tu-hsiu. This was not unnatural for 
Ch’en was certainly the best known as well as the most 
prestigious and feared member of the CCP. As Ch’en himself 
recalled shortly after the break down of the collaboration, ’for 
almost a year, the KMT always sabotaged or resisted the movement
48for reorganization.’ Just prior to the KMT Congress senior
comrade Teng Tse-ju, head of the Kwangtung Branch of the KMT,
led ten other senior comrades to present a secret submission to
Sun Yat-sen on the 29th November 1923 as a last ditch attempt to
49stem the Red Tide.
These senior comrades found that Ch ’en’s willingness to 
work with other warlords, such as Ch'en Chiung-ming, and the 
criticism the Communists had aimed at the KMT, Sun, and the 
Three Principles objectionable. In other words, it was not the 
’exclusiveness’ of the communist's tactics but his practical 
tactics that these senior KMT comrades objected to. Furthermore, 
these senior KMT men were of the opinion that Ch'en already had 
too much influence over the KMT. They had suspected that it was 
Ch'en who wrote the new KMT Constitution because the Party
4 0  . . ✓Ch’en, 'Kao ch'uan-tang t'ung-chih shu' (A letter to all 
comrades of the Party), 10-XH-1929. p.2 (n.d., n.p. edition 
used is that in the Hoover Library).
49 Teng Tse-ju, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang erh-shih nien shill-chi 
(Historical records of the KMT in the pas t 20 years) , pp.289-29 I 
(Shanghai 1948).
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Platform now included the two main communist slogans:
Down with the imperialists.
Down with the warlords.
These KMT senior members felt that to accept such slogans would 
alienate international support and sympathy as well as the really 
powerful centres and sources within China.
They also had foreboding concerning the pledge to 
democratize the KMT. As the office of Director-General, the 
title Sun held, was to be made elective, Teng and his like-minded 
comrades were afraid that ’with the vicissitudes of circumstances, 
five years from now, Ch’en Tu-hsiu probably will be elected as 
Director-General’. Their attitude really demonstrated the 
traditional cliquish mentality of these senior comrades as well 
as their contempt for the rank and file members of the party. 
Their fear of democratization, however, was not entirely without 
foundation. At the time of the Teng petition, the KMT had just 
had their first exercise in internal democratization. Canton 
City was divided into twelve districts in the re-structured Party 
and the members of each district elected their own district 
committee. The communists had some success in these district 
elections and the most noticeable success was T ’an Ping-shan.
As well as being the communist representative on the KMT's Act in;1; 
Executive Committee, he was elected chairman of the 10th 
District.^
5 For details, see Kuo-min-tang chou k ’an (The KMT Weekly) No.2 
(2-XII-1923)» p.2. This was an official organ of the Acting 
Executive Committee of the KMT in Canton 1923*
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However, Sun Yat-sen had no lack of confidence in his own
control of the Party. While his reply avoided direct comment on
the senior comrades' fear of communist subversion, Sun did
explain to them the drafting of the KMT Constitution:
The Constitution was prepared by Borodin at 
my request and checked by myself. The 
original was in English and was translated 
into Chinese by Liao Chung-k'ai. Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu had no part in it.
For our discussion, however, it was Sun's explanation to his old 
comrades on their ideological doubts that is most pertinent. As 
the reply was a communication between comrades of long standing 
as well as being old friends and being of a confidential nature, 
we may regard this as a sincere attempt by Sun to explain his 
actions to his comrades.
Sun explained that 'essentially, there is really no 
difference between the Principle of People's Livelihood and 
Communism ... the Principle of Nationalism (Min-chu chu-i) is a
timely remedy [for the ills of China] and not an obsolete relic
51of the past.' Sun further revealed that the Russians had
'ordered the Chinese communists to join the KMT' whereas the 
Chinese communists had wanted to monopolize Russian friendship. 
At the same time, Sun was confident that 'if the Russians want 
to co-operate with China she must co-operate with our Party and 
not with Ch'en Tu-hsiu1. He then assured his senior comrades
r) 1 In 1912, Sun and his group dropped the Min-chu chu-i from his 
party's platform because prior to 1911 it was a slogan for their 
anti-Manchu sentiment and, by 1912, was considered no longer 
appropriate. This was taken up by the KMT after the
establishment of the Canton Government. For sources of quotations 
see Note 49 supra«
that ’if C h ’en disobey our Party, he will be ousted.’
Another prominent senior comrade who had reservations was
Tai Chi-tao. His opposition to the CCP and his position within
the KMT were quite unlike those of Teng and his fellow
petitioners. Tai was versed in Marxism and was in the original
Communist Unit founded by C h ’en in Shanghai in 1920 but, out of
loyalty to Sun and his disbelief in the necessity for class
struggle, he left the CCP. He was against co-operation with the
Russians because he was against reliance on foreign loans and
consequently declined to serve on the Acting Executive Committee
of the KMT, which was in charge of the details of the
52re-organization of the KMT in 1923» However, he was prevailed
upon to change his mind and attended the KMT Congress as well as
accepting membership in the Central Executive Committee and
headed the Propaganda Department. His biographer claimed thau
he tried to persuade the members of both the collaborating
parties to work harmoniously towards the common goals. However,
he left Canton in June 1924, possibly a victim of intra-party
53politics for he told Chiang Kai-shek that:
The old order has broken down, the new order 
has not yet been established. It is inevitable 
that each acts according to his will ... Since
C h ’en Tien-hsi (ed. ) , Tai Chi-tfao hsien-sheng pien-nien 
ch * uan-chi (Biographical chronicles of Mr. Tai Chi-tao), pp*35- 
37• (Taipei, Chung-hua, 1958).
5 3 Chiang Kai-shek hsien-sheng - Min-kuo shih-wu nien i-chion 
Chiang Kai-shek h s i e n - s h e n g (M r . Chiang K a i - s h e k - Mr.Chiang  
prior to 1926) VII, pp.32-4, or C h ’en Tien-hsi O p . c. i t. , p-37* 
Chiang's work is edited by Mao Ssu-cheng in 20 vols., n.p., n.d. 
but the editor's postscript was dated Oct. 1938, and usually 
referred to as his Diaries.
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a correct view cannot be reached, whence 
comes the tranquility?
However, Tai continued his anti-communist activities in Shanghai
and returned to Canton to serve Chiang Kai-shek, after the death
of Sun, as the leading anti-communist theoretician in the KMT.
Another senior comrade, Tsou Lu, who headed the Youth
Department of the Party and the Presidency of the Kwangtung
University made good use of his position to suppress communist
activities and was particularly active in his efforts to counter
the influence of the Socialist Youth Corps. Although he was
unable to suppress entirely the communist activities in the
University, he did much to extend patronage to the KMT students
54and brought over many to his anti-communist stance.'
Dissension was, however, quickly becoming more and more 
noticeable and open. By March 1924, Sun felt constrained to 
issue a circular instruction admonishing Party members that they 
had no individual freedom and must therefore observe Party
5 5principles and policies unconditionally. But, that was not to
be an effective move. By June, his own son, Sun Fo, and another 
member of the Central Executive Committee, Huang Chi-lu, a 
Canadian-Chinese and staunch anti-communist, jointly submitted a 
proposal to the CEC to discipline the Chinese communists for
^4 Tsou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shih kao (Draft History of 
the KMT) pp. 386 ff. [~2 voIs . Chungking 1 944 ) .
5 5 Circular No.24, 'Party Members Must Strictly Observe 
Disciplines and Work Hard', Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang chung yao 
hsiian-yen hsiin-ling chi (important Declarations & Instructions 
of the KMT of China) pp.13-15 (Political Dept, of the KMT 
Military Academy 1925» n.p., but probably Canton).
alj eged illegal activities.
Then, two weeks later, the Central Supervisory Committee of 
the KMT sought to impeach the CCP over what had been referred 
to as the so-called T'uan K'an case. The T 1uan K ’an was an 
official organ of the Socialist Youth Corps (SYC) and the 
offending issue was No.7, dated the 11th April 1924. In this 
issue were the Manifesto and certain resolutions of the 2nd 
Congress of the Corps. The senior comrades who brought the 
charge of impeachment were Teng Tse-ju, Hsieh Ch'ih, and Chang 
Chi. While the first two had demonstrated their opposition to 
the collaboration from its beginning, Chang was the sponsor of 
Li Ta-chao in the latter’s application to join the KMT and a 
long-time colleague of both Li and Ch'en dating back to the 
pre-republican days.
This case deserves careful consideration, not only for the 
interest it aroused at the time it occurred, but it was also an 
important landmark in the development of the Chinese communists’ 
concept and attitude towards the national revolution and its 
leadership. There were also signs that this case was an outward 
expression of factional disputes within the KMT. Being an 
official impeachment, the CCP was obliged to put forward a 
defence, or at least to offer an explanation. This they did, 
most effectively. Not only were the leading communist 
theoreticians called upon to put forward a defence, but, as the
56 Chiang, Diaries VII, p.1 ; Lo Chia-lun, Liu-shih nieri lai 
Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang yu Chung-kuo (The KMT and China in sixty 
years), p.668. (Taipei: Committee for Compiling Historical 
Materials of' the KMT, I 959)*
result of this challenge, the communist theoreticians took up 
even more explicit and determined stances over the issues of 
class and leadership in the national revolution.
The accusers of the CCP made much of the secretive nature of 
the T 1uan K * an but judging from the allegedly offensive portion 
of the journal which the senior comrades of the KMT brought to 
the Party’s attention, the CCP really had no need to keep those 
matters confidential. However, as that journal was available to 
members of the SYC, and as the offensive matters were resolutions 
and the Congress Manifesto, such a charge of a secretive act must 
have had other motivations.
Indeed, these offensive materials came to the notice of the 
Central Supervisory Committee of the KMT, a committee of ’senior 
comrades', via a devious course. Tseng Ch'i, who was the founder 
of the Chinese Youth Party, had secured the offensive materials 
from France and he immediately considered those materials a 
violation of the spirit of the collaboration. At that time, 
according to Tseng, Tsai Yuan-pei and Wang Ching-hui were also in 
France and he referred the materials to them asking them to bring; 
them to the notice of Sun for action. To Tseng’s annoyance, both 
Tsai and Wang not only refused to be intermediaries, but also 
held that the materials were not as damaging as Tseng thought 
they were. Thus rebuffed, Tseng sent the materials to Hsieh
57C h ’ih in Shanghai.' Hsieh and Chang Chi agreed with Tseng. The
r 7' Tseng C h ’i, Tseng Mu-han hsien-sheng i-chu (Posthumous 
writings of Mr. Tseng C h ’i), p p .3» 315-21 for the documents; Tsou
Lu, O p .cit., p.401. The documents are also reprinted in Kc-iiiing- 
wen-hsien IX, pp.72-80. Tseng’s works were published in Taipei, 
by the CEC of the Chinese Youth Party, 1954.
two senior comrades then gathered some of the materials they
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already had on the CCP and came to Canton to lodge impeachment 
proceedings against their collaborators on the 18th June 192-4.
These senior comrades objected to the SYC ' s resolutions 
calling on its members 'to assist the CCP in expanding the 
organization of the KMT throughout the country' especially 
because the CCP and the SYC wanted to 'propagandize the national 
revolution amongst the toiling masses on a scale so large as to 
expand the national-revolutionary KMT'. These senior comrades 
also found it particularly objectionable that these Resolutions 
called on the individual SY to 'work in unison with the members 
of the CCP both in words and deeds,' and, at all times, tried 
to 'maintain the independence and rigid organization of the SYC' 
from other youth organizations.
As with their elders, the SYC were also prone to publicize 
their strategy and this also made the senior comrades in the 
KMT worry enough to conclude that their worst fears had 
materialized. Amongst the strategical instructions which proved 
objectionable were, firstly, work at all times in cohesion with 
the CCP and to draw the KMT closer to the Soviet Union and away 
from the greedy and wily imperialists. Secondly, in matters of 
propaganda, the YSC pledged to emphasize political propaganda 
amongst the masses while hoping that in so doing, they would 
prevent the KMT from indulging in its penchant to rely on 
military action as well as mere reformism in social, especially 
labour and agricultural, matters. At the same time, the SYC 
would work to ensure that in their political propaganda, the
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forces of the national revolution would not make compromises with 
the imperialists and warlords.
As these admonitions to the SY were carefully worded so as 
to appear that they were not urging disobedience towards the KMT 
directives but to work towards ensuring that the KMT would 
continue in an acceptable (to the communists) revolutionary 
track, the senior comrades really had no case to effect an 
impeachment of their new collaborators. After all anti­
imperialism and anti-warlords as well as a better socio-economic 
condition for the masses were slogans and programmes that formed 
integral parts of the Three Principles of Sun. On the other 
hand, in spite of the presence of these ideas in Sun’s Principles, 
the Chinese communists' conception of these programmes were 
certainly different because they saw the development of the 
national revolution in class terms - as a series of class 
struggles involving temporary alliances of the proletariat and 
other classes in order to overcome certain obstacles of history.
These senior comrades also charged that the communists, in 
spite of Li Ta-chao's explanation at the KMT Congress, were still 
forming a ’party within a party’ and this, these zealous KMT 
comrades contended, constituted a violation of the terms of 
admission into the KMT. However, apart from the lack of logic 
in this argument, this charge really amounted to a denial of the 
agreement made between Sun and Joffe as well as the new KMT 
Constitution. As the communists were admitted to the KMT as 
individuals without their renunciation of their CCP membership, 
it therefore implied that the terms of admission permitted the 
communists to continue membership in the CCP which would involve,
/of course, the receipt of instructions from the CCP. There was 
no demand on the communists that while they were in the KMT the\ 
must not associate with each other, provided that they would act 
to realize the policies of the KMT as stated in its platform and 
not to flout party discipline. Of course, this provision would 
not preclude the communists having different interpretations as 
well as having varying degrees of emphasis on the various planks 
of the platform and their intentions. Nevertheless, the unity 
of action by members of the CCP within the KMT did not constitute 
a violation of the admission agreement between the two parties.
As well as trying to impeach the CCP, Hsieh Ch'ih, Chang
58Chi, and Sun Fo went to see Borodin demanding an explanation. 
Borodin, when shown the offending materials, claimed he had not
59seen them previously. However, when questioned whether there
should be a 'party within a party’, Borodin replied:^
That a political party should have factions 
is inevitable. However, the Party's (i.e. 
KMT) CEC cannot realistically be regarded as 
the "centre" of the party. Therefore, it is 
natural that within the Party there will be
Text of the interview is reprinted in Ke-ming-wen-hsien IX, 
pp.80-84; also in Teng Tse-ju, Op .cit., p p .324-328.
59 Subsequent conversation revealed that Borodin knew of tin? 
actions of the SYC but he was technically correct in that he 
could not read Chinese. Jen Yu-wen, who met Borodin when the 
latter was on his way home in 1927 whilst passing through Feng 
Yu-hsiang's territory, confirmed in a personal interview that 
Borodin had no Chinese. Jen was Feng's Foreign Affairs 
Commissioner.
^  In stating that the CCP was the Leftwing of the KMT, Borodin 
was stating a position not in conformity with the Chinese's own 
view, as will be demonstrated.
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factions, and will have Left-wing and 
Right-wing divisions. For instance, Fang 
Jui-lun's group and their Manifesto on 
Sino-soviet relations may be regarded as the 
Right-wing and the Communist Party the 
Left-wing.
He further defended the CCP actions by accusing the KMT of 
lacking in resolution almost immediately after the January 
Congress. Therefore, Borodin explained, 'the CCP ... on seeing 
that the CEC of the KMT could not exert any uplifting efforts as 
well as seeing so many Right-wingers in its midst, could not but 
organize a corps within the Party'. He reiterated that the 
Comintern was of the opinion that in the Chinese revolution only 
the KMT Constitution was to be used and not any other ideology. 
'Hence if any member of the CCP or SYC, upon joining the KMT, 
would not obey this order then that member will be regarded as 
having disobeyed orders.'
Such circumlocution would hardly be expected to pacify the 
senior comrades, especially when Borodin also told them that:
The KMT is dead, it can no longer be regarded 
as a political party. We can only speak of 
KMT members and cannot talk of the KMT as a 
party. With the entry of new members, such 
as the communists and their forming of 
organizations and party groups, the old party 
members' competitive spirit may be aroused 
and the Party may thus be resuscitated.
The senior comrades stoutly argued that the CCP and the KMT were 
two separate parties and not two factions. However, Borodin 
showed much confidence and challenged his visitors that if the
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majority wished to do so then they were free to expel the COP 
members from the KMT.
Borodin, who was appointed by Sun to the position of Senior
Advisor, not only stood his grounds at the onslaught of the
senior comrades, but had also demonstrated that his confidence in
his judgement of the political situation was well placed. Sun
could not afford to do without the help of the Soviet Union and,
consequently, was very irritated and embarrassed by this
impeachment attempt. When Chang Chi took the case to Sun in a
personal interview, Chang not only failed to convince Sun of the
dangers of harbouring communists in the KMT but he was also
strongly reproached by the leader. Worst of all, these senior
comrades, Chang and Hsieh, had to endure a pronouncement from
Sun which, as much as anything else, had endeared Sun to the
communist cause. It was at this confrontation that Sun was
6 1reported to have told his visitors that
If you do not approve [of the communists' 
entry into the KMT] I may dissolve the KMT 
and join the CCP myself.
Though these senior comrades clearly lost this battle, they 
were determined not to lose the war. They soon returned to
There are many reports on this incident. Chang Chi left his 
own account in his Chang Ch'u-ch'uan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi 
(Collected Writings of Mr. Chang Chi) , p . 105 (ed. C ommittee for 
the Compilation of Historical Materials, Taipei 1951)• Chiang 
Chieh-shih ch1uan-shu (Collected writings of Chiang Kai-shek) 
recorded on p.25 (ed. Tung-ya Wu-wo-tzu, n.p. 1927). Ho Hsiang- 
n.i ng (Mr-s. Liao Chung—kai) recalled likewise in her Hui-i Sun 
Chnng-slian he Liao Chung—k/ai (Reminiscences on Sun Vat-sen and 
L i ao Cluing-ka:i ) , p . 16 ( Peking, 19 57).
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Shanghai after their failure in attempting to persuade Sun to 
change his mind. However that failure only spurred them on to 
redouble their efforts. They rallied like-minded comrades 
together as soon as they returned to Shanghai and continued their 
agitation. They also made great efforts to strengthen their case 
for impeachment, and for the next round of the confrontation. As 
an official request for the impeachment of the CCP had been made, 
the case had to be heard and discussed by the CEC of the KMT and 
there obtain the final decision. The senior comrades marshalled 
their resources and obtained new evidence while the communists, 
who had stood their ground during the proceedings to date, took 
the offensive. They called on all their best theoreticians to 
state their case.
The case was taken up during the 4th conference of the CEC
of 1 he KMT which commenced on the 3rd July 1924. On the 7th
July, a manifesto was issued over the names of Shao Yiian-ch'ing
and Wang Ching-wei in which the acceptance of the communists was
6 2re-affirmed.  ^ It proclaimed that the Three Principles of Sun 
were 'the sole foundation for the Chinese revolutionary movement 
... therefore whoever has revolutionary courage and determination, 
and espouses the Three Principles, regardless of which party one 
formerly belonged to, one is sincerely invited to join the Party.’ 
Then, without naming any person, it went on to chide those making 
allegations against the communists, saying that to harboulr such
the entire text is reprinted in Tsung-li Ch'uan-shu (Collected 
Works of the Director-General) pp.759_760. (ed. Hu Han-min,
Shanghai , I 930)•
suspicion would create 'psychological barriers' between members 
of the KMT. While it promised a plenary session of the CEC to 
'reach a thorough solution', it also re-affirmed that 'since our 
Party shoulders the mission of the Chinese revolution, it is 
necessary to rally all the revolutionary elements in the whole 
country. Therefore, the criteria for membership depend on 
whether their speech and conduct are in agreement with the 
principles, the platform, and the regulations of the Party 
regardless of their past affiliation.'
Thus, it is obvious that this oracular manifesto cannot be 
expected to soothe the friction between the ideological factions, 
for, once again, it left undefined the contested meaning of such 
vague terms as Democracy or People's Livelihood. Indeed, this 
decision still implicitly permitted the communists to continue 
with their own definition of the People. Furthermore, it did not 
preclude the communist contention that the national revolution 
was but a stage in the total revolutionary process of the 'people'
The Second Plenum of the CEC of the KMT was scheduled for 
the 15th August 1924. However, before allowing the impeachment 
to be thoroughly studied, Sun consolidated the organizational 
structure of his Party through the establishment of a Political 
Council on the 11th July. The Council was intended to 
amalgamate the Party's functional and policy-making aspects into
6 3 There are many versions on the council. Lo Chi a-tun, Op. «* i I . , 
p .722 listed names and some details and his study was based on 
Council minutes. Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, 
Nationalism and Soviet Advisors in China, 1918- 1927, p . 132 (NY 
1956) ; T 'ang L e a n g - l i , Foundation of Modern China, p . 169 (Lon. 
1928) have slightly different accounts, especially on the number 
of members.
o o o
one organ. It was, in the manner of Lenin's concept of
democratic centralism, to be 'responsible' to the CEC on matters
of party affairs but it was empowered to act first then report
back to the CEC for ratification. It was also to be the
executive conduit for political and diplomatic decisions of Sun.
It consisted of seven members with Sun as chairman and Borodin
as senior advisor but not officially a member. Tan P'ing-shan
was the CCP member on the council but was soon replaced by Ch'u
Ch’iu-pai. As there was no provision for such a council in the
Party Constitution, its establishment meant that its authority
depended on Sun. It also implied that the constitution might be
tampered with by the party leader, or whoever happened to possess
the necessary power to assert the authority. It may be argued
that the arrangement suited the putschist mentality of the
Russian Bolsheviks and Borodin certainly made good use of it.
In its first meeting, it resolved to appoint Kan Nai-kuang, Ku
Ying-fen, and P 'eng P'ai as agricultural investigators, with
Borodin as their advisers. At that time, and indeed all through
the collaboration to 1927, Kan was a 'leftist' with views on the
6peasant movement almost identical to those of the communists'.
At the Second Plenum, the senior comrades found themselves 
thoroughly defeated by the rhetoric and logic of the young CCP 
representative, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai who was then only twenty-five 
years old but already made a member of the Political Council of 
the KMT as well as the Central Committee of the CCP. In the end,
See Kan's speech On the Beginnings of the Peasant Movement 
( N I uig-iii i n > iii >-I ung ch pul to the Poll Lical Eduea I ion class at 
Mia Chungshnn University. (Canton, 1027)
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the Plenary Session of the CEC resolved that 'those whose eonduri
violates party regulations, and who are unwilling to engage :i n
the revolutionary movement of the Three Principles, or do not
oppose the warlords and imperialism, or do not support the
toiling masses, regardless of what school of thought they might
65espouse, must be disciplined by the Party'.
To make the rout of the senior comrades complete, the
resolution actually affirmed the historical conception of the
communists. And, if one is to regard this resolution as the
orthodox interpretation of Sun's Three Principles of the People,
then the opponents of the communists had every need to institute
bodies such as the Society for the Study of Sun Yat-senism after
the death of the Director-General. And, taking such a
perspective, theoreticians of this ilk, such as Tai Ch'i-tao,
may be regarded as the founders of Sun Yat-sen-revisionism. If
the anti-communists in the KMT later became 'revisionists' it
was at least partly because the Second Plenary Session of the
CEC resolved to accept a materialistic conception of history:
66it asserted that
The communists are the proletariat in the growing 
Chinese industrialized society. They are also a 
part of the political organization that has 
emerged from the natural class struggle. Even if
6 5 The text of the Resolution was published in Chung-kuo Kuo-mln- 
tang chung-yao husan-yen hsün-ling chi, p.82. (Important
Declarations and Instructions of the KMT of China, n.p. Dec. 1D2 r>, 
published by the Political Department of the Military Academy of 
the KMT. Chou En-lai was then the Head of the Department . )
66 Ibid.
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we could dissolve the existing Chinese 
Communist Party by human force, it does not 
follow that the Chinese proletariat can be 
exterminated, for surely they will be organized 
again.
Later, much later, it was alleged that Sun allowed such a 
resolution to go through because of tactical reasons. It was 
alleged that privately, Sun's real feeling was that 'in the 
circumstance, the only way to deter the Chinese communists from 
inciting class conflicts and sabotage to the national revolution 
was to place them under the leadership of the KMT and subject 
them to the Party's unified direction. ... so that, by the time 
the Northern Expedition was successfully completed and the Three 
Principles carried out according to schedule, it would then be 
too late for the Chinese communists to disrupt the national
/T
revolution even if they should so try.' However, only a person
as devious and as ignorant of the 'schedules' of the "three 
Principles as Chiang Kai-shek would fabricate such an explanation 
thirty-three years after the event. According to the schedules 
of the Three Principles, after the military liberation of the 
country by the defeating of the warlords and imperialists, there 
would come an indefinite period of party tutelage. Besides, one 
does not deter the incitement of class conflict by resolving to 
admit that class struggle is a natural historic phenomenon, and 
that the CCP is the political party of the proletariat.
Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, pp.24-2r> (N.Y. 1()o7).
Chiang's implication was that he was the trusted confidant of 
Sun.
Judging from the available records of that fateful Plenary
Session, the more likely explanation was that the gathered
dignitaries, even if they were strongly anti-communist, could
not find any adequate argument to counter the brilliant defence
put up by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. On the other hand, if what Sun had in
mind was in fact what Chiang alleged that Sun had informed him,
then Sun's strategy would not succeed for Ch'en Tu-hsiu seemed
to have the same strategy in mind when he agreed to the
collaboration. In April 1923, when Ch'en was offering a
6 8prescription to defeat the warlords, he recommended a unified 
democratic national revolutionary front of all classes who were 
against the exploits of the imperialists, warlords, and 
compradors. However, he insisted that in this united national 
movement the labouring classes were not only the ones demanding 
'real democracy’ but also the most powerful, determined and 
forceful element in the struggle for real democracy. Thus, 'not 
only is the labouring classes - lao-tung - the important element 
but is already the bravest vanguard.' He then claimed that the 
workers' actions in recent times, such as the February 7^b 
Incident, had demonstrated the workers' willingness to struggle 
for min ch'üan (Sun's term for Democracy) on behalf of the 
Chinese people.
However, a little later, after the 3rd CCP Congress 
Manifesto claimed that the KMT 'should have been the leaders of 
the national revolution' and Ch'en himself led the CCP to
1 Ch'en, 'Tsen-mo ta tao chun-fa' (How to Overthrow Warlords). 
Hsiang Tao, No.21 (18-IV-1923) pp.152-4.
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participate in the KMT, Ch'en was alleged by his erstwhile
6 9comrade Chou Fo-hai to have adopted the strategy of:
Firstly, make use of the cover of the KMT 
to expand CCP activities. If we openly use 
the name of the CCP, we may frighten away 
the people. Then, we will communize the KMT.
Once we gain membership we can obtain, in the 
KMT, positions of power and change its policies.
While nominally retaining the name of the KMT 
we will effectively annihilate the party.
Writing in 1927» the ex-communist Chou Fo-hai was probably 
anxious to demonstrate that he indeed had a fan-shen - turn over 
the body - but, as far as Ch'en was concerned, he was really 
saying nothing more than what he did when he first went to Canton 
to serve as education commissioner for C h ’en Chiung-ming. He was 
always the practical revolutionary.
By August 1924, the Chinese communists no longer needed to 
hide their intentions and identity, at least in the CEC of the 
KMT. To be sure, as any reader of the many CCP journals would 
know, the CCP had never been hesitant in announcing to the world 
their ultimate goal and their strategy in obtaining that goal, 
even on the eve of the KMT Congress. Eight months later, the 
CEC of the KMT, through the influence of communist participation 
had come to perceive class struggle as natural and an integral 
part of socio-political development, and that the existence of a
Chou Fo-hai, ’Wo t ’ ao ctiu liao ch*ih~ tu Wuhan’ (My Escape from 
the Red Capital, Wuhan), written in 1927« Edition used is the 
1971> Hong Kong ed. of C h ’en Kung-po, Chou Fo-hai hui-i lu 
ho-pien (joint edition of the M e m o i r s o f  C h ’en and Chou), p.149*
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party of the proletariat as an inevitable development of history, 
in short, the decision of the Second Plenary Session meant that 
the KMT leadership at that particular time shared with the 
communists the communist perception of the national revolution. 
That is, the KMT’s decision meant the admission that during the 
national revolution - a struggle against imperialism and its 
stooges to regain national independence - the proletariat would 
rise, and be led by their own party, a communist party, to 
continue the social struggle against, and then to overcome 
capitalism thus fulfilling the natural and historic role of the 
proletariat as a social class. It would certainly be wrong to 
imagine that such a deterministic and materialist conception of 
history was the unanimous view of the KMT. By the same token, 
one may be permitted to suggest that in obtaining this resolution 
from the CEC and thus defeating the clumsy attempt at impeachment, 
the CCP, especially Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, were effectively intensifying 
the class struggle and the conflict potential between the CCP and 
the KMT, and within the KMT itself.
Events in August 1924 may be taken as expressions of a 
series of attempts by the Chinese communists to test their 
strategy of dialectical materialism. In this instance, they may 
be taken as attempts to test the contradictions within the KMT 
and to split it into two. If the KMT members who kept a watchful 
brief over the activities of the CCP had read the various 
communist journals carefully - the impeachment attempt, based as 
it was on the published materials of the CCP, suggested that 
these communist journals were carefully read - then, they would be 
left in no doubt that the communists had not only adopted the
:»:»8
materialistic conception of history but materialistic dialectics 
as their world-view (yii-chou-kuan) and philosophy-of-life 
(jen-sheng-kuan).
On 1st August, in the midst of the impeachment incident,
Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, the newly appointed CCP member of the Political
Council who also held the position of an alternate-member of the
CEC of the KMT, published a statement on his revolutionary 
70philosophy. In it, Ch'u argued that the world-view and
philosophy-of-life in each age and period reflected a class 
background. Thus, he explained, that the development of 
pragmatism after the May 4th Movement was not accidental. It was 
then a period during which the patriarchal society in China was 
very much shaken under the attack of international capitalism.
The people, in looking for a new philosophy of life and world­
view suitable for the new conditions found pragmatism suited to 
the needs of the day. 'This marked the development of the 
intellectual revolution of the "Third Estate". But whether
pragmatism now holds a revolutionary position in European and
71American intellectual circles is a doubtful matter.'
Then, bringing back the debate conducted by Ch'en Tu-hsiu,
Li Ta-chao and Hu Shih in 1919» Ch’ii said that the slogan ’More 
studies on Problems and less discourses on Isms' had little 
intrinsic value and its suitability depended on time and place. 
'If it is used by China's Third Estate to resist the oppression
^  Ch'ü ' Shih-yen chu-i yu ke-ming che-hsiiefo' (Pragmatism and 
Revolutionary Philosophy), HCN Quarterly No.3 (1-VIII-1924),
pp.10-16.
71 Ibid., pp.10-11.
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of the warlords, then it is a revolutionary [concept of actionj.
In Europe and America, the capitalists are using it to deal with
72the actions from the labouring class, there it is reactionary.’
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to treat this line
of argument by Ch’ii as coming to the defence of the pragmatists.
In fact, he took the debate a step further than where Ch’en and 
73Li left off. Ch'u argued that it would be a misconception of 
history to think that because China was a backward nation and 
thus in need of scientific knowledge that pragmatism should be 
the philosophy-of-life (jen-sheng-kuan). While pragmatism might 
be a good method for the acquisition of scientific knowledge, it 
had little value as a precept to live by because it had little 
to do with the realities of life and human needs.
Indeed, as Ch ’ii saw it, pragmatism as a world-view has no 
absolute nor objective reality for it was but a subjective and 
idealistic world-view. Therefore, he argued that what the 
pragmatist thought as truth would, to him, a communist, be merely 
expedience. 'The aims and desires in real life depend entirely 
on what we decide as beneficial or profitable. Thus, according 
to pragmatism, seeing that the important criterion is profit and 
that profit means different things to different people, the 
pragmatist can only say that: as there are many types of profit
74there will be many types of truth.'
^  Ibid., p .11.
7 3 The debate was conducted in the pages of Mei-chou p!ing-lun 
(Weekly Review), founded by Ch'en and edited, in turn by Ch'en 
until his imprisonment, then Li until he had to flee, and Hu who 
finally stopped it. The Debate was in Nos.31-37 (20-VII to 
31-VIII-1919).
^  Ibid., pp .14-3.
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He then went on to explain that while some ini/’ht see in the 
above some resemblance to Marxist materialistic dialectics, to 
the Marxist, the difference could not be more distinct. He 
explained that as a Marxist he realized that ones perspective of 
the world, and ones conception on what is beneficial and 
profitable depended on ones contact with the external. In short, 
ones attitude depended on ones social class. Pragmatism then 
might be a useful tool for class struggle in defending class 
interest but it would be in no position to discern the truth. 
Indeed, 'the spirit of pragmatism (that is^as a tool) is already 
included in materialistic dialectics... Pragmatism, therefore, 
can only recognize what is profitable as truth. As a means of 
social understanding, it can only point myopically to compromises.
75It is not a revolutionary philosophy'.
What Ch'ii was putting forward, in the midst of the 
impeachment case, was that the KMT senior comrades might choose 
to see the world through different perspectives from the ones 
the communists would prefer, but, if one would still insist on 
being a revolutionary, one simply could not afford the luxury of 
looking at the world and judging it with outdated criteria. In 
linking the anti-communists with Hu Shih, though without naming 
the latter, Ch'ii was, in fact, accusing the anti-communist senior 
comrades of being too willing to effect compromises with the 
Northern warlords and rejecting the revolutionary ideology, as 
Hu was doing.
75 Ibid., pp.14-15.
231
Editor Ch'ü demonstrated his fighting spirit by pressing on 
with this ideological attack and publishing three more articles 
in the same issue on the same theme. One of the articles was
by Ch'en. He mentioned Hu Shih by name and bracketed him witJi 
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Chang Chun-maias voices from the past 
defending reactionary ideas. Then, pushing the theme further, 
the two contributions by Chiang Hsieh-seng: argued that the social 
reconstruction which the proletariat were now engaged in were 
more than merely a question of bread but involved the struggles 
to open new roads for human culture.
Indeed, this series of articles were aiming at targets 
larger and more important than the senior comrades. In effect, 
they may be regarded as the first official CCP response to the 
lectures of Sun Yat-sen. In his lectures on Min-sheng chu-i, or 
People’s Livelihood, Sun explicitly denied the necessity for 
class struggle and Marxist materialism. Instead, Sun saw 'social 
evolut ion ... [in] ... social and industrial reforms. However,
the alternative proposed by Sun cannot be regarded as systematic, 
and Ch'ii and his comrades must have wondered what their
They are: Ch'en Tu-hsiu 'Ta Chang Churwna i chi Liang Jen-kung'
(Replies to Chang Chun-mai and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), pp.1-10. Chiang 
Hsieh- seng, 'Wo-chan chieh-chi ke-ming yu wen-fa' (The Proletariat 
Revolution and culture) pp.16-22 and his 'Wei-wu shih-kuan tui 
jen-lei she-hui li-shih fa-chan ti chieh-shih' (The Development 
of Human Social History as Explained by the Materialistic 
Conception of History) pp.22-38- HCN Quarterly No.3 
(1-VIII-1924).
77 San-min chu-i. The edition used is the 1962 edition published 
by Hai-wai in Taipei. It includes the six lectures each on 
Min-chu and Min-ch'iian and the four on Min-sheng as well as Chiang 
Kai-shek's Supplementary talks on Min-sheng. This quote is from 
p.195» Lecture 1 of Min-sheng.
k
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Director-General had in mind. On one hand, Sun spoke of
’ d e s t r o y i n g ;  t h e  m e r c h a n t s '  l o r  t h e i r  p r o f i t  maki np;  a n d  men ( i o n e d
that the solution or method lor this destruction was to
enlighten the people and urge them to develop co-operatives.
7 9And yet, he would say:
What our KMT propose is Min-sheng chu-i. It 
is not only the highest ideal but also the 
motive force of society and the centre of all 
historical movements. If Min-sheng chu-i 
can be brought into practice, then social 
problems will be solved, and if social problems 
can be solved, mankind may then enjoy great 
felicity.
Today, we will distinguish between communism 
and Min-sheng chu-i. We may say that communism 
is the ideal of Min-sheng and Min-sheng chu-i 
is communism in practice. The two ideologies - 
chi-i - do not have many differences. What 
needs to be distinguished is method.
No Leninist, especially those urging a Jacobinical method of
action would accept such interpretations of history nor such
solutions to social problems, nor indeed such views of social
problems. Sun not only denied the existence of capitalists in
8oChina, on the grounds that by comparison to the major 
capitalists in America and Europe the Chinese variety would be 
poor men? but also - even at this late stage - insisted on the
78 Ibid., p . 203 , Lecture 1 , Min-sheng.
7 9 Ibid., p . 2 0 9 , Lecture 2 , Min-sheng.
8 0 Ibid., p . 2 1 0 , Lecture 2 , Min-sheng.
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necessity for using foreign capital to develop Chinese 
industries.^
In reply, the communist writer wrote, rather pointedly,
,82that
Some say China can avoid class struggle 
and can walk a felicitous road, that China 
has not been proletarianized and that there 
is no distinction between the labouring 
class and the capitalist class, and hence 
it is not suitable to discuss communism in 
China. While it may be good to harbour 
such wishes, recent history has clearly 
demonstrated such wishes and talks as 
fallacious.
Then, to demonstrate that capitalism and class struggle had 
already occurred and was still happening in China, Chiang 
Hsieh-seng listed the Hong Kong Seamen’s Strike, the Railways 
incidents and the various disputes, which often resulted in 
deaths, in the various types of factories. Then, Chiang added:
I can resolutely say: China now has
capitalism and China now has class struggle.
In future, China will have a proletarian 
revolution. This is not just my individual 
desire but an objective and materialistic 
tendency.
Then, directly denying the Sun-styled linkage between Min-sheng
8 2and communism, Chiang replied:
81 Ibid., p.222, Lecture 2, Min-sheng.
8 2 Chiang isieh-seng, Op.cit., p*37*
^  Chiang, Op.cit., pp*37-38.
The power to produce is the motive force 
of human social development but until the 
productive power reaches its highest 
point, then the process of development 
cannot but have class differentiations.
The existence of class will lead to class 
struggle and the final step of class 
struggle is the destruction of classes.
This is the law of the development of 
human society. The proletariat will be 
victorious over the capitalists and will 
destroy the system of private ownership 
and then build a communist society.
As these were the views of the communists at the beginning 
of August, the resolution of the CEC of the KMT may thus be 
regarded as a resounding communist success. To achieve this 
success, editor Ch'ii did not leave it to the power of persuasion 
of his journal but personally devastated the anti-communists, 
albeit with an argument bordering on sophistry. He argued that 
methodologically speaking the two parties were in basic agreement 
for both advocated revolutionary dictatorship. Ch'ii argued, not 
without reason, that the period of Tutelage was in fact another 
name for revolutionary dictatorship and that even the KMT senior 
comrades would not deny that during this period, the aim of the 
Party would be to develop the nation economically without the 
rise of capitalism, as would be the case in a bourgeois 
revolution without party dictatorship.
As to the question of the communists working in the KMT,
I fCh'u argued that the communists were concentrating their efforts 
on the workers and peasants - party of the common people 
(p'ing-min). Ch'u argued that it was also the expressed desire
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of the KMT to have these people joining the national revolution. 
Hence, the communist propaganda must be regarded as part of the 
total propaganda for the national revolution. Though the KMT’s 
propaganda would not include class struggle as the communists 
were doing, Ch'ü said that both parties agreed that the workers 
and peasants needed to be awakened to the national needs. To 
C h ’ii, this awakening was the awakening to class consciousness, 
otherwise these classes would not join the national revolution.
Then, making use of Sun’s expressed aim to eliminate 
capitalism, Ch'ü explained that the two parties were really very 
similar. Both anti-imperialist, anti-warlord, against class 
exploitation, both also wanted to eliminate capitalism, and both 
were trying to build a classless society of all the people. The 
elimination of capitalism implied that capitalists were not 
allowed to enjoy privileges of the Society of All people - 
ch'uan-min she-hui. Hence, Ch'ü claimed that the CCP was really 
helping the KMT to expedite the achievement of their shared 
goals. He then apologized for the rough wording that might have 
been used in the communists’ various writings, but explained 
that they were really indicative of the eagerness of the 
communists in their anti-imperialist and anti-warlord 
endeavours.^
From the Statement by Ch'ü given to the 2nd Plenum of the CEC 
of the KMT, on the 19“20 Aug. 1924. The original is in the KMT 
archives in Taiwan. I have a xerox copy, in my possession, of 
the minutes of the Plenum in which Ch'ü's speech is included.
My source for this copy is confidential.
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That speech by Ch'ii at the CEC of the KMT, while it gained
the young communist the CEC resolution which suited the CCP
line, also gained him the hatred of the Shanghai-based senior
comrades. They totally forsook their comradely spirit and
resorted to violence. At the October 10 National Day of that
year in Shanghai, a meeting was sponsored by the KMT to celebrate
the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution. It seemed that plans
were made to assassinate Ch'ii who was one of the scheduled
85speakers at the celebration. Fortunately, he received warning
of the plan while he was on his way to the meeting. While he
escaped unhurt, one of his students at the Shanghai University
86was beaten to death. The police of the French and British 
Concessions were tipped off and they searched his residence, 
confiscated his books and forced him to go underground for a 
while.
In seeking the aid of the imperialists to attack their
communist collaborators, these anti-communist KMT members had
demonstrated that they were more anti-communist than anti­
cs ry
imperialist or anti-warlord. From then on, instead of
J Yang Chih-hua (Mrs. Ch'ii), 'Recollections about Ch'ii Ch'iu- 
pai' (i Ch'u Ch'iu-pai), Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao VIII (VII— 1958)» 
pp.30-31* This is admitted by KMT historian, Li Yun-han, T s 'ung 
jung-kung tao ch'ing-tang (From the Admittance of the Communists 
to the Purification of the Party) I, 331 (Taipei, 1966). Li 
called it an unfortunate incident by some KMT members who could 
not control their anti-communism.
Ch'ii was teaching in that university's Sociology Department. 
It was jointly run by the KMT and CCP. See also Hsiang Tao
N o.87 (15-X-1924), pp.716-720.
8 "7' See Teng Chung-hsia and others in Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien No.50 
( 18-X-1924).
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retreating, the Chinese communists had made anti-imperialism 
and anti-warlordism the twin test for loyalty to the cause of 
the national revolution.
However, the plot to murder Ch'ü was more than merely an
attempt by sections of the KMT to silence a brilliant adversary.
There were powerful forces within the KMT which were pushing the
party, and the national revolution, in a direction against the
one which the; communists would want to go. In his address to
the CEC of the KMT, Ch'ü defended the various slogans adopted
by the SYC for the national revolution. Amongst the slogans
88mentioned in his speech was:
Prevent the KMT from forming an Alliance 
with the Feng (-tien)—Che (-kiang)
Militarists; and Prevent the KMT [from 
adopting] Reformist Labour [policies].
While the communists were really quite confident that they would 
have the trade unionists backing them, the penchant of the KMT 
leadership for forming alliances with warlords did worry them.
At the same time, the effectiveness of the communist propaganda 
also worried the KMT, for both parties had very similar targets 
for the propaganda.
The significance and the communists' insistence (as well 
as the denial by the senior comrades of the KMT) on the 
importance of the proletariat leadership of the national 
revolution, the necessity for class struggle during the national 
revolution, as well as the anti-warlord slogans can be clearly
88 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Speech at the 2nd Plenum of the CEC of the 
KMT, 19-20 August 1924, p.7 (of the original transcript).
,?>s
perceived if this debate between Ch'ii and the KMT can be seen 
against the background of the military-political situation of 
China at the time. The second Chihli-Fengtien war was on the 
horizon. The KMT had hoped to gain from the trial of strength 
between the Chihli clique of Ts'ao K 'un and Wu P’ei-fu and the 
Fengtien clique of Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui, by siding 
with the latter. When the impeachment was in progress, the 
negotiation between Sun Yat-sen, Chang Tso-lin, and the latter's 
colleague in Chekiang, Lü Yiing-hsiang was also in progress.
The immediate theatre of action was the conflict between the 
Chekiang tuchun, Lü and his counter-part in Kiangsu, Ch'i 
Hsien-yuan and Sun Ch'uan-fang of the Chihli clique. The 
Kiangsu-Chekiang War broke out on the 3 September and by the 
15th September, Chang Tso-lin marched his troops on to 
Shanhaikwan and the Second Chihli-Fengtien War broke out. On 
the 18th September, Sun Yat-sen, as if to insist on demonstrating 
his preference for militaristic methods to reliance on the 
masses, issued his Northern Expedition Manifesto and led his 
troops to Shaokwan in northern Kwangtung province.
Indeed, as the impeachment process was in progress, the 
Chinese communists were to see their collaborators sending no 
less a personage than the Director-General’s own son, Sun Fo, to 
Fengtien to meet the sons of Chang Tso-lin and Lü Jüng-hsiang, 
that is, Ching Hsüeh-liang and Lü Shao-chia. This was the 
so-called Meeting of the Three Crown Princes - San tai-tse
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hui-i. The result of the Fengtien negotiation was the 
Triangular Alliance. But, Sun Yat-sen, who had taken on the 
grandiose title of Generalissimo after Ts'ao K 'un became the 
president, was angling for yet another partner - Feng Yu-hs.iang. 
Sun sent his brother-in-law, H.H. Rung, to Feng who had earlier 
held back when Sun's first emissary Hsü Ch'ien failed to win 
the Christian General over. Brother-in-law Rung was more 
successful especially when Feng was able to see, after the
commencement of hostilities, what his participation might
. . 90achieve.
If the Chinese communists found such negotiations between
9 1their collaborators and the various warlords distasteful, they
must have been even more concerned to know that Senior Advisor
and Comintern comrade, Borodin, not only approved of these
92negotiations but encouraged them. However, they were not
deterred. Instead of following the example of Borodin, the 
Chinese communists redoubled their efforts in their anti­
imperialist and anti-warlord propaganda.
Jen Yu-wen, 'Feng Yu-hsiang chiang-chun chkan' (Biography of 
General Feng) Pt.8, p.83,(The Journal of Historical Record No.9 
(May 1972). Jen served on the personal staff of Sun Fo and 
Feng Yu-hsiang. I also had a personal interview with Jen.
^  Sun Fo, 'Rwangchow shih-cheng 1^shu' (Reminiscences of Canton 
city politics) Rwangtung wen-hsien Vol.I, No.3 (X— 1971), p.8. 
Also see Jen, Op.cit., p.85.
See, for example, Chang Ruo-ttao's memoire, Op.cit,, pp.375- 
384.
92 A personal account by a contemporary witness may be seen in 
Jen Yu-wen, Op.cit. especially Pt.IX which dealt with 1924.
24o
All the leading propagandists of the CCP were active during 
this period. Party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu vehemently denied that 
the socialists - meaning the CCP - were the Leftwing of the KMT,
93as Borodin had suggested. He insisted that the 'revolution of
94the KMT will only benefit the capitalist class' because of
the semi-colonial conditions in China and the necessity to
liberate the country from the exploitations of the imperialists,
the working classes and the capitalists had to work together.
Thus, Ch'en strongly advised the KMT and its capitalists not to
forget the interests of the working classes. He then explained
what his party's intentions were in the present state of 'party
9 3co—op era tion' :
1. The various classes co-operate but not 
amalgamate because classes do not 
amalgamate.
2. The national revolution is a political 
co-operation, not a compromise or 
co-operation between capital and labour 
because economically speaking, the two 
classes have no common ground for 
co-operation.
He then warned the KMT that while they should strive hard to 
liberate the Chinese capitalist class from the exploitations of
Ch'en, 'Kuo-min-1ang tso-yu-n *ai chih chen i-i’(The true 
Meaning of the Left and Right wings of the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.(>2 
(23-IV-1924) pp.493-6.
94 .. *•Ch'en, ' Kuo-min-tang yii lao-tung yun-tung' (The KMT and the 
Labour Movement) Hsiang Tao No.71» pp.367-8 (18-VI-1924).
93 Ch'en, Ibid., p.568.
the foreigners, they must not sacrifice the interests of Lhe 
working classes in this struggle. If the KMT ever forget this, 
then not only would the liberation of the capitalists fail but 
the KMT would also alienate the most powerful forces of the 
national revolution, and the most revolutionary forces - the 
workers and the peasants.
As to the various Great Powers, Ch'en not only attacked
the actions of the British and American governments but the
9 6Japanese as well. Indeed, during this period when the KMT
were seeking an alliance with the Japanese-backed Chang Tso-lin 
and Tuan Ch'i-jui, Ch'en did not spare either. Then, while 
young Ch'u Ch'iu-pai attended the CEC of the KMT to deliver a 
personal rebuttal against the charges of the 'senior comrades', 
Ch'en also published a long reply to the charges contained in
97the impeachment incident. He naturally denied the accusation
that the communists were sabotaging the national revolution. On 
the contrary, he accused the accusers of being disloyal to the 
ideals of the national revolution. Indeed, he claimed that the 
entire impeachment exercise was really a factional fight between 
the Left and Right wings of the KMT, between the revolutionary 
and the counter-revolutionary factions.
Q() Ch'en in Hsiang Tao, see Nos.73, 75, 76, 79 (9, 23, 30 VII and 
2O-VIII-1924 when he attacked the U.K., U.S.A., and France. In 
Nos.73, 77, 79 he singled out Japan for criticism. On many 
occasions he simply made no distinction between the Europeans, 
Americans, and Japanese.
^  Ch'en 'Wo-men ti hui-ta' (Our Reply) Hsiang T a o , No.83, 
pp. 673-678. ( 17-IX-1924, that is, two days before Ch'ii's
appearance at the CEC of the KMT).
With the party leader taking the lead, the other Chinese
communist writers took up the call energetically. P'eng
Shu-chih, a product of the KUTV, was probably the most abrasive.
While not all members of his party would care to use the same
words P 'eng used, his position gave his words added importance.
He had taken over the editorship of the Hsiang Tao from T s ’ai.
He claimed that since the 1911 Revolution, most of the truly
revolutionary elements were already dead, and that ’since 1911
the KMT, apart from Sun Yat-sen and one or two leaders, 99%
98are compromisers ... and self-servers’. As with the other
communist writers, P 'eng viewed the war as being master-minded
by Japan and France on the side of the Fentien Clique and the
U.S.A. on the side of the Chihli Clique. Thus, he urged his
readers not only to regard the confLict as merely a fight between
warlords, or even warlord factions backed by foreign Powers, but
also as an example of imperialism in action. He then called on
the people to rise up and eliminate imperialism and the 
99warlords.
The CCP issued their Third Manifesto on the Contemporary 
Situation in C h i n a , w h i c h  also saw the conflict in terms of 
the various imperialists trying to extend their power and 
influence while spilling Chinese blood in the process. It also
9 8 ?Peng Shu—cbih, 'Kuo-min-tang yu-p/ai fan ke-ming ti ching-chi 
pei-ching' (The Economic Background of the counter-revolutionary 
KMT Right-wing), Hsiang Tao, No.82, pp.6 6 5 - 6 6 6  ( 10-IX-1924).
99 Pfeng, 'Chiang-Che chan-cheng chi shih-chieh cheng-chü ti 
pei-ching' (The International Political background of the 
Chiang-Che War), Hsiang Tao, No.8 3 , pp.6 7 0 - 6 7 1 (17“TX-1924).
100 See Hsiang Tao, No.82, pp.6 5 7 - 6 6 0  (10-IX-1924).
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denied the validity of a slogan then used by many in the KMT:
’To oppose the Chihli Clique is to fight for the nation and the 
people'. Instead, the Manifesto argued that to be really 'for 
the nation and the people* in the struggle for national 
liberation demanded the slogans of: anti-imperialism and anti-
warlordism. The Manifesto counselled against any 'peace talks' 
with the warlords and urged the people to unite and overthrow 
the murderous warlords and all imperialism - Japanese, French, 
American, British, etc.
Indeed, Ch'en, P'eng, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Kao Ch'un-yu, and Chang 
Tai-lei urged the national revolutionary movement to adopt the 
spirit of the Boxers and oppose all forms of imperialism.
Labour organiser Teng Chung-hsia102 angrily warned the leaders 
of the KMT to stop flirting with the warlords, whether regional 
ones like Lu or major ones like Chang Tso-lin. He warned that 
unless the leadership would quickly repair the damage which 
the Rightwing of the KMT was doing to the party, the KMT would 
be unfit to fulfil its task in the national revolution. He then 
reminded the KMT that according to the party constitution adopted 
at the January Congress, the task of the national revolution was 
'anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism' and not to seek liaison 
with them.
Hsiang Tap No.81 (3-IX-1924) was a special issue on the
Boxers Rebellion in which all the CCP leading members contributed.
Teng Chung-hsia,*T'ung-chih Luang Jen ti szu'^ 'pjie Death of 
Comrade Huang Jen) Chung-kuo ch4.ng-nien, No. 50, pp.1-3 (18-X- 
1924). This journal was published by the Socialist Youth Corps.
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Unfortunately for Sun, in spite of all his scheming and
liaison with the Fengtien factions as well as manifesto-issuing,
no sooner had he set up new headquarters in Shaokuan as his
forward command for his Northern Expedition, than he found that
his home base was under attack. This was the so-called Revolt
of the Shang-tuan, the Merchant Corps, when violence broke out
in Canton on the 10th October 1924.
This was led by C h ’en Lien-po, the comprador of the British-
owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and also linked
with the resurgence of the forces of C h ’en Chiung-ming who was
in league with the Chihli Clique. Ch’en Lien-po, who was also
the president of the Canton Chamber of Commerce, was urged on by
the British Consulate in Canton to form a Merchant Defence Guard
and then a government to replace the National Government of Sun.
However, when a shipment of nine thousand rifles and machine guns
arrived on board a Norwegian steamer at Canton, they were seized 
103by Sun. During the ensuing bargaining for the release of the
weapons, hostility broke out on that fateful Anniversary Day of 
the 1911 Revolution.
However, immediately prior to the outbreak of hostility in- 
Canton, there was a massive and significant propaganda campaign 
conducted by that influential Chinese newspaper, the Chinese Mail,
1 04in Hong Kong. Ever since the establishment of National
Government in Canton and the ousting of Ch'en Chiung-ming, that
10 3 See Ke-ming wen-hsien X, pp.4l-43 for documents concerning 
this incident.
The campaign ran from the 4th-l4th Oct. 1924 in the Chinese 
Mail (Wah Tse Yat Pao), sometimes a 2, or even 3» full pages 
were devoted to it.
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daily had been informing its readers that within the National
Government there was a vital struggle between the CCP and the
pro-Communist Left KMT on one side and the anti-Communist Right
KMT on the other side. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Tan P'ing-shan were
the devil genii of the Left with the former being portrayed
105almost as the very personification of evil.
Now, on the 4th October, just a week before the conflict, 
the paper informed its readers that the anti-communist KMT 
Rightwing had been engaged in an almost life-and-death struggle 
with the communistic L e f t w i n g . W h a t  made this propaganda 
campaign different from its previous attempts was its timing as 
well as the intensity of the message not the content. Its 
Special Correspondent in Canton had read the Hsiang Tao 
carefully, thus testifying to the influence and importance of 
this CCP organ and the messages contained therein.
This campaign was, in fact, a rehashing of the impeachment 
of the CCP and the SYC, with the comments voicing the views of 
the accusers of the communists. As the proceedings were supposed 
to have been in camera, a case may be put that in their eagerness 
to rid themselves of the influence of the communists, this 
diverse group of anti-Communist KMT members were prepared to 
pool their varied resources even though in some respects, this
See, for example, the Chinese Mail, 21 and 28-11-1924 written 
by Liu Cheng-yu a former Republican Party member of the House of 
Representatives in 1912.
Detailed references were given on the articles in the Hsiang 
Tao, especially those by C h ’en Tu-hsiu; as well as a journal by 
the so-called Anti-Communist Group, the Vu-tang ti-kan (Special 
journal for the Protection of the Party).
2kb
group had links with both sides of the Second Chihli-Fengtien
War. Indeed, the impeachment incident and arguments presented
were published in great detail, including reprinting the
offending articles and resolutions by the SYC that were presented
as evidence by the accusers. It was presented as a Bolshevik
plot with Ch'en Tu-hsiu as the chief culprit. It labelled all
those who were not siding with the anti-communist group as
communist elements within the KMT. The newspaper was also
concerned with the effective penetration of the CCP-led peasant
and worker movements, especially with their success in the rich 
1 07Canton Delta.
In contrast to these self-styled protectors of the party 
who were prepared to engineer the downfall of the Canton 
Government, the latter was saved - to a very large extent - by 
the first appearance of two 'People's Armies', which probably 
confirmed the worst fears of the anti-communists. They were the 
volunteers organized by Tan P'ing-shan into the workers self- 
defence corps and the peasants self-defence corps. They marched 
into Canton and put themselves at the disposal of Sun's
108government even though Sun was about to give up Canton. These
two People's Armies made significant contributions to the
1 07 See, for example, Adrian Chan's 'A Sceptical Eye on the 
Peasant Movement in Shun-te' in Papers on Far Eastern History,
No.8 (Sept. 1973), pp.37-48.
I 0 8 See Ke-ming wen-hsien X, pp.44-45 in which Sun disclosed his 
desire to give up Canton to Chiang Kai-shek.
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1 09eventual rapid collapse of the merchants revolt.
If the Chinese communists had harboured any hope that Sun,
after this event, would realize who his supporters were or that
he might then genuinely embark on his proclaimed national
revolution of anti-imperialist and anti-warlord campaigns, then
they would be sorely disappointed. With the timely change of
allegiance of the Christian General, Feng Yu-hsiang, the Chihli
Clique of Tsao and Wu was defeated and Sun rekindled his hope
of getting his wishes through negotiation what he had hitherto
failed to get in the battle fields. He went to Peking hoping to
negotiate with the victorious warlords for a national unity. He
left Canton on the 13th November telling the people he was on a
mission to promote the power of the people, by first promoting
the power of the military to combine with the people then,
somehow, would lead to the transition from military power to
power of the people. By people, Sun had meant his group and
himself who had, somehow and unexplained except by the adoption
of the name 'National' come to be the self-appointed
1 1 0representatives and spokesmen of the people.
When he got to Shanghai, he reiterated his desire for a 
national assembly and the abolition of the unequal treaties.
Then, he continued his way to Peking via Japan. In his stopover
See Lo Chia-lun, Op.cit., p.694; and Ho Yang-ling, Nung-min 
yun-tung (The Peasant Movement, a source book) ch. VIII(Nanking, 
School of Party - KMT - Affairs, March 1928, 2 vols.) Both are 
impeccably anti-CCP sources.
See Sun's 'Manifesto on Going to Peking', in Kuo-min- tang 
chung-yao hsuan-yen hsun-ling chi (Collection of the Important 
KMT Manifestos and Orders), pp.22-26.
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in Kobe, he informed his audience that he was an advocate of 
Sino-Japanese amity and wished to build a programme of peace and
development on the foundation of Pan-Asianism which, of course,
1 1 1would have Sino-Japanese amity as its basis. At the same
time, Sun repeated his desire to abolish the unequal treaties. 
Little wonder, then, that the ruling junta was unhappy to see 
Sun. Instead, Chang and Feng agreed to recall Tuan Ch'i-jui, 
made him the Provisional Executive, and had him declare that the 
junta would respect all the existing treaties and commitments 
with foreign Powers.
Meanwhile, the Chinese communists, having observed the clay 
feet of the Nationalist Generalissimo, felt that they had to 
make their position clear. It is worth recalling that at their 
3rd Party Congress in June-July 1923 the Chinese communists 
publicly.announced in' the Congress Manifesto that they would try 
to dissuade the KMT from a position of total reliance on military 
means and to urge their collaborators not to neglect the people 
but to make political propaganda amongst the people. Now their 
worst fears seemed to be materializing before their very eyes.
However, for tactical reasons, the communists did not attack 
Sun. After all, they had helped to build his image as the leader 
of a popular national revolutionary movement and if they were to 
attack Sun so soon after the commencement of collaboration they
111 ’Pan-Asianism', a speech Sun made in Kobe on the 28th Nov. 
1924, in Sun Chungshan hsien-sheng yen-shuo ch’iian-chi (Collected 
Speechs of Mr.Sun), pp.9-18*
1 1 2 See 'The Establishment of the Peking Provisional Government', 
in Tung-fang tsa-chih XXI, 23, pp.1-4 (10-X-1924).
they would be inviting doubt on their judgment, if nothing else.
Therefore, they warned Sun against listening to his bad advisors
as well as urging him to take note of the unfaithfulness of some
members of the KMT. So, shortly before Sun left for his trip,
the CCP propagandists launched a concerted attack on the
imperialists and their stooges, the warlords.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu took the lead in proclaiming that any
reliance on Tuan for a real peace would be doomed to
disappointment. If a peaceful situation was to be the desired
goal, Ch'en warned that it would not come through campaigns
against one warlord or another, 'but only by the complete
1 1 3sweeping away of all imperialism and warlords.' Ts'ai Ho-sen
identified Sun Fo as a member of the KMT Rightwing and denounced 
all warlords including Tuan and Feng, while at the same time, 
wished Sun a successful peace conference - 'an anti-imperialist, 
anti-warlords, and anti-Rightwing peace conference ... [which 
would] ... represent the interests of the four hundred million
1 1 4revolutionary people'.
P'eng Shu-chih concurred with his two comrades. But he 
also warned the workers and peasants and their organizations 
not to be deceived into thinking that their liberation is at 
hand. He warned them against putting their trust in 'traitors'
Ch'en, 'Pei-ching cheng-pien yu Chung-kuo jen-min' (The 
Peking coup d'etat and the Chinese people), Hsiang Tao No.89 
(29-X-1924), p.733. This is the front page article of the issue.
1 14 1 ^ ai had two articles in this issue. They had similar 
sentiments, but the article cited was the 'Pei—ching cheng—pien 
yu Kuo-min-tang' (The Peking coup d'etat and the KMT), Ibid, 
pp.736-737.
like Tuan or Feng. He regarded the latter as having sold out. 
to the Japanese and European imperialists and urged the workers
and peasants to rise up and be awakened to their task - of
1 1 5greater struggles in the national revolution. Unlike his
comrades who called for the cleansing of the KMT, P'eng appealed
1 1 {)to the ’oppressed masses’ to intensify their class struggle.
However, in view of Sun's determination to talk to the
northern warlords the Chinese communists were reluctant to break
with Sun, so they took a slightly different tack. After all,
since the conference in Peking was styled as a peace conference
and the nation was weary of war, the communists found it
difficult to oppose a call for peace. But they would not give
up. Ts'ai Ho-sen advised Sun to redouble his anti-warlord
propaganda while urging him to demand political freedom from
117the Peking junta* Ch'en warned that the only thorough
resolution to the recurring troubles from the imperialists and 
the warlords was a prolonged insurrection by the revolutionary 
masses, although as a temporary tactic, there might be a case 
for making use of one group of warlords against the most 
reactionary warlords. But, 'the party of the national
1 1 5  • • /P'eng Shu-chih, 'Pei-ching cheng-pien yu tbu-chi wu-ch'ih
ti kung-t’uan chih ch’ing-ch' iu' (The Peking coup d'etat and the 
shameless and opportunistic requests of the 'public groups') 
Hsiang Tao, No.89, pp-737“9 (29-X-1924).
Ch'en called for a cleansing in the same issue, p.739, 'Su
chfing nei-pu' (Cleanse the interior).
Ts'ai, 'Huan-ying Sun Chungshan hsien-sheng li Yueh lai liu * 
(Welcome Mr. Sun's departure from Kwangtung and his arrival at 
Shanghai) Hsiang Tao, No.91, p.757 ( 12-XI-1924) .
revolution' must make clear to the people its political programme
and to expose utterly the schemes of the imperialists and
warlords. He conceded that maintaining political power was
not a bad thing during the present situation otherwise,
mentioning recent events in Canton, the counter-revolutionaries
would be able to oppress the people even more. But, a
revolutionary party must not compromise and turn its back on the
118revolution solely in order to stay in power.
The tactics of the CCP, then, was to voice their approval 
for Sun to go north and at the same time openly urge him to 
denounce, rather than to make compromises with, the very people 
he was to talk to in Peking. The Peking victors, Chang, Tuan 
and Feng, were described as totally devoid of principles, 
opportunistic and self-seeking agents of imperialists, and 
the junta was merely a temporary alliance drawn together in 
order that they might defeat opposing groups of warlords. Ts'ai 
Ho-sen warned the people that they must be prepared to embark 
on the road to revolution because if they waited for the 
warlords to improve the conditions of China it would be a forlorn 
dream.  ^^
On the eve of Sun's Pan-Asianism speech in Kobe, the CCP
Ch'en, 'Kuo-min-tang ti cheng-cbih ta i-t}1 * (The Political 
Attitudes of the KMT) Hsiang Tao No.91 )12-X-1924), p.758.
119 Ts'ai Ho-sen, 'Tuan. Feng, Chang san p*ai ch'un-fa an-tou 
chih pei-fang cheng-chli * (The Secret Struggles of the Tuang- 
Chang-Feng warlord factions in the political situation of the 
North), Hsiang Tao No.91, pp.758-761 (12-X-1924).
issued a proclamation on the political situation in China. 120
It warned that the various warlord conflicts really meant that 
no one imperialist power had complete control over China but 
all were still struggling to increase their influence, using 
the warlords as their agents. The CCP announced that it would 
support the formation of a national assembly if it was truly 
national and representing the people^and not militarists, of 
China; and that the CCP would support Sun's attempt to negotiate 
for a national government provided this government so negotiated 
would be merely a temporary one and pledged to the total 
opposition of imperialism, whether Japanese, British, or 
American. They also wanted this new government to be totally 
opposed to the militarists but would support the ordinary 
people to participate in politics. This latter prescription 
was to include 'the arming of the Peasant Associations' self- 
defence forces.'
In truth, the Chinese communists had lost faith in the
ability of the non-worker-peasant classes to remain faithful
to the ideals of the national revolution. Thus, while Sun was
trying to negotiate with Tuan and finding himself having to
121retreat from his original position the CCP made their 
position abundantly clear by publishing a special National
" See Hsiang Tao No.92, pp.765-767 (19-XI-1924). Its full 
title was ’Chung-kuo Kung-chan-1ang tui yu shih-chti chih chu- 
chang* 1 (The Attitudes of the CCP on the Present situation).
1 2 1 See Tung-fang tsa-chih XXI, No.23 (10-XII-1924), pp.1-4. 
Tuan, after deciding to respect all foreign commitments, 
announced that he would convene a Reconstruction Conference 
and not Sun's National Assembly.
Revolution Edition of the HCN Quarterly with Ch'en and P'enp
each contributing a significant statement. The significance 
of these statements went beyond the dispute between the 
collaborating parties of the national revolution but in the 
development of the Chinese communist’s conception of the
national revolution.
The issue opened with an article by P ’eng significantly
titled: 'Who is the Leader of the Chinese National
1 22Revolution?' He admitted that the national revolution
involved many classes, the working class, the capitalists, the 
peasants, the handicraft workers, the petty bourgeoisie, the 
toilers of all types, and even the lumpen proletariat but
in view of the situation in the world and 
the tendencies of the various social classes 
in China, only the Chinese working class 
deserves to be the leaders of the Chinese 
national revolution, only they can be the 
1eaders. ' ^  ^
To P'eng, the proletariat should lead the petty bourgeoisie
and other classes within the ranks of the national revolution
to struggle against the compradors, the feudal warlords and the
imperialists, 'otherwise, the national revolution will be 
1 24aborted.' He still distinguished between the 'national
revolution' and the 'proletariat revolution' which should follow 
the former but he was no longer urging the KMT to awaken to
1 22 P^ng, 'Shui shih Chung-kuo kuo-min ke-ming chihling-tao ehe', 
HCN Quarterly No.4 (20-XII-1924), pp.1-14 or pp.455-469 in the 
overall pagination.
1 23 
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Ibid., 
Ibid.,
pp.13-14. 
p. 14.
their historic duties as the leaders of the national revolution
- as the Manifesto of the 3rd Congress of the CCP had done.
If P'eng Shu-chih had deviated from the CCP policy of
mid-1 9 2 3 » then he did so with the complete agreement of his
leader, Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The latter followed P'eng's discussion
with a magisterial survey of the national movement of the past
12 3twenty-seven years and came to the same conclusion as P'eng.
He took the view that the national movement (kuo-min yun-tung) 
in China came about as a reaction to the defeat by Japan in 
1 8 9 5 * To Ch’en, a national movement was one in which ’the 
masses were involved, unlike the 'Constitutional Defence' 
movement which was really a conflict of northern and southern 
militarists. The latter movement not only had no participation 
from the masses but also had absolutely no significance in the
relationship between the people (min-1su) and the foreign
, 1 26powers.'
Xn that twenty-seven-year period, he recognized four 
different national movements, viz, the 1 898 Reform Movement, 
the Boxers Incident, the Revolution, and the May 4th
Movement. However, they all ended in failure because the masses 
were not properly organized and the leadership did not understand 
the nature of the development of the social classes. Basically, 
Ch’en conceded, in all four cases, too much reliance was placed
12 5 ; "C h ’en, 'Erh-shih-chi nien i lai kuo-min yun-tung chung so
te ch iao-hsI5r * (Lessons from the National Movements of the past 
27 years), HCN Quarterly No.4, p p .15-22 (20-XII-1924).
1 2 ö Ibid., p .15. The 'Constitution Defence' movement was the 
Canton National Military Government founded by Sun and others 
on the IO-IX-1 9 1 7 .
on the petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals and that was a
basic contributing factor for their eventual failure. Since
the May 4th Movement, however, with the development of urban
industries in China and the international revolutionary tides,
the Chinese revolution developed into a new direction. ’This
new direction was the enabling of the most revolutionary
proletariat class to join the revolution, and the beginning of
127this class to demonstrate their social strength.’
Then, reviewing the past twenty-odd years - over which he 
was actively involved in the national movements - the former 
professor saw this lesson:
Of the various classes in society, only 
the last one - the proletariat - is the 
most uncompromisingly revolutionary class 
as well as being the natural enemy of 
international capitalism and imperialism.
They are not only the main force in the 
social revolution of the imperialist- 
capitalist nations, even in the national 
revolution of those nations oppressed by 
capitalism-imperialism they are the 
’governors' of the war. They govern and 
encourage all the friendly troops which 
have compromising tendencies - the peasants, 
handicraft workers, the revolutionary 
intellectuals, the lumpen proletariat (the 
soldiers and bandits) and the petty merchants - 
and urge and direct them to attack, 
uncompromisingly, the imperialists and their
Ibid., p .19•1 27 
1 28 Ibid., p .22
running dogs - the nation’s militarists, 
bureaucrats, wealthy merchants, corrupt 
gentry, big landlords, and the anti­
revolutionary intellectuals. Only through 
this way can the national revolution 
achieve its true goal - national liberation.
Thus, over the past twenty months or so, the position and
role of the working class in the national revolution - as
perceived by the Chinese communists - had developed from that
of the 'important element ... the most willing and strongest
fighter for true democracy ... [and] ... the bravest vanguard'
1 2Qin 1923 to become the only class capable of leading and
directing the battles against the enemies of the national 
revolution. Indeed, as P 'eng saw the lessons of recent events, 
'only the workers and peasants are true revolutionaries ... 
only they can shoulder the great task of the Chinese national 
revolution. ' ^
This new state of affairs came about because the Rightwing
1 3 1of the KMT had become reactionary and counter-revolutionary.
Its Leftwing, while 'undoubtedly wishing to oppose the Peiyang 
warlords - those servants of the imperialists - and imperialism, 
... still have not quite understood [the realities of the social
129 . . .See Ch'en 'Tsen yang ta tao ch'un-J'a' (How to Overthrow the
Warlords) Hsiang Tao No.21 ( 1 8-IV-1923) •
1 30 P ’eng, 'Kwangtung shang-tuan shih-pien ch ih ken-pen vuan-yin 
chi ch^ . tui Chung-kuo kuo-min ke-ming shang chi so yu chihchiao- 
hslin (The Basic reasons for the Merchants Revolt and the lessons 
for the Chinese national revolution) Hsiang Tao No.88 (22-X-1924) 
P.729.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Hsiang Tao No.87, p»7l6 (15-X-1924); P'eng,
Op.cit., p.728.
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situation], and had not sided firmly with the common working;
p e o p l e . ’ Even those who understood might not always find the
1 32courage to act upon their convictions.
Thus by the end of 1924, the CCP with a membership of about 
930, came to the conclusion that their collaborator in the 
national revolution, the KMT, had now split into three factions, 
Right, Centre, and Left. The Rightwing had demonstrated itself 
to be reactionary and counter-revolutionary. The Centre was
1 33uncertain and opportunistic, while the Left might know what
was right they often lacked the courage of their convictions. 
Thus, it was left to the CCP, the Leftwing of the national 
revolution coalition - not the Left of the KMT as Borodin had 
suggested - to lead the forces in the national revolution and 
to set its direction.
At the same time, however, as Ch*en had pointed out, even 
during the process of the revolution, the revolutionary forces 
needed 'political power', or a revolutionary base. Ch'en being 
a practical man of politics, realized that with such a small 
party it would not be a practicable proposition to establish 
their own political power or revolutionary base. Thus, some 
type of arrangement that would be less than the ideal would have 
to be made. As his own life had demonstrated, he was quite
Wei Chin, 'Kwangtung cheng-fu yu kuo-min k e - m i n g ' (The 
Kwangtung Government and the National Revolution) HCN Quarterly 
No . 4 (20-XII-1924), p . 29.
1 O O
Ch'en, Ts^i, and P 'eng were of the same view in Hsiang Tao 
N o .83 (1-X-1924) which evoked a retort from the KMT and followed 
by a rejoinder from the CCP. See Hsiang Tao N o . 92, pp.769-772 
( 19-XI-1924).
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prepared to make strategic compromises, provided there were no 
compromises of principle or the ideal. Once again, faced with 
a collaborator that was showing a penchant lor liaisons with 
warlords and to compromise, Ch'en could not but issue stern 
warnings to his collaborators while trying to devise new
1 34strategies appropriate to the new situation. The CCP must
now come lorward to lead.
Under such new political conditions, a re-assessment was
in order and the 4th CCP Congress was convened in Shanghai in 
1 35January 1925* In its Manifesto, it urged the people to
demand a truly national assembly to give expression and 
representation to the masses and to oppose resolutely the 
victorious warlords in Peking. It also urged the people to stop 
the warlord-sponsored Reconstruction Conference. But, while the 
CCP urged the masses to get organized and demand a national 
assembly - kuo-min hui-i - it stopped short at making an open 
support for the KMT demanded national assembly. Reference to 
the KMT, unlike the 3^d CCP Congress Manifesto, was noted for 
its absence. While Sun was waiting on his death-bed hoping 
Tuan Ch'i-jui and Feng Yu-hsiang, with whom Sun had a 
Quadrilateral Alliance, would agree to negotiate for some sort 
of national conference, the CCP denounced those warlords as the
Ch'en 'The Political Attitudes of the KMT' Hsiang Tap No.91, 
p .758 (12-XI-1924) discussed such strategic compromises.
1 35 Twenty delegates attended, representing a membership of 950* 
This meeting, held in Shanghai, was convened in secret because 
of the political condition of the time. The terminal dates of 
the Congress is unknown but the Manifesto was dated the 22 
January 1925» when it was published in the Hsiang Tap No.100,
p p .833-835 (28-1-1925).
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’most reactionary' as well as being stooges of Japanese 
imperialism.
Since they had decided that the KMT had already split into 
three factions, it is to be expected that given their acceptance 
of materialistic dialectics as their world-view and their 
materialistic conception of history, their plan of action would 
be to exploit this contradiction within the ranks of the KMT.
This they resolved to do, and at the same time, re-affirmed the 
position of leadership of the proletariat in the national
•I o/T
revolutionary movement. In short, the coming years should
witness a class struggle within the ranks of the national 
revolution forces, with the Left - the CCP - openly declaring 
that it was their aim to lead the KMT Left and at least some of 
the KMT Centre from the reactionary KMT Right who had cast their 
lot with the enemies of the revolution.
In the meantime, Sun failed to persuade the northern warlords 
to accept his ideas and the national assembly did not
materialize. Tuan's Reconstruction Conference also failed to 
reconstruct the ailing body politic. Sun, having failed to 
respond to medical treatment, died in Peking on 12th March 1925»
In the 3 st years of his career, Sun had been disappointed and 
betrayed by his militarist allies on many occasions. When he 
announced his decision to collaborate with the Soviet Union and 
the CCP, Sun had just been ousted, again, from Canton by 
Governor Ch'en Chiung-ming. Having established the National
1 ^ 6J These were decisions of the 4th Congress. Cited from Huang 
Ch'u-mu, Chung-kuo Kung-chan-tang chien yao li-shih (A Short 
Selected History of the CCP) p p .3^-37 (Peking 1956. Cited from 
4th e d . 1 9 6 2 ).
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Government in Canton with the help of the Russians and in 
collaboration with the CCP, he still seemed impatient to embark 
on his oft-mentioned Northern Expedition. As if impatient of 
the slow process of effecting a mass-based national revolutionary 
movement, Sun never gave up hope of manipulating the uneasy 
alliances of the warlords to his own benefit. The Second Chihli- 
Fengtien war seemed to have been a temptation too great for Sun 
to resist. Unfortunately for him, Sun did not realize or did 
not seem to have realized until too late, that political power 
comes out of the barrel of a gun, especially in warlord politics.
As a practising politician and revolutionary, it is only to 
be expected that Sun’s ideas and operational methods would vary 
according to circumstances, especially when he was not 
intellectually committed to a systematized political philosophy. 
It seems, therefore, that on his death-bed when he could see 
that his life-long effort in manipulating the fluid warlord 
alliances had failed him, Sun turned again and for the last time 
to the Russians and the communists. While historians will have 
no definitive way to decide or divine his true state of mind in 
his last days, Sun did leave behind the best weapon - in the 
form of a message to the Soviet Union - the Chinese communists 
could ever hope to have in their coming struggle with the KMT; 
and, the CCP had been grateful to him ever since.137
^ This ’gift’ was Sun's last message to the USSR. The CCP 
published it in full in the very next issue of the HCN Quarterly 
after his death (No.1, 1925, pp.5^-2). Here, Ch'en Tu-hsiu
published it as Sun's affirmation of his (Ch'en's) own analysis 
of the contemporary situation in an article entitled 'Leninism 
and the People's Movement in China' (Lieh-ning chu-i yii Chung- 
kuo min-tsu yun-tung) . Chang Kuo-i/ao, Op. ci t. , p»39&f recalled 
that Sun's letter 'was drafted jointly by Borodin, Soong Ch'ing- 
ling and Wang Ching-wei and was ... [endorsed] ... and signed by 
Dr. Sun.'
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The CCP had never attacked Sun while he was alive, they 
only claimed that he was poorly advised. But Sun left no 
political heir and no prescribed method of succession. While 
the CCP had no aspiration to gain the leadership of the KMT, 
they had announced their intention of leading the national 
revolution which now had risen to a ’higher* stage involving 
intensive class struggles between the classes in the Chinese 
society in general as well as within the ranks of the comrades 
of the national revolution. It seemed to the CCP leadership
that the national revolution in China had approached the point
I/where the revolutionary process would reach 'the highest state
... [and the proletariat] ... would be able to merge with the
international revolutionary forces and directly achieve 
"1 3 8socialism. It is of interest and import to a discussion of
the development of Chinese communism to note that while the
Chinese communists on behalf of the proletariat would claim
leadership of the national revolution by late 1924, their
Russian comrades were not so forthcoming. As late as December
1926, the Comintern was still of the opinion that ’at this
stage, the leadership of the movement passes more and more into
1 39the hands of the proletariat.' That is, the proletariat were
not yet the leaders.
1 3 8 Cb • 15, ’Tsu min-chu chu-i cbih she-hui chu-i* (From Democrary 
to Socialism) HCN-Q No, 2 (20 XII 1923), p. 100.
1 39 Theses adopted at the 7th Plenum of the ECCI, cited from 
Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East (Stanford U.P. 1957) 
p.358.
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Accordingly, the CCP elevated into the central leadership
comrades with a penchant for class struggle. The CCP also
created the Political Bureau in order to improve the
organizational structure for such an undertaking. Members
elected to the Poliburo were Ch'en, Ts'ai, Ch'u, Chang Kuo-tao
1 40and probably P'eng. Amongst those elected to the Central
Committee, either as full members or as alternate members, were
such activists in the labour movement as Lo Chang-lung, Hsiang
Ying, Wang Ho-po and Teng Chung-hsia. There were also comrades
experienced in collaborationist politics, such as Li Ta-chao
1 41and Tan P'ing-shan. The Poliburo held weekly meetings, at
the Shanghai residence of Voitinsky, to formulate major policies 
while the day to day practical matters were discussed in a newly 
established body known as the Central Work Conference - chung- 
yang kung-tso hui-i. Amongst the regular participants were 
P'eng who was the new chief of the propaganda department, and 
Jen Pi-shih the newly elected secretary of the Communist Youth 
Corps. This body, which began life as the CYC, changed to 
become the Socialist YC and now in 19^5» reverted to its original 
name. Wang I-fei, also known as Wang Jo-fei attended as 
secretary of the Shanghai Regional Committee while Liu Shao-ch’i 
and Li-Li-san attended as members of the Labour Movement 
Committee and Hsiang Ching-yii, wife of Ts'ai, attended as head
See Chang, Kuo-t;ao 'Wo-ti hui-i' (My Recollections) No. 13 in 
Ming Pao (Jan.19^7)» p»88, in which he excluded P'eng but P'eng 
insisted he was a member. See Ross Dowson, 'Chinese 
Revolutionarists in Exile', International Socialist Review 
(Summer 19^3)» P«78 who interviewed P'eng in Paris that year.
Chang, 'Wo-ti-hui-i’ (hereafter known as Hui-i) No.13» P•90, or, his Rise of the CCP, p.4o4.
oP the Women's Movement Committee. Many ol' these newcomers142
to the leadership were alumni of the KUTV, as well as the 
student-worker movement in Western Europe.
With this fusion of the new and the experienced, the CCP 
were able to revitalise the labour movement in accordance with 
the resolutions of the 4th Congress which called for the seizure 
of the proletarian leadership of the revolution, increasing the 
proletarian content in the KMT membership and exploiting the 
internal contradiction within the KMT. As Chang recalled, they 
met to discuss 'how the CCP could unite with the Left Wing of 
the KMT to win over the Centre and oppose the Right W i n g . '
Peasant associations and their development were issues of major
1 43discussions at these meetings.
They centred their attention on the Shanghai area where 
there was a concentration of industrialization and foreign 
industrial investment, especially by the Japanese. The CCP, led
by Chang, Teng, Li and Liu were ably complemented by the CYC,
{•led by Yung Tai-ying, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and their radical students 
from the Shanghai University. Apart from the efforts at 
unionization, they engaged in such Marxian activities as founding 
the Workers' P a r t - t i m e  School, Workers' Association for the
1 44Promotion of Virtue and Workers' Social Clubs. Aided by the
high-handed and repressive actions of the Shanghai authorities
142 
1 43
Chang, 
C h a n g ,
Hui-i, No.13» pp.88-89; Rise of the CCP, 
Rise of the CCP, p.405.
p.4o4.
Jean Chesneaux, Le Mouvement Ouvrier Chinois de 1919-1927 
(Paris, Mouton, 1962"] p . 372; H u  Hua, Chung-kuo ke-ming shih 
chiang-i (Lectures on the History of the Chinese Revolution) 
p . 93 (Peking, Jen-min 1 9 6 2 ).
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and the factory owners, 1925 witnessed a resurgence of labour 
protests and strike actions. While class struggle might have 
been a novel concept, anti-imperialism was an easily understood 
plank on the CCP platform. With the omnipresence of 
international capitalism in the industrialized sector of 
Shanghai, the CCP comrades successfully followed Sun’s last wish 
of anti-imperialism as a way to national liberation.
By May Day, 1925, the CCP were able to convene the Second
National Labour Congress in Canton as well as the First Kwangtung
Provincial Congress of Peasants. The achievements of the Labour
Congress ’laid the organizational groundwork for the May 30th
Movement which immediately followed it.' This Labour Congress
was officially sponsored by the General Union of Railway Workers
in the North which Chang Kuo-t'ao played a large part in its
revival after the February 7th Incident, the General Labour
Union in Central China, the Workers’ Congress of Canton, and the
Seamen's Union of Hong Kong. That is, the CCP was not linked to
the Congress in an official capacity, though 'the Labour
Movement Committee of the CC of the CCP actually made the
145preparations for the Congress.'
This Congress provided an appropriate example of the 
modus operandi of the CCP in the post-4th Congress style of 
national revolution, involving an intensification of class 
struggle. Anti-imperialism was a slogan that needed no 
explanation in China at the time and no one, unless one 
willingly courted the accusation of being unpatriotic, would
145 Chang, The Rise of the CCP, pp.4l4-4l5*
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dare to be against such a slogan. It was the desire to improve 
the sad state which they found in China that led the young 
students and their professors to turn to socialism. Now, as 
members of the CCP, they saw as their duty the awakening of the 
masses to their objective reality and to the struggle to improve 
their lot. The communists, and others, in China had long 
accepted the concept that China was a proletarian nation. Now, 
the communists were to fuse the two concepts as a means to 
introduce the concept of class struggle. As the imperialists 
were to be struggled against, so should their running-dogo - 
the warlords and those who exploited the masses. The exploited 
ones on the other hand struggled not only for their own class 
but for the liberation of China.
This Labour Congress convened with 277 delegates 
representing 165 workers’ organizations with a total of 540,000
1 46members. They met to express their opposition to the
imperialists and their running-dogs. It was so because the 
respective class interests were in conflict and thus would lead 
to the exploitation of the working class 'unless [the exploiters' 
are first overthrown.' There was to be a united front, the 
Congress Manifesto went on, for the workers had to unite with 
the organized 210,000 peasants and the thousands of revolutionary 
soldiers because 'the liberation movement of the embittered and 
toiling masses of China [requires] firstly, the progressive 
proletariat class to lead the great peasant masses; and secondly,
Chang, Rise of the CCP, pp.415“4l6. But Chang thought there 
were 281 delegates. According to the Manifesto of the Congress 
there were 277 delegates, see Chung-kuo ti-erh—tzh chuan kuo 
lao-tung ta-hui chtieh-i-an (Resolutions on the 2nd National Labour 
Congress), p.2 (May 1925, Canton).
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l,o form an alliance with the proletariat classes of the world
1 47to struggle together, in order to obtain final victory.'
The Congress also resolved to organize more unions and
educate the members and masses to realize their common goal,
and to educate the masses so that they would be awakened to
realize the objective conditions of China and of themselves.
Then, after listing the numerous ways of conducting such
propaganda, the resolutions also warned that outside Kwangtung
such activities could well be dangerous and counselled that in
such areas operations should be conducted in a clandestine
manner. For practical measures, the Congress also listed the
nineteen most disreputable exploiters of the Chinese masses.
Amongst them were Feng Tzu-yu, and such notable compradors and
business men as Sir Robert Hotung, Huang Huan-ting and Ma
Chao-chun. Given such an array of enemies, the Congress called
for the formation of armed self-defence brigades by the trade
148unions and similar organizations. In spite of such slogans
and resolutions all were done in the name of 'close co-operation 
between the KMT and the C C P . ,lZ+9
However, their manifest plan to form a united front with 
the peasants and the soldiers was not new. Even a labour 
organizer such as Ten g  Chung-hsia had long accepted the
‘ f.
1 47 
148 
1 49
Manifesto, O p .c i t ., p.2. 
I b i d ., pp.3-5.
Chang, The Rise of the CCP, P-415•
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importance of involving the peasantry in the national 
1 r)0revolution. hy the end of 1 y 23, Teng had aoknowl edged that
even a warlord like Feng Yu-hsiang had realized that the
peasants were struggling against exploitation. And, in view of
the various land-reduction and other peasant movements in
Chekiang, Shansi and in Hai-feng in Kwangtung and the peasants'
eagerness to form themselves into peasant associations, 'the
Chinese peasants have demonstrated they have arrived at the
1 51stage of revolutionary awakening* . Teng found that the
peasants' ability to learn the technique of revolution and their
valour were certainly not inferior to those of the workers.
The holding of the provincial peasant movement congress
at the same time as the labour movement congress testified to
the realization 'that the influence of the revolution had spread
1 52to the remote countryside. ' True to their claims , these
peasant associations were operating under the auspices of the 
Canton Government's Peasant or Rural Department and true to 
their resolves, the rural action comrades agreed with Marx and 
Engels and brought 'to the front, as the leading question ...
1 53the property question.' And, they were met with strong
Teng Chung-hsia, 'Lun nung-min yün-tung' (On the Peasant 
Movement), Chung-kuo ching-nien No. 1 1 ,  pp.2-4 (29-XII-1924).
This was an organ of the Communist Youth Corps. This article 
was from a series by Teng on the three forces in the national 
revolution: workers, peasants, and soldiers; and he described 
them all as main forces - chu li chiin of the national revolution.
1 5 1J Ibid., p.3.
1 52 Chang, The Rise of the CCP, p . 4 2 0 .
153 
P-7 6
Marx & Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, ch.4 
(Peking ed. 1968).
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repressive reaction by the local government and landlords.
Whilst their opponents formed their private militia, the
min-tuan, the peasant associations in turn attempted to form
their own armed self-defence forces. There were frequent
conflicts and this was the cause of much concern to the CCP
1 54and the Rural Department of the Canton Government. The
peasant associations viewed their struggles in terms of class
struggle. And, to their chagrin, the rural comrades found that
all too frequently, the county chiefs - hsien chiang - though
nominally members of the Canton Government and even members of
the KMT, tended to side, or be in league, with the landlords.
This often drove the peasant self-defence forces underground
and the peasant associations as a result, often suffered loss
1 55of property and even lives.
Of course, the peasant movement had been in action for
some considerable time prior to the first provincial congress
in May 1925* By February 1925, it was reported that 'imperialism
and its tools' had perpetrated evil and reactionary
deeds against the peasant associations. These 'tools' included
1 56the 'evil gentry in league with local bandits and soldiers.'
1 54 See Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) No.1, p.13*
The News Section(lJan. 1926) where great concern was shown. 
This was the official organ of the Provincial Rural Department. 
Chang (The Rise of the CCP, pp.472-3) recalls that Borodin was 
against the intensification of class struggle, a position 
opposed by his Chinese comrades.
1 55 Chung-kuo nung-min No.1, News Section.
1 56 'Kwangtung sheng nung-min i-nien lai chih fen-tou pao-kao 
ta-kang' (A Brief Report of Peasant Struggles in the Past Year 
in Kwangtung Province), Chung-kuo nung-min Nos.6-7 (July 1926). 
Hereafter, this Report will be cited as 'Summary'.
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The peasant movement, however, was staffed by well motivated
graduates from the Peasant Movement Training Institute conducted
by the young Mao Tse-tung and others. Thus, in spite of
heightened reaction the Second Provincial Congress of the
Peasant Associations, held in May 1926, was able to report a
threefold increase in membership while the movement had been
able to extend into three times as many counties as they had
1 57the previous year.
Nor had the CCP neglected to put into practice their new
strategy concerning the ’third member' of the three ’main forces
of the national revolution’ - the soldiers. Almost immediately
after the 4th CCP Congress, efforts were made to organize a
Young Servicemen's Club to woo the cadets at the Whampoa
1 58Military Academy. It was a communist-led united front type
of organization and its effect was the consolidation of the 
communist elements in the Academy with the Left-leaning ones.
But the communists did not stop at the Academy. Their 
presence and influence were also prominent in the regular army. 
On 19th September, 1925, when Political Departments were 
formalized in the army, Chou En-lai became the chief of the 
Political Department of the First Army while communists occupied 
four of the five positions in the divisional level of that Army. 
The heads of the Political Departments in the Second, Third, 
Fourth and Sixth Armies were Li Fu-ch'un, Chu K'o-ching, Lo Han
1 57 See 'Nung-min hsieh-hui ch'ing-fang pao-kao' (Report on the 
Affairs of the Peasants Association), Chung-kuo nung-min Nos.
6-7 (July 1926), pp.10-19- Hereafter to be cited as 'Affairs’.
1 5 8 See Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russian in China, pp.35“6.
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and Lin Tsu-han respectively, and all were communists; so was 
the head of the Navy's Political Department, Li Chih-lung. As 
Ch'en Kung-po recalled the situation, when he was the Chief of 
the Political Department of the Military Council of the Canton, 
the heads of the three sections of his Department were all 
communists. Even at the Military Council there were two
1 59Russians in the Political Department acting as advisors.
This was strongly resented by some KMT officers who
responded by forming a Sun Yat-senist Society after the death
of Sun. It seemed that the communists and the Left-KMT had
tried to gain control of this society but were 'squeezed out'.
Consequently, this Society became the focal point of anti-
1 60communist actions within the military. According to Chiang
Kai-shek, the Society was formed to counter the influence of
1 6 1the communist-sponsored League of Military Youth. The latter
was directed by Chou En-lai and Kao Yii-han, a politics instructor 
at the Academy and a communist since his Peita days and was the 
sole CCP member in the Supervisory Committee of the KMT. Through 
their efforts, communists were appointed to the positions of 
political commissars in the various army units. Kao seemed to
1 59 Ch'en Kung-po, Wo yii Kung-chan-tang, pp. 56-57*
Wilbur & How, Op.cit., p.259; being Doc.24, 'Questions and 
Criticisms concerning Stepanov's Report'. This supports Ch'en's 
recollection.
Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, pp.35”6. He recalls that 
the communist Young Servicemen's Club was formed on 25”I“ 1925, 
the Sun-Yat-senist Society was formed on 29”XII— 1925 but no 
exact date was given for the League's formation, only indicating 
that it was sometime earlier.
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have angered Chiang by accusing the latter of lacking in 
revolutionary ardour.
In their intensified efforts towards class struggle and 
in their efforts in intensifying the contradictions within the 
KMT and the three main forces - kung, nung, ping - of the 
national revolution, the Chinese communists were really putting 
into practice their publicly announced theoretical perception 
of the national revolution. In the pages of the HCN Quarterly 
in 1924, the CCP propagandists were making claims to be the 
leaders of the national revolution on the ground that the 
proletariat were the only ones worthy of the leadership class 
of the national revolution. By 1925» the CCP propagandists 
were insisting that their 'weapon' of the national revolution
-1 zT o
was Leninism. Ch'en Tu-hsiu further insisted that 'the
contemporary national movement - min-tsu yun-tung - must ... 
have and appreciate Leninism, an anti-imperialist and
164-international national movement.' He then gave Sun's final
message to the Soviet Union as evidence that the founder of the
Chiang, Chiang Chieh-shik hsien-sheng tsui-chin chih yen-lun 
(Recent speeches by M r . Chiang) p . 1 9 ( Peking, IX- 1926 ) .
^   ^A slogan on p.2 of HCN Quarterly No.1 (22—IV— 1925) which 
read: Our Flag: LeninI Our Weapon: Leninism! Our Task: World­
wide Revolution!
Ch'en, 'Lieh-ning chu-i yii Chung-kuo min-tsu yun-tung' 
(Leninism and the Chinese National Movement) HCN—Q No. 1 ( 1925)
pp.13- 14. The last phrase cited, the original Chinese reads: 
kuo—chi min-tsu yun-tung, and may conceivably be translated into 
'international people's movement.'
KMT had understood the changing requirements of the national 
revolution.
P'eng Shu-chih agreed with his leader. The former
i ^  1^5 explained:
Formerly, there were some doubts as to "Who 
should be responsible for the leadership of 
the Chinese national (min-tsu) revolution?"
But, since the February 7th Struggle, this 
lesson has been completely solved for us by 
objective realities. Only the Chinese 
working class can be responsible for all the 
revolutionary duties - from the national 
revolution to the proletariat revolution.
The February 7th Struggle has proved that 
China's working class (kung-jen) is the only 
vanguard and leader (ling-tao ehe) of the 
Chinese national revolution.
In short, according to P'eng, the revolution in China was still 
a national revolution. But, unlike the Manifesto of the CCP's 
3rd Congress where the communists urged the KMT to wake up to 
their duties as the leaders of the national revolution, now the 
working class led by its class party - the CCP - would not only 
be the vanguard but also assume leadership of the revolution.
Ch'en then explained what had become of the previous class 
of leaders, the capitalist (tzu-chan) class. This had become 
factionalized into the counter-revolutionary Right, the non­
revolutionary ( fei-ke-ming) Centre and 'those with a 
revolutionary tendency ... by chance [_ they have] revolutionary
1J P'eng, 'Erh-chi tou-cheng chih yi-i yü chiaorhsün*(The 
meaning and lessons of the Feb. 7th Struggle) Hsiang Tao No.101
(7-11-1923), pp.842-844.
tendencies but are prone to compromises.' Given such a Low 
opinion of even the Leftist capitalists, Ch'en could not but 
conclude that in China's national revolutionary movement if the
working class did not join the struggle, the movement would
, . , 166 never be vxctorxous.
Ts'ai Ho-sen took the opportunity of the anniversary of 
the February 7th Incident to remind his readers that efforts at 
working out a compromise with the warlords would be doomed. He 
reminded his readers that while Sun was still trying to 
negotiate with Tuan Ch'i-jui in Peking the compradors and the 
warlord, Ch'en Chiung-ming, were attacking Canton. This, Ts'ai 
argued, demonstrated that the workers and peasants were the
-1 zf
real pillars of the national revolution in China. At the
i isame time, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who always tried to demonstrate the 
historical inevitability of his perception of socio-political 
development, explained with considerable theoretical 
sophistication the differences and significance of the February
1 / Q
7th Incident of 1923 and 1925.
Ch'u explained that at one time, the CCP had proposed and 
urged the united action of all democratic elements. But, since
Ch'en, 'Chung-kuo Kuo-min ke-ming yun-tung chung kung-jen ti 
li-liang' (The Power of the Workers in the Chinese national 
revolutionary movement), Hsiang Tao No.101, pp.844-5* ' 7”II_ 1925)•
167 Ts'ai, 'Sun Chung-shan ping hou ti-kuo chu-i yii chun-fa chih 
yin-mou' (The Treachery of the Imperialists and the Warlords 
since Sun's illness), Hsiang Tao N o.101, pp.84l-2.
1 6 8 "  1 .,Ch'u, ' I-chiu-erh-san nien chih erh-chi yii I-chiu-erh-wu nien
chih erh-ch’i' (The 'Feb. 7th' of 1923 and the 'Feb.7th' of 1925),
Hsiang Tao, No.101, pp.845"7 (7-11-1925).
that time, the capitalist class and others had not given due
importance to the strength of the workers and, on the contrary, 
concentrated on military activities. He then accused the 
Rightwing of the national (min-t su) revolutionary movement of 
trying to destroy the unity of the working class by claiming 
that certain workers' representatives were Bolshevik terrorists. 
Therefore, Ch'u explained that 'the Right of the national 
revolutionary movement would certainly use governmental power 
to destroy the workers' movement. This year's February 7^h 
anniversary ... signifies the achievement of class consciousness 
by the workers ... not only will the workers be able to 
guarantee their own independence in class struggle ... but will 
also defend the headquarters of the main force of the national 
revolutionary movement.'
This was a very serious charge and a significant statement. 
The 'Right of the national revolutionary movement', for Ch'u, was 
but another name for the KMT in the context of the united front, 
just as the CCP styled itself as the Leftwing of the National 
Revolution. As has been noted, Borodin had referred to the 
CCP as the Leftwing of the KMT, in his interview with the 
would-be impeachers of the CCP. Now, in Feb. 1925 Ch'ii not only 
found that the proletarian class had arrived at that stage of 
development in which they were ready to conduct independent 
class struggles, but also that the KMT had practically forfeited 
its eligibility to be considered revolutionary. The necessity 
for having the KMT in the national revolutionary movement was 
practically defined out of existence.
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On the other hand, given the trend of development of 
Chinese communism as expressed by these theoreticians, this 
was the only possible conclusion, and even the 'logical' 
conclusion. As the Chinese communists perceived the 
revolutionary situation in China, the party of the proletariat - 
the CCP - entered the ranks of the national revolutionary 
movement because China was suffering from two types of 
exploitation. The nation as a whole was oppressed by inter­
national imperialism and capitalism, hence it was beholden upon 
all who wanted to have an independent China to join the ranks 
of the national revolutionary movement. At the same time, as 
communists, their revolutionary goal was a proletarian China. 
Thus it was beholden upon every communist to struggle against 
every class which would stand in the way of accomplishing this 
goal. Earlier, the Chinese communists were of the opinion, at 
least in their publications, that the proletariat did not have 
the necessary experience in the process of revolutionary 
politics and not enough of the proletarian class were awakened 
to their objective situation. However, as has been noted, the 
Chinese communists had long expressed the conviction that China 
was already a proletarian nation.
Now, the communists felt that these deficiencies in 
experience and consciousness were being alleviated and the 
proletariat was strong enough for independent action. More 
than that, the national revolutionary movement had advanced to 
the stage in which the ranks of the bourgeoisie had developed 
irreconcilable cleavages. Even the Leftwing of the bourgeoisie, 
according to this new communist perception, were wavering as
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was the historic behaviour of such an economic class during 
the transitional stage between the national and socialist 
revolutionary movement. Further, the Chinese communists were 
now interpreting their anti-imperialist struggle in terms of 
class struggle. As they saw their struggle as being part of an 
international revolutionary movement against international 
capitalism and imperialism, the Chinese communists argued that 
in the Chinese theatre the revolutionary activities were between 
the Chinese proletariat and the Japanese and other 
capitalists. ^
That the CCP placed great store on such conceptual
development may be judged by their official publications. Their
weekly, the Hsiang T ao, in its comments on current events had
given its readers ample examples of their new thinking. Now, in
the leading theoretical journal of the party, the HCN Quarterly,
editor Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai expounded in considerable detail the
1 70historical basis for this perception and conception. It is
worth recalling that eighteen months earlier, Ch'ii, in the same
journal, urged the adoption of the Jacobinical revolutionary 
1 7 1methodology. And, barely six months previously, P 'eng
See, for example, Ch'ii's article, 'Ti-kuo chu-i ti yung-pu 
yii Chung-kuo p’ing-min' (The Servant of Imperialism and the 
common people of China) Hsiang Tao No.104, pp.868-870 (28-11- 
1925). This was published under the name Hsiang Lin, one of the 
many pseudonyms of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai.
170 . , ,Ch'ii, 'Sun Chung-shan yii Chung-kuo ke-ming yun-tung' ( Sun
Chung-shan and the Chinese Revolutionary Movement), HCN-Q No.2
(I-VT-1925), pp.1-14. This was the opening article of the issue
and was published under Ch'ii's own name, not a pseudonym.
1 7 1 44Ch'u, 'From Democracy to Socialism' HCN-Q No.2 (20-XII-1924).
•*77
Shu-chih declared in the self-same journal that the proletariat
was the only class worthy and capable of assuming the role of
172leadership in China's national revolution. Now, editor Ch'ii,
in his first official comment in this journal since the death
of Sun agreed with Comrade Peng.
Ch'ii declared that in the last year of Sun, the people's
(min-tsu) revolutionary movement in China began to embark on a
1 7 3new road, which was
truly representative of the proletarian class 
of the Chinese people and truly able to [conduct 
a]thorough revolution.
Furthermore, this new proletarian class would be able to lead 
the 'great masses of peasants and all the common people (p 'ing- 
min) to engage actively in revolutionary struggles against all 
the scholar-gentry class, the comprador class and their 
reactionary powers, and to prevent the capitalists' policies 
of compromise and to overthrow directly imperialism and its 
tools, the warlord class.'
A very significant point in this article by Ch'ii, in the 
context of the Chinese communist's conception of the evolution 
of the national revolution, was the understanding of the term 
the common people, p ' ing-min. Ch'ii argued that Sun had always 
led the 'lower classes in society' - hsia-teng she-hui - even 
before the 19^1 Revolution. This social group had the common 
people as its main support and that the Tung-meng hui was the
pfcng, 'Who are the leaders of China's National Revolution' 
HCN-Q No.4 (20-XII-1924).
Ch'ii 'Sun and the Chinese Revolutionary Movement', p.13*173
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political party representing this lower class, which in turn 
served as the foundation for the Tung-meng hui» ’These so- 
called "lower strata of society", and only these, can shoulder 
the responsibility of the true people’s revolution (min-tsu 
ke-ming).’ ^  ^
C h ’ii further explained that in order to resist the Great
Powers, Imperial China needed ’more than just the p ’ing-min. She
also needed the Manchu aristocracy and the scholar-gentry class
as well as the p ’ing-min class - the so-called Third Estate and
the peasant class. At the early stages of national (min-tsu)
awakening, all these classes shared the common tendency to
17 5resist the foreign Powers’ Unfortunately, Ch'u informed his
readers, according to the historic development of the Chinese 
economy and politics, the various classes would expose their 
own class characteristics even during their opposition to the 
foreign Powers. The different classes would make use of the
•1 --yZ
anti-foreign movement to work for its own class interests. '
Even within the Third Estate, or the Common People or
p *ing-min, there were classes with opposing economic interests.
Before the overthrow of their common enemy - the aristocracy of
the C h ’ing Dynasty and the scholar-gentry class - their
differences were not very apparent and there was no internal
struggle, C h ’u explained. Hence, the Tung-meng hui was able
1 77to encompass many diverse* elements. But, with the
1 74 C h ’u, Ibid., p.5 the beginning of Section III.
175 C h ’u, Ibid., p«5 last paragraph.
1^  C h ’u, Ibid., pp .5-6.
^  C h ’ii, Ibid. , p.7*
revolutionary struggles extended from the political into the 
social sphere such as the attempts to fulfil the slogan 
Equalization of Land Rights, and into anti-imperialistic 
actions, then the warlords, compradors, capitalists, the 
scholar-gentry class would all leave the ranks of the revolution. 
This left the petty bourgeoisie and the masses of the common 
people. Fortunately, at this time, the people’s revolutionary 
movement (min-tsu ke-ming yun-tung) obtained a new army - the 
'revolutionary proletariat who will be the true vanguards of 
the revolution as well as the leading class of the revolutionary 
movement. ' ^
As with his party leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'ii also cited 
Sun's final message to the Soviet Union as proof that the 
Chinese revolutionary movement needed the help and co-operation 
of the Russians. Finally, reviewing the Chinese revolutionary 
movement over the 'past half century* Ch'ii was able to report 
much progress. One of the evidences of progress was the use of 
slogans, (k'ou hao). He felt gratified that the former slogan 
of 'Wealthy Nation and Strong Army' (fu-kuo ch' iang-chiin) had 
been replaced by 'Oppose all forms of Imperialism and Abolish 
the Unequal Treaties'. He also noted progress in revolutionary 
methods, from militarist insurrections to the alliance of the 
workers and peasants, and from a policy of allying with Japan 
to joining hands with the proletariat of the world. In a 
gesture of calculated magnanimity, he claimed that 'This bitter
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178 Ch'ii, Ibid. , pp.8-12. The quotation is on p.12
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and difficult road reflects the life and works of Sun Chung- 
shan.'179
At the very time when this article by Ch'ii was going to 
press, the anti-communist elements of the CCP-KMT united front 
were preparing their counter arguments. The communists’ 
argument, as presented by Ch'ii and others, was based on their 
perception of history. That is, according to their 
understanding of the materialistic conception of history, the 
Chinese communists saw history as Marx and Engels did: 'the
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles' with the proletariat the ultimate victors.
The anti-communists in the ranks of China's national revolution 
denied this. Furthermore, since the Chinese communists based 
much of their argument on their own interpretation of the ideas 
of Sun - trying to demonstrate that Sun was perceiving the 
development of the Chinese revolution in a similar fashion as 
the communists - the anti-communist theoreticians also felt 
obliged to argue that they and not the communists were, the 
true interpreters of the ideas of Sun Yat-sen.
The leading KMT theoretician who led the counter attack 
was Tai Chi-t'ao. He had been a close associate of Sun for a 
long time as well as being an old friend of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. 
Indeed, Tai was a member of the first unit of the CCP in 
Shanghai in 1920. Now in mid-1925 Tai still proclaimed that 
the ultimate goal of the KMT was the same as that of the CCP: 
communism. Citing Sun, Tai said that 'Min-sheng chu-i
179 Ch'ii, Ibid. , p . 1 4
28 1
(People's Livelihood) is socialism arid is also called communism
which is the same as Tai-tung chu-i (the Concept o 1' the Croat
Unity).' Furthermore, Tai agreed with Sun that 'Communism is
the ideal of People's Livelihood, and People's Livelihood is
Communism in Practice.' He went further than Sun by claiming
that both the aim and nature of People's Livelihood and
communism were 'completely the same ... they both want to solve
the same problems ... and both break national boundaries,
1 8 0having the entire world as their objective.'
However, in spite of such similarities, the two concepts,
as Tai saw them, were completely different in both their
1 8 "1philosophic foundation and method of realization. Instead
of the Marxist materialistic conception of history, People's 
Livelihood had its philosophical foundation in the 'traditional 
Chinese ethical and political philosophies' and was concerned 
with matters wider than mere economic issues, but also with 
'education and enjoyment'. While communism was to be realized 
by revolutionary means involving class struggle, Tai claimed 
that to achieve People's Livelihood one would need a national 
revolution. However, the national revolution envisaged by him 
involved 'political reconstruction, using the power of the 
state to achieve the goals. Therefore [People's Livelihood] 
proposes to use revolutionary dictatorship, using the 
revolutionary powers of the various classes to prevent the
-j g  Q
Tai Chi-t'ao, Sun Wen chu-i chih che-hsüeh ti chi-chu (The 
Philosophical Foundation of Sun Wenism), p .18 (Shanghai VIII- 
1925)« This was first drafted in Canton in May and completed 
in June of 1925 in Shanghai.
181 Tai, Ibid., pp.18-19.
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expansion of the power of [any individual] class but to expand 
the powers of the state to build a common economic social 
system and thus gradually eliminate classes.' He then 
introduced a term that now has come to be associated with his 
former secretary, Mao Tse-tung. Tai claimed that China 'is 
really like a sheet of white paper' and Sun would write on it 
his Three Principles. This task of fulfilling this 
revolutionary programme would belong to the party once led by
1 82Sun, else imperialism would be able to leave its marks on it.
He saw that the forces confronting each other in China 
today were not that between opposing classes. 'In China, the 
opposing revolutionary forces and the anti-revolutionary forces 
are the awakened and the unawakened. Therefore, what we have
-I Q  <">
to do is to awaken the entire people and not just one class'. 
Indeed, according to his scheme of things, once 'the ruling 
class is awakened, they will join the national revolution and 
fight for the interests of the ruled; the capitalist class will 
fight for the interests of the working class; the landlord 
class will fight for the interests of the peasant class.' To 
the unbelievers, Tai pointed to Prince Peter Kropotkin of Russia 
as an example of what an awakened person would do in 
transcending class interests 2 ^
1 82 
1 83 
184
Tai, 
Tai,
Ibid., 
Ibid.,
p . 23 •
p . 4i.
Tai, Ibid., pp.44-45
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Since Tai regarded Sun and the latter’s ideas were truly
Chinese and that they represented the ’resurrection of Chinese
ethics and culture' - that 'orthodox ideas and ideals of Yao,
1 85Shun, Confucius and Mencius' - he could not but have
contempt for Marxist revolutionary ideas of class struggle and
the Chinese Marxists. As expected, Tai saw the role of the CCP
in the KMT-led national revolution as parasitic, and the members
of the CCP and the SYC/CYC were either misguided zealots or
hypocrits. He was particularly angered by the manipulations of 
1 86Ch'en Tu-hsiu and what Tai regarded as the lack of moral 
rectitude in Tan P ’ing-shan for the latter's efforts in making 
troubles within the KMT while holding a senior position in
it.1 87 The CCP organ, Hsiang Tao, also came in for special
188 /criticism for rumour-mongering. Tai's anger was not
unjustified for the CCP writers had never been slow in 
publicising their aim in effecting a class struggle within the 
KMT and, as had been demonstrated, had even attacked the very 
fidelity of the KMT comrades towards Sun and the national 
revolution.
Since Tai had challenged the validity and necessity of the 
CCP's conception of the national revolution and openly called
1 85 
1 86
Tai, Ibid., p.43»
Tai, Kuo-min ke-ming yii Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang (The National 
Revolution and the Chinese KMT) p.51• (Sept.1925 Shanghai).
This pamphlet was a continuation of the earlier one and was a 
direct challenge to the CCP's concept of the national revolution, 
It was an influential pamphlet and noted by the CCP.
1 87
188
Tai, Ibid., p.65» 
Ibid., p .65•
2 84
into question the integrity of the CCP leadership, the Chinese
communists had no other option but to face the challenges
squarely. Ch'en, in an open letter to Tai, insisted that Tai
and his like-minded comrades had a basic theoretical mistake:
that the latter group ’only see the need for a racial (m i n - t s u )
1 8Qstruggle but failed to see the need for a class struggle.’
He reiterated the communists' perception of the anti-imperialist 
struggle as not merely a struggle between the Chinese people 
and the people of any country, or countries, which had exploited 
China, but a struggle between the exploited people of China and 
the exploiting class from the foreign Powers as well as within 
China's borders.
Then, apart from warning Tai that such a way to misinterpret 
Sun would only be welcomed by the reactionary forces, Ch'en 
made a brilliant riposte which amply demonstrated his 
professorial linguistic and debating skills. He denied the 
allegation that the communists were luring away KMT members by 
arguing that since 1924, the number of KMT members joining the 
CCP was tiny compared with the number of communists joining the 
KMT. Touche!
Ch'en's view was shared by the other leading members of 
the CCP. Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai concentrated his counter attack on 
the theoretical side. In the same issue he claimed that recent 
experiences such as the May 30th incident and the publications 
by Tai had demonstrated two things. Firstly, they indicated
^  Ch'en, *Chi Tai Chi-tao ti i-feng hsin' (A Letter to Tai 
C h i - t a o ), Hsiang Tao N o s . 129-130 (11, 18-IX-1925), p p . 1186-119 0 ,
1196-7 .
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that the capitalist class had betrayed the interests of the
people, min-tsu, thus forcing the working class to unite with
the revolutionary masses to resist the renegades. 'This is the
class struggle of the Chinese proletarian class in the political
sphere. From one perspective, the working class is struggling
for their class interests; from another perspective, the
proletariat is also struggling in the national (min-tsu)
liberation movement.' The second lesson learnt was that 'the
nature of the people's liberation movement (min-tsu chieh-fang
vun -tung) in the national revolution is the struggle between
the exploited and oppressed classes in China and the imperialist
class. At the same time, within the people's liberation
movement, there is bound to be class struggles between the
proletarian class and the capitalist class, and, realistically,
1 90this cannot be avoided.'
Lo I-nung counselled against reliance on the military and 
claimed that four-fifths of the troops in Kwangtung were anti­
revolutionary and the remaining fifth was untrustworthy, and he
191urged the re-organization of the military. P 'eng Shu-chih
thought that for the Chinese people to be liberated from
 ^ Ch'u ' Wu-sa yun-tung chung chib kuo-min ke-ming yli, chieh-cbi 
tou-cheng' (The National Revolution and Class Struggle in the 
May 30th Movement), Hsiang Tao No.129, pp.1183-1 186 (11-IX-1925 ) • 
Quotations from p .118 5 • Ch'u used the phrase: 'kuo-min ke-ming 
chung ti min-tsu chieh-fang yün-tung'. Since he implied that 
the min-tsu liberation movement was within the national 
revolution, I am constrained to use the term 'people's liberation 
movement', if only for the lack of a better term.
1 Q 1 Lo, 'Liao Chung-l/ai pei-tzli ch/ien-hou ti Kwangchow cheng-chtt* 
(The Political Situation in Canton Before and After the 
Assassination of Liao Chung-kai), Hsiang Tao No.130, pp.1192- 
1196. (18-IX-1925)• Quotation from p.1193*
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imperialism and its tools and for the national revolution to be
successful, the only way would be for the Chinese workers to
stand up for the struggle and 'to lead' the struggle. He urged
the Shanghai workers to realize their potential and understand
their position and duties in the national revolution in China
and the Chinese proletarian revolution. He informed them that
they were the 'workers of Petrograd' and should, therefore,
model themselves after the Petrograd workers and be ready for
1 Q2their final task in the Chinese proletarian revolution.
Against this background of such an irreconcilable 
ideological confrontation, the CCP called an enlarged plenary 
session of the Central Committee which met in October, 1925 in 
Peking. It resolved to continue the efforts at conducting class 
struggles within the ranks of the KMT by opposing the KMT Right- 
wing and uniting with its Left-wing. At the same time, the 
Enlarged Plenum resolved to 'expand and strengthen our Party 
everywhere, especially where the KMT's influence exists. Our 
Party should actively enter the political arena and carry out 
our ideological strategy and struggle everywhere.' It then put 
forward certain 'concrete terms' as guides to future action 
within the national revolution. The party members were enjoined 
to expand their political propaganda and organization independent 
of the KMT, especially in Kwangtung, and at the same time, should 
try to win over to the CCP the allegiance of the workers and
1 92 P'eng, 'Shanghai tsung-kung-hui pei feng yii Shanghai kung- 
jen chin hou ti tse-jen' (The Closure of the Shanghai General 
Union and the Future Duties of the Shanghai Workers) Hsiang Tao 
No.132, pp.1207-8 (5-X-1925); quotation cited from p.1208.
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peasants. However, the comrades were instructed 'not to join
the KMT nor engage in its work, particularly the work in
higher-level of the Party machinery, with the exception of
Party headquarters which are absolutely under our influence.'
Furthermore, though there would still be co-operation in places
where the KMT had influence, such as in Kwangtung, the Chinese
communists were told that they 'must not yield one inch of
ground to the KMT in terms of the theory and practice of class
struggle in all movements.' Finally, the comrades were informed
that instead of seeing the KMT as having a Left, Centre, and
Right, they should correct their perception for there were
really only two factions, viz, the Left and the Right;
unfortunately, 'at the moment, ... the so-called Left is merely
talk' while the former Right had become reactionary and the
1 93former Centre, the new Right.
Thus, apart from the re-defining of the factions within 
the KMT, the general conception of the nature of the national 
revolution and the role of the CCP in it at this Enlarged 
Plenum were really a re-affirmation of the ideas expressed by 
the leading CCP propagandists during the months prior to the 
plenum. Now, instead of individual comments, the ideas hitherto 
expressed by individuals in the numerous articles in the Hsiang
1 9 3 'Resolutions on Relations between the Chinese Communist 
Party and the KMT'. An English translation, which is followed 
here, can be found in Wilbur and How, Op.cit., pp.234-236, being 
Document 20.
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Tao and the HCN Quarterly had become officially sanctioned
1 94ideological positions.
1 94 Ch'en Tu-hsiu claimed, in his Letter to all Comrades of 
the Party, written on the 10th XII 1929» that he had wanted to 
take the CCP from the United Front but, in the face of opposition 
from the Comintern representative, as well as 'lacking in 
resoluteness, I did not insist on my proposal'. But, judging 
from the sentiments in his writing before the Plenum and 
comparing them with the resolutions of the Plenum, one is 
constrained to feel that if Ch'en had real disagreement with the Comintern representative, then this disagreement had intensified 
with the passing of years and in the recalling of them. An 
English translation of Ch,en,s Letter may be found in
Chinese Studies in History III, No.3 (1970, USA), pp.224-247»
CHAPTER 5
The Peasantry
As mentioned earlier, both Li Ta-chao and Feng Tzu-yu 
had found it necessary to proclaim on New Years Day 1920 that 
China was a proletariat! nation. That being the case, these two 
revolutionaries argued, China should adopt the Leninist 
revolutionary method of forming a front of the workers, peasants 
and soldiers - the proletariat! classes of China. To them as 
well as many of their readers, there was nothing incongruous 
in those proclamations a China was undeniably poor and a great 
proportion of her population were, for all practical purposes, 
without property. Furthermore, in the Chinese context, the 
three sections within this proletarian group - nung (peasants), 
kung; (workers) and ping (soldiers) - were really three sections 
of the same social group. It was, as observed by our two 
revolutionaries, the inability to maintain a subsistence living 
in the villages that forced the unpropertied to seek a 
livelihood in the cities or to join, or be conscripted into, 
the armies of the warlords. The two writers, and their readers, 
would have little trouble in seeing the peasantry as a matter 
of great concern in the revolutionary movement in China, though 
the exact nature of this concern might, and did, differ.
The first major discussion of rural policies by the
1Chinese communists was in the journal The Communist. The
'I Chiang Ch?un, 'She-hui ke—ming ti shang-chio* (On the Methods 
to bring about a Social Revolution), The Communist No. 2, 
pp.2-9 (7-XII-1920).
author, after citing the Marxian slogan that 'All past history
is history of class struggle', went on and expanded the slogan 
into his theoretical framework for a revolution. He explained 
that:
the foundation of social structure is built 
on human activities - the production of goods 
and their distribution ... The causes of 
revolutions are from these and not invented 
by human intellect nor abstract theorizing.
In short, revolution is not the revolt of 
philosophic research but from the realities 
of socio-economic conditions and changes.
The realities in Chinese society he saw was one of class 
exploitation and struggle. After setting the Marxist framework 
with the appropriate quotation from The Communist Manifesto and 
an explanation in Marxist terms, he skilfully applied the theory 
into the concrete situation of China. Indeed, he did so quite 
creatively. He again commenced with an appropriate quotation, 
this time, a Chinese proverb:
Fu-che tien lien chien mo, pun-che tu mo 
li chi
An approximate translation of it would be: The fields of the
rich stretch from the towns to the distant lanes, while the 
poor do not have enough land for even the point of an awl to 
stand on. This, the writer argued, was ’indicative of China 
having two classes, the extremely rich and the extremely p o o r . ' 
The two classes, traditionally, meant the 'landlords and the
t enant s .
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He considered China to be in the midst, of her own 
industrial revolution, but with some distinctive features 
compared to the industrialization processes in Europe, the USA 
or Japan. Though China was not as prosperous as these other 
lands, her proletariat were actually suffering more intensely 
than the counterparts in the other lands because of the very 
special type of capitalist class found in China. Arguing in 
the Leninist fashion, he saw the capitalist class in China as 
an 'international capitalist class, that is, a confrontation 
between the Chinese working class and the international 
capitalist class.' From this not unexceptional analysis of 
the industrial economy, he extended his theme into the rural 
sector, thus:
In China, the landlords and the tenants are 
the two opposing classes. This has been in 
existence for a long time. Now, under the 
influence of the industrial revolution, the 
two classes come to be the capital and 
labour classes. ... with the increasing 
poverty of the proletariat matching the 
increasing wealth of the propertied class, 
the opportunity for a social revolution has 
arrived.
In short, this Chinese communist was giving witness to the 
observation of Mr. Sundus, the British Consul in Anhwei province 
in 1905.2
Decennial Report, 1902-11, pp.282-3. In his report, the Consul 
observed that 'the great bulk of the rice land is not the 
property of peasant proprietors or village communes but belongs 
to some half-dozen powerful families [which ] have ramifications 
throughout the Empire'. Not only that, but these landlords 
'have manufacturing and financial interests' in the urban 
centres. In short, the landlords, manufacturers, and financiers 
were seen by this foreign observer as the one capitalist class.
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That other ^roup of important members i n the <I rama < is
personae of the development of Chinese communism, the worker-
student group in France, upon observing China from distant and
industrialized Western Europe, concurred with Li and Feng.
Their views were given eloquent expression by the pen of Ts'ai 
3Ho-sen. Furthermore, Party Leader Ch1en Tu-hsiu agreed with 
his young admirer and counselled the young man not to regard
4Marxism as a 'completely mechanistic philosophy'.
Ts'ai argued that the peasants of the non-industrialized 
nations and the proletariat of the industrialized nations were 
suffering the exploitation? of international capitalism, and 
hence, giving rise to a need for a social revolution. China 
was in such a situation, therefore a social revolution was 
called for. In his view, of the four hundred millions in China, 
three hundred and fifty millions were in dire poverty. They 
could either fight their own way out of such a situation or 
allow China's economic masters, the five Great Powers, to decide 
their fate. He therefore saw that a social revolution was 
unavoidable. What was needed was for the awakened members of 
the proletariat class to awaken fellow-members of the same 
class. This, Ts'ai argued, was the Marxist way of having a 
social revolution. 'The capitalists of the foreign nations
O Ts'ai, 'Ma-ke-ssi hsiieh— shuo y(i Chung-kuo wu-crfan cbieh-chit 
(Marxist Teaching and the Chinese Proletariat Class), HCN IX 
No.4 (1-VIII-1921) 'Correspondence Section', pp.4-9» The letter 
was written on the 11 Feb. 1921.
4 Ch'en, his reply to Ts'ai, Ibid., pp.9“ 10.
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are the masters of the proletariat in China. Therefore, to say
that class struggle in China merely involved the overwhelming
majority of the workers against the few pitiful local capitalists
is to forget China's international economic condition. To do so
is to forget that the foreign capitalists are already the masters
of China's proletariat. Therefore, I firmly claim that class war
5in China is an international class war.'
Looking at this concept from another perspective, what 
Ts'ai was saying was that there was really no difference between 
the peasants and the workers in the factories. In Ts'ai's view, 
foreign capitalism and industrialization, as well as the 
inability to erect a tariff barrier to protect the Chinese 
economy led to sufferings in rural life which Ts'ai himself had 
experienced. Now, living in industrialized Western Europe and 
working in the factories there, Ts'ai saw the same economic 
situation existing in France as his native Hunan in that the 
workers were oppressed by the owners of the means of production. 
Hence, if the industrial workers were calling for common 
ownership of the means of production, so should the workers in 
the rural conditions of China. This, of course, was not a new 
idea even in the China of the days of T s ' a i /
However, in the context of the development of Chinese 
communism, the most interesting feature of this exchange between
 ^Ts'ai, Op.cit., p.8.
6 See Tung-fang tsa-chih XVIII, No.13 ( 10-VII-1921 ) , pp. 2.5-36 
'Nung-yeh chih she-hui chu-i fa' (The Socialisation of the rural 
industries) was just a typical example of the many thal this 
nation-wide journal published. This particular one, by Hsi 
Ch'en, put forward ideas that were practically the same as 
Ts'ai's.
Ts'ai and Ch'en was not so much the ideas of a young zealot
from Hunan being enlightened by his French experience, but the 
timing of its publication in the pages of the HCN. Ts'ai, as 
has been mentioned, was not unread in Marxist literature. He 
translated The Communist Manifesto for the group of Chinese 
worker-students in France. He may therefore be expected, as 
Marx enjoined all communists, to see as the leading question 
in the revolutionary struggle the 'property question.'
Together with ^ he exchange of letters between Ch'en and 
ls'ai, the HCN in the very same issue, published the results 
of the first communist-led peasants' association in the province 
of Chekiang. To the contemporary readers, a conclusion might, 
well be made that the reporting of the latter was a timely and 
practical illustration of the theoretical discussion. Indeed, 
the editorial board seemed to have been very interested in the 
peasant association for in the very next issue, a speech 
delivered at that peasant association by a leading organizer was
7reported in great length. These two issues of the HCN were the 
first two issues to be published since the first CCP Congress.
The Ya-chien Peasant Association, in Hsiao-shan hsien of 
Chekiang, was probably the first communist-led or inspired
7
‘ Hsiian Lu, 'Nung-min tzu-chiieh' (Peasant Self-determination)
HCN IX, 5 (1-IX-1921). Hsiian Lu was also the reporter to the 
HCN giving the account of the opening of the peasant association 
and its affiliated primary school, in the previous issue of the 
HCN. The writer could be Shen Hsiian-lu who was the father-in- 
law of Yang Chih-hua who later became the second wife of Ch'u 
Ch'ui-pai. Shen was from Cheking province and was closely 
associated with the CCP.
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peasant association in China, although it is very little known 
today. Judging by its manifesto and constitution, its political 
allegiance was unmistakable. Its Manifesto opened with a most 
provocative statement, rivalling that famous manifesto by Marx 
and Engels thus:
In Chinese history, the peasants have been 
the most respected people. Unfortunately, 
the spirit of this respect has been drowned 
by the poisonous water of the capitalism of 
the Third Estate.
The peasants in the association might not understand who were
the Third Estate, but the language certainly was in conformity
with that used by the political radicals of the May 4th
operation. The Manifesto went on to proclaim the rejection of
the 'political system of the Third Estate» because 'the
development of the economic system they worship would make the
development of our poverty faster than the growth of their
wealth. The pain engendered by this bad economic system is
Qsuffered equally by the workers and peasants alike.'
The other, more notable, association was P ’eng P'ai's in Hai- 
Lu-feng which was founded in 1922. See Shinkicki Eto, 'Hai-lu- 
feng - The First Chinese Soviet Government' Pt. I in the China 
Quarterly No.8 (Oct.-Dec. 1961) pp.161-183» Eto did not mention 
the Ya-chien association.
 ^ 'Ya-chien nung-min hsieh-hui hsiian-yen' (Manifesto of the Ya- 
chien Peasant Association), HCN IX No.4 (1-VIII-1921). It has 
two pages. Quote cited from p.1. According to this report, 
the Manifesto was proclaimed on 26-IX-1921 which was obviously 
impossible, given the date of publication of that issue of the 
HC. It could be as late as July as the 23th July was the latest 
letter mentioned in the Correspondence column.
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Therefore, it went on, the members of the Third Estate were not 
worthy of the power of control of the economic system.
In so saying, the Manifesto provided a practical example 
to the Chinese communist concept of equating the rural poor 
with the urban poor. In this case, they had as their common 
class enemy the Third Estate, which in the rural situation meant 
the landlords who had ownership of the means of production.
The Manifesto went on to say t h a t ^
We recognize that land is the tool whereby 
the peasants use their strength to nurture 
mankind.
However, the Manifesto admitted that it would be a long time 
before this means of production would come to be owned by the 
organization of the peasants, but it, nevertheless, urged the
peasants not to forget that ’the lands of the world belong to
1 1the ones who farm them.'
In its constitution, the association made their social
stance abundantly clear. They stood in opposition to the
landlords while regarding as good friends all ’productive
1 2workers and activists in the cause of socialism.’ It admitted
into membership all those who planted and cultivated their own 
1 3land. While it agreed with the Manifesto that common ownership
1 0 & 1 1 Ibid., p .2.
’Ya-chien nung-ming hsieh-hui chang-ch'eng’ (The Constitution 
of the Ya-chien Peasant Association), HCN IX, No.4 (1-VIII-1921), 
Article 4.
Ibid., Art.2.13
of the means of production - land - was a distant goal not to 
be forgotten, the association did try to do the next best thing.
It claimed for its members the right to decide on the rate of' 
land rent and interests on loans. These were to be varied and 
dependent on the yearly average surplus, after the average
1 4expenditure required by the members were deducted. And, should
such a decision provoke the wrath of the landlords and thus 
result in any legal dispute, the entire membership would become 
the accused. On the other hand, should any member lose his 
rented land as the result of the association’s decision on rent,
then this unemployed member’s livelihood would become the
1 *5responsibility of the association. " Reporter Hsuan Lu announced 
that the Constitution and the Manifesto were approved by a 
meeting of the entire village of Ya-chien and an executive 
committee of six had been elected.
Since their ultimate goal was still some distance away, 
plans were made with this long-term project in mind.
Consequently, a primary school was established. Its aim, however, 
was quite different from that which one normally associates with 
a primary school. In the manifesto^ of this new school, a 
claim was made that prior to the surrendering of tariff autonomy, 
’the strength and the spirit’ of the great majority of the 
masses were ’robbed by the monarchical political system.’ Since
Ibid., Art.8.
1 Ibid. , Art. 9 .
1 6  .. ,’Ya-chien nung-ts’un hsiao-hsueh-hsiao hsuan-yen’ (Manifesto
of the Ya-chien Village Primary School) HCN IX, No.4 (I-VTII-
1921), pp.3-4 of the Report on the Ya-chien Peasant Association.
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the surrendering of tariff autonomy, there was a new robber.
This was the European and American educated ’propertied class’ 
who robbed the products of the proletariat, the class without 
property.
The school, therefore, was to provide the children of the 
proletariat the opportunity to escape from the powers of the 
capitalist class. The children would be educated with the aim 
of learning to understand and effect social changes. In short, 
the students were to be educated combatants in the forthcoming 
class struggles. Hsiian Lu reported that this manifesto for the 
school of peasant association was proclaimed and explained to 
the gathered masses on the opening day of the school. The 
gathering included 'workers, peasants, capitalists, landlords, 
bureaucrats' and students and, upon explanation, the masses 
understood the message. This, said Hstian Lu t indicated the need 
to propagate the same message to the interior of China and to 
organize the peasants. 'The only thing lacking was the
determination and revolutionary zeal of the educated
1 7proletariat'.
The wording of the various manifestos and the constitution 
clearly demonstrated that the peasant association was communist 
inspired. On the other hand, it would be most unlikely that 
those documents would be widely, or indeed easily, understood 
in the rural communities in which the Ya-chien association was 
located. To be oppressed by the 'capitalism of the Third
17 Hsuan Lu, his comments at the end of the Manifesto of the 
School.
Instate' was a concept that needed much explanation to the 
Chinese peasant community. Thus, reporter Ilsiian Lu had to 
explain the meanings and significance of the proclamations.
And, it is of interest to note that in spite of the European 
expressions of the official proclamations, the explanations 
were in very colloquial Chinese expression. This really 
demonstrated a certain degree of adaptability and sophistication 
of the Chinese communist propagandists.
Reporter Hsiian Lu himself delivered a speech to the peasants
1 8of Hsiao-shan hsien. The audience consisted of peasants from
1 9twenty to thirty villages. He told them how they were being
exploited by the lao yeh (old masters) rather than using such 
terms as capitalists or members of the Third Estate. Instead of 
arguing that the proletarian class should revolt against 
oppression , he reminded them that when they were children 
they were unable to attend schools while the children of the 
landlords did; that when they were sick they dared not spend 
much time resting because of the heavy burden of work they had 
to complete. And, he reminded them that they and their children 
would still have to work very hard only to die poor. He then 
reminded them that they were forced to stay poor because the 
results of their labour had to go to the lao yeh, while the 
peasants had nothing left over. In short, what would have been 
the surplus of the peasants' productive labour were being- 
enjoyed by the landlords.
1 8 Hsiian Lu, 'Nmig-min tzu-chiieh' (Peasant Self-determination)
HCN IX, 5 (I-IX-I921), being an address given to the Hsiao-shan 
peasants. It has four pages.
* ^  I b i d . ,  p . 1 .
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Thus, in a way eminently understandable to any peasant, HsttanI
In introduced and explained the concept of surplus value and
the connotation of economic exploitation in which one class
suffered at the hands of another. He went on, producing
figures, to demonstrate how the appreciation of value of
reclaimed land, and their corresponding appreciation of land
rents were actually already paid for by the peasants - through
a fair evaluation of the labour put into the improvement of the
land by the peasants themselves. He used this to demonstrate
that it was not the silver of the rich that bought the land but
the sweat of the peasants. He went on to remind them that
unlike the peasants, the rich had organized groups under arms
to protect and extend their private property systems, and
reminded the peasants of the local saying that ’whatever your
20hands can grab are yours '. Indeed, if he had wanted to,
he had a perfect opportunity to introduce the Proudhonist 
concept of Property is Theft’.
He then advised his audience that the only way to escape 
the perpetuation of this fate was for the peasant to gain the
right of self-determination, such as the peasants in Turkey and
21Russia were doing. The land, having been wrested from nature
by the labour of the peasants, should be publicly owned. But 
to do that successfully, the peasants themselves must quickly 
unite and organize themselves into associations. He warned them 
against disorganized or poorly organized insurrections for this
Ibid., p .2.
2 1 Ibid., p .3•
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would be little better than the robbery conducted by the
’capitalist class’. He insisted that ’the country belongs to
22the labourers (lao-tung ehe).’ Thus, after using the common
colloquial language to introduce the new communist concepts,
he concluded with the more standard appeal of class struggle.
Then, as if in response to these published reports by Hsiian
Lu, Chou Fu-hai commented on the very same issue that some
people were harbouring the mistaken belief that because the
peasantry were generally conservative, therefore the proletariat
dictatorship system would be inappropriate in China. Instead,
Chou argued that ’it is just because the peasants were
conservative that China needs the dictatorship system [in the
socialist revolutionj.’ And, he cited the Russian example as
23demonstrating the rightness of the policy. Though the Ya-chien
Peasant Association had not achieved the fame of the Hai-lu-feng
Soviet of P ’eng P ’ai, it was certainly not unnoticed by the
contemporary CCP leadership. In 1923» noted labour organizer
Teng Chung-hsia cited this movement in Hsiao-shan hsien as
evidence that the peasants in China ’have already arrived at the
24period of revolutionary awakening' and that their revolutionary 
ability could certainly rival that of the progressive workers.
2 2 Ibid., p .4 .
^  Chou Fu-hai, ’ Ti-We-t' ui-to chih yii nung-min' (The 
Dictatorship system and the peasants). HCN IX, 5 (l-IX-192l) 
Random Thought No.126.
24 <• fTeng Chung-hsia, ’Lun ning-min yun-tung' (On the Peasant
Movement), Chung-kuo ch1ing-nien No.11 (29-XII-1923), pp.2-4.
Quote cited from p.3» This was an organ of the CYL, and
hereafter will be cited as CKCN
This was a generous accolade. But il' Teng was exaggerating
the achievement of the Hsiao-shan movement he was but praising
it for being the first of such peasant movements, and was doing
no more than acknowledging what must have been common knowledge
of the time. In the self-same sentence, Teng mentioned other
movements in diverse areas and regions of China. They were
P’ing-hsiang in Kiangsi province which commenced a similar
movement in 1922 and where another one had just commenced in
the same province in Ma-chia-ts*un. Then, there were the other
peasant movements in yen-tien in the Ch’ing-tao area, the
Hai-feng movement in Kwangtung and the Heng-shan movement in 
2 5Hunan. In the context of this discussion, Teng’s view is of 
particular interest for it indicates that to the contemporary
j t
Chinese communists, the activities in Hsiao-shan hsien marked
the first of their peasant movements. Furthermore, the movement
in Chekiang was adjudged as the beginning of the general peasant
awakening and the more familiar Hai-feng movement was but one of
many. Indeed, Teng regarded the peasantry as one of the three
main forces of the revolution, the other two being the workers
26and soldiers.
At the time of the founding of the Ya-chien Peasant 
Association, the CCP still had no formally established department 
on rural activities. On the other hand, there can be no doubt 
that the ideological orientation of the Ya-chien Peasant 
Association was that of the CCP and, as has been noted in 1923»
Teng, Ibid., p.3*23
26 Ibid.,p.2
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Teng Chung-hsia proudly claimed that was the first expression 
of the revolutionary awakening of the peasants, as with the 
situation in Hai-feng. What these reports and statements 
indicate, therefore, was that from the very inception of the 
CCP, various members were already taking the programme of social 
revolution and class struggle to the countryside though there 
was no formal rural department in the Party. In the early years 
of the CCP, with such a small membership and the omnipresence of 
physical danger from the various warlords there was little 
organizational coherence. Indeed, when the Ya-chien Association 
was founded, the Party had about 57 members - that being the 
generally accepted membership.
Nevertheless, as Teng reported, there were movements, 
similar to the Ya-chien one, starting in other regions of China 
by individual members or groups of members. The best known of
these were the ones in Hai-feng and Lu-feng organized by P'eng
27P'ai. However, that the Hai-lu-feng movement was more 
successful was due, at least in part, to the sympathetic 
attitudes of the local warlord - Ch'en Chiung-ming - who had 
demonstrated certain degrees of socialist inclination, even to 
the extent of inviting the well-known radical thinker, Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu, as the Commissioner of Education for Kwangtung when 
the Warlord was the governor.
27 For detailed development of the Hai-lu-feng movement, see 
Shinkichi Eto, 'Hai-lu-feng - The First Soviet Government'
Pts.1 and 2, The China Quarterly Nos.8 & 9 (Oct. and Jan.1961/2 ). 
Here, Professor Eto demonstrated clearly that the Soviet depended 
very much on the attitudes of Ch'en Chiung-ming.
However, the lack of a central organization did not imply
the lack of interest on the part of the Chinese communists on
the peasant movement. Until the CCP joined forces with the KMT
in their National Government in Canton, the Chinese communists
had no secure territorial base. And, without such a base,
peasant movements must perforce be regional, relying much on the
ability of the regional leadership to survive the hostile
environment. On the other hand, the peasantry formed an integral
part, indeed a main part, in the Chinese communism that was being
developed during the early years of the Party. Certainly, while
the Chinese communists, and some others in China, had long come
to regard China as a proletarian nation, the majority of the
proletariat! class were regarded as unawakened to their objective
reality. Hence, there was a need, an urgent need, for the party
of the proletariat, the CCP, to enlighten the masses of their
social-economic-political situation. To this end, another noted
labour organizer of the CCP, Chang Kuo-t'ao, in discussing the
political duties of the educated class, concluded in these
28ringing exhortations:
If they are true patriots and truly want to 
reconstruct China, they must unite with the 
revolutionary socialists in China, and have 
as their common goal the overthrow of the 
Foreign Powers and the warlords and to build 
a united, peaceful, free, and independent 
China. And, together, bring this message to
Chang Kuo-t/ao, 'Chih-shih chieh-chi tsai cheng-chih shang ti 
ti-wei chi ch’i tse-jen' (The Political Position and Duties of 
the Educated class), Hsiang Tap No.12 (6-XII-1922), p p .98-100. 
Quotation cited in p.100.
' K ) r>
every village, every factory, every shop, 
and every school, and, to organize them to 
take part in this urgent political struggle.
If they understand their position and duties, 
they will not shrink from them but will 
endeavour to win for China the revolutionary 
victory similar to that of Turkey. (emphasis 
added)
It might be little more than political sloganeering to 
include the villages as a target for the duties of the educated 
class and place the peasants as one of the targets of their 
propaganda effort. But, in the context of the development of 
Chinese communism, the fact that both Teng and Chang who were 
more noted at that time for their work as labour organizers 
saw it necessary to include such a slogan was of great 
importance. It indicates that in their conception of the social 
revolution there was a direct need to involve the peasantry, and 
an urgent need. The fact that as a party the Chinese communists
I
were unable to bring into effect their desired revolutionary 
programme was of less concern. At the time of writing, at the 
end of 1922, the CCP had no territorial base and a membership 
of abour two hundred. Thus, they were in a position to do little 
more than create propaganda. And, in their propaganda, the 
peasant movement had a central place in their programme of the 
social revolution.
Indeed, it may be argued that the Chinese communists could 
not be expected to do anything else. As noted earlier, they 
became communists and launched their social revolution because 
they perceived that the objective realities of China called for
their efforts to lead a revolution. All that remained to be done
and hence the positions and the duties of the presumably 
politically enlightened and educated, would be to inform the 
masses of these objective realities and to awaken them into 
action and to liberate themselves. When the opportunities 
presented themselves, as in Hsiao-shan and Hai-lu-feng, there 
were the awakened members of the educated proletariat to lead 
and to try to enlighten and organize.
As the peasant masses formed the overwhelming majority of 
the Chinese population, any effort to propagandize them would 
require a very significant force of propagandists. And, until 
the CCP had their territorial base they were in no position to 
train such an army of propagandists. But, their very acceptance 
of communism constrained them to act thus, otherwise they would, 
intellectually and politically, lose the very rationale for 
their existence as a political party. If China was a proletariat 
nation needing only someone to enlighten the proletarian masses, 
then members of the political party of the proletariat - and, 
by definition, that was how every communist party member must 
regard themselves - must make the effort. And, as demonstrated, 
they considered that the hour to launch their revolution was at 
hand.
In short, then, until the founding of a special training 
school for rural cadres - and such an idea would have been out 
of the question when the CCP had no territorial base - there 
was only one group whom the Chinese communists could turn to 
for help. They were the educated class that Chang Kuo-t’aO 
mentioned. More precisely, this educated class meant student, 
middle school students who formed the target of the communist
propag;mda. Thus, the CCP strategy in these early years involved 
a two-tier effort. Firstly, they had to awaken the members o I' 
this educated class to their tasks and to accept the OOP’s
conception of the objective realities in China. Then, this 
educated class would become so enlightened and awakened that 
they would undertake the revolutionary task in the countryside.
To be sure, in the process of realizing this, the two-tier 
strategy would merge and the boundaries of the tiers would not 
be easily defined. However, in order to investigate the CCP 
strategy on the peasant movement in these early years, we would 
need to examine the ways in which the communist student movement 
was being conducted. This may well be regarded as a fortunate 
coincidence, because it is difficult, by definition, to have 
records on the propaganda messages to the illiterates. But 
because the CCP were using the students as their agents, we can 
examine the communist messages to the peasants through a study 
of what the students were taught to propagate, and how to 
propagate•
It may be argued that in making use of the students the 
Chinese communists were approaching the peasant movement with 
less than total seriousness. However, to do so would be to 
disregard the history of the CCP and the background of the 
Chinese communists. It was true that much of the work done in 
the peasant movements was by members of the Socialist (or, 
Communist) Youth Corps led by members of the CCP. These youths 
were the students who had sided with the communist cause, just 
as many of the leading members of the CCP had done. Such leaders 
of the CCP as Teng and Chang, as well as Ch’u Ch’iu-pai,
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Tsai-Ho-sen, P'eng Shu-chili, Chou Fo-hai, and leaders ol' l he
SYC such as Yun Tai-ying and Shih Chuan-tung, were students ol“
the May 4th generation who, like the students they were now
propagating the message to, followed such teachers as Ch'en
Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao into the CCP.
Given such a background, it becomes quite understandable
that Chang Kuo-t'ao should tell the students that they had two
duties, one was to work for the benefits of the students
themselves and the second and greater one was their political
duty to their nation. But, this former student-activist warned
that while the students in China occupied an important position
in society, 'if they are divorced from the masses, the students
will achieve nothing. If the merchants, workers, peasants, or
soldiers can learn to organize themselves and be awakened, their
strength and effectiveness will be much greater than that of the 
29students.' Therefore, he saw that the greatest task students
could perform, and the most important and urgently required task,
was 'to go into the midst of the people to propagate ... I hope
that all the students of China will not forget to unite closely
and intimately with the people and not to leave the people ...
those students who have the spirit of revolution will quickly
30go to the people to propagate the revolutionary message.' In 
the mind of Chang, while the students were not a power group, 
they were certainly the most active.
O Q  ^Chang Kuo-tao, 'Hsiieh-sheng yun-tung ti wo chien' (My View 
on the Students Movement), Hsiang Tao No.17 (24-1-1923) pp.138- 
140. Quotation cited from p.139*
30 Ibid., p.140.
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This was indeed the official policy adopted by the first
National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, held in
Canton in May 1922. It was at this meeting that the name was
changed from Communist YC to Socialist YC. The original name,
however, was re-adopted during the Third Congress of the Corps 
11in 1925» At the First Congress of the SYC the members took 
the view that^
At this stage of the revolutionary struggle 
and in view of the political and economic 
conditions in China, we, the proletariat, 
and the poverty stricken peasants should 
help each other in this revolutionary struggle; 
and together form the real strength of the 
proletariat. We must not adopt the posture of 
a bystander or take a position in opposition 
[to the above decision] else the life of the 
feudal system will be prolonged.
Furthermore, the Congress reminded its members that while they 
would all hope to achieve victory in the democratic revolution, 
such a victory did not mean a total liberation. On the contrary, 
upon the successful conclusion of the democratic revolution would 
come the revolutionary movement in which the proletarian class 
would oppose the capitalist class. ’The aim of this revolution 
is the adoption of the worker-peasant system. That is, the
31 See the official explanation given at the 3rd Congress whose 
Manifesto asserted that it was time to make its identity 
unambiguous. The Manifesto was published in CKCN No.69, pp.295- 
8 (7-III-1925).
32 Cited from the Preamble of the SYC Constitution. A report on 
this Congress together with its Manifesto and Resolutions were 
published in HCN IX, No.6, pp.117-129 (1-VII-1922). Quotation 
cited from pp.119-120.
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political power will reside with the proletariat. The speed 
that this revolution will take to be realized will depend on 
the international situation and the organizational ability and
33power of the Chinese proletariat) class.'
Among the many resolutions passed by the Congress was one 
concerning education. It had five sections but it is Section 
One that is of interest to this context. This concerned the
3 4Education Movement of the Young Workers and the Young Peasants.
On the latter, the Resolution took the view that as 'the young 
peasants were more backward than the young workers, special 
endavour should be made on their education movement so that they 
will understand their social position and that unless communism 
is realized, they will not be liberated.' The method they 
decided to employ was to spread socialism through the medium of 
village schools as well as helping the peasants to organize 
peasant associations.
What the SYC Congress had resolved to do in their peasant 
movement, as we have demonstrated, were really amplifying and 
formalizing what most of them had read in the pages of the HCN 
concerning what had happened in the Ya-chien Peasant Association 
in Chekiang. Since the Congress was a national organ, there was 
thus a need to formalize policies. However, looking at the 
peasant policies of the Chinese communists from the perspective 
of the development of Chinese communism, we are constrained to
33 Ibid., p.120. That is, from the Preamble.
In­ cited from Ibid., p.126.
conclude that the Chinese communists came to their conclusions
35independent of the directives of the Comintern. Their 
international comrades sent the Chinese directives in May 1923 
which were to be discussed at the 3rd CCP Congress in July 1923* 
But, as has been demonstrated, the Chinese communists were 
already having some practical experiences some considerable time 
prior to the sending of these gems of wisdom.
To argue thus is not to deny Soviet influence in the 
development of Chinese communism. Detailed accounts of the rural 
developments in Soviet Russia had long been reported on the pages
q  /
of the HCNy and the Ya-chien Peasant Association was obviously 
modelled after the Soviet models. However, what is being 
submitted here is that as with so many facets of the development 
of Chinese communism, the peasant policies of the Chinese 
communists were much influenced by the Soviet situation, but the 
influences did not come as the result of Comintern directives. 
They came as the result of the Chinese communists reading and 
observing the situation in Russia and then decided on their own 
models. We may say that the Chinese adoption of foreign 
communist ideas, from Marx to the Russians, was an active process 
and not a passive one of merely acting under Comintern 
instruction or direction.
The Young Socialists seemed to be young people who meant 
what they had resolved. In the coming months, they became very
35 The directives were published in Eudin and North, Op.cit., 
pp. 3^-3^-6 •
36 See, for example, HCN VII Nos.3, 4 , 5, 6 (1-XI, 1-XII-1920);
1-1, l-IV-1921) as well as all subsequent Numbers in 1921 where
many articles on rural development in Soviet Russia were 
published in Chinese translations.
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active and achieved considerable success, so much so that
they were being deeply resented and feared by their ideological
37and political opponents. However, while contemporary non­
communist reports gave witness to the disruptive effects of 
these communist-led peasant activities and thus provided eloquent 
witness to the effectiveness of the programme of 1 student- 
organized peasant forces’, there seems to be some doubt as to 
whether the CCP leadership was unanimous in their devotion to 
the peasant movement.
This doubt seemed to have been echoed by Teng Chung-hsia 
and the cause of this uncertainty seemed to have been certain 
statements made by C h ’en Tu-hsiu. In the CKCN Teng published a 
series of articles on the ’three main forces of the revolution' - 
the workers, the peasants, and the soldiers. In his first of 
two studies on the peasant movement, Teng spent considerable time 
in demonstrating that 'the Chinese peasants have already arrived 
at the stage of revolutionary awakening’ and added that the more 
’enlightened warlords, such as Feng Yu-hsiang' had already taken
n  Q
note and advantage of this. While Teng used such expressions 
as 'proved', ’I am certain' and even mentioned that 'though
^  See Wah Tse Vat Pao (The Chinese Mail), 31 March and 4 April 
1924 reporting the disruption caused by the SYC in Shun-te. It 
claimed that the work was initially started by Tan Ping-shan 
about a year ago. A Foreign Correspondent also noted 'student- 
organized peasant forces' instigated by the Kwangtung Regime was 
causing chaos in China. See The Chaos in China (n.p. 1923)
being reprints of articles in the Peking & Tientsin Times, June 
and July 1923» p.48; in the Hankow Collection, HKU.
o Q
Teng, 'Lun Nung-min yun-tung’ (On the Peasant Movement) CKCN 
No.11 (29-XII-1923)» pp.2-4. Teng was not praising Feng per se
but only said that Feng was able to take advantage of latent 
revolutionary energy of the peasants.
theoretically there is little chance of a peasant revolution but 
if we realistically examine . . . ’ , he refrained from announcing 
the name of the person with whom he was debating.
In his second article, however, the mystery was solved. In 
his opening paragraph, he lamented the neglect of the peasant 
problems by the various sections of the community especially 
the neglect shown by the press and other publishing media. He 
then mentioned that there had only been one good discussion on 
the peasant situation and that was an article in the CCP journal 
Ch1ien-feng (Vanguard) entitled ’The Chinese Peasant Problems1.^ 
Teng claimed that this article by C h ’en was accurate in its 
analysis of the peasant conditions in China and 'may be used for 
references'. What he would do, however, would be to describe 
the 'conditions of the peasant movement. If this is understood, 
we may then understand the strength and the degree of the 
peasants' awakening as well as their position in the 
revolutionary movement'.^
Teng then went on to describe quite fully the developments 
in Hai-feng and Heng-shan, the two peasant movements in Kwangtung 
and Hunan respectively, on the ground that when he wrote his 
first study on the peasant movement he did not have all the 
sources. Having called in these two witnesses on the success 
of communist-led peasant movements, Teng concluded that the
39 Teng, ' Chung-kuo nung-min chuang'-k *uang chi wo-men yttn-tung ti 
fang-chen' (The Conditions of the Chinese Peasants and the 
Directions of our Movement) CKCN No.13 (5-1-1924), pp.3-10.
Quote cited from p.5» Ch'en's article was published on the 1st 
July 1923•
40 Teng, Ibid., p»5*
strength of the peasants’ awakening ’has already arrived at the
stage where the peasants would dare to resist the oppressing
class. Such brave actions compare favourably with the striking
Hong Kong seamen and the railwaymen of the Peking-Hankow
Railways. This is really a happy phenomenon for the future of
41China's revolution!’
To be sure, there were other statements by Ch'en that Teng 
could have mentioned although in saying what he had already said, 
his readers were left in no doubt that he was more optimistic 
about the chances of success and the revolutionary elan of the 
Chinese peasants. In this article by Ch'en which Teng referred 
to, the Party Leader felt that the present need for China was a 
national movement to eliminate the influence of the foreign 
Powers and to overthrow the warlords and bureaucrats.
'Therefore, the peasant question cannot be neglected because over
. 4270% of the Chinese people are peasants.' He had the rural
society divided into ten segments, ranging from the large
landlords to the hired labourers. While he did claim that the
landlords 'use the methods of capitalism to rob others of their
surplus labour and thus should be regarded as belonging to the
43middle class', he did exhibit a certain lack of confidence in 
the potential of the revolutionary elan of the peasants. He saw
Teng, Ibid., p.9*
42 /Ch'en, 'Chung-kuo nung-min wen-ti' (The Chinese Peasant
Question), Chnen-feng (Vanguard) No.1 (1-VII-1923), PP«5l-57* 
Quotation cited from p.51»
43 Ch'en, Ibid., p.53
only k0% of the rural population as ’landless peasants’ who would 
be expected to join the revolutionary ranks and even this figure 
had to include those who own some land but not enough for
44subsistence without selling out their labour. Thus, in his 
insistence on demonstrating the readiness of the peasant masses 
for revolutionary action, Teng was really making his reply to 
the lack of faith on the part of his leader who had exhibited 
uncertainty and low opinion on the revolutionary preparedness of 
the peasants.
At the time of his writing, the 29th December 1923» Teng 
could have cited some even less encouraging remarks by C h ’en on 
the peasants. However, these latter remarks have not been 
unnoticed by modern scholars because these latter remarks seemed 
to point to some strong disagreement within the leadership of 
the CCP. Shortly after this article in the C h ’ien-feng, which 
must have been written before the 3rd CCP Congress which was in 
session when the journal was published, C h ’en made a reply to a 
reader’s letter in the Hsiang Tao on the peasantry. Xn this
45oft-quoted reply, C h ’en wrote:
Ibid., p p .53-4.
Ch’en 'Reply to reader', Hsiang Tao No.34, p .258 (1-VTII-1923• 
This was cited by Eto, Op.cit., P£1, see Note 59« Eto argued 
that *Ch'en ... [and] the Central Headquarters of the CCP did 
not take an active part in the peasant movement” . (p.178). Five 
years later, Stuart Schram, quoting the same article, agreed with 
Ete. (See Schram's Mao Tse-tung [Pelican 1966] pp.78-9)«
Schram also cited an article by Ch'en in the HCN-Q 4 (Dec. 1924) 
to show that Ch’en remained the same during that period. Schram, 
however, conceded that some individual communists worked -within 
the KMT on the peasant movement, during the early years.
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According to my humble opinion, Sir, your 
proposal that there should be a communist 
movement in the villages is somewhat romantic.
This is so because a communist movement needs 
the factory workers as their main force.
Amongst the small peasants in China, over half 
are self-supporting (i.e. owning sufficient 
land for substenance). In this petty- 
capitalist class, their conception of private 
ownership is strangely strong. How can we 
conduct a communist movementl ... At the 
present time, only the national movement is 
suitable for the villages. Besides, the 
national movement is China’s urgent need, 
and only the national movement can overthrow 
the warlords and open the way for a communist 
movement.
To be fair to Ch ’en, there were extenuating circumstances 
for those remarks in the Hsiang Tap and the HCN-Q. On the 
former occasion, C h ’en was replying to a reader who wanted a 
purely proletariat communist revolutionary movement. While the 
Chinese communists, even in 1923» had expressed different views 
on the nature of the national revolution to those of the KMT, 
it would be impolitic and impractical for C h ’en or any Chinese 
communist to espouse openly a purely communist movement. Indeed, 
as we have noted, Ch’en had always eschewed such exclusivist 
revolutionary movements and tendencies. On the latter occasion, 
in late 1924, the Chinese communists were then insisting that 
only the proletariat! class was capable and worthy of leading 
the national revolution. By then, while the CCP was still 
talking about a national revolution, it was a national revolution 
entailing class struggle within the ranks of the nationalists.
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Therefore, this latter statement, as well as the one in Hsiang 
Tao, should be read against such a background.
However, Ch'en did mention, in a very pointed way, the
revolutionary unpreparedness of the peasants. This statement,
if read in context, was much stronger than the ones heretofore
cited and Teng would have noticed it. It was published in
December 1923, again in the C h *ien-feng, shortly before Teng
46wrote his articles. Here, Ch'en was discussing the various 
social classes in the national revolution in China. Here, Ch'en 
took great pains to emphasize that the national revolution which 
he was concerned about was not a democratic (min-chu) revolution 
but a class struggle.
To be sure, this argument was quite a conventional one for 
the Chinese communists. It simply meant that as China was a 
semi-colonial state the proletariat was not yet strong enough to 
wage a revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and 
capitalists without the aid of some other allies from other 
classes. Hence, in view of the peculiar economic and political 
situation in China, a national revolution was needed, but only 
to pave the way for a socialist revolution. This was how Ch'en 
argued his case here. Writing on the eve of the inauguration 
of the KMT-CCP National Government and KMT Party Congress in 
Canton, he, not unexpectedly emphasized the importance of a 
'united front strategy of many classes', as he explained, 'even
Ch'en, ' Chung-kuo kuo-min ke-ming yii she-hui ke chieh-chi' 
(The Chinese National Revolution and the various social classes) 
C h 'ien-feng N o .2 (1-XII-1923), pp.1-9* Teng's articles were 
published on the 29th XII 1923 and 5-1-1924.
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in advanced countries, the capitalist revolution, their
capitalist classes used the slogan o I' the whole people - clm.i n
himin - in their attack on the aristocracy. *
However, he did see certain peculiar points for the Chinese 
situation. He argued that 'from now on, in the national 
movement, the merchants, workers, and peasants naturally become 
the main motive forces of the revolution, but the revolutionary 
elements of*intellectual class - chih-shih - will act as links 
of the various classes and the student movement is a case in 
point.' Here Ch'en was, in fact, reverting back to the very 
traditional view of Chinese society. He actually used the 
traditional term shih to denote the chih-shih or intellectual
48class. He was seeing Chinese society in the traditional four
classes, the shih (scholars), nung (peasants), kung (workers),
shang (merchants). During the May 4th period and since then,
the national movement had seen the shih class at the centre
stage. This, Ch'en claimed, was a sign of development. This
was the Third Stage of the national movement, with the events
of 1898 Reform as the First Stage and the 1911 Revolution as
the Second Stage. The next stage would be characterised by the
49withdrawal of the capitalist class from the national movement.
In accordance with the Marxist-Leninist framework of analysis, 
Ch'en regarded this new shih class as one without economic
47 C h 'en, Ibid., p p . 2-3
48 C h 'en, Ibid., pp.4-5
49 Ibid. , p . 2 .
foundation and therefore not an independent class, but with 
wavering political views and could be revolutionary as well 
as counter-revolutionary.
While what Ch'en had said hitherto had been quite
unexceptional, he had some strange things to say concerning the
peasant movement. In a ’communist social revolution, one would
naturally seek the peasants' sympathy and help because such a
revolution needs the strong proletariat! class as his main force.
But he also saw problems with the concept of private ownership
so prevalent amongst the peasants, with 'everyone wanting to be
50a landlord.' Therefore he suggested that
The Chinese peasant movement must wait 
until the successful conclusion of the 
national revolution before being 
activated. ["it will commence] after the 
development of national industries, after 
the general capitalization of agriculture, 
after the agricultural proletariat can 
develop and be concentrated, only then will 
the villages have their true communist 
social revolution, or the need to have one.
(emphasis added)
Indeed, he used the term fanciful to describe any call for the 
inclusion of the peasantry or the peasant movement into the 
national movement because 'we cannot satisfy their demands and 
they cannot realistically join our movement. [if they join] 
it would indeed be a great loss to the urgent needs of the 
national revolution'.
50 Ibid., pp.6-7•
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Given these remarks from Ch'en, what Teng wrote in the
pages of CKCN may thus be regarded as a polite but firm rejection
of the Party Leader’s perception. To be sure, the proponents of
the peasant movement in the Chinese Communist Party, such as
labour leaders Teng and Chang Kuo-t'ao and others, had taken a
position quite dissimilar to that taken by the Comintern
directives of May 1923* The Comintern’s position was that the
’revolution can be victorious if it becomes possible to draw
into the movement the basic masses of the Chinese population,
51th. l is the peasants with small holdings.' As noted, Ch'en
in his article in the July issue of The Vanguard, saw strong
capitalistic tendencies in this group. Furthermore, the
Comintern saw 'the peasant problem [becoming] the central point
32of the entire policy of the CCP.’ Ch'en, by December 1923,
saw the peasant movement as detrimental to the Chinese national 
movement while Teng tended to agree with the Comintern comrades, 
but only up to a point.
The Comintern insisted that the peasant movement must call 
for the 'confiscation of landlords' land, confiscation of 
monastery and church land, and the passing of this land to the 
peasants without compensation; the abolition of the practice of 
the starvation lease; abolition of the existing system of 
taxation; of the practice of the 'squeeze'; abolition of the 
customs barriers between provinces; destruction of the institution
5 1J See Eudin and North, Op . cit. , p.3^, being Directive No. 1 .
52 See Eudin and North, Op . cit. , p.3^, being Directive No. 2 .
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of tax-farmers [otkupshchikij, abolition of the mandarinate; 
creation of organs of peasant self-government to take charge
53of the confiscation of land, and so forth, and so forth.
In calling for the abolition of monastic and church land, the 
Comintern comrades seemed to have been more influenced by the 
situation in Russia than China; and, if the Chinese comrades 
decided to pay little notice to the details of these directives, 
then their actions are very understandable, especially in view 
of their insistence on the special conditions of the Chinese 
revolution not to mention the rather obviously inappropriate 
nature of some of these directives.
Besides, the Chinese communists had long been involved 
with their own peasant movement before the arrival of these 
words of wisdom from afar. From as early as the Ya-chien 
Peasant Association in 1921, the Chinese communists had come 
to the conclusion that the total abolition of the landlords 
would take a long time, involving a process of education and 
propaganda. The prospect was not one of rapid success, 
nevertheless, they accepted the challenge with an undaunted 
spirit, with perhaps the above mentioned exceptional expressions 
of C h 'en.
Those remarks by C h ’en deserve further investigation for 
they might not be in total accord with the overall revolutionary 
perception of C h 1en. Contemporaneous to the expression of those 
cited views, Ch'en also published contrary ideas. In the
53 Ibid., Directive No.3*
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opening issue of the CKCN, Ch’en, writing in one of his commonly 
known pen-names, admonished the young readers, the students, 
that while they were the more awakened people in China, they 
should not forget that their strength was not great and that 
they certainly 'cannot match the merchants, workers, or peasant s 
in strength for conducting class struggles.' Their task,
the former professor advised, was to awaken the other classes 
and endeavour to link the various classes together in a national 
united front. Unless Ch'en in 1923 was involved in some deep- 
seated intra-party dispute or being very inconsistent, and 
there is no real evidence to support either proposition, one 
is constrained to re-examine what Ch'en meant by the term 
'peasant movement' - nung-min yun-tung - when he used it in 
December 1923*
In this particular article, the main thrust of the message 
was that no one class, not even the workers, should embark on 
the revolutionary task single-handed because of the special 
political and economic situation in China. On the contrary, he 
urged that the various classes - merchants, workers, peasants, 
and scholars (shang, kung, nung, shih) should work together 
for a united front in a national revolution. In the section in 
which he discussed the peasants, he commenced with the words 
'the peasants form an overwhelming majority of the population 
of China, naturally they give great strength to the national
r
J Shih An (Ch'en) 'Ch’ing-nien men ying-kai tsen yang tso! '
(How should the Young People Act:) CKCN No.1 (20-X-1923) pp.2-3. 
Quotation cited from p.3*
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revolution. If the Chinese peasants do not join the national 
revolution it will never succeed as a mass revolution.' Yet, 
it concluded with the sentiment that to launch a peasant
55movement now would be detrimental to the national revolution.
We are thus constrained to investigate what Ch'en meant by the 
concept of a ’peasant movement'.
Ch'en was in fact espousing sentiments similar to the 
reply he made to the reader of the Hsiang Tao when asked if a 
communist social revolution should be launched in the villages.
Ch'en was, in December 1923, as he was in August, firmly against 
it. Yet, in the intervening months, he had admonished the 
students to launch their movement to awaken the peasants. A 
plausible explanation for all these seeming contradictions may 
be culled from all these statements. Here we found the Chinese 
communists launching themselves into a peasant association 
movement, quite independent of the Comintern directives, in 1921. 
By 1923, they had started a number of such movements in many 
parts of China with varying degrees of success. Their experience 
had taught them that, as in the Hai-lu-feng associations,, much 
depended on not antagonizing the local warlord too muah unless 
there was a countervailing force. Indeed, in their first attempt, 
even before they experienced any opposition in the Ya-chien 
Peasant Association, they admitted that common ownership of land, 
however justified, would only be realized after a prolonged 
progress of struggle.
Ch'en, Ch'ien-feng, No.2, Section 5, PP*5"6 (1-XII-1929)55
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Now, the Chinese communists found that suddenly their 
Comintern comrades, having decided to take part in the national 
revolution, presented them with a set of obviously inappropriate 
directives. It was not that the Chinese communists were not 
interested in having a peasant movement or involving the peasants 
in their national revolution. What the Chinese communists 
objected to was a communist-styled revolution in the villages 
which the Comintern directives entailed. To the Chinese such 
directives were impractical and unrealistic, and the Comintern 
comrades, in calling for the abolition of monastic and church 
holdings, had demonstrated that they were but transplanting 
their Russian experience to China. The Chinese communists 
seemed determined to maintain their own policies because their 
perception of the objective realities in China constrained them 
to their own conclusions - both in their dealings with the 
peasants and in other aspects of the revolutionary development. 
This was not to say that the Chinese communists were always 
successful in maintaining their independence but merely to show 
that the development of Chinese communism was not always being 
directed by the Comintern comrades. Viewed thus, the positions 
of Teng and Ch'en were really not so dissimilar because both 
disagreed with the policies of massive abolition called for in 
the Comintern directives. While the Chinese scheme was also 
aimed at a rural class struggle, the Chinese communists realized 
that the exploited class had to be awakened first.
Ch'en was in fact in substantial agreement with Peng and 
the proclaimed programme of the movement in Ya-chien. In his
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article in The Vanguard, while agreeing that the peasants formed 
a major motive force in the national revolution, Ch'en was also 
arguing against those who felt that 'the peasants will 
immediately commence a communist-styled socialist revolutionary
56movement.1 It was such a style of 'peasant movement' that he
was against and he described such ideas as 'crude'. But, he 
was of the opinion that the peasants should participate in the 
national revolution. However, he did depart from Teng in 
relegating the communist-styled socialist revolution in the rural 
sector until after mechanization of the rural industries. It 
would be unlikely that the Party Leader should consider that it 
was his duty to correct a reader's allegedly mistaken ideas 
more than once, and to report this correction in a theoretical 
journal. Up to that period, apart from this reader of the 
Hsiang T a o , the only person or organization urging such a radical 
rural policy of land confiscation on the CCP was the Comintern. 
While Ch'en did not mention the Comintern in this article but 
used the vague expression 'some people', it may be reasonable 
to assume that Ch'en had in mind these Comintern directives. 
According to a Japanese source, the 3rd Congress of the CCP did
57water down the rural policy directives of the Comintern.
In a number of ways, the method of rural propaganda, and 
1 he message, were distinctly different from those which the 
Comintern had directed. Teng, while showing great pride and 
enthusiasm in reporting the peasant associations in Ha.i-feng,
5b Ch'en, Ibid . , p . 5 •
^  See Eto, Op.cit., Pt.I, pp.176-177.
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and Heng-shan and elsewhere, even likening them to the striking 
seamen and railwaymen, and looking forward to a nation-wide 
co-ordinated movement, strongly warned the student-activists 
to be realistic and not to be carried away by their enthusiasm. 
He placed great emphasis on organizations, hoping to unite the 
peasants into associations by appealing to their self-interests. 
Indeed, he urged the students to induce the peasants to identify 
their interests with the associations that the students would 
be forming.^
However, on the method of educating and indoctrinating the
peasants, the students were strongly advised not to adopt as
59their slogan ’communist revolution' because
in China, the hired-labourers are not as 
numerous as the self-supporting peasants 
or the tenants ... and because the peasants 
still have strong views on private ownership.
He then reminded the students of the wise words of 'Mr. Ch'en
zT 0
Tu-hsiu who said:
They oppose the landlords only because 
they want to transfer what the landlords 
own to themselves.
Therefore, Teng warned that if 'high slogans' were used, the 
peasants might be scared away. He therefore advised that the
58 Teng, 'The Conditions of the Chinese Peasants and the 
Directions of our Movement', CKCN No. 13 (5“I” 1924), p.9*
59 Teng, Ibid., pp.9"10. 
b° Ibid., p .10.
slogans should be 'restricted to "Limitations on Rent",
"Limitations on Ownership", "Overthrow the Corrupt bureaucrats
and gentry", "Overthrow the Warlords", "Boycott Foreign Goods",
and "Realize the National Revolution"', and so Forth. He was
6 1very emphatic on these issues.
In advising the student-activists to be cautious, Teng
was certainly not telling these youngsters to disregard their
ultimate aim oF gaining control oF the country. In advising
the students on revolutionary methods , Teng simply suggest ed
that the various economic issues were devices to induce the
peasants to identiFy the economic programme oF the peasant
associations with their own interests. However, there was to
be the political side oF the movement. This involved Free
elections and popular control oF such Financial expenditures as
irrigation. But more importantly, Teng urged the students to
work towards a democratization oF the min-t’uan, or peasants
militia. These organizations, as Teng pointed out, were
traditionally under the control oF the gentry or large landowners
who, being wealthier and hence better armed, were stronger than
the peasant associations. While the landlords might use the
militia to ward oFF the bandits, iF the militia could become
organized by the peasants, 'then, when the opportunity comes,
b 2they can be used as the army For the revolution.' He reminded
his readers that in Hai-Feng, in spite oF the numerical strength
Teng, Ibid♦, p.10. 
Ibid., p . 10.
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of the peasant associations, they were eventually defeated 
because they could not match the military might of Ch'en Chiung- 
ming' s troops.^
So it was that as members of the CCP openly joined the 
KMT in January 1924, the Chinese communists had already devised 
a strategy for their rural activities. Certainly, they were 
adopting the slogan of a national revolution and not a communist- 
socialist revolution, but they took such a step only because of 
necessity, and they openly regarded such a move as a strategic 
retreat. More importantly, they let it be known that the 
strategy of a national revolution was but the initial step 
towards the goal of an eventual take-over of the political 
powers. For a well-known communist such as Teng Chung-hsia to 
publish such a statement could not but cast doubt on the 
credibility of the protestations of Li Ta-chao at the KMT 
Congress. And, the contemporary observers, such as the Chinese 
Mail of Hong Kong and the Correspondent of the Peking and 
Tientsin Times certainly had cause to worry about the communist 
agitation in the Chinese countryside.
That the Chinese communists had intended that their point 
of view be known publicly, and to the KMT, was quite evident. 
Indeed, in expressing his views on the various 'main forces', 
especially the peasants, on the national revolution, Teng and 
his fellow communists had the imminent KMT Congress in mind. 
Shortly after the new KMT Constitution was published, the CKCN 
published a lengthy two-part critique on the constitution by a
63 Ibid., p.10.
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64regular contributor to the journal. While expressing general 
approval of the programme, the writer urged that the KMT should
65carry out their promises to the workers and peasants. But
the author let it be known that for the KMT to earn or deserve
their leadership in the national revolution in the labour and
peasant movements, then the KMT was expected to carry out the
66programme as discussed by Teng Chung-hsia, and not simply 
regard the poor in the cities and countryside as merely vagabonds 
and bandits. These people, the writer claimed, were victims 
of the social system and the national revolution was the means 
to rectify the system. Indeed, he went on, in a national 
revolution the aim of the revolutionary government 'must be to 
emphasize the benefits of the peasants, workers and the
/T r y
vagabonds.' '
Furthermore, the CKCN was insistent that their rural
programme was not the same as the so-called New Village
6 8programme of the May 4th 'dreams'. These earlier ones were 
inspired by the Tolstoy-model and not based on the concept of
Tan Yi, 'P'ing Kuo-min-tang cheng-kang' (Critique on the 
Political Programme of the KMT) in 2 parts CKCN Nos.18-9 
(16-II-23, 11-1924), pp.1-4 and pp.1-7.
6 5 Ibid., Part I, p.3.
66 Ibid., Part II, p.3.
^  Tan Yi, 'Ho wei kuo-min ke-ming? ' (What is the National 
Revolution) CKCN No.20 (1-III-1924), pp.1-6. Quote from p*3*
C) H Lin Ken, 'Huang-kang ti hsiang-ts fun chiao-yü yun-tung' (The 
Village Educational Movement of Huang-kang) CKCN No.20, pp.b-9«
Lin was formerly a member of the New Village Movement .
;3 3o
class sl.ru^(3 o that the Chinese communists were now espousing.
To he sure, some of the workers of the new programme had 
personally experienced the New Village programme but they now 
looked back on their experience as one of childish dreaming.
For now, their aim was to prepare the peasants to embark on
69the road to economic and political struggle. They did not 
expect rapid success for they realized that apart from the 
shortage of manpower to carry out the programme to such a wide 
area, there was also a shortage of money. Therefore, in the 
initial stages, the students were counselled not to antagonize 
the local notables until their own movements foundations were 
established. Indeed, the students were told that if necessary 
they might even enlist the help of these notables though 
ultimately the aim of the movement was to suppress the oppressors 
of the masses.
As to their new collaborator - the KMT - the Chinese 
communists informed their following of student-activists that 
the relationship between the two parties was certainly not, of 
antagonism. Yun Tai-ying, a leading figure of the SYC, informed 
his readers that Sun Yat-sen was a sincere old revolutionary.
But, Yun added, Sun 'is already a sixty-years old man ... the 
Chinese revolution, I am afraid, is not a matter that concerns 
Mr. Sun alone. As to how to improve a revolutionary party, T
I 1 > a d . , pp.8-9 .
70 I b i d . ,  |).().
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am afraid it is also not a matter solely the responsibility of 
7 1Mr. Sun. ' What Yun wanted was for the KMT to be 'like
72the Bolshevik Party in Russia.' Warming up to the theme, h m
revealed his great dissatisfaction with the then current
programme of the KMT. As with his CCP colleagues in other
spheres of the collaboration, Yun also took the view that he
was in basic agreement with the Three Principles of Sun but that
the Chinese communists felt that the KMT had been misapplying
or had misunderstood the Principles. To Yun and his communist
colleagues, the Three Principles meant 'the leading of the
workers, peasants, and soldiers and the ordinary citizens ...
into the revolution. This would be many tens of times more
effective than the present military movements. Therefore, I
am of the opinion that all those who desire to remake society
7 3must help him (that is, Sun ) . '
In short, then, the leaders of the SYC were instructing 
their young followers that the KMT had, hitherto, inaccurately 
understood the real meaning of the national revolution. Thus, 
he hoped and urged that 'all will try hard to change and improve 
the KMT so that it can properly shoulder the task of the
74revolution.
Yun Tai-ying, 'Tsao tang' (The Making of a Party), CKCN 
No.21 (8-111-1924), pp.7-11. Cited from p.8. This article 
was a reply to a query from a reader on the best way to help 
China.
Yun, Ibid., p.9* 
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V mi, Ibid. , p. 10.
7'I Ibid., p .9•
The rural strategy ol' the CCP, at the commencement of the 
official collaboration with the KMT in the Canton National 
Government was thus made abundantly clear. The activists were 
told not to reveal their communist identity too quickly or 
openly partly because to do so might antagonize the powerful 
elements on the land and partly that might scare away their 
ideologically backward quarry. They were instructed to adopt 
slogans of a national revolution and identify themselves as 
members of the KMT, which in fact they were. But, in practice, 
they were to interpret the KMT message in a fashion quite unlike 
what the KMT members had hitherto done. In fact, the message 
and the image of the KMT were to be remade into the communist 
mould. As one field worker reported, ’We should not merely 
remember to "Recover Lii-Ta" or "Remember Lenin" ... but we should 
also pay attention to, and make use of, every local incident to 
teach the masses so that they will learn to resist [oppressionj
75and rise up to join the revolution.’
To be sure, many of these student-activists in the fields 
would need more than the advice and directives such as those 
given by Teng. But, it was apparent that the advices of Teng 
were very seriously taken. One young man reported that in the 
Hupei region where he was working, the peasants were rather 
more backward than the picture painted by Teng and wrote to the
76CKCN for help. Yun Tai-ying not only counselled patience but
r
‘ ) Meng; Yuen, ’Shui-shen huo-jo ti Hunan’ (Hunan in Deep water 
and Hot fire) CKCN No.25 (5-IV-1924), pp.2-5. Cited from p.2. 
Lii-ta stands for Lii-shun and Ta-lien, two treaty ports which 
remained in Japanese hands after World War i.
/(> ’ Nung ts’un yun-tung’ (Village Movement), a Cor respond once
Section, CKCN 29 (3-V-1924), pp.12-14.
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advised the young man to be careful always of the power
structure of the locality and the psychology of the local
77peasants. Certainly the aim of the village movement was to
unite with the peasants to oppose and remove the oppressive 
landlords and local corrupt gentry, but first, the workers had 
to gain the confidence of the peasants. Unless that was 
accomplished there would ke no hope of organizing any 
association.78
More importantly, Yun not only counselled against any 
unnecessary and premature arousal of antagonism, even from 
those who were the natural class enemies, but, for tactical 
reasons, there might be a need to seek a temporary united front 
with them to face the greater enemy. To put it in a more 
sophisticated communist expression, the field workers were 
enjoined to seek out which was the prime contradiction and try 
to overcome that first before dissipating one^ s energy 
unnecessarily. Yun pointed out the very successful actions in 
Shun-te in Kwangtung as an example of how such tactics might
79be called into use. In Shun-te, the field workers made
friends with the local gentry and, using their name, called 
upon the peasants to join the min-t\ian - the militia. At the 
same time, other workers addressed themselves to the self- 
supporting peasants and the tenants, classes which Party Leader 
Ch'en had previously warned that harboured ambitions of being 
landlords. Appealing to their self-interest , the workers
77 Ibid., p.13.
78 Ibid., p.14.
79 Ibid., p.14.
induced peasants to join the militia and reduce the role of the
gentry to one of supporter. This way, the militia came under
the control of the peasants who would then be in a stronger
position in their requests for rent reduction, or loans at a
more reasonable rate. Certainly, the movement in Shun—te had
the benefit of being led by an experienced communist, Tan
P ’ing-shan, but nevertheless the main force of the workers were
80middle school students and the SYC.
Some field workers were more adaptable than our worker in
Hupei, in spite of the different social conditions they might
encounter as compared to the generalized picture and the optimism
given by Teng Chung—hsia. In Shantung, a field worker found that
in the Kwang—jao hsien had a rural population of which over 90^
81were classified as self-supporting peasants. This, on the 
reckoning of Ch'en Tu—hsiu, would make the place one with a 
strong tendency towards being totally reactionary. But, the 
workers there were resourceful and were able to inculcate the 
concept of class struggle even in that area — where the people, 
would normally be regarded as having a strong urge to be land­
lords. As the peasants had to sell their products through a 
middle-man in cash and as there was a bout of inflationary 
action in the economy, the producers found that the returns for
A good description of the Shun-te movement was recorded by 
the Wah Tse Yat Pao, 8-VII-1924.
8 1 Chun Ts'ai, ’Shantung Kwang-jao hsien nung-min sheng-huo1 
(Peasant Life in Kwang—jao hsien of Shantung) CKCN N 0.3O 
( 10-V-1924), pp.9-12.
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their labour were so meagre that they were often in debt, to 
the buyers of their goods« The chief of the hsien was in league 
with the buyers whom the field workers described as capitalists. 
By not being dogmatic in their approach, the workers were able 
to organize the peasants into self-defence militia, the min-tuan, 
against the exploiting class — the corrupt bureaucrats and 
capitalists«
Indeed, the student—led village movement (hsiang—ts'un 
yun-tung) was getting so encouraging that with the coming of the 
summer long vacation, Yun Tai-ying began to make hopeful plans 
for a massive action with tens of thousands of students to take 
to the fields. Judging from the results and in the context of 
the total programme of the CCP, this village movement was of 
increasing importance in the second half of 1924 and the first 
half of 1925. Only with the labour incidents associated with 
the May 30th Movement was public attention drawn to the labour 
movement vis-a-vis communist activities in China. Indeed, the 
labour front was so quiet that 'by 1924 there were hardly any 
[labour] organizations left [in Shanghai] that were under 
Communist influence'; and even Teng Chung—hsia had to concede
8 2that the labour front was inactive . ±n the winter of 1924«
Of course, the lack of strike action in Shanghai did not mean 
the lack of activities on the part of the CCP. As already noted,
Quotation cited from Chesneaux, Op.cit., p.232; see also his 
chapter IX 'Two Years of Retreat' (i.e. 1923-24), pp.211-236.
For Teng's comment, see his Chung—kuo chih—kung yun-tung chien 
shih (A Brief History of the Chinese Labour Movement) Chapter 8, 
pp.108-124, (1953 Peking; first published in 1930» Moscow).
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the communists were re-establishing the major unions and,
ideologically, making claim that the proletariat class was the
only worthy one to lead the national revolution.
Thus, just before the summer vacation began, Yun made a
strong appeal to the students pleading with them to participate
in the village movement during the coming holidays. He appealed
to their revolutionary ardour certainly, but he also made strong
appeals to their sense of duty as the intellectual class and
81their sense of justice. J Indeed, the CKCN had assumed that 
the love for ones country constrains one to participate in the
84national revolution and that Yun’s particular burden was really
to explain that the village movement was the most suitable and
urgent expression of being a patriotic youth of the new style.
Yun hoped that in every region a village movement study group
would be organized to study what needed to be done and to
85co-ordinate activities. But, if some were unable to attend
such a study group, Yun urged them not to preach revolution and
bloodshed at the very first opportunity. On the contrary, the
students were urged first and foremost to win the friendship
86and confidence of the peasants.
To further help those who could not participate in such 
study groups, the CKCN published a do-it-yourself questionnaire
8 i Yun, 'Yii pei shu-chia ti hsiang-ts'un yun-tung' (Prepare for 
the summer vacation's village movement) CKCN No.32 (24-V-1924) 
pp.4-10. See especially Section I, pp.4-5*
84 .. ,See Cheng Han, 'Chung-kuo shih ti hsiieh-che' (The Chinese­
style scholars) CKCN No.32, p.1 (24-V-1924).
85 Yun, Op.cit., CKCN, No.32, p.5> Section 5*
86 Yun, Ibid., p.9, Section 10.
337
for participants of the village movement written, again by
O ry
Yun. Again the importance of the work was emphasized. Now,
Yun insisted that the Chinese revolution would not succeed
until the peasants themselves thirsted for the revolution
because the workers were numerically weak and, as the soldiers
were really the male members of the peasantry, a revolutionized
peasantry would achieve the bonus of a revolutionized
88soldiery. The labour leaders in the CCP might not have 
approved of Yun* s exaggeration of the importance of the village 
movement but numerically there were more members enrolled into 
the peasant associations than into the trade unions when the 
two movements held their joint National Congress of May Day 1925.
The student-activitists were not the only workers in the 
village movement. Since the formation of the KMT-CCP 
collaboration, ’ a Peasants' Department was established by the 
Canton Government. It was authorized by the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC) of the KMT, ’but with no previous experience
89all activities were merely in the planning stage.' However, 
a series of surveys were soon authorized and, judging from the 
plans made, the intention of the peasant movement being planned
^  Yun, 'Nung-ts'un yun-tung' (Village Movement) CKCN No.37 
(28-VI-1924), pp.8-12.
Yun, CKCN No.37, p.9.
89 Lo Ch'i-yuan, 'Pen-pu i-nien-lai kung-tso pao-kao kai-yao' 
(Short Report on the Activities of Our Department for this Year) 
Chung-kuo Nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) No.2, 1926. Hereafter
cited as Report. Lo was then the Secretary of the Department.
was one of instilling class consciousness. One of the plans
for which the Peasants' Department had the approval of the CEC
was that there should be four types of peasant associations,
those for the self-supporting peasants, those for the tenants,
those for the hired labourers and the peasant self-defence
90militia organizations. However, there was no evidence that
such a plan was actually carried out for the very formation of 
a single peasant association in a given area was difficult 
enough to achieve, as shown from the reports of the field 
workers mentioned above in the CKCN. At the same time, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that until the first graduates were 
produced by the Peasants' Movement Training Institute in August 
1924, the student-activists were the only reservoir of manpower 
available.
The Chinese communists were very much in control of the 
leadership of this Department, so much so that their erstwhile 
collaborators remembered those days with much anger. As Tsou 
Lu, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chou Fo-hai recalled the situation, 
P'eng P ’ai and the other communists were not only in control of 
the running of the Peasant Department and the Institute, but 
the communists were also recruiting only sympathetic students 
and manning the various front organizations with their selected 
people. Indeed, Tsou Lu claimed that P'eng P'ai had boasted
^  Decisions of the 15th Meeting of the CEC, 19’III"1924.
Report.
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that 'anyone who did not agree with him would not dare to remain
91as Head of the Peasant Department.'
The peasant movement seemed to have achieved much success,
especially in Kwangtung province. When the First Peasant
Movement Congress convened in Canton on May Day 1925, the
Institute had graduated 288 workers for the movement in its
92first three classes. And, the Congress itself was able to
claim it represented a total membership of about 200,000 enrolled
93in the peasant associations scattered over twenty-two hsien.
These successes were noticed by their opponents and, as a result, 
oppressive reactions increased almost correspondingly.
The students of the second class of the Institute were 
given an unexpected practical experience in military affairs 
when the Merchants' Revolt occurred in the midst of their
94training session. Furthermore, the First Annual Report of the
n -j Tsou Lu, Kuo-min-tang shih-kao (A Draft History of the KMT) I, 
386. (Shanghai 1929)• Also see Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 
p .31 (NY 1957); and Chou Fo-hai 'Wo t 'ao ch •uliao criih-tu Wuhan' 
(My escape from Wuhan the Red Capital), Ch'en and Chou, Op.cit.,
p . 150.
92 /See Chung-kuo nung-min Nos.2-9, 1926. These articles are
reprinted in Kung-fei huo-kuo hui-pien IV, pp.253—295» especially 
pp.259”276. (Collected Documentson the National Calamity by the 
Communist Bandits) (Taipei 1961).
93 There appears to be some differences on the actual numbers in 
the membership. According to 'Summary' of Chung-kuo nung-min 
Nos. 6-7 (July 1926) there were 117 delegates representing over 
180,000 members. Ho Yang-ling's Nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant 
Movement) gave 210,000 in IV, p.20 (Nanking 1928) and Eto 
accepted Ho's figures in the former's 'Hai-lu-feng...' II, 153*
94 From the Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) reprinted in 
Kung-fei huo-kuo hui-pien (hereafter known as KFHK) IV, p.265*
340
Kwangtung Provincial Peasants Associations was replete with
reports of oppressive actions taken by the landlords and the
militia (min-1' uan) against the activities of the peasant
movement. In February 1925, the Report recalled, 'imperialism
and its tools' were perpetuating more evil and reactionary deeds
while the 'evil gentry', in league with the local bandits and
soldiers, looted and burnt the Peasants Association headquarters
95in many hsien.
But, of more relevance to this discussion was the background
of the students of the Institute. Of the first three classes -
the only ones which the occupational background of the students
were recorded and the ones relevant to the period under
discussion - their background bore witness to the suggestion in
this study that the rural movement of the Chinese communists
was heavily staffed by students. The first class 'was mainly
students of the May Fourth Movement who had participated in the
, 96'To the People' movement' during the May 4th period. The 
second class had 30$ of the intake classified as 'students', 10$ 
'from the peasant associations', that is, those who had 
participated in the rural movement but were now returning to 
receiving formal training, 22$ were classified as workers, 30$
97as peasants and another 8$ as 'girl students' . If the last 
mentioned meant that those young women were students but the
9 5 See 'Summary', Chung-kuo nung-min, Nos.6-7*
967 KFHK, IV, p.259.
97 KFHK, IV, p.259.
Inina I (' conn I (upa rl. o I' Mic other JO'/, ol’ ma.l.o si iuU m iI s, then,
Ui(! class had a j8'/> of' school students. On the other hand,
those young women might be from other walks of life but classed
as students after having joined the Institute, then the second
class still had a 30^ of school students. Judging from the age
recorded, it seems that some of the enlisted women were too old
98to have been students but some were under twenty years old.
In the third class, although the percentage of students had
dropped to 22.6</> nevertheless, just over 70$> of that class were
99under twenty-five years old.
It is of interest to note that the second class had an 
initial intake of 225 members which was only second to the final 
and sixth class which was the most comprehensively trained class 
under the direction of Mao Tse-tung. The large intake at the 
second class showed signs of lack of care in the selection 
process for many found the military training too strenuous and 
resigned, while others were frightened by the Merchants Revolt 
and f l e d . I n d e e d ,  this seemed to give witness to the idea 
that the upsurge of rural activities in the latter part of 1024 
was, in some ways, a compensatory action vis-a-vis the labour 
movement. The second class of the Institute commenced on the 
21st August 1924 under the direction of CCP member Lo Ch'i-yuan. 
Hut, the large number resulted in some embarrassment to the
98 Ibid.,
99 Ibid.,
p. 265•
p.270.
100 Ibid., p .263•
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organizers because there was a shortage of space as well as 
101instructors. Such haste, in both preparation and recruitment
- which resulted in a drop-out of 3 7 of the original enrolment - 
becomes more understandable if the rural and labour movements 
at that time were seen in the special light of 1924.
Contemporaneous to the second class of the Institute, the
SYC organ, the Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien reported the death of a
102comrade, one Liu Tun, who died of exhaustion. Yun Tai-ying,
who was then the secretary of the Corps published parts of a 
number of letters this fallen comrade had written to him. In 
one of these letters the writer, Liu Tun expressed the ideas 
that since the May 4th Movement and especially since the 
February 4th Incident, great progress had been made in the 
labour movement. As to the peasants, while the work there was 
difficult, natural calamities, wars, and other exploitation had 
made many realize the need to unite and struggle. However,
while the labour movement is temporarily in 
a doldrum, the workers are still an army in 
hiding. Now [we] should promote the peasant 
movement. Even if it ends in failure - and,
I am sure it will suffer great attacks - it 
can be made into another revolutionary army.
Therefore, we should still participate in the 
realistic movement of the present. Otherwise, 
the "Down with the Warlords" call will become 
tedious before it can reach the people. If
Ibid., pp.262-263.
1 0 ? Liu Tun, ’I shu' (Bequeathed Letters) CKCN No.45 (20-IX— 1924) 
pp.8- 13. Quote cited from p.9*
this call cannot be amongst the people, 
and if !the people] have no such demands, 
the warlords will not be overthrown easily.
In short, Liu Tun regarded the extra promotional efforts on the 
rural movement as necessary, especially at the time when the 
labour movement was not getting much action. It was not that 
the labour movement organizers were not hard at work but that 
the opportunity for open struggle - strike actions - was not 
readily available.
The use of students as active participants in the rural
movement was not without its drawbacks. As the rural movement
had encountered much active resistance, the Institute began to
offer military training commencing with its first class, though
as mentioned, part of the reason for the military training was
to weed out the weak and the fainthearted. But, more
fundamentally, these students - the intelligentsia - did not
form an economic class and the organizers complained that some
of these had no appetite for revolutionary actions. Some,
coming from the 'petty bourgeoisie' were 'either opposed to
military training or could not withstand the hardship and
103withdrew voluntarily.' At the same time, this leavening of
the class by the students seemed a necessity if it was to be a 
successful operation. Not only were they zealous, or could be 
so, but some instructors found that the other students had such 
a low level of educational attainment as to render the training 
ineffective.
103 KFHK IV, p.260 and p.271.
104 Ibid., p.272.
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At the Institute, these first three classes were under
the direction of CCP members, with P 'eng P'ai directing the
first class, Lo Ch'i-yuan the second and Yuan Hsiao-hsien
105directing the third. In their teaching, the peasant movement
was taken as a part of the national revolution because the CCP 
believed that the revolution would not succeed unless the 
workers and the peasants were wholeheartedly supporting the 
national r e v o l u t i o n . T h e  purpose of the Institute was, 
therefore, to train personnel for the peasant movement.
Thus, just as the CCP had perceived the role of the 
workers in the national revolution as the proletarian vanguard 
in steering the successful revolution into its socialist phase, 
so the CCP also perceived the peasant movement in similar class 
struggle terms. That is, in the national revolution, the 
peasants would not only be enjoined to support the anti­
imperialist activities of the national revolution but would also 
learn to commence class struggle for their own class interests. 
As with the labour movement, the concept of class struggle was 
integral to the totality of the struggles entailed in the 
national revolution. Indeed, such endeavours in the peasant
movement was regarded as a means 'to promote the progress of the
107national revolution.1 The awakening of the peasants to
struggle for their own class interests, especially through the
105
106
KFHK IV, pp.260, 
Ibid., p.253.
262, 270.
107 Ibid., P.254.
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introduction of a materialistic conception of history, was taken 
by the CCP as an integral part of the CCP's contribution to the 
efforts of a national revolution.
As the Chinese communists had such an aim in mind for 
their peasant movement, it would be expected that they would 
foresee strong resistance, as they had experienced in the labour 
movement front. It seemed that after their acquisition of a 
territorial base in Kwangtung, the Chinese communists were 
making better preparations for their peasant movement than their 
labour movement, at least in their preparation for armed 
resistance. From the very first class at the Institute under 
the direction of P'eng P'ai, the trainees were given some 
military training. Though the entire class lasted only one 
month, the trainees were given ten days of military training. 
Having just been expelled from his home county of Hai-feng,
P' eng P'ai would certainly appreciate the importance of military 
strength in the peasant movement. Indeed, the graduates of the 
first class were expected to be 'warriors' as well as promoters
and organizers of the peasant movement and the peasant
. .. 108 associations.
At the second class, the students had the benefit of such 
notable instructors as Lo Ch'i-yuan, Tan P'ing-shan, and Yuan 
Hsiao-hsien. Apart from having the experience of the Merchants 
Revolt as a practical lesson, the students' instructions on 
propaganda methods included the emphasis of the peasant
108 Ibid., p.260.
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associations and militia as defenders of the interests of the
1 09peasants class and that the landlords were the oppressors.
By the third class the differentiation of classes in the rural 
scene was seen in terms of the exploiting and the exploited 
classes. By then, the Institute was able to claim, with some
pride, that their graduates had been at the vanguard of the
1 1 0struggle between the peasants and the landlords. And,
judging from the results of the final examination of this class,
the organizers proudly reported that the students now understand
’the special characteristics and systems in social revolution,
the causes of revolutions and their tendencies.’ At the same
time, the reports showed that the organizers were very proud of
their students’ grasp of the importance of the peasant movement,
the methods of investigation of rural conditions, and the methods
of propaganda. And, most importantly, the students were trained
11 1to acquire ’the real meaning and significance of class.’
These, of course, were in conformity with the general and 
expressed perception of the nature of national revolution 
according to the perspective of the Chinese communists. They had 
expressed similar views in the context of their perception on 
the nature of the leadership of the national revolution and the 
position of the CCP in it as well as in the context of the 
proletarian or labour movements. To the Chinese communists, the 
national revolution had at least two integral components: ;t
^ ^  Ibid., pp.263-6
11° Ibid., p.271.
1 1 1 Ibid., p.272
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united front of a number of classes in China against the 
exploitation of the imperialist-capitalist class of the foreign 
Powers while at the same time there would be an intensification 
of the class struggle within the social fabric of China.
In short, then, the Chinese communists in this period 
viewed their activities in the rural areas in much the same 
light as their activities in other sectors - as part of the 
general movement in the national revolution. Putting it in 
another way, the nature of Chinese communism in relation to the 
rural sector of China developed along similar lines to those in 
other sectors of communist activities in China.
Such was the conclusion which the Chinese communists
112themselves arrived at after working in the peasant movement.
And, that was exactly what they had previously announced that 
they would try to do, after having perceived the conditions of 
China according to their own perspective. As the Chinese 
communists began to organize the training classes at the 
Institute, their comrades announced through the medium which had 
long been concerned with the peasant movement - the Chung-kuo 
ch*ing-nien (The Chinese Youth) - that the most urgent task in 
the revolution was not to conduct revolutionary movement amongst
the soldiers but revolutionary movements amongst ’the peasants,
1 1 3workers, and even the vagabonds.’ Yun Tai-ying, in discussing
The above mentioned quotes from the KFHK IV were but reprints 
from the official journal of the Peasant Department of the Canton 
Government, the Chung-kuo nung-min (The Chinese Peasant) where 
there were detailed reports on the various classes of the 
Institute.
113 Yun Tai-ying, ’Chung-kuo ke-ming yii shih-chieh ke-ming’ (The 
Chinese Revolution and the World Revolution) CKCN No.35 PP«5~9 
(14-VT-1924). Cited from pp.6-7*
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’The Chinese Revolution and the World Revolution’, stressed 
that
We have to make the peasants, workers, and 
even vagabonds of all China realize that 
only through revolution can their problems 
be solved. They have to rely on the 
revolution to destroy all exploitations and 
disturbances by the warlords; they have to 
rely on the revolution to abolish all illegal 
rents and taxes; and they have to rely on the 
revolution to resist the powers of the 
foreign nations so that their industrial and 
rural enterprises may be benefited-.
Yun regarded such lines of action as those demanded of a 
semi-colonial state, such as China, in its process to acquire
1 1 4independence. It would be a nation-wide revolution against
the warlords and the imperialists. To that extent it was to be
a national revolution. Nevertheless, he was calling for these
revolutionary movements amongst the peasants, workers, and
vagabonds because ’if we do not overthrow the warlords, we will
not be able to organize a revolutionary people's government -
1 1 5ke-ming ti ,jen-min ti cheng-fu* In calling on the peasants
as participants in the anti-warlord segment of the national 
revolution, Yun may be considered as having ante-dated Mao 
Tse-tung in making a similar call in the latter’s famous Report
of the Examination of the Peasant Movement in Hunan. 1 16 As with
1 1 4 
115 
1 16
Yun, Ibid., p»9* 
Ibid., p .3.
Mao, Hsiang Tap No.191 (12-111-1927), especially p .2063
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Mao, Yim was also very practical. Whilst the ultimate aim was
to involve the peasants in the national revolution, he advised
that the best way to succeed was not to talk so much about
specialized matters and 'national events, or even the good and
bad points of the political parties and factions in the nation'
as the revolutionary workers themselves were wont to discuss,
but to discuss with the peasants the price of rice and the
117rates of interest. In short, he was reiterating what he had
*l 1 3published earlier in trying to get the peasants to identify 
their interests with those of the peasant movement which, in 
turn, would awaken them to the fact that their economic plight 
was the result of the economic and political exploitation of 
their class enemy, the landlords and the warlords. And, in 
arousing the opposition of the peasants towards these enemies 
in terms of class struggles, the Chinese communists would lead 
the peasants into the communist concept of a national revolution 
which involved class struggle as an integral part. For anyone,
including the KMT, to oppose such actions would be to betray
119the national revolution.
Therefore, it can be seen that the peasantry occupied an 
integral position in the revolutionary thinking and praxis of
Yun, 'Hsiang-ts* un yun-tung wen-ti' (Problems on the Village 
Movement), CKCN No.40, pp.12-5 (19-VII-1924); cited from p.15.
-jig
Yun, CKCN No.29 (3-V-1924), p*l4 'Nung-ts'un yun-tung' 
(Village Movement).
119 Tan I, 'Kuo-min-tang chung ti Kung-ch'an-tang wen-ti' (The 
CCP Question in the KMT) CKCN No.4l (19-VII-1924), pp.1-5, 
especially p-5- The date seems to be a misprint and should have 
been at least the 26-VII-1924.
jr>0
the Chinese communism. The workers were certainly the vanguard 
and the main force. But, the peasants who were also members of 
the proletariat, were also members of the main force only that 
they needed more effort to awaken to the objective realities.
The peasant movement was certainly a part, an important part, of 
the national revolutionary movement. And, as in the other 
sectors of the national revolutionary movement, the rural sector 
also called for the introduction and then intensification of 
class struggle. Such a struggle was perceived as an integral 
part of the national revolutionary movement and insisted on in 
their literature by the Chinese communists. As has been 
noted by Professor Eto and others, the rural policies of the 
Chinese communists were not the same as those directed by the 
Comintern given prior to the Third CCP Congress. The Chinese 
policies subsequent to that Congress were in line with their 
practice and policies prior to that Congress.
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EPILOGUE AMD CONCLUSION: TOWARDS
A SOCIALIST CULTURE.
While Chinese communism in this period was very much 
influenced by the Marxian ideas in The Communist Manifesto, the 
revolutionary praxis of the Chinese communists during these 
early years of the national revolution was very much in accord 
with a Leninist interpretation of Marxism. The actions of the 
Chinese communists seemed to be the practical expression of the 
1905 injunction of Lenin when he proclaimed that
A Social-Democrat must never for a moment 
forget that the proletariat will inevitably 
have to wage the class struggle for Socialism 
even against the most democratic and republican 
bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. This is 
beyond doubt.... Hence the temporary nature 
of our tactics of 'striking jointly' with 
the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a
strict watch 'over our ally, as over an enemy,'
1etc. All this is beyond the slightest doubt.
However, as Barrington Moore, Jr. has observed, 'if one speaks
of Leninist theory, it is usually necessary to speak of it as
it existed at a given point in time and at a given stage of its 
2development.' As we have noted, in 1923 the leading Chinese 
communist theoretician, Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, had given considerable 
notice of Lenin’s 1905 tract, Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in
 ^ Lenin, Two Tactics, pp.90-91 (Peking, 1965)- 
2 Barrington Moore, Jr. Soviet Politics - the Dilemma of Power, 
p.39 (N.Y. Torchbook ed. 1965).
the Democratic Revolution. Herein lies a major point of
variation between Chinese and Russian communism. Lenin was 
writing his piece whilst in exile in Geneva and the Chinese were 
reading it in China and applying it during the first stages of 
their national revolution.
This last point is of importance. This is so not only
because Lenin*s great tactical flexibility would never make him
regard doctrinal purity as an end in itself but also because
when Lenin was making his pronouncements he did not envisage a
drawn out united front type of national revolution in his
homeland, such as one confronting the Chinese communists. In
spite of the tough stand taken in 1905 in the Two Tactics, the
exiled Lenin did not persist in stirring the fears of the
bourgeois and peasant leaders whom the Bolsheviks sought to
effect a limited tactical alliance. Thus, as late as October
31915» Lenin would issue a thesis suggesting that
the task confronting the proletariat of Russia 
is that consummation of the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution in Russia in order to kindle the 
socialist revolution in Europe, (emphasis his)
While this implied that his ultimate goal was socialism, it was 
also apparent that at that time Lenin thought it would first 
develop outside Russia. Yet, within days of the founding of the 
new government in Russia, Lenin voiced strong objections against
3 Lenin 'Several Theses', first published in the Sotsial Demokrat 
(Social Democrat) No.47, 13-X-1915» thesis No.6. Collected Works
v.21 pp.401-402. Quote cited in p.402. (Moscow, Progress 
Publisher 1964).
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it and declared that ’the revolutionary proletariat can ...
only regard the revolution of March 1 (14) as its initial, and
by no means complete victory on its momentous path. It cannot
but set itself the task for a democratic republic and 
4socialism.’
In short then, when the time of action came, Lenin had no 
use for his 1915 thesis and showed neither trust in, nor 
disposition towards, co-operation with the bourgeois parties. 
Instead of working towards the ’consummation of the bourgeois- 
democratic revolution’, Lenin reserved his strongest objections 
to the leftist elements in the new government. He claimed that
Not only this government, but even a
democratic bourgeois republican government,
were it to consist exclusively of Kerensky
and other Narodniks and "Marxist" social
patriots (i.e. those socialists supporting
the war) cannot lead the people out of the
5imperialist war and guarantee peace.
However, he was not entirely certain what the future programme 
should be. He would go as far as granting the proletariat of 
Russia the title of ’the vanguard of the revolutionary proletaria 
of the whole world' because the Russians seemed to have the 
'honour of beginning the series of revolutions'. Nevertheless, 
he was of the opinion that 'single handed, the Russian proletaria 
cannot bring the socialist revolution to a victorious conclusion
Lenin, ’Draft Theses', 4 (17) XIX, 1917, Collected Works v. 23, 
p .290.
5 Lenin, 'Draft Theses', Ibid., p.290
only starts it.' In so saying, he was really echoing what
Marx and Engels said in 1882 that the Russian Revolution might
7become the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West.
Indeed, as Barrington Moore, Jr., observed, 'when in 1917 a
second revolutionary upheaval in Russia suggested to Lenin the
possibility of success, he left behind him in Switzerland the
ideological baggage of parliamentary democracy without taking
with him a definitely socialist programme.'8
When he returned to Russia in April 1917 in the famous
sealed train, Lenin was no longer satisfied with parliamentary
government and wanted nothing short of 'a republic of Soviets
of Workers', 'Agricultural Labourers', and Peasants' Deputies
9throughout the country, from top to bottom.' And, after the 
surprisingly swift Bolshevik conquest of power, Lenin remarked 
to Trot sky:10
You know, from persecution and a life 
underground, to come so suddenly into power 
... 'Es Schwindelt' (my head spins).
Lenin, 'Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers' 26-III (8-IV- 
1917). Collected Works v. 23, pp.367-373.
7 Marx & Engels, Preface to the 1882 Russian translation of The 
Communist Manifesto
8 Barrington Moore, Jr., Op.cit., p.36.
9 Lenin, 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution' 
(the 'April Theses') 20-TV— 1917* Collected Works v.24, p.23.
10 L. Trotsky, My Life, p-337 (N.Y. 1930).
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Indeed, in revolution the appetite for change comes with eating.
While Lenin and the Russian communists achieved power 
rapidly by a coup d 'etat, the situation confronting the Chinese 
communists was very different and they realized the differences. 
Hence, the Chinese had always talked and planned in terms of 
prolonged struggles. The revolutionary experience of the Russian 
communists really provided little concrete examples for the 
Chinese to follow. For, even during the interregnum between 
the February and October Revolutions in 1917 when the Bolsheviks 
held their Sixth Congress (in August) to discuss party organ­
ization, its top leaders - amongst them included Lenin, Trotsky, 
Zinoviev, and Kamenev - were either in hiding or under arrest.
The Chinese communists, however, were not in exile though
in certain situations they had to operate secretly. But, as a
member of the National Government coalition in Canton, the CCP
was operating openly. Thus, in their formulation and projection
of their ideology, the Chinese communists were not writing for
an audience of fellow-exiles as their Russian counterparts were
doing but were openly appealing to their fellow citizens around
them and in other parts of China. The Chinese Communists were
1 1certainly aware of this environmental difference.
Eg. When Ch’ii Ch'iu-pai advocated the Jacobinical method for 
the Chinese revolution in 1923* he admitted that such an advocacy 
was going further than what Lenin would allow. But, he argued 
that the method was necessary because China was economically more 
backward than Russia, while politically, China was no longer a 
monarchy as Russia was before the revolution. See Ch'ii's 'From 
Democracy to Socialism', HCN-Q No.2 (20-XII-1923)•
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The Chinese communists were undoubtedly taking lessons 
from the Russian experience but not blindly. Before they had 
become communists, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his friends and colleagues 
were searching for ways and means to change the ethos of Chinese 
society. Before they embraced Marxism, Chien and his fellow 
intellectuals - chih-shih fen-tzu - were not certain of the 
means which they should adopt to effect the changes, nor indeed 
were they certain of their goals. However, they all agreed 
that China was in need of urgent radical changes. Those 
intellectuals who eventually became communists also shared the 
conviction that there was an urgent need to remove the 
fundamental causes of the social inequality they found in the 
Chinese society.
While they were searching for the means and goals they 
were also active in trying to awaken the Chinese people to 
share their vision. These people were certainly dissatisfied 
intellectuals, but compared to the dissatisfied intellectuals 
in pre-revolution Russia, there were major differences in the 
nature and expression of their dissatisfaction and an 
understanding of these differences may be of help to an 
understanding of the decisions and expressions of these Chinese 
intellectuals after they had become communists.
A fundamental difference between pre-revolutionary Russia 
and pre-revolutionary China was that regardless of the faults 
and weaknesses in Russian society, Russia was still a great 
power, a feared and formidable factor in the international 
scene. On the contrary, pre-revolutionary China had been 
defeated in every war, and, with the decision to abolish the
Examination System, signified to all that even the Court agreed 
to the need for basic changes. In a germinal discussion on the 
general differences between the attitudes of the pre-revolution­
ary intellectuals in China and Russia, the late Professor Mary
1 2C. Wright had observed that the Chinese intellectuals, in 
contrast to the Russian intellectuals were politically 
nationalistic. This, she explained, was the result of the 
different international status of the respective states. She 
further observed that the Russian intellectuals’ basic hostility 
to the state per se seemed lacking in the Chinese intellectuals. 
This was properly explained that traditionally the bureaucrats 
and intellectuals in China had been largely the same people 
whereas in modern Russia, say since 1762, there was an 
'abhorrence of state service by Russian intellectuals.' As a 
result of such differences in socio-political background, she 
found that 'the Chinese intellectuals do not seem to have been 
alienated from society in the sense that Russian intellectuals
, 13were.'
The leaders of the communist revolutions in both Russia 
and China were certainly intellectuals. The Chinese leadership 
were university professors, young graduates and students, and 
though the Russians were mainly exiles they may be regarded as 
declasse intellectuals. In view of their differences in
Mary C. Wright, 'The Pre-revolutionary Intellectuals of China 
and Russia', The China Quarterly, N o .6 (April-June 1961),
PP.173-179.
13 Ibid., p.177-
'3 r> 8
socio-political background and attitudes, as suggested by 
Professor Wright, we may expect that such distinctions would 
have their influences on those intellectuals in both countries 
who had decided to take the communist revolutionary path. As 
has been noted at the beginning of this chapter it is difficult 
to speak of the Leninist revolutionary strategy, even right up 
to the eve of the October Revolution. Lenin certainly did not 
have a carefully worked out revolutionary strategy, whilst in 
exile, to be practised in his homeland in order to bring about 
the desired results. Indeed, as he had confided to Trotsky, 
he was surprised by the rapidity of the Bolshevik success.
A most distinctive aspect between the two groups of 
revolutionary intellectuals was the cultural aspect of their 
respective programmes. Indeed, one may be permitted to suggest 
that the Chinese revolutionary intellectuals turned to communism 
as a result of their cultural programme while the Russians, at 
least the Leninists, really had no cultural programme to speak 
of even after the October Revolution. As it was in the realm 
of ideas - the development and nature of communism - that the 
Chinese intellectuals-cum-communists had expressed dissimilarity 
vis-a-vis the Russian counterparts*, it may be appropriate to 
round off this study of Chinese communism with an examination
While stressing dissimilarities in this study, I am aware that 
in matters of practicality, the CCP was often called upon to 
perform tasks as the result of directives from their Comintern 
comrades. However, it is not the purpose of this study to 
discuss those issues but merely to delineate certain aspects of 
the development and nature of Chinese communism
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of the more cultural aspect,s of the development of Chinese 
communism.
Lenin came from the popular-educational as well as the
revolutionary tradition of the Russian intelligentsia: his
father was a radical inspector of schools under the tsar. But
neither Lenin nor the Bolsheviks in general can be said to have
a coherent cultural programme prior to the October Revolution.
Lenin, as has been demonstrated, was rather preoccupied with
the problem of adopting his protean ideas to the changing
political situations in Russia and amongst the fellow exiles
in Geneva. Indeed, ’Bolshevik propaganda, being purely
materialistic and scientific, could appeal to the proletariat
but failed to gain the emotional sympathy of the intelligentsia
1 4or the peasantry.'
More than anything else, the events from his return to 
Finland Station to the Bolsheviks' seizure of power had amply 
demonstrated Lenin’s talent in grasping opportunities and in 
organization. It seemed that his attitudes to culture were 
also preconditioned by his penchant for revolutionary 
organization. This was nowhere better demonstrated than in the 
second speech he made at the First All-Russian Congress on
i
extramural education which opened on 6 May 1919* This was in 
fact a congress of the leading cultural figures meeting to 
discuss cultural policies for the new Soviet Republic. Lenin's
Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment, p.4 
(Cambridge 1970)*
speech, given on the last day and entitled 'On the deception
of the people by slogans of freedom and equality' deserved to 
be recalled. The speech, lasting one and a half hours, was an 
attack on the anti-Communism of the socialist and liberal 
intelligentsia. In part, Lenin proclaimed:
I have shown you that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is inevitable, necessary and 
undoubtedly obligatory in order to escape from 
capitalism. Dictatorship means not only force — 
though it is impossible without force - but 
also a higher level of labour organization than 
before. That is why, in my short welcoming 
speech, I underlined this basic, elementary 
and most simple task of organization; and that 
is why I regard all intellectual fantasies of 
"proletarian culture" with such ruthless 
hostility. ... The task of proletarian discipline 
is to distribute bread and coal in such a way 
that there is a careful attitude to each unit 
of coal and each unit of bread ... If we solve 
this very simple, elementary problem, we shall 
... win. ... The basic task of "proletarian 
culture" is proletarian organisation.^
Though the speech failed to convince the Social-Revolutionaries, 
anarchist, Bundist and non-Communists in the Congress to the 
Bolshevik concept of enlightenment, it provided an enlightening 
glimpse into the mind of Lenin.
1 5J Cited from Fitzpatrick, Op.cit., p.107* Chapter 5 of her 
book, pp.89-109, deals with the first attempts of the Bolsheviks 
to try to establish proletarian cultural organizations after the 
October Revolution.
In Marxist terminology, what Lenin was trying to do was to 
create a new social base through the rearrangement of the 
superstructure. He wanted to bring about the ’base' of 
proletarian democracy and communism by reconstructing and re­
organizing the superstructure - ’the task of proletarian 
discipline is to distribute bread and coal ... the basic task 
of ’proletarian culture’ is proletarian organization.* To be 
sure, the concept of the superstructure influencing the base is 
Marxian and the Chinese communists would certainly not deny such 
a possibility. However, the approach, and assumption, of the 
Chinese communists were very different. As has been mentioned, 
those Chinese intellectuals who became communists, especially 
C h ’en Tu-hsiu, were moved by the social injustices they 
witnessed in the society. C h ’en, after associating himself with 
revolutionaries for many years, founded the Hsin C h ’ing-nien
magazine in the hope of awakening the intellectuals. In a reply
16to a query from a reader, Ch ’en expressed his attitude thus:
The foundation of progress of the masses is 
in education and industry and not in politics.
But politics must progress to above a certain 
level before education and industry can have 
the proper milieu for development.
Now, as has been noted, in making this reply, C h ’en was 
explaining to the reader the reasons for politicizing the 
magazine, a decision which this reader regarded as a turning 
away from the original aim of educating the youth. In wording
361
16 Reply to Ku K ’e-kang, HCN III, 5 (1-VII-1917).
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his reply thus, Ch'en was putting forward the proposition that.
in the political and educational aspects they were not mutually
exclusive but complementary. This reply, therefore, may be
taken to be an amplification of the earlier statement on literary
1 7revolution, ’A Treatise on Literary Revolution’, where he 
enunciated the three fundamentals of the literary revolution:
1, Down with artificial, untrue, aristocratic 
literature! Create a natural, simple, lyrical 
people’s (kuo-min) literature!
2. Down with rotten, unrealistic literature based 
on quotations! Create a new, true, and 
realistic literature!
3« Down with the obscure, unclear, difficult 
literature of "woods and hills" which is 
remote from life! Create a clear social 
literature which is popularly understood!
Unlike the Bolsheviks who had to struggle to define the
concept and nature of culture in the new society they were 
1 8ushering forth , the Chinese revolutionaries regarded the 
cultural component of their programme as an important integral 
in the totality of their programme. Furthermore, whilst Lenin 
sought to bring forth this new culture through the reorganization 
of the means of distribution, after his seizure of political
 ^ Ch’en, ' Wen-hsiieh ke-ming lun’ (A Treatise on Literary 
Revolution), HCN XI, 6 (1-II-1917)* pp.1-4. Cited from p.1. 
This translation is by Wolfgang Franke, A Century of Chinese 
Revolution, p .111 (NY, 1970)«
1 8 See Fitzpatrick, op.cit., chs.5 "Proletkult" and 6 "The Arts".
-](>')
power, the Chinese approach was very much the reverse. The 
Chinese revolutionaries wanted to awaken their compatriots to 
the need for change by a cultural-cum-political process of 
enlightenment. They were not ruminating in exile but in the 
cultural and political centres of the nation - Shanghai and 
Peking. To say so certainly does not imply any lack of courage 
on the part of the Russian revolutionaries. That the Chinese 
revolutionaries had so much freedom was very much due to the 
relative weakness of the Chinese state, vis-a-vis Russia.
The revolutionary significances and implications of the 
statement by Ch'en Tu-hsiu on literary revolution must be seen 
in its contemporary context. This statement concerned more 
than mere literary matters but was a very political statement, 
especially so if compared to that by the Deweyite, Hu Shih.
The best known contribution by Hu was his article 'Suggestions
19for a literary reform', with its now well-known eight—point 
programme. However, compared to the statements by Ch'en to 
date, Hu's statement was not political but merely literary. 
Further, it was basically negative - seven of his eight points 
were admonitions of what not to do - and, in calling for the 
avoidance of the use of allusions (Point Seven) Hu's 
'suggestions' may even be regarded as of doubtful literary 
value. To Ch'en however, the cultural programme was but a part, 
albeit an important integrant, of the total revolutionary 
programme to reconstruct China.
19 Hu Shih, 'Wen-hsüeh kai-liang ch'u-i', HCN, II, 5 (1“I-1917)•
When Ch'en founded his Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih in 1915
(renamed Hsin Ch1ing-nien in 1916) his proclaimed aims were to
provide a forum to discuss with the youths of the day 'the
means of cultivating oneself and of governing the nation ...
[therefore] ... the magazine will freely discuss international
20affairs, scholarship, and ideas.' In short, he regarded the
educational and cultural aspects of his programme inseparably
21integrated with the political activities. So when he launched
his attacks on Confucianism - which he described as 'the idol
that had lost its magic and an ossification of the past' -
Ch'en was concerned 'not only with constitutional rule but with
the realities of our lives and the basic questions concerning
22ethics and intellectual thoughts.' Indeed, he reminded his
readers that before he had launched this attack on Confucianism, 
he had already urged the readers to be concerned with such 
matters. The message Ch'en liked to remind his readers of was:
Since the introduction of Western culture 
into our country, we are first awakened to 
the inadequacy of our scholarship, this we 
all know. Secondly, [we are awakened to the 
inadequacy of] our politics and the political 
situation in recent years is evident enough.
20
She kao (Publisher's Declaration) Ch'ing-nien tsa-chih, I, 1
(15-IX-1915)•
2 1 These concepts were expounded in the opening article of the 
journal by Ch'en, entitled 'Ching kao ch'ing-nien' (Repsectfully 
informing the Youths).
2 2 Ch'en, 'Hsien-fa yii K ' ung-chiao' (Constitutional rule and 
Confucianism), HCN, II, 3 (1-XI-1916).
2 3J Ch'en, 'Wx)-jen tsui-hou chih chiieh-wu' (Our Final Awakening), 
HCN, I, 6 (15“II-1916).
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The readers of his Journal would certainly remember that dh'en 
had already proclaimed that in his opinion the highest form of 
Western culture was French culture and the greatest gift from
24the French culture was socialism. By the time Ch'en made
his proposal for a literary revolution he had made two more 
strong attacks on Confucianism and his colleagues also published 
more articles in his journal.^
Thus it was that before Ch'en announced his programme for 
a literary revolution, he had already demonstrated a strong 
concern over the detrimental sociopolitical effects that the 
old culture - Confucianism - had on China. In other words, 
from the perspective of one in search of a praxis to effect a 
sociopolitical reconstruction of China, Ch'en in 1915“6 was 
already of the opinion that in any programme of sociopolitical 
change there must be included an integral programme to change
the cultural ethos as well. In his various statements against
-1Confucianism, he specifically emphasized the detrimental effects 
of Confucianism on the sociopolitical aspects of Chinese life 
and society. In his call for a literary revolution, he was 
delineating more clearly these detrimental effects of 
Confucianism on culture as well as pointing out, more succinctly,
24 Ch'en, 'Fa-lan-hsi jen yü chin— shih wen-ming' (The French and 
Modern Civilization) HCN, I 1 (15-IX-1915)*
2 5J Ch'en, 'K'ung-tzu chih tao yü hsien-tai sheng-huo' (The Way of 
Confucius and Contemporary Life), HCN, II 4 (1-XII-1916); 'Tsai 
lun K'ung-chiao wen-ti' (Another discussion on the Problem of 
Confucianism) HCN, II 5 (1-1-1917)* Two more discussions on 
Confucianism were published in the HCN, I 6 ( 15-11-1916) and II 
1 (1-IX-1916).
the relationship between the literary and the sociopolitical
aspects of a culture and to show that the two were inseparable,
especially to those aspiring to bring forth revolutionary
changes to the Chinese society.
In his three-point programme for a literary revolution,
Ch'en called for the replacement of ’aristocratic literature’
with a 'people's literature'. In so doing, he presented many
reasons, some of which may be called negative and some positive.
He rejected aristocratic literature because it 'bears no
relevance to the evolution and progress of society and
26civilization'. This may be regarded as a negative reason and
tallies with the new democratic system he proposed shortly
afterwards - where the large bureaucrats (ta kuan liao) and
27militarists will have no place in it. The positive reasons
stemmed from the premise that the literary revolution was a
part of the general sociopolitical revolution. Hence, he
argued that he wanted to destroy the three types of old
literature because they were 'not concerned with the universe,
with Life (j en-sheng) and society. ' He claimed that such types
of literature were responsible for the unsavoury attitudes of
28the people. Therefore, he insisted that
Ch'en, 'Literary Revolution', HCN, II 6 (1-II-1917), pp.1-4. 
Cited from p*3*
27 Ch'en, 'The Basis for the Realization of Democracy', HCN, VII
1 ( I-XII-1919)•
28 Ch'en, 'Literary Revolution', pp.3"^-*
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if one desires innovation in politics, one 
cannot but innovate literature - because it 
occupies the position of the moving ’spirit'
(ching shen) of politics.
Therefore, since Ch'en later decided to resign his chair and
deanship at Peita in order to devote his total’ attention to
the innovating of the Chinese society, one would be justified
in expecting that in his programme of sociopolitical innovation,
there would be included a cultural or literary segment. As far
as Ch'en was concerned, his commitment was total. To him the
issues 'are so clear that the opposition must not be given any
grounds for discussion. We regard our proposal as absolute and
will not permit others to reform it.' As to Hu Shih, he
explained that 'although we have unfurled the revolutionary
banner, although we cannot retreat, we dare not regard our ideas
29as absolute or that these ideas cannot be reformed.'
It seems appropriate, however, at this juncture to comment
on a linguistic feature of this literary revolution. Hitherto
the essays by Ch'en, Hu, and their colleagues, were written in
a modified literary style rather than the vernacular (pai .hua,
or the plain speech) style. This remarkable state of seeming
30inconsistency had not gone unnoticed by modern scholars. But,
as Kuo Mo-jo explained, objectively there is no real 
inconsistency. He argued that merely to write in the vernacular
29 Hu's statement was made in a letter to Ch'en, 9“IV-1917 from 
New York and Ch1en's statement was his reply to Hu. Both 
published in HCN, III 3 (l-V-1917) Correspondence Section.
30 e.g. Wolfgang Franke, A Century of Chinese Revolution (NY
1970), p.111.
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does not make a piece of writing revolutionary, nor can one
conclude that simply because something is written in the
classical literary style that it would be non-revolutionary.
He cited as examples the translation of Adam Smith by Yen Fu,
done in the classical literary style, as a contribution to the
revolutionary literature. At the same time, he noted that
there were various translations of the Christian Bible into
the pai hua, indeed into Cantonese and Fukienese and 'cannot
be more in the vernacular (pai) , but can we recognize these
[translations' as representative literature of the literary 
31revolution!'
In so saying, Kuo was not really belittling the 
radicalism involved in the use of pai-hua as a medium of 
literary endeavour. His argument really focussed on the 
sociopolitical aspects of the literary revolution. A basic 
assumption underlining Kuo's argument was the materialistic 
conception of history. Based on such a conception, Kuo not 
unexpectedly came to regard the introduction of the capitalistic 
ideas of Adam Smith into the pre-capitalist 'feudal socio­
economic environment of 19th Century China, as Yen Fu had done,’ 
a revolutionary or progressive step. Likewise, the introduction 
of the Christian religion - the opiate of the people - albeit 
in the vernacular, would have to be regarded as a retrograde 
step.
O  -1
J Kuo Mo-jo, 'Wen-hsiieh ke-ming chih hui-ku' (Recollections of 
the Literary Revolution) written 26-1— 1920, cited from Chang 
Ch'ing-lu, Chung-kuo hsien-tai ch'u-pan shih-liao (Historical 
materials on modern Chinese Publication) vol. 'chia'(a ), pp.122-
134; cited from 124.
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At the time of the publication of his statement on the
literary revolution, Ch'en was not yet persuaded to the
materialistic conception of history, although he was already
espousing the ideas of realism in the arts - which, to him,
32meant 'writing and painting about life and actual events.’
Hence if one accepts the materialistic conception of history, 
ones concepts of the real and progressive and the desirable 
goals, would differ from those who hold different concepts of 
historical development. Such a difference in views would 
inevitably lead to conflict, whether in the realm of political 
ideology or theory of art, and this is especially true if those 
demanding changes were uncompromising, as Ch'en had declared 
himself to be. In the exchanges between Ch'en and Hu, one may 
detect that the seeds of conflict had already been sown.
Those who would like to preserve the old ways or ideas 
would naturally be the opponents of the innovators. However, 
within the group of innovators, the acceptance of Marxism by 
some members would inevitably lead to irreconcilable conflicts 
within the group. That such a phenomenon would not be avoided 
was the result of the divergent world views, though the 
opponents themselves might still be on personally friendly terms. 
Ch'en and Hu seemed to remain on friendly terms and retain 
certain intellectual respect for each other through their lives. 
Indeed, Hu pleaded for leniency when Ch'en was being tried as a
32 Ch'en was already of this opinion in December 1913; see Reply 
to Readers column, HCN, I, 4 ( 1 3""XII-1 9 1 3) •
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political prisoner by the Kuomintang regime - his plea was made
33on the ground of Ch'en's contribution to scholarship. All
innovators, Ch'en and Hu or Marxists and non-Marxists, warned 
to be realistic. But if they espoused different world views, 
then their concepts of realism will be different. As a result 
what was real for one need not be so for the others.
Those who eventually became Marxist would consider the 
existence of class struggle not only unavoidable but necessary 
because, to them, only through class struggles would the old be 
destroyed and the new established. From the perspective of the 
materialistic conception of history, human endeavours reflect 
class interests - in the sociopolitical as well as cultural 
aspects. To those who believed that the materialistic 
conception of history as scientific, they would naturally regard 
anyone who claimed to be realistic yet denying such a world view 
as dangerously deviationist and mouthpiece of the reactionary 
forces; and as such had to be opposed most resolutely. From 
the exchanges between Ch'en and Hu, we can see that Ch'en already 
had such resoluteness even before he became a Marxist.
When Ch'en issued his call for a literary revolution in 
February 1917 > he was not yet a Marxist though he had shown much 
admiration towards socialism. This demand for a literary 
revolution was made before Lenin and his comrades were able to 
seize political power. However, as has been demonstrated,
3 3 See Hu's contribution to Ch'en Tung-hsiao (ed.) Ch'en Tu-hsiu 
p'ing-lun (Peiping 1933)*
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Ch'en's concept of a literary revolution meant more than merely
the use of the vernacular and stylistic and linguistic changes.
He saw in it a movement with strong sociopolitical implications.
In pursuance of the declared aim to have a 'people's literature'
and the desire to write and paint life (sheng huo) realistically,
came the need to involve the people - to know more about the
people and to enable more people to know about the new
literature that these revolutionaries espoused or hoped to
create. Hence, social Survey reports found their places in
the pages of the Hsin Ch'ing-nien as well as the mass education
programme being carried out by Ch'en and his colleagues and
students. These literary revolutionaries soon saw the need to
found a more political channel of expression. Thus the Weekly
Review - Mei-chou p'ing-lun - was founded in 1918. By New
Year 1919» these literary revolutionaries were exhorting their
readers to overthrow capitalism and the capitalists in order
34to bring forth the New Era.
To be sure, though the editorial board of the HCN and the 
Mei-chou p'ing-lun shared the key personnel - with Ch'en 
occupying the key role in both - not all shared this vision of 
a new culture. Compared to his colleagues Ch'en and Li Ta-chao, 
Hu Shih was certainly not a revolutionary, whether in the realm 
of politics or culture, even in the sense defined by Hu himself.
34 Mei-chou p'ing-lun No.2 (5”I~1919)• The editorial.
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His exchanges with Ch'en demonstrated his hesitancy even at
the very onset of the new cultural movement. Now in 1919, this
Columbia University-trained doctor of philosophy virtually
announced his departure from the ranks of the literary
revolutionaries within two years of his return to China. in
the so-called 'Problems and Isms' debate in 1919? mainly between
Hu and Li in the Mei-chou p 1ing-lun (Ch'en was imprisoned) Hu
really declared his rejection of the political implications of
the literary revolution. Li, realizing his fellow professor's
desire to be uninvolved, apologized to Hu for making the latter
having to suffer such mental anguish. Li openly declared that
to accuse Hu of being guilty through associating with
revolutionaries of Li's ilk would be libel. Nevertheless, Li
declared that »I still think that the spread of Bolshevism will
bring great changes to world culture. We should study it,
introduce it so that the truth [about Bolshevism] may shine and
35spread over human society.'
Li's absolution of Hu may be regarded as a watershed of
the literary revolution for it marked the separation between
those who accepted the Marxist or materialistic conception of
history and those who denied it. To those who accepted such a
perception of history, the new culture was communism and could
36only be achieved through class struggles. To those who would
3 5 Li, 'Tsai lun wen-ti yii chu-i' (Another discussion on 
Problems and isms), Mei-chou p'ing-lun, No. 33 (17"VIII-1919)•
Li, 'Chieh-chi ching-cheng yü hu-chu' (Class Conflict and 
Mutual Help), Mei-chou p'ing-lun, No.29 (6-VII-1919)•
not accept such an interpretation of human social development,
to be associated with people who would accept such a view
became, as was the case of Hu, a source of personal embarrass
ment. One may be permitted to say that such developments were
inevitable in that the acceptance or rejection of the
materialistic conception of history inevitably leads one to
certain conclusions. In Li’s case, having accepted the
materialistic conception of history, he naturally accepted the
inevitability of class struggles as the means of eliminating
social classes. And, as a consequence, he could not but see
’economic explanations in the changing ideas in modern China’
and that anti-Confucianism was not only a ’narrow’ cultural
movement nor even a social movement, such as the freeing of
oneself from the traditional patriarchal dominations. Anti-
Confucianism became also an economic movement because ’the
labour movement of China is also an anti-Confucian class 
37movement’. This was so because these people believed that 
'culture addresses itself to military matters, to. politics 
(actual political matters of government and even political 
philosophy) and capital [that is, the means of product ionJ 
[though] culture involves sciences, religion, ethics, the arts
o Qliterature and music, etc.'.
37 Li, 'Yu ching-chi shang chieh-shih Chung-kuo chin-tai szu- 
hsiang pien-tung ti yuan-yin' (Economic Explanations for the 
reasons of the changing ideas in modern China) HCN VII 2, 
pp.47-53 (1-1-1920), cited from p.52.
3 8 • 1 /Ch'en, 'Hsin wen-hua yun -tung shih shen-mo?’ (What is the 
New Culture Movement?) HCN VII 5 (1-IV-1920), pp,1-4; cited 
f rom p.1.
37*1
To be sure, it cannot be said that at this time, ^9 ^9-^920,
that Ch'en, Li or their comrades had a fully developed theory
of socialist culture or what Ch’en here called New Culture. It
seemed that by New Culture he meant the social conditions which
were the goals of his agitations and not the cultural movement
which someone like Hu Shih had in mind. Hence, while Ch’en
would say that 'New Culture addresses itself to military matters,
to politics, etc.' he quickly pointed out that what had been
hitherto understood as the cultural movement was quite a
different thing. He explained, 'Politics, industrial enterprises,
and transportation are necessities of life. Culture comes as
these develop. We cannot say that politics, industries, and
transportation are culture.’ The creation of culture, he went
on to explain, was a long term undertaking and that the cultural
movement and the social movement were two different entities
and for anyone to confuse them was to be ignorant of the meaning 
39of culture. In short, it meant that New Culture was the end
product of a combined cultural-social movement.
At about this time a group of young intellectuals returned 
to China after their studies in Japan and formed the Creation 
Society. The leading lights in this group were Kuo Mo-jo, Yii 
Ta-fu, Cheng Fang-wu, and Chang Tzu-p'ing, and published the 
Creation Weekly (Ch'uang-tsao chou-kan). While they opposed 
the Literary Research Society (Wen-hsüeh yen-chiu hui) of Hu 
Shih, the Creation Society at that time was quite distinct, at
^  Ch'en 'Wen-hua yun-tung yü she-hui yun-tung' (Cultural Move­
ment and Social Movement) HCN IX 1 (1-V-1921).
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least theoretically, from the position of Ch'en and Li. They 
claimed to espouse socialism but, as Kuo recalled that at
40that time they were really 'individualists'. Since they had 
contributed little to the development of the concept of 
socialist culture, they are being excluded from this discussion. 
However, to do so is not to deny that members of the Creation 
Society did make considerable contribution to the development 
of the theory of socialist culture. Their contributions were 
made in what may be regarded as the Second Phase in the history 
of the development of this theory or concept - the period 
after the termination of the First National Revolution, after 
1927, when the development of this concept was complicated by 
the appearance of the Left Oppositionist ideas. To delve into 
this very interesting period, however, would be beyond the 
scope of this study.
Ch'en who proposed the literary revolution and led the 
call for a socialized and politicized New Culture, played a 
leading role in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.
The evolution of his political opinion, as well as those of 
his comrades', parallelled the evolution of their cultural 
opinions. Such a parallel development, of course, was to be 
expected. Having accepted the materialistic conception of 
history, as Ch'en explained, one naturally takes the view that 
'the social relations of production form the foundation of
Kuo, 'Recollections of the Literary Revolution', Op.cit., 
p.133.
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social economy and that the laws and politics build on such a 
foundation.' The former professor went on to explain that 
'all systems, culture, and the formations of the ideas of any
41period change with the changing economic structure.' Thus
by dedicating their lives and energy to the realization of a 
communist society, their cultural goals would then be the 
realization of a socialist culture.
As has been demonstrated, there was an apparent dichotomy 
in the activities of the Chinese communists in the period under 
discussion. They were in collaboration with the KMT in a 
national revolution. Numerically, the KMT was certainly the 
major partner, but as has been demonstrated, the Chinese 
communists took great care to point out to their contemporaries 
that the collaboration was but a mere tactical step dictated 
by circumstances. They had never concealed their ultimate aims 
nor had they really tried to conceal their lack of respect, 
indeed contempt, towards their collaborators. Their cultural 
expressions were parallel to their political ones. This, of 
course, was to be expected, given their conception of New 
Culture.
As befitting a revolution calling for a united front 
tactic, Ch'en also called for a 'united front in the revolution 
of ideas.' According to the perception of the Chinese 
communists, the reactionary forces in the national revolution 
included the remnants of feudalism, militarism, and imperialism,
4 1 Ch'en, 'Ma-k'o-ssu hsüeh-shuo' (Marxism), HCN IX 6, p.5 
(1-VII-1922).
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hence the necessity for a united front tactic. Likewise, there 
was a necessity in the revolution of ideas. Therefore, though 
'Hu Shih's pragmatism and our historical materialism are 
naturally different, in the revolutionary struggle to sweep
42away feudalist thoughts there is a need to unite.' This was
so because in Ch'en's view Hu was the only major literary 
figure truly representative of the capitalistic culture while 
all the other so-called New Learning scholars still 'had one 
foot in feudal-patriarchal thoughts'.
As has been noted, the Chinese communists claimed at this 
very time that they were the vanguard of the national 
revolution. Thus one may expect that they would not be content 
just to remain in the same stage of ideological development as 
Hu. Indeed, to be content with that would be to deny the 
materialistic conception of history. Thus we find one of the 
more outstanding students of Ch'en, Teng Chung-hsia, while 
cheering Hu for his efforts in countering the conservative 
thinkers, accusing Hu of really working against the
43revolution. In Teng's view, Hu was guilty of denying the
imminent danger of imperialism to China and for not supporting 
the national revolution of the KMT-CCP. Teng’s view was 
certainly consistent with his world views - the materialistic
Ch'en, 'Szu-hsiang ke-ming shang ti lien-ho chan-hsien' (The 
United Front in the Revolution of Ideas), Ch'ien-feng (Vanguard)
No.1 (I-VII-1923).
 ^Teng Chung-hsia, 'Nu-li Chou^k^n ti kung tsui' (The Guilts 
and Merits of the Endeavour Weekly) Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (CKCN) 
No.3 (3-XI-1923)•
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conception of history. To be bourgeois and capitalistic in a 
feudal milieu would be progressive. But to remain so in a 
semi-feudal and semi-colonial milieu in which the national 
revolution had already commenced with a communist vanguard 
would be going against the current of sociopolitical - or, 
historical - development. He therefore advised that since the 
feudal influences had not been entirely eliminated there was a 
need to form a united front with Hu Shih and his ilk. But,
'society is in the process of evolution. Frankly, the evolution 
of the economic structure of the society will see the capitalist 
system overthrowing feudalism and capitalism will, in turn, be 
overthrown by communism.' He regarded such developments as the 
truly New Cultural Movement and dismissed his opponents as the
44'new reactionaries'.
For Teng to have espoused such views on the very eve of 
the formal opening of the First Congress of the restructured 
KMT was more than mere student radicalism. Culture, as Ch'en 
had told his readers was the superstructure and reflects the 
base - the economic system - of a society. In their revolution­
ary programme, the Chinese communists were attempting to effect 
changes to both the cultural and the socio-economic-political 
aspects of society concurrently. For, unlike Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, the Chinese revolutionaries had hoisted the banner 
of cultural revolution before they had accepted the materialistic 
conception of history. Hence, after the acceptance of this new
44 /Teng, 'Chung-kuo hsien-tsai ti szu-hsiang chieh' (The 
Contemporary Chinese Intellectuals) CKCN No.6 (24-XI-1923)•
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world view, they naturally brought their cultural revolution 
forward as an integral part of their total revolutionary 
programme.
Teng was firmly in agreement with his party leader, Ch'en
Tu-hsiu, and a leading theoretician of the party, Ch'ü Ch'iu-
pai. Both leaders published similar views on the eve of the
KMT Congress, as if to make sure that there would be no ground
for doubt. In the Twentieth Anniversary issue of the widely
read literary journal, The Eastern Miscellany, Ch'ii proclaimed
45that 'civilization is but the power of mankind over nature.'
However, he explained that while skill might denote the 
materialistic aspect of civilization, 'the skills that carry a 
mystical nature are the skills of the feudal period, and skills 
of a scientific nature are the civilizations of the capitalistic 
class but the skills that are even more advanced, those with an 
artistic nature, are the civilizations of the proletarian
46class. ' As Ch'ii explained it, this new civilization could be 
achieved through socialism by the 'full development of science.' 
This, to Ch'ii meant 'class struggle in the realm of ideas' in 
the same way as class struggle in the realm of sociopolitics.
The achievement of the 'artistic civilization of socialism 
along this path (class struggle) together with the other
4 5 Ch'ii Ch'iu-pai, 'Hsien-tai wen-ming ti wen-ti yii she-hui 
chu-i' (The Problems of Contemporary Civilization and Socialism) 
Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany) XXI, 1, pp.1-11 
(10-1-1924, but article was written on 8-XI-1923), cited from
p. 1 .
46 Ibid., p.3.
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endeavours of mankind as well as historical and social
47determinism, are objective facts and not subjective fatalism.'
Ch'ii then directed his readers to his elucidation of 
such objective facts as the natural processes of historical 
development in another article he had written in his own
48journal, the HCN. In the issue that published this explanation
49was an article by party leader, Ch'en. In his article, C h ’en
also took the view that the materialistic conception was the 
natural and scientific view. Indeed, editor Ch'ii and party
50leader Ch'en repeated their arguments in the very next issue.
Since the Chinese communists had long proclaimed that 
China was a proletarian nation and that the goal of their 
revolutionary activities was a proletarian society achieved 
through a process of class struggle, though temporarily styled 
a national revolution, they naturally regarded their cultural 
aim as the bringing forth of a proletarian culture - a culture 
of the people. However, while together with Lenin, the Chinese 
communists would say that 'bread is the basis of culture' the 
Chinese went on to say that 'the proletarian revolution does 
not only seek to solve the bread problem but also to seek a new
47' Ibid., p.11.
48 Ch'ii, 'Tzu-yu shih-chieh yii pi-jan shih-chieh' (The Free 
World and the Natural World) HCN-Q No.2, pp.37-47 (20-XII-1923) 
written on the 24-XI-1923»
49 Ch'en, 'K'o-hsiieh yu jen-sheng-kuan hsii' (Preface to Science 
and Attitudes of Life) HCN-Q No.2, pp.31”36; written on the
13-XI-1923.
50 «• .Ch'en, 'Ta Chang Chun-mai chi Liang Jen-kung' (Replies to 
Chang ChUn-mai and Liang Jen-kung/Ch'i-cHao) HCN-Q No.3 pp.1-10; 
Ch'ii ' Shih-yen chu-i yii Ke-ming che-hsiieh' (Experimental! sm and 
Revolutionary Philosophy) HCN-Q No.3, pp.10-22 (1-VIII-1924).
path for human culture.'
In short, as the Chinese communists officially entered
into their collaboration with the KMT in the national revolution
the banner of literary revolution which Ch'en hoisted in 1917
had been replaced by the banner of cultural revolution. To
be sure, when Ch'en suggested his literary revolution, he had
in mind more than merely literary activities in the narrower
or normal sense of the term. Now, having accepted the
materialistic conception of history, the Chinese communists
took the view that 'spiritual life (ching-shen sheng-huo) is
determined by material life; in other words, the development
of culture depends on the materialistic - economic —
52foundation.' At the same time, the Chinese communists
certainly accepted the idea that culture is the product of all
mankind and not just the domain of any particular class.
However, since the social and political development of history
since the period of primitive communism meant the development
of classes and exploitations, the cultural goal of the
communists in the total revolutionary programme was to return
culture to all people by the elimination of classes - the
53creation of a classless society through class struggle.' 
Meanwhile, as they were actively engaged in a revolutionary
J Chiang H.sia-seng 'Wu-chkn chieh-chi ke-ming yii wen-hua ’ (The 
Proletarian Revolution and Culture) HCN-Q No.35 pp.16-22 
( 1-VIII-1924); cited from pp.l8~9c
51
 ^ Ibid., p.19- 
53 Ibid., p.20.
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struggle in a class divided society which was also being
exploited by imperialism - that is, during the national
revolution - 'the new literature that deserves respect is that
which would arouse the spirit (ching-shen) of the people to
participate in the movements for national independence and
54democratic revolution.
Social injustice compelled C h 1en and his colleagues 
to work to build a nation and society that they could love.
Their 'lovable state' meant more than just a strong nation with 
an army that would bring military glory but a state which would 
offer protection to the rights of its citizens. They regarded 
it as part of their task to create an awakening to the need 
for a new and just social ethos. This, to them, included the 
rejection of certain aspects of the traditional culture and 
replacing it with a new one. When in their process of searching 
for a new culture - a new sociopolitical culture - they came to 
accept the materialistic conception of history as their new 
world view. This acceptance contrained them into action - 
political and cultural.
Of special interest to this discussion, however, is the
fact that when Ch'ü and Ch'en were publishing their ideas on a
socialist culture and civilization, Ch'ü was also publishing
his significant comments on Lenin which have been discussed
55earlier. As the Chinese communists were launching their
^  Yun Tai-ying, 'Pa ku?' (Eight-legged?) CKCN No.8, pp.3“6
(2-VTII-1924); cited from p.4.
JJ Ch'ü, 'From Democracy to Socialism', HCN-Q No.2, pp.79~102
(2O-XII-1923).
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national revolution, Ch'ü, one of their leading theoreticians, 
was discussing Lenin's writings of 1902 and 1905 (What is to 
be done? and Two Tactics) - his writings in exile. While Lenin 
would urge the use of the 'Jacobin method' to settle scores 
with Czarism, Ch'ü, a longtime student of Russian literature, 
would quote Lenin but suggested that the Chinese communists 
should use the Jacobin Method to wage their revolution. While 
the Comintern would advise that the impact of imperialism 
together with the weakness of the Chinese proletariat 
necessitated the strategy of a national revolution, the Chinese 
communist did not oppose the advice but added that the more 
backward the country the stronger the proletariat in such a 
revolution and the greater the chance of such a revolution 
giving success to the proletariat.
This study does not attempt to answer the value-loaded 
judgment that Marxism 'in its movement eastward ... had under-
56gone a slow but steady process of decomposition' nor is this 
an attempt to evaluate the degree of orthodoxy in Chinese 
Marxism or Communism. The Chinese communists, however, regarded 
themselves as Marxists and Leninists. It seems that there 
was some justification for them believing that they were 
Marxists and were conducting their revolutionary activities 
approved by Marx and Lenin. The Chinese communists thoroughly 
endorsed the injunction by Marx and Engles, published in 1848
56 Schwartz, Op.cit., p.4.
that:57
the communists everywhere support every 
revolutionary movement against the existing 
social and political order of things. In 
all these movements they bring to the front, 
as the leading question, the property 
question, no matter what its degree of 
development at that time.
Forty years later, in 1888, Engels commented that 'however
much the state of things may have altered ... the general
principles laid down in this Manifesto are, on the whole, as
correct today as ever. Here and there, some details might be
improved. The practical application of the principles will
depend, as the Manifesto itself stated, everywhere and at all
times, on the historical conditions for the time being
58existing.' In 1922, the Chinese communists used this section
of the Manifesto to justify the timeliness of their
59revolution.
The Chinese communists were also undoubtedly Leninists. 
They accepted Lenin's view of imperialism - as well as his 
many other ideas written in exile. While Lenin might not have 
a systematized ideological baggage with him in the sealed train
57 Marx & Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, Section 
4 , p .76 (Peking, 1968).
58 Engels, Preface to the English edition of 1888 of The 
Manifesto.
^  See the Hsiang Tao (The Guide Weekly) No.15 (27-XII-1922),
p . 1 2 2 .
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across Europe and while the rapidity of the Bolshevik success 
caused his head to spin, the Chinese communists were trying to 
conduct their revolutionary activities in their homeland along 
the ideological guidelines uttered by Lenin - during the 
exiled years. At the same time, the Chinese revolutionaries 
were also including a cultural component in their revolutionary 
programme - a component which the Russian communists began to 
concern themselves with, seriously, only after the accession 
of political power.
To the Chinese communists, the development and nature of
Chinese communists in the period under discussion, to 1925,
were Marxist and Leninist. To others, this development as well
as the nature might be unorthodox and even in the process of
decomposition. To the historian confronted with such judgments,
he can but delineate what the Chinese were trying to say to
their contemporaries and to bear in mind the advice that 'to
6 0what a man thinketh in his heart, so is h e . '
60 Proverbs 23:7* Authorized Version.
386
SELECTED BI RLIOGRAPHY
CHINESE WORKS
To list the numerous articles written by the Chinese 
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